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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

OCTOBER, 1897.

NANSEN.*

I SHALL attempt to speak of a topic which lies perhaps a little outside of our ordinary limits. We are supposed to be primarily interested in ethical problems, and especially as they are affected by the speculative movements which modify accepted creeds, or by the great social changes which bring into prominence new applications of old principles. When, however, I was requested to give this lecture, I was solacing myself with reading a book which has no direct or tangible bearing upon such high matters. Happily, one cannot talk about anything without stirring some ethical problem, and, as the duchess said, there is a moral in everything if you know where to look for it. There is no social problem in the Arctic region, and an account of a journey in that quarter involves no special metaphysical presuppositions. I confess, however, to have been fascinated by Nansen's story of adventures to a degree which very few treatises upon "Appearance and Reality," or discussions of the true law of wages and population, have ever rivalled. What is more, I am not ashamed of myself. I have been under an irresistible compulsion. I have been living—so far as my imagination would enable me to live—in the farthest North: I have looked from the mast-head of the Fram over the vast ice-fields, and listened to the grinding

* Lecturer to the London Ethical Society, May 16, 1897.

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floes piled up by the oceanic currents against the ship's timbers; to sounds such as those which the Ancient Mariner heard when

> "The ice was here, the ice was there,
> The ice was all around:
> It cracked and growled, and roared and howled,
> Like noises in a swound."

I have made the acquaintance of white bears and walruses and watched the strange play of the shifting Northern Lights above the boundless Arctic solitude. And especially I have become a friend—upon paper only, I am sorry to say—of the gallant thirteen who took danger and toil so cheerily and simply; and I have been convinced of one consolatory fact. Norway is not, I believe, specially interesting to the economic mind; its manufacturing output is certainly limited. From a literary point of view, again, it has lately been known to us as the environment of singular psychological monstrosities, who represent, it appears, latter-day morality and show what extraordinary freaks are played by "heredity" and degeneration, —the modern substitutes for the devil. Well, after reading Nansen, one perceives that Norway can still turn out one product, and that the noblest of all products,—I mean, brave men. They are men, too, who illustrate the doctrine of heredity in a pleasanter way than Ibsen's dramas. There is no degeneracy about them. Nansen and his followers have shown sufficiently to all who have followed his story that the simple-minded old heroes of the Sagas have left worthy descendants,—men whose nerves are braced, instead of being shaken, by danger; and who, if they have lost some of the brutality and reckless disregard of human life of the old Vikings, are not one whit behind them in the manly qualities which attract us even to the ancient warriors whose morality was not in all respects that of the Sermon on the Mount. Nansen's book, it was remarked to me by one who has a good right to speak, is superior as a book for boys,—and I hope I have not quite ceased to be a boy,—even to Robinson Crusoe; it proves that Nature can always improve upon art when she

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chooses, and that the most ingenious combinations of the novelist fall short of the reality. I do not press the comparison or judge the order of merit. But there is a relation. The charm of Defoe's masterpiece is the portrait of the sturdy commonplace Briton, deprived of all resources and left to fight his way for himself against the dumb opposition of nature. He is the type of the self-reliant and indomitable capacity for falling upon one's feet, which, in the days of his biographer, was laying the foundations of the British empire. Robinson Crusoe is the English adventurer who stood behind Clive and Warren Hastings and Wolfe and Hawke and Anson, and turned their victories to account by planting himself solidly in the world, sometimes upon other people's toes. Nansen may be taken as another incarnation of the same qualities; and we regard him with a similar feeling as he calmly settles himself with a single companion, not on a tropical island, but to live upon blubber and frozen bear in the dominions of the old Feast Giant, as imperturbably and confident as if he was taking up his quarters at the best hotel in Paris or London.

It may be I make the remark from a certain vanity which I cannot quite repress, but in one respect Nansen appeals to me a little more than to his average reader. In old days, I was a worshipper—partly because I could never be an embodiment—of athletic excellence. There is something complete, satisfactory, undeniable about a knock-down blow at boxing which you can seldom find to the same degree in more exalted pursuits. Among all forms of athletic sports, there was none which I loved better than sheer unscientific Alpine scrambling. I remember with perverted pride how I once incurred the severe censure of the leading historian of the day because I had seduced a favorite pupil of his to join in an attack upon a hitherto unclimbed peak instead of devoting his vacation to an investigation of the mediæval history and present constitution of the Swiss Federation. It flatters me, too, to recollect how on another occasion I offended an eminent man of science—he was magnanimous enough to forgive me most cordially afterwards—by confessing my utter rejection of the theory that Alpine adventure required some scien-

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tific pretext for its justification. Science I said—I am quoting myself partly from memory—was simply a nuisance in the Alps, and no one but a hypocrite would condescend to mask a love of climbing pure and simple under any profession of scientific zeal. Well, I do not defend myself. I do not think my opinions require defence. They are too obviously sound. I refer to them partly from a candid desire to explain part of my admiration for Nansen. He exemplifies my old doctrine and brings me back to my old state of mind. My adventures, indeed, were to his as a boy's practice with a pop-gun to practice with the monster guns of a modern iron-clad. So far from supporting myself, even for a day, upon raw sea-gulls, I always kept within measurable distance of a good table d'hôte, and subscribed to the sentiment which used to appear in an advertisement that the best scenery in the world is improved by a good hotel in the foreground. Still, one may compare small things with great. Experience in the Hampshire militia, as we know on the highest authority, might be useful to the historian of the Roman Empire, and similarly a love of the glaciers which one can cross in a day's march is some help towards appreciating the achievements which involved three years' isolation in the Arctic regions. This predisposition may show why I appreciate one side—some people think it the lower side—of Nansen's achievements. I was inclined to look upon him from what may be called the sporting point of view,—to admire the sheer exuberance of spirits, and consequent delight in measuring oneself against difficulties, in taxing one's physical powers to the utmost, even at an imminent risk to life, of testing not only courage but coolness, resource, and endurance, which he exhibited in the highest degree, and which are in some degree manifested even in much lower forms of sport and afford some justification of our appreciation. There is a satisfaction in witnessing such a superabundance of vitality that its possessor, not content with commonplace opportunities, must needs go and try whether his head or an iceberg is the hardest. I treat the so-called scientific aim as a respectable pretext, a producible excuse for giving full play to the demands of excessive energy. Undoubtedly,

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as I have confessed, that was my own view in the matter of Alpine scrambling; but I will not presume, or rather I do not dare to say a word against the claims of science. It is quite as dangerous now to depreciate in the slightest degree anything that can be called a scientific aim as to sneer at any action that can cover itself under a religious mask. The Royal Society and the Salvation Army are objects at which one may not even smile. If a man can discover a new variety of flea, or find out, as Nansen appears to have found out, that there are a great many diatoms (whatever they may be) in the Arctic Ocean, we count him to be repaid for any cost of labor. I have no complaints to make of wasted energy,—though to me personally it is a matter of perfect indifference whether there be or be not diatoms in the water at latitude eighty degrees,—and I am willing to grant to any scientific enthusiast, for the sake of argument at least, that such a result is worth the labors of a lifetime. I regard the pretext as relatively insignificant, but I admit it to be in some sense essential. Writers upon ethics have sometimes discussed what they hold to be a paradox. The end of fox-hunting, they say, is presumably to catch the fox. Now, no one would risk his neck to catch a perfectly useless animal, and his real motive must of course be the exhilaration of the gallop. Yet it is equally true that the pleasure somehow vanishes if you suppose the fox to be absent. The riding across country would lose all its charm, if there were not a real animal and a *bona fide* attempt to catch him. The scientific results attainable in Nansen's case,—the mapping of an utterly useless region,—the incidental discovery of new forms which may help to illustrate some points of natural history, have the same kind of value as the catching of the fox. In that sense, I admit a certain importance in providing oneself with a pretext, which takes the pursuit out of the category of mere amusement. Without it even so grand a sport as a journey to the North Pole would tend to lose its charm. Some people might condemn adventure for the sake of adventure as a frivolous waste of good energy; and we can at least silence him effectually by appealing to the magical phrase, scientific exploration. But, besides

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this, the pretext has the good effect of obviating any suggestion of mere love of display. Sport—which ought to spring simply from unmixed delight in giving vent to accumulated energy—rapidly degenerates whenever it is tainted by the least suspicion of gambling or mercenary motives and in a less degree, whenever the apparent purpose is ostentation or mere desire to surpass other performers. The excuse of science has just this good effect in Nansen's book. It excused him at any rate to himself for yielding to his love of adventure. It excludes the supposition which would spoil everything that he was merely going, like some travellers whom one could mention, in the hope of becoming a lion in social circles, or to show that he was a better man than some of his predecessors. That gives the stamp of simplicity which contributes the special charm to his narrative. We feel that he has not the smallest wish to lower the character of earlier travellers who did not get so far; he speaks of them heartily as valued comrades who have a common passion, and whose experience has been necessary to his own success. That is a virtue in which neither travellers nor students of science at home are always conspicuous. We feel, again, that the scientific aim is at least so far serious that he considers it to be a full justification; and therefore, the lower the rate at which we put it, the stronger it becomes as a proof of modesty. It argues an humble estimate of the qualities which he has dedicated to the achievement. He counts himself at so cheap a rate, that is, as to hold that we should make a good bargain by spending a dozen Nansens as the price of filling a small square in the maps of a useless region. I was interested again in the simple musings by which he solaces himself when drifting with exasperating slowness before the winds and the too languid currents. It will be all the same, he reflects, in a century or perhaps a few millenniums hence. The whole planet will be then declining towards the state of our unfortunate satellite, spinning through the infinite spaces without air or water or any one to breathe or drink; and it will then matter to nobody—or rather there will be no one to whom it could matter—whether in the remote past somebody

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did or did not get a few miles nearer to the North Pole. I do not know whether reflections of this type are really very consolatory; they are perhaps as good for that purpose as many of the famous reflections with which Stoics and other ancient and modern philosophers have tried to comfort themselves; but, if logically doubtful, they are characteristic of the mood of any brave man who is occupied in a dangerous enterprise. They are one way of expressing the sentiment that we must not bother too much about success, so long as we are discharging the function that has been imposed upon us. It must be added, too, that Nansen's hopes are not for merely personal success. His function is always endeared to him by the thought that it has been intrusted to him by his countrymen, and that he is doing something for the honor of his beloved Norway. A ship, according to Johnson, is a prison, with a chance of being drowned. Nansen and his comrades go to prison for three years in the spirit of patriots who encounter persecution for the sake of their country.

The ostensible end, then, of such adventure, if we cannot call it useless,—for I am not permitted to intimate such a heretical opinion,—is not commended, to outsiders like me, by its utility. We are charmed by the qualities displayed, not by the value of the result. In other words, we take a purely æsthetic view of the case; and here occurs one moral problem, namely, whether such a view can ever be justifiable. I was reading the other day a fierce controversy as to the legitimacy of this mode of considering moral questions. You must, Sir James Mackintosh had said, admire virtue for its own sake, for the beauty of character displayed, not for the results obtained. Directly you begin to admire it merely for the sake of its advantages, you desert the truly moral point of view. This is to take the stand-point of the artist. A pleasure is what we call æsthetic just in so far as it is, so to speak, self-contained. The object ceases to be purely beautiful when you think of it as a means to something else. The appreciation means the immediate delight which goes with the direct intuition. You admire a beautiful figure—an athlete who presents a perfect combination of grace and

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vigor—with a certain instinctive perception; and directly you begin to admire him because he can do you a service, knock down an enemy, or pull you out of a pit, your admiration becomes merely utilitarian, and has no more of the characteristic quality of moral approval than your value under similar circumstances of a rope or a revolver. Mackintosh proceeded to illustrate this doctrine by the character which some one has given of Fletcher of Saltoun. Fletcher, it had been said, was a man who would give his life to do the least service to his country, but would not commit a base action to save it. He was therefore a model of heroic qualities. This statement excited the wrath of James Mill, sturdiest and most rigorous of utilitarians. The remark about Fletcher, he said, sounds like a pretty compliment; but when you look at it, you see that it is a mere bit of delusive phrase-making. Fletcher, you say, would not do a base thing to save his country; but what do you mean by "base"? Suppose, for example, that he had been intrusted with a Scottish fortress which was besieged by the English. If it had been necessary to kill, to lie in wait, to encourage the basest treachery in his enemies, would he not have done it? Would he not, if it had become necessary, have turned out women and children by the hundred and left them to starve between the lines, if he could thereby have held out a little longer and given another chance to his side, even though, it maybe, his side was clearly in the wrong? You say that he would have done nothing base to save his country; but then you tacitly assume that nothing which would have contributed to save his country—that is, to give his country the advantage, whether his country were in the right or the wrong,—could possibly have been base. You profess to admire a man for disregarding the consequences of his actions; and yet you proceed to admit that an action may become wicked or virtuous in the highest degree as the consequences change. Is this not a mere juggle?

Mackintosh, that is, had been giving himself the airs of a lofty moralist because he denounced the maxim, which may certainly be applied in a bad sense, that the end justifies the

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means. Mill, on the other hand, carries through to its logical results the doctrine that morality is in every case determined by its utility, or in other words by its calculable consequences. To admire the quality, the sense of honor, even the benevolence or the public spirit of a hero, independently of its results, is either to admire mischievous conduct or to evade the result by a mere trick of logical fence. You pretend to obey your conscience for its own sake, but you tacitly arrange that it may give the most different answers under different circumstances; or you really admire even a misguided conscience and then you become a mere sentimentalist, admiring what does harm as well as what does good and utterly unable to assign a reasonable criterion of morality. You start from professions of the immutability of morality. If it be immutable, in the sense that it does not change whether it does harm or good, it ceases to be moral; and if it does change, you must give up all claims to making good your brag of immutability. This leads to a very pretty quarrel; and it might be interesting on another occasion to inquire precisely what is meant by the maxim that the means are not justified by the end. From the absolute utilitarian point of view that maxim becomes, as Mill said, something very like nonsense; or it must be interpreted only to mean that you must consider the consequences implied in the means as well as the consequences implied in gaining the end. I do not wish at present to stray into a discussion as to the primary ethical assumptions. I will only point out that this case of Fletcher of Saltoun may be put in a way which would evade Mill's objection. For, in the first place, when we admire such a man, a man of honor, to whom the thought of treachery or any want of chivalry is intolerable, we may mean that he is displaying qualities which are admirable because essential to the welfare of society, without asking whether they are in this particular case rightly applied. We have to make such a distinction in most concrete cases, if we would form a sound judgment. In most wars, for example, we desire victory to fall to one side, though, generally speaking, there is a great deal of wrong on both sides; but that need not hinder us from admiring the fine

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qualities displayed on both sides. We may surely admire the patriotic zeal of the French patriots who turned out to resist foreign invasion in 1793, and admire at the same time the simple-minded British sailors whose whole theory of duty was summed up in fighting for King George. I should be very sorry not to admire both, whatever my views might be as to the merits of the particular questions at issue. Even at the present moment, one who sympathizes with the Greeks and detests the Turkish government may feel respect for the military virtues of the Turkish private. A man may show noble qualities, though he takes entirely erroneous views of political issues; and it is most desirable that they should be recognized by his antagonists. That is to say, a sound moral estimate will not be guided simply by our calculation of the particular consequences or of the intentions of the actors; but also by the qualities which remain even when they are applied to very bad purposes. In another sense, again, we may agree with the eulogy upon Fletcher which appeared so ridiculous to Mill. We may admit, for example, that actions depend in a sense upon their consequences for their moral coloring. If it became necessary to save one's country, to save it, say, from the invasion of a despotic invader, from slavery, devastation, and misery, a man could certainly be justified in sacrificing his own life and the life of his followers, and even those of many innocent people. Not to admit that would certainly be to cease to admire some of the noblest and most virtuous of heroes. But, even in such a case, we admire the man who is guided and governed by a chivalrous principle; who shrinks from the use of some motives because they appear to be base, even though they might contribute to a good immediate end. Civilized laws have begun to admit, for example, that there are methods of warfare which are not justified by the injury inflicted upon the enemy. They are base in the sense that they are barbarous, and such, therefore, as would be condemned by the higher humanity which recognizes a fellow-creature even in an enemy.

So far, there might be an ultimate agreement; if we interpret "consequences" and "utility" in a wider sense than

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Mill contemplated. The chivalrous instinct, which shrinks from inflicting injury at any cost, is perhaps a blind prejudice which can give no sufficient account of itself; but it may be also justifiable in the light of reason, as a tacit recognition of the value of human life in general, and of the necessity of keeping up a standard of high feeling. In other words, if we admit the principle of utility, we must interpret it, not to mean the particular set of consequences which can be foreseen at a given moment, but the importance of maintaining self-respect and, with it, preserving the qualities which are in the widest sense useful to the race at large. It is desirable, perhaps, that some kinds of conduct should be absolutely condemned for this reason even when they might be temporarily useful, because abstinence from them tends essentially to strengthen qualities which are both moral and permanently useful.

Mackintosh, at any rate,—though I need not dwell with length upon his special point,—admitted this. The qualities which you admire, he said, are useful, though you admire them without explicit reference to utility. A horse is a beautiful animal by reason of the form which also enables him to win a race. You perceive and feel the beauty without caring whether he will win the Derby or whether his racing will bring you money or loss, or be absolutely indifferent. So in the moral question; you may admire devoted patriotism or a keen sense of honor, whether in the given occasion it may array the possessor on your side or against you; but so far from including the consideration that these qualities are in the highest sense useful, it admits the utility and recognizes the principle, without bringing it into the foreground of your thought. To admire a pernicious quality would certainly be to show a moral obliquity. But the question follows whether I can admire conduct which is essentially useless or rather which is its own end; which is pleasant not for any ulterior motives, but simply as delightful in itself. And this brings me back to Nansen, from whom I have been apparently diverging. His narrative is fascinating, I have said, precisely as a novel or a poem is fascinating. We regard it æsthetically, almost without asking whether it be a fiction or a truth.

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We, I speak for myself, care very little more whether there be a real place called Franz Josef's Land than whether there exists anywhere in the world a real island to which Friday was brought to be eaten by cannibals. The charm, again, is in the display of certain characteristics; in the courage displayed by the dash into the unknown world; the admirable good humor with which a small party of men, shut up together for months, keep up their spirits, do not feel, or, at any rate, suppress—for that they should not feel seems superhuman—any sense that their companions are occasionally bores, preserve discipline along with perfect ease and good fellowship, and accept everything in the spirit of the admirable maxim that it is all in the day's work. That these are excellent qualities is undeniable; and we should naturally express our conviction by repeating the old eulogium that such men would be able to go anywhere and do anything. If the enterprise had been undertaken for a purely philanthropic object,—to convert savages or lead a colony to a land of freedom,—we should of course have felt that our sympathy was, so to speak, perfectly normal and legitimate. But the peculiarity of my feeling at any rate is that I sympathize the more, just because they had no object which commends itself to me as adequate because there were no Esquimaux to convert and no colony to be planted. Is it not wrong to admire men whose fine qualities run more or less to waste; or, if that cannot be said, that might have been applied to some purpose of more importance to the welfare of mankind? To admire simplicity, daring, vigor, and good comradeship is of course right; but ought we not, it may be asked, to regret all the more their devotion of these virtues to inadequate ends? Is there not work enough to be done and no superfluity of workers? Society, even society in Norway, suffers from evils of which we hear enough and to the remedy of which every able and vigorous man can lend a hand. Can we excuse anybody for neglecting such tasks? for painting pictures or writing novels or running off to the North Pole instead of promoting some method of reform? Dr. Johnson, somewhere or other, mentions a young gentleman who scandalized

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his relatives by neglecting his duties and spent his time in running about the town shooting cats. That was obviously wrong; but is it so much better to be running about in the Arctic regions shooting polar bears? If we take the strictly utilitarian view and measure the value of every action by the value of the end to be produced, are we not bound to condemn all such divergencies? Do they not imply a miscalculation of the true purposes of human energy? Must we not consider them to be liable to the same objection as luxury in general?—that is, that they involve a misappropriation of some part of the total stock of human energy to purposes which, after all, seem to end in mere enjoyment and to have no appreciable tendency to make mankind wiser or better? To give a satisfactory answer, I must go back a little.

I began by speaking of my youthful reverence for athletic heroes; and I might have accounted for it partly by referring to certain characteristics of the moral guides of my youth. Those were the days in which a great deal of good-humored ridicule was being expended upon a new sect which had lately arisen and been nicknamed "muscular Christians." Their prophets, it was said, declared it to be the whole duty of man to fear God and to walk one thousand miles in one thousand hours. The doctrine was expounded with a delightful simplicity in "Tom Brown's School Days;" which to school-boys, at any rate, seemed to intimate that the merits of Dr. Arnold as a moral reformer were to be measured by the zeal displayed by his scholars in the pursuit of foot-ball and cricket much more than by their scholarship. Even before the appearance of that delightful work, the popular novel of that period generally contained a hero of gigantic strength,—as strong as Porthos in Dumas's "Three Musketeers,"—and also, as it would seem, entitled to claim or sometimes to dispense with the possession of the Christian virtues. Charles Kingsley's "Amyas Leigh" is perhaps the hero of the race who has still most vitality in him at the present day. In Kingsley's case, the exaltation of these athletic heroes was a part of his protest against the starved and ascetic type which he associated with the preaching of Newman and the sacerdotal-

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ists. In "Hypatia" the same part is played by the Goths, who, Pagans as they are, are obviously much more to his taste than the thoroughly orthodox Christians who fast and pray most energetically with very bad results to everybody concerned. At first sight, at any rate, and it is needless to go into the question further, it is certainly rather difficult to understand how Kingsley's enthusiasm for the full-blooded, life-engaging, fighting, and adventurous type, which he employed so wisely in the old Teutonic invaders of the empire and the Scandinavian Vikings and the Elizabethan seamen, half pirate and half Protestant and patriot, is to be blended with the ordinary Christian ideal in which such virtues come to be perilously near to splendid vices. Anyhow, the doctrine became popular for a period, and, as the enemy declares, has led in some directions to objectionable results. English education, we are told, has suffered from the exaltation of athleticism, and young men are tempted to injure their health and neglect their studies to the detriment of more serious intellectual cultivation. I must be content to say that I cannot quite desert my old doctrines. I think that Kingsley and his followers attracted us because their teaching corresponded to a real want, which is certainly not less pressing now than then. Apart from all exaggeration, it is of course obvious that the need of bodily exercise becomes more felt as we are more congregated in vast towns and deprived of our old playgrounds. The love of sport, as I think Mr. Herbert Spencer has somewhere remarked, is the expression of the old faculties that were organized in the race when it still had to roam in forests and depend upon the chase for its existence. They had still room for display at a recent period. In Scott's inimitable Dandie Dinmont we have an ideal portrait of a type which is daily becoming more impossible,—of the perfectly simple-minded, vigorous yeoman leading a masculine open air life, and possessing, under a rough outside, the domestic virtues which mean that strong affections flourish most richly in masculine natures. A Dandie Dinmont now, born in a back lane with a gin palace round the corner, and in the society of all the waifs and strays of a huge population instead of among a

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lot of comrades as independent as himself, has every temptation to be misled by his animal instincts and to become a mere rough or bully, a part of the proletariat, instead of a stalwart, self-respecting member of a little circle of healthy simple-minded farmers. The change of environment has come upon us with such amazing rapidity that adaptation has lagged behind it. Possibly, some of us may look forward to a Utopia, in which we shall have dropped all the rustic excess of appetite and muscular energy and become creatures with big brains and attenuated muscles, capable of finding sufficient employment in town life and forgetting that there are such things as open fields and skies untainted by smoke. Meanwhile, however, the flesh struggles against such a consummation, and, I must confess, it has my sympathies. I have lived much in libraries; but I do not want to lose all the impulses which led me to pant for a breath of air from Alpine glaciers or off the Atlantic waves. My fellow-creatures, I am glad to perceive, appear to be of the same mind. The modern love of wild scenery for its own sake,—so far, that is, as it is modern,—the desire to preserve open spaces and commons in this over populated little island; and the growing appreciation of athletic amusements to take the place of the old field sports are at bottom different forms of the protest which is being made under modern restraints which are always tightening their grasp. We feel that we are being overcrowded, physically and morally; that we cannot get out of each other's sight; and are treading more and more persistently upon each other's toes; we are in danger of becoming items in a mob instead of members of an organized society; and we have something of the feeling of those unfortunate victims who were crammed into the Black Hole of Calcutta. The air is becoming stifling, corrupted by the products of our own breathing; and we long more and more for something fresh and for room to give play to muscles warped by mutual pressure. That I suspect was what made some of us take to Alpine climbing; where we could at least play at being upon untrodden ground or elbowed at every step by our fellow-creatures. And that is what gives a special charm to that scenery of Nansen's adven-

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tures; in regions where there is nothing to right or left but the expanses of absolutely unvisited deserts, and where you may wander as far as northern skies will permit without the slightest danger of being run over by a hansom cab.

I have dwelt upon this by way of connecting the question before us with some of a wider application. It is evident, in brief, that the purely utilitarian canon requires modification and expansion. In thinking of Nansen, we have been led to the borders of a wide problem. Social changes have been so vast and rapid in the last two or three generations, that, whatever exultation we may express for some of the results achieved, we certainly feel that we are far from being properly adapted to the new constitution of things. One of the questions, we see, that is forced upon us is the simple problem, what is to become of our muscles? Are they to be mere ligaments intended to move pens over paper or to turn the handles which set machinery in motion? One answer is perhaps suggested by the existence of bicycles. I never see a bicycle, unless it is coming round a very sharp corner, without a sense of gratitude to the inventor. I am glad, that is, that city clerks have a new inducement to use their legs as well as their fingers, and have fresh opportunities of getting outside of city streets. Our grandfathers sometimes indulged in lamentations for which we generally express small sympathy. There was the ingenious, chivalrous, high-souled Mr. Windham, for example, as Macaulay calls him, the "finest gentleman of the age, his form developed by every manly exercise," and his face beaming with "intelligence and spirit." He is introduced to us by Macaulay as one of the men who endeavored to call Warren Hastings to account for misusing the power of England over the unfortunate Hindoo. He is now more frequently remembered as having made a speech in the House of Commons in defence of bull-baiting. He would leave a debate to be present at an encounter of the old heroes of the prize-ring. He won by such tastes the special admiration of Cobbett, who quarrelled first or last with every other statesman, but could never quite give up a man who thoroughly appreciated cudgel-flaying, wrestling, and cock-fight-

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ing. The love of these rough and sometimes brutal amusements has become offensive to most of us, in spite of some little tendency to an occasional revival. We may, however, agree that, little as we regret the brutality, we could wish that, instead of being simply suppressed, such recreations had been supplanted by others equally manly and free from the degrading elements. We agree, that is, that a completely civilized being should include the full development of body as well as mind; and that both body and mind require for their healthy development something more than application to purely utilitarian purposes. The ideal civilization supposes that a large part of the energy of the human being should be spent in healthy enjoyment, in activities which are delightful for their own sake without reference to any other end. That, of course, is obvious in a social point of view. Nothing is more pitiful in a great town than the sight of children who do not even know how to play or whose playground is limited to the gutter. It is equally sad, however, though it may not be so pathetic, to see grown-up people who do not know how to amuse themselves; who cannot appreciate books or pictures or music or natural amusements, and who are therefore doomed to spend whatever time is left by the struggle for existence upon the distraction which comes from coarse stimulants, from the excitement of gambling, or the oblivion of care that is produced by strong drink. But that is to say, in other words, that play, both for old and young, is an essential element in human life; and that the moral worth of a people must be tested by its amusements as much as by its directly useful pursuits. Play, understood in this sense, includes, of course, a wide sphere. Art in general, according to some psychologists, is essentially a form of play. Poetry or music or painting, the fine arts in general, suppose a form of activity in which a man devotes himself not to any further result, but to the expression of his own emotions and the cultivation of pleasurable sentiment. To deny its utility on this ground would be to suppress all the elevating and refining impulses; and to look forward to a state in which everything except the

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gratification of the instincts necessary to the lowest kind of existence would be entirely suppressed.

This, in short, gives one form in which the freedom of which I have spoken sometimes presents itself. You admit in some sense that the main end of conduct should be to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number; and yet the precepts which you deduce from your principles seem to imply a colorless monotony and a life uncheered by any pursuits enjoyable in themselves. That is the difficulty which one feels in a great many philanthropic schemes. It is easy, and it sounds edifying, to draw up a list from the countless sorrows and wrongs of human beings and to ask how a human being can find it in his heart to attend to anything else. Rome is burning and you are fiddling; while your fellow-creatures are suffering from so many and such deeply seated evils, how can you be sitting in comfort, excogitating sonnets and painting pictures for the pleasure of millionaires? That is the argument which is put to us by philanthropists, whom we must all respect, even if their views be occasionally somewhat narrow and one-sided. We must, I think, admit also that the argument is a serious one. We may, of course, give various answers. We may say, for example, that philanthropy no doubt points to a very excellent purpose, but is liable to the obvious objection that it is generally so mischievous. The science of helping our neighbors is a difficult one which requires full thought, skill, and care. However true this may be, we must of course not use the argument to justify indifference. It is meant to prove not that we should harden our hearts but train our understandings; that we should take more not less pains in our endeavor to be of some use in the world; and not justify the lazy assumption that, as it might do mischief, we may wrap ourselves in comfortable indifference. The justification for "play," if we may call that play which involves most strenuous labor, must take a different ground. One ground is that the energy which has had no directly utilitarian aim has been of most essential service to mankind; that, if the world has improved even in the sense of being able to support a larger population in

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moderate comfort, the improvement has been owing not simply nor perhaps chiefly to those who have consciously labored to redress grievances and remove causes of misery, but to men who have pursued intellectual aims, scientific or artistic, for the pure love of art or science. The advantage to the race at large of wider and more accurate knowledge; the refining and purifying influence of poets and artists who have presented new ideals of conduct is too obvious to require any expenditure of rhetoric. If we have incomparably more power over nature, if we have a wider sense of human sympathy, a greater abhorrence of brutality and coarseness, the result is due to people who have had no immediate intention of benefiting their neighbors, but have simply given full play to their natural impulses. The true moral is not that we should disapprove of conduct which is really of such essential importance, but that we should admit that, though mere utility does not prescribe the immediate end, it supplies in another sense an important condition of legitimate activity. The founder of positivism condemned a variety of intellectual pursuits as idle and frivolous. Such investigations as Darwin's into the origin of species or the inquiries into the constitution of the ether seemed to him to imply a running to waste of intellect which should have been applied to the service of humanity. I believe, with the great majority of his critics, that this is a mistake; that knowledge can scarcely be advanced in any direction without throwing light upon knowledge in general; and that the devotion of some men of great powers to minute and apparently remote interests is really to be admired because it constantly leads to unforeseen and important results. The true doctrine seems to be that it is an imperative duty for a man to devote his intellect to those purposes, whatever they may be, to which it is most fitted. He should not spend upon trifles powers which might be serviceable in the most promising lines of inquiry, but he should be satisfied, if his pursuit is trifling in appearance, by the reflection that he is co-operating with the great army of inquirers, and that even the smallest achievement will have its place and its importance. The parallel error is

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that which condemns poetry or fiction because it has not a distinct moral tagged to it. The man of artistic mind usually replies by taking the opposite extreme. Since art must be spontaneous and express some genuine emotion, he infers that all spontaneous expression of any emotion must be good. Then the art which is a mere effeminate luxury or which panders to corrupt instinct fancies itself to be justified and becomes essentially base in the artistic as well as in the moral sense. The true principle is rather that any pursuit deserves sympathy and cultivation, which is in fact such as finds a proper place in a worthy ideal of human nature and society and which requires for success the possession of really manly and noble qualities; but that it is neither necessary nor desirable that it should be directed towards the achievement of some definite utilitarian purpose. We may fairly desire that men should find some worthy employment of their energies; and we may define its worth by its fitness to be cultivated in a society where there is room for full development of all the faculties, and where there will be found a large field for activity justified sufficiently by its enjoyableness, only limiting the phrase by adding that it must be enjoyable by vigorous and good men.

If I have ventured to class Nansen's performance as a kind of play, I have tried to make amends for my irreverence by explaining that play in this sense of the word includes a very large part of the most valuable and elevating human activities. Play, that is, may be taken to mean every variety of energy which is delightful without reference to any ulterior end; which is made delightful because it implies the existence of superabundant vigor, ready to discharge itself in other directions than those imposed upon us by the absolute material necessities of life, and which may be indirectly useful in the highest degree, both in its moral and, in what may be called in a wide sense, its educational influence. Qualities which would be atrophied for want of exercise in the man bound strictly to the ordinary routine of supplying daily needs have room to expand and develop. There was then much truth at least even in the contentions

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of our old friends, the muscular Christians. They urged quite truly that boys may receive in the play-ground, in the cricket field, or on the river, a training not only physical but moral, which is an important supplement to that of the school-room. Apart from all silly exaggeration, the advantage of such things in bringing lads and young men together; the help in forming friendships, and competing with the devil for the employment of idle hands, the experience, too, which comes from co-operating for a common purpose, managing affairs and submitting to discipline, has real advantages of which, when concerned in such matters, I certainly formed a high estimate. But I am speaking of the principle as applied on a larger scale. When we worry ourselves, as we sometimes do, about the position of our grandchildren,—a rather needless but tempting occupation,—we are tempted to share the depressing anticipation that the world is growing dull and monotonous, and that their lives will be frittered away in a thousand petty sentiments and occupations without any opportunity for cultivating the old simple and manly tastes. And then, perhaps, we are tempted to look too leniently upon a reversion to the old brutal accompaniments. Many games are a mimicry of war, and we begin to think that war itself may have its merits as at least the first of games, and as giving the widest scope for muscular energy. Nansen's enterprise had the merit of suggesting one possible solution of the difficulty. His expedition required such qualities as would be essential to the military or naval commander; and yet it was for a perfectly peaceful and in some sense even a rational end. We can follow every step without regret—except perhaps the unfortunate though necessary fate of the dogs—and without the least misgivings as to our moral approval. His example, it is true, cannot be widely imitated in details. Very few of us will ever have a chance of going to the North Pole, even if we should think that such an adventure would be the most delightful way of spending an appreciable portion of our lives. I cannot now attempt to suggest any efficient substitute in other fields. But I believe that the problem of discovering a pretext for some

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investment of energy which shall be innocent in itself and yet give occasion for preserving and developing the old vigor, once applied to more questionable purposes, may be safely left to impetuous and inventive youth. Given courage and simplicity and the qualities which make good comrades, I hope that they will always be able to find modes of testing and strengthening themselves. So long as such qualities exist, and that will be as long as society is in a moderate healthy state, their possessors will recognize in Nansen a congenial spirit and be stimulated and encouraged by the record of his adventures.

LESLIE STEPHEN.

LONDON.

CITIZENSHIP.

BY citizenship I mean the duties and rights that each member of a political society has towards the state of which he forms a part. No other English word, so far as I know, fully expresses these complex relations: "patriotism," "nationality," "suffrage," are all in different ways too narrow. If the word itself is a comparatively new one, the idea which it expresses is as old as civilized society. It reaches back to the time when men first began to group themselves together in societies for common life and government more comprehensive than the village and more concentrated and developed than the life of the horde or of the tribe. I cannot venture into the field of the anthropologist and discuss the possible sources of the city, nor am I enough of a philosopher to examine the philosophic basis of civic life: I would rather call attention to the idea of citizenship as exhibited in different stages of the world's history, *i.e.*, in the western world of Europe and America, to which it distinctively belongs. Such a survey may suggest to us what conception of citizenship we at the end of the nineteenth century may appropriate as our own. Every now and again it is well for us to re-examine the current terms of our political and social conversation, that we

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may realize afresh the significance which use and habit and the wear and tear of time have dimmed to our eyes. Possibly we may discover, by the way, new matters of interest,—in any case, we may clear up our ideas.

Let us look, then, at some typical moments in the history of Europe and see what were the ideas of citizenship which they embodied in their institutions or which found expression in the thought of their best thinkers, and then turn to the life of our own day and ask how far and in what proportions these several ideas have been incorporated, or may hereafter be incorporated, in the thought and practice of our every-day life. Matthew Arnold compares man's efforts to construct society and government to a child forming one word after another from a heap of letters put in his hand:

> "And man has turned them many times, made Greece,
> Rome, England, France;—yes, nor in vain essay'd
> Way after way, changes that never cease;
> The letters have combined, something was made."

Are we to believe that the words so fashioned have borne no relation to one another, have been just the disconnected and fortuitous outcome of blind gropings after truth and order? or may we not find in them some continuity of development, some sort of progress from narrower to wider notions of citizenship and of a commonwealth? Let us see. Take the great periods of civic life,—Athens, Rome, Mediæval Italy, the England of the Renaissance.

For the root ideas of government as of art and science, we must turn to Greece. Mr. Warde Fowler, in his "City State," and Prof. Seeley, in his "Lectures on Political Science," have brought out into clearness the essential distinction between the constitutions of the ancient world and of the modern. England and France of to-day are "nation-states," Athens and Republican Rome were "city-states." This means that in the old Greek world the city is the unit of government, and that its area is limited by the fact that all citizens are to take part immediately and in person in the duties of government,—in the law court and the assembly, in the election of

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magistrates and the making of laws.* All citizens share and share alike in the privileges and burdens of the city to which they belong. "We alone," says Pericles, in the noble speech which Thucydides puts into his mouth as the justification of the Athenian constitution and character, "we alone consider the man who takes no interest in public affairs not as a harmless, but as a useless character." Or if we turn to a sadder and more struggling generation at Athens, to the age of Demosthenes, when civic life is more divided and differentiated, when professionalism, in the army and in oratory, is ousting the old idea of Pericles that every citizen is to be capable of every duty, we still find the same ideal of common service pressed home on the Athenians by their greatest orator.

"If you get rid, all of you, of the spirit of evasion; if each man will show himself ready to act wherever duty calls him and he can possibly render service to the state; he that has money, being ready to contribute it; he that is of military age, to take the field; in one brief word, if you are willing to depend on no one but yourselves, and will give up each one of you hoping that he can remain idle while his neighbor does everything for him, then I say you will come to your own; if God will, you will recover once again the position which your past indolence has thrown away, and you will punish Philip!" †

The citizenship to which Demosthenes thus appeals is based upon three principles: (1) freedom of person and speech; (2) equality before the law and in civic opportunity and service; (3) law as at once the expression and the safeguard of the ordered life of free citizens. These are the *conditions* of citizenship. What is their outcome? It is a civic *character*—or *êthos*—showing itself in devoted service, rivalry for the honors, moral rather than material, which the people can bestow. In the individual life—self-control, devotion, and activity; in the life of the city, as one state among many,

* The point is brought graphically home to us by the play of Aristophanes where we see the citizens compelled into the Ekklesia by the ruddled cord.

† Phil. i. 7.

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the pursuit of the path of honor, the maintenance of the good name of Athens as the guardian of free government in the Greek world; and, finally, a temper of noble generosity which is ready to forgive and forget in the face of a common danger or in the maintenance of a great cause.

We are all familiar with the fact that this "free" city, like all the states of the ancient world, was only free in name, for it rested upon the forced labor of a population of slaves. But, even apart from this radical defect, the ideal is one which the very speeches which set it forth acknowledge to have been but imperfectly and spasmodically realized at Athens. We have only to read the contemporary writings of Plato to see how deeply the best men of that age felt that Athens and the Athenians fell short of the pattern of the civic life. For Plato's Republic, if on the one hand it is an exhibition in an ideal world of the philosophical principles which he conceives to lie at the root of conduct and character, a solution from the social side of the vexed problem of human education in its widest sense, is on the other hand a criticism of the Greek state as it existed in his day, and a proposal for a practical reform. Briefly, his reform lies in putting all government upon a basis of trained capacity. Education in the fullest and deepest sense is the condition of political leadership: the principle of the state is not equality, but justice,—*i.e.*, the distribution to every man of power and service according to his capacity. The philosopher alone is to rule, because he alone has the wisdom which the ruler needs, the power to see things as they are. To achieve this end society is reconstructed and the family is sacrificed. There is no need to criticise now the details of Plato's city. All that I am concerned to point out is that here, too, we find two leading ideas: first, Every man, from the highest to the lowest, from the philosopher to the hewer of wood and drawer of water, is to think not of his own, but of the city's good; second, The outcome of this polity again is not mere material wealth or physical excellence, but *character.* Justice in the state—the fair apportionment to every man of what is fittest for him—finds its fruit in the life of each citizen (though in varying degrees according to their gifts), in the

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perfect and harmonious development of man's complex nature, in which spontaneity and discipline find their proper balance, and the mental, the moral, and the physical are happily reconciled. In a word, to Plato and to Demosthenes, as to Aristotle, the state is vital and human, not abstract or mechanical.* Citizenship is the product of living forces and of a social and political atmosphere.

Neither the eloquence of Demosthenes nor the philosophic imagination of Plato sufficed to reconstruct the failing fabric of Athenian city life, and the free cities of Hellas, after enjoying for a few brief generations that heightened sense of civic and intellectual existence to which we owe so much, had to give way to the ruder but more vigorous force of a military monarchy; yet the city-life which the Macedonian conqueror carried with him into Asia still bore within it, though in a shrunken and imperfect form, the fruitful idea of self-government and public service which had made the greatness of the states of Greece.

The Macedonian Empire and the Greek world which it had absorbed became, before many generations had passed, a part of the wider Empire of Rome. Rome has given us the words "citizen" and "civic." What does the Roman state contribute to our conception of civic life? Rome, like Athens, started as a city-state, and for a long time she was only one among many sovereign cities in Italy. But when Rome, by strength of character and a genius for war and government, became the dominant power in the peninsula, she came face to face with a problem which no city of Greece had solved,—how to adapt the habits and constitution of a city-state to the government of widely scattered communities in Italy and distant provinces beyond the sea. There is not time to trace how the Senate of Rome took the place of the nominal sov-

* "At Larissa," said Gorgias the Sophist, "citizens are manufactured by the magistrates." (We cannot convey the humor of the Greek; it is as though he said that the citizens of Birmingham were Brummagem goods, or that Florentines could be made as easily as florins.) But Gorgias, as Aristotle tells us, was ironical; and it is clear that to the Greek thinkers citizens were not a manufactured article.

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ereign, the Comitia of citizens, and became the centre of all government, gathering into its powerful grasp the control of the executive and the legislative, and along with this the formation of that *mos maiorum*, that constitutional tradition, which was for so long the ruling force in Roman politics. All that need here be noticed is that (1) In Rome, as in Greece, the state made great demands on the citizen, and (2) To the Roman, as to the Greek, his constitution was valuable as an instrument for the production of character, *virtus* or manliness, the power to conquer the world and order it aright. It is true that government here did not appeal directly to the whole body of citizens, as at Athens, but within the narrow circle of Senatorial families which was enriched from time to time by new material from without, it called forth some of the strongest qualities of government and public service which the world has ever seen. The conquest first of Italy and then of the neighboring powers of the Mediterranean showed what could be accomplished by this "extraordinary government by ordinary men." The type of character was more severe and narrow than the Athenian, less versatile and more concentrated, but what it lacked in width of culture was fully made up for by vigor and capacity for rule. And this governing capacity found expression in two institutions which have enriched the political thought of Europe and have colored our modern conception of citizenship. First, the Roman genius for law developed a legal system which has formed the basis of many of the codes of the modern world, and influenced them all. It was this which made possible the orderly government of that wide Empire which was organized out of the series of conquests begun by the Senate and completed by the Cæsars. Secondly, the growth and organization of this Empire brought into prominence for the first time the double aspect of citizenship as at once local and imperial.

Rome thus contributes to our modern idea of citizenship two important elements which help to bridge the gap between the ancient world and that world of politics in which we move to-day. The cities with Roman rights, whether in Italy itself or in the scattered provinces, could not share even

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in the nominal exercise of the Roman *franchise.* All alike were governed from Rome by the centralized government of the new monarchy. The citizens within the Empire enjoyed the privileged status and the private rights of Roman citizens, but they could not really share in the Imperial government unless they made their way to Rome and into the Roman Senate and the official careers still associated with it. The Roman citizenship to which the Apostle Paul lays claim is identified not so much with political rights as with personal status and personal privilege. On the other hand, Municipal government, developed and encouraged by imperial patrons on the old lines of local self-government in Italy, plays a large and active part in the life of the Roman people. Thus we see for the first time the idea of local government as distinguished from imperial government and coexisting with it. For the first time in the full sense a citizenship comes into being which includes the two notions of participation in a self-governing community and a privileged membership in a widely extended empire. But the citizenship was still limited to a fraction of the population, and for them, too, it was but a faint and imperfect copy of the old. The very vastness of the Empire meant loss of civic unity and loss of civic character. The Roman Empire was a complex of many nations, its citizenship was long the attribute of a limited and privileged class, and when it was extended to all the subjects of the Empire it had become no more than "the shadow of a great name."

The Greek city had fallen through its intense individualism. Roman citizenship failed because it became universal. It lost the power to create a common character and to command a common allegiance. Something was needed which should be less narrow than the city-state, and less wide than a world-empire, before the modern conception of citizenship could be realized.

In the city politics of Mediæval Italy we find revived in a new form the Greek idea of citizenship. There is the same intense activity within a limited area, the same intimate participation in civic duties and privileges, the same pride in the

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material and spiritual development of the city itself. But faction, the ruin of the cities of Greece, is rife in the Italian, and here it is animated by a bitterness if possible more personal and more intense. You have only to read the burning words of Dante to see to what depths the civic spirit might descend.

> "Ah, servile Italy, thou home of sorrow,
> Ship with no pilot in a mighty storm,
> Thy lordship narrowed to a house of shame." *

And, in bitter irony, of his own city of Florence,—

> "Ay make thee glad, thou hast good reason why,—
> So rich, so peaceful and so wise withal!
> How many times within thy memory
> Laws, coinage, customs, office, hast thou changed,
> And all thy members many times renewed." †

But other and ampler ideas of citizenship were in the air. The Roman Empire had left to the world the idea of a wider and a juster rule, and the Christian theory of a universal citizenship, though it was but parodied in the secularized Church of the Papacy, had enlarged and ennobled men's views of the possibilities of political life. And so in the minds of some of the noblest men of the time the thought of the Holy Roman Empire comes in to correct and purify the perverted and corrupted forms of civic life. Throughout the "Divina Commedia" of Dante, and more explicitly in his "De Monarchia," is expressed the belief in an universal kingdom to which all the states of Europe are to be subject and in which divided Italy is to find unity and peace. From our point of view this stage of civic life is interesting, because it is the last appearance in history of the city-state. It has enriched our world with great masterpieces of literature and art, but in its strength and in its weakness it belongs to the older world: the nation-states of Europe had come into being and the city-states could not survive beside them; for the Holy Roman Empire, though it continued to count for much and

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* Purg. vi. 76. † Ibid., 128.

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kept alive in Europe the idea of order and civil relations among states, never fulfilled the promise of Dante's dream.

We must come nearer home to see the idea of citizenship take a fresh development in the "nation-state." For centuries England was a divided polity. The period of warring kingdoms, the period of feudalism, had to pass away before the English conception of citizenship could grow to its fulness. It is no accident that the age of our greatest poet is the age, also, in which the nation first becomes fully conscious of itself, and the unity of citizenship is felt as a real and national bond, a source of pride to every Englishman, claiming his allegiance and devotion. The historical plays of Shakespeare are not history, but they record once for all the idea of the free English people, now at last finding its full expression in a formed and definite national character, and resting on the possession of a compact and independent territory. England stands clear and aloof from the claims of Pope and Emperor which distract the continent, and seeks abroad new outlets for its young and lusty vigor in distant exploration and adventure. The gates of a new world are opened, and the strong sense of national life finds expression in the creations of the dramatist, just as the newly wakened hopes of human knowledge find their prophet in the philosopher-statesman who tried to lead his fellow-countrymen by a new way into the promised land of universal science.

The nation has come into being, and the citizenship which we recognize is no longer the share in one city, no longer, even, as in the Roman Empire, the passive participation in a world-wide polity, but a free and active share in political as well as in personal rights and duties. The Englishman, like the Roman of the Empire, is a member of a smaller as well as of a wider society; he has ties which bind him to town and parish, as well as to king and Parliament. So far they are alike; but his share in the larger polity, unlike that of the Roman, is coming to be exercised in a political as well as in a social sense. He is an active member of the body politic, with a true share in the government of his country, as well as in the pride and privilege and opportunity which his citi-

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zenship affords him. How is this possible? The answer is this, and it marks the new stage of political development: *Representation* has given a new character and new possibilities to national life. Imperial and municipal claims can now be reconciled in a real sense. The possession of civil rights was still, no doubt, limited, and a long period of struggle between King and Parliament ensued before the English citizen entered fully into his inheritance, before the idea of self-government was fully embodied in the supremacy of a representative Parliament. Side by side with this internal and constitutional development, there went on a more or less continuous expansion without, which has given some of its characteristic features to our nation as we know it to-day. With the growth of our foreign possessions we have entered into a new and wider world, in which we have not yet fully realized the duties and responsibilities which our citizenship carries with it, any more than we have yet fully adapted our organs of government to the new conditions. Like the Englishman of Shakespeare's day, we have still laid upon us the double claim of local and national ties; but our membership in the nation of which we form a part has received a vastly wider range, and the growth of our state has been so rapid and so extensive that we have not yet had time or patience to adjust our old ideas to the new place we are called upon to fill. *What ideal of citizenship are we going to maintain in this new world?* On the answer to this, as made by the country at large, the future of England will in the main depend. How far is it possible to adapt what is best in the old-world notions of citizenship to this new society and to the conflicting claims which it makes upon us? For us surely, as for the Athenians whom Demosthenes addressed, there is no better rule than to frame our conduct by the pattern of what is noblest in the past, and to live up to our inheritance. Let us look back for a moment over the ground we have traversed.

In Greece we have seen the free development of the individual citizen controlled by the idea of personal service. In the Roman Empire we have traced, along with the reconciliation of local and imperial government, an ideal of universal

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law and order as the privilege of all citizens and the guardian of civilized life for them and for their subjects. Mediæval Italy has shown us the intense city-life of the Greek, with a difference. Citizenship is still restricted, but free labor and wide commerce have broadened its foundations, and the ideas of the Church and the Empire have enlarged its range of vision. Finally, in Shakespeare's England we are confronted by the eager spirit of a young nation beginning to make free use in every sphere of the gifts of enterprise and government which it has come to recognize as its own. In what relation do we stand ourselves to these ideas and principles of the past?

We are no longer, like the Greek, exercising civic rights within the narrow compass of a single city, supported by a slave population without rights and without opportunity. We are like the Roman, in that our citizenship finds its field in a wide range of empire; but our individual responsibility is intensified far beyond his, because we are all, in a sense, through the Parliament and Ministry which represent us, members of the governing body in whose hands lie the guidance and control of our world-wide interests and duties. Like the citizens of Florence or Venice, we have each of us his own city or country-side to think of and to live for, but our interest in them is distracted by considerations of a far wider scope than ever Venice dreamt of when she still held "the gorgeous East in fee." The glory of England as Shakespeare saw it is ours to keep and cherish, but the duty carries with it to-day a far more momentous issue, while its demands come upon us no longer with the vivid and concentrated force of the old appeal. Our citizenship is diffused in more ways than one, for the population of our own island has enormously increased, while the larger England, in India and the Colonies, lays upon us obligations of sympathy and responsibility unequalled in the history of the world. Thus our duties have grown, while the very increase brings with it a danger that our personal sense of duty may diminish.

Can we face our responsibilities? Have the old ideas any value for us? Many of us, from the mere complexity of the

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situation, are disposed to set aside all such claims. We are inclined to regard our country as the most comfortable home, our colonies as the most obvious outlet for the unoccupied talents of our younger kinsfolk, our national honor and prestige as the natural accompaniment of our success and a creditable and convenient resource in foreign travel. We are ready to criticise with equal frankness our local and imperial authorities, our parish council, or the Ministry of the day, while for ourselves we quietly pursue our own professions or devote ourselves to self-culture or to meeting the thousand and one demands of family and social life. To some of us, indeed, "society" has taken the place of the city and the state, and government and its ministers are only valued so far as they can be made to serve the purposes of social ambition or personal display. It is no doubt a true instinct which makes us prize government and political organization only so far as they contribute to the life and to the well-being of the community. But what is the community? To take "society" in the limited sense as identical with the state is, of course, a ludicrous travesty of the political ideal. We have all of us now accepted the fact that all classes, except criminals and paupers, are to share in government and civil rights. How, then, are the old ideas to be applied to the new order? It was easy, you may say, to be a good citizen in a city so small that the things for which he wrought and fought were daily visible to the eyes of every citizen, when service was done not for an unknown multitude or a vague abstraction, but for the neighbors of one's own hearth, the companions of one's every-day walk and conversation, as at Athens or Rome; or when the concentration of power in a few hands, as at Venice or in Republican Rome, gave a peculiar zest to the performance of duty and the exercise of privilege. "You call us to be citizens," it may be urged, "but citizens of what city? To be one in five hundred makes existence worth having; even to be one among ten thousand is still to count for something, but what is one citizen among millions?"

To this cry there are two answers: first, No man can cut himself loose from the society in which he was born and bred,

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and in which he finds the sphere for his activities, whether he live as a student or a poet or a man of action and affairs. In Plato's happy phrase, he owes to his city "the price of his nurture." That is the answer to all pure individualism, and it holds as good now as in the age of Plato. But, secondly,—and this is the answer that this age perhaps needs to ponder more than any other,—Every man counts; the power of personality, now as ever, remains inexhaustible, and no man can say that his action or inaction is indifferent to the community in which he lives. The argument of numbers happily tells both ways. If *one* is swallowed up in a million, let us remember, on the other hand, what a tremendous human force a million means, if only every unit is alive with devotion and endeavor, if all are actual citizens, and not merely ciphers in a census. The field thus opened out to us is a vast one. I can only suggest a few lines of thought.

1. The secret of citizenship to-day will be found in somehow appropriating for the new order of things the personal and concentrated enthusiasm of the old city-state. The city which is now a nation with all a nation's claims must be brought home to our minds and hearts. "This needs," you will say, "a great effort of imagination, and we English are not an imaginative people." But, on the other hand, we have an enormous advantage in the traditions and experience of English life. Day by day we see at work around and about us, in our parish or town or country-side, the activities of self-government. Reaching far back into the past are the records of service in local government which have made England the envy of foreign countries. Among the artisan class a similar sense of corporate unity and responsibility has been developed during the last fifty years in the trades-unions and co-operative and friendly societies. Such self-governing institutions may help our imagination as they also train our abilities for the exercise of citizenship in the wider sphere. Other influences have helped to heighten and deepen the sense of the solidarity of our state. The "social movement" has quickened the feeling of the inter-dependence of classes and of the claim of the state on its individual members, while historical works,

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like Seeley's "Expansion of England" and Milner's "England in Egypt," and works of imagination like those of Mr. Rudyard Kipling and Mrs. Steele, are helping the English people to entertain the wider aspects of life which have opened up for us as an imperial nation. We are more conscious to-day than we have been before that for good and evil we are one people, and that no one of us can separate himself from the national destiny and reputation.

2. If the first condition of citizenship is to realize the state, to know what it is, the second is equally essential,—to remember that it rests upon character. The foundation of a sound polity is character, and by character, as Greek and Roman saw, will a state in the long run be judged, by character as exhibiting itself not only in the acts of this man and that, but in national transactions of all sorts. And for this character we have all to answer. Immediately, in our own acts; indirectly, through our choice of men to rule us, and through the education we give to the sons and daughters of the nation, we are forming the character of the English people day by day.

We can hardly deny that this is a critical moment in our history. Perhaps we never held a greater place in the world: probably we were never more fiercely and universally distrusted. There is a blessing on those of whom all men speak evil, but it behooves those who are in such case to see that they give no real cause of offence. You know that in our competition with foreign nations to-day in trade and manufacture we need to take stock of our resources and strain every nerve to make them available, we have to maintain our old name for first-rate goods and honest dealing. So it is in our political relations with foreign powers, and, it may be added, in that personal intercourse with foreigners which tells for so much just because, I am glad to say, politics are not mechanical, but human: we need now more than ever to be careful what type of citizens we send into the world. Our institutions will be worth little if they do not produce a civic character which is finely tempered to just issues, which is gentle, if it may be, as well as honest, which has learnt not only the mastery over circumstance, but that secret of

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humanity which comes from perfect self-control. And if we all need this counsel, none perhaps need it so much as those who go far afield to subdue the wild places of the earth, to carry on the struggle for order and humanity beyond the seas. The words of the Psalmist come into one's mind, "How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?" the pathetic cry of an exiled people for whom the note of triumph and even the glad songs of daily life and worship seem forever impossible. Is it too fanciful to find a wider application in these words as the tragic utterance of the spirit of man struggling with alien surroundings among an uncongenial people? The citizen living at home among the institutions in which he has been born and bred, which are of the very fibre and texture of his being, finds it no hard thing to fulfil the duties of his position: for he breathes at every hour the atmosphere of his country's manners and his country's laws, and they naturally and insensibly mould his character and conduct. In his party or his church or his social circle he finds the moral support which helps to make him the man he is. But how many of us are there who, suddenly transplanted into new and untried surroundings, can keep fresh and untainted the character that at home lived wholesome and secure? We English have shown a great power to thrive in all climates and to frame new organs of government in the countries we have conquered. The genius for self-government crosses the seas with us. But if it is to win us respect and honor, it must be united with a personal character which draws its inspiration from the nobler qualities of our race: with a spirit which finds in self-control, no less than in law and order, one of the essential conditions of civic life, and which regards the ordinances and institutions of a colonial commonwealth not as mere means to the exploiting of a new country, but as the conditions of that civilized common life which distinguishes man from the non-political animals.

3. "These," you will say, "are far-off matters; what are our plain duties as citizens at home in England?" I can only repeat the two principles I have laid down. Realize the unity of the state, transcending all class differences, all sec-

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tional and sectarian jealousies; realize the personal responsibility of each citizen. If you hold these fast, particular duties will discover themselves as you go on your way. Happily, the varieties of public service are as diverse as men's gifts. One man will feel a special interest in local government, another in imperial affairs; but whether in the larger or the lesser field, let us be careful that we do not fail by the faults which history has proved to be fatal to civic organisms. The cities of Greece and of Mediæval Italy failed because they put motives of personal pique and family honor above the interest of the city as a whole. The Empire of Rome collapsed because the machine of civil government afforded no inspiration of personal interest and devotion to its individual members to make of them a living and a moving power. All the old constitutions suffered from the fatal flaw of resting on a basis of slavery, more or less pronounced. The area of citizenship has in these days been extended to coincide with the entire people. The resources of the whole nation may now, if we so will it, enrich the civic life. But still, as always, the nation stands or falls by its individual members. Each man and woman among us has his own duty to the state, which only he or she can discover. There it is, and theirs is the responsibility to find it and perform it. It may be to guide the councils of the state, to control an army, or "to serve," as Sir Alfred Milner finely said the other day, "as a civilian soldier of the empire;" it may be to inspire with new ideas, and to humanize by personal sympathy and devotion, the national institutions which surround us on every side,—poor law, prisons, hospitals, schools. But most of us are not made for the work of control or government. On the other hand, with all of us rests the duty of choosing the right men and women to serve us in such matters. We English are not generally given to affectation, but we are apt to affect a fine scorn for the obvious duties of citizenship as they fall to our lot. We despise our vote for the poor-law guardian, or even for Parliament, and we pay our rates and taxes with a rueful face, as though we had no share in the work which they do for the nation. If we are called on a jury, most of us, I fancy

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think little of the chance it gives us of sharing in a historic institution, and of seeing from within and for ourselves the working of that great instrument of justice which is the living embodiment of the English spirit of fair play. All such services are occasional; the exercise of citizenship, we must feel, is not confined to election-day or the assizes. It pervades our life. Beneath all institutions which surround us is one on which our state rests, and with which its moral and political existence is forever bound up; I mean the family life, in which are born and reared those who go to make up this nation. Institutions? Yes, they are a necessity of ordered life. Societies? Yes, they are the natural expression of men's craving for common life and action. But no society, no number of societies, can relieve you of your personal responsibility as a citizen; no institution can take the place of the true family life in moulding the thoughts and affections of men. In this sphere—in the family—thousands who can take no part in conspicuous civic duties find, and will find, a perpetual opportunity of proving their citizenship. For what service to the state can be higher than the bringing up of good citizens in gentle manners and a high ideal of civic service?

I have travelled over a wide field, and I have omitted many factors that are at work in civic life. I have not touched on what to many men and women have been and still are the strongest motives for the fulfilment of civic duty. I have not discussed what constraining and inspiring impulse may be given to the idea of citizenship by religion or philosophy, or both. I have left them aside for the moment, and have asked you to look at the development of the idea of citizenship, and to consider whether, as it stands, it does not carry with it an appeal which no reflecting man can resist when he looks back upon the activities and efforts which have brought us to our present stage of political development. To most Englishmen, I fancy, who think at all, one of the most moving of all thoughts is the thought of those men of our own and other races who have made us what we are. To recognize our inheritance is the first step towards entering into it, by

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appropriating the noblest ideas of the Old World and realizing them in the New. There are moments, indeed, when the very greatness of the problem of government appals us into inaction and despair. But when we look back to the past we have good grounds of hope. Let me give a familiar illustration. I have lately been staying in the valley of the Teviot, among the legends of the raiding and robbing clans which have made the Minstrelsy of the Border. The ballads tell of a society in which citizenship had no place, where the ties of person and family and clan were all in all. Yet the growth and development of national life have turned to good use the vigorous virtues of that wild heroic age. The spirit which once inspired the rescue of Kinmont Willie from Carlisle Prison has survived in the sons of many a Border clan, to animate the courage of British regiments and to share in the great task of governing India and the Colonies. This is one instance among many of the way in which political ideas widen, and of the process by which personal and selfish motives may be ennobled by finding an ampler range and opportunity. If such things have been in the past, may we not trust that in the future our race will show an equal power of adjusting its human as well as its material resources to the new needs of the time? But, that this end may be achieved, no condition is so essential as this,—that the life of all members of the community should have open to it some real opportunity of intelligently sharing in the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. Healthy conditions of life for all classes, sound education in manners as well as in intelligence, a proper feeling of neighborliness among all sorts and conditions of men, as members of a nation and society which is organically one,—these are some of the conditions on which the possibilities of citizenship must depend. In all these directions there are many points where we fall short,—I need not enumerate them,—but in all alike there is not one of us who has not power in his measure to contribute to the commonwealth by the devotion of personal service and by the force of personal opinion and character and conduct.

I am conscious that I have touched on many questions and

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fully answered none. I know that such slight historical sketches as I have given are apt to be misleading. But if history is not to overwhelm us by the weight of its accumulated documents, we must at all costs try to take general views from time to time. All that I have attempted to do is to draw from the history of the past and from the circumstances of the present age a few thoughts which may quicken our ideas of citizenship, and enlarge for us the horizon of civic duty, and give us some sense of the abiding value of personality in building up the institutions and moulding the character of the nation in whose inheritance we have a part. "For a city is not walls, but men."

P. E. MATHESON.

NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD.

PROFESSOR JOWETT.

THE admirable Memoir of Professor Jowett by Mr. Abbott and Professor Lewes Campbell has done nearly all that can be done to give an idea of his character and his work to those who have had no personal relations with him. In particular, they have brought very vividly before the public the strenuous continuity of effort by which he made himself one of the greatest of teachers and rendered his college the centre of the best intellectual life of Oxford. And this is, perhaps, the most important aspect of Jowett's work. His published writings, indeed, have had and still have great influence upon English thought. His work on the Epistles of Saint Paul was one of the first books in which the methods and results of German theological criticism were made familiar to English readers; and the essays on the character of Saint Paul, on the Atonement, on Casuistry, etc., were the first revelation of that vein of suggestive reflection which is characteristic of all Jowett's writing. His translation of the Dialogues of Plato, by the beauty and richness and appropriateness of the style, may be said to have made Plato an English classic; and the Introductions, apart from the illustration

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which they throw upon Plato's train of thought, are full of a subtle and delicate criticism of life, a mixture of homely sagacity and philosophical insight, of sceptical criticism and moral idealism, which makes them no unworthy companion of the Platonic Dialogues. Yet, after all, Jowett was not one of those who can put their best into literature. His best achievement lay in the stimulating and pervasive influence which he exercised upon many generations of pupils, and in his steadfast and long-continued effort for the liberalizing of University life. He did more than any other man of his time to raise the ideal of University teaching and of the relation of teacher and pupil. But when we try to explain the secret of his influence, it is not easy to say anything definite. In truth, an original personality like Jowett is very difficult to describe. The general impression which he makes is unique and self-consistent, yet when we attempt to analyze it we seem to be putting down a mass of inconsistencies. In the light of his biography, however, it may be possible to make others than his friends to realize a little more clearly the strange union of different elements in his mind and character.

He was primarily a man of very sensitive temper, with the strong desire that usually goes with such a temper for the sympathy of others. At the same time, he was naturally shy, reserved, and unwilling, or even unable, to disclose himself unless he was sure of a response; and the effect of his manner, therefore, was at first somewhat chilling, especially to those who had any kindred tendency to reserve. Family difficulties, which have been explained or indicated in the Memoirs, tended at a comparatively early period to throw him upon his own guidance and to make him prematurely jealous to maintain his personal independence. And the general suspicion and distrust with which he was for a long time regarded by the society to which he belonged helped to produce or to increase in him a sense of isolation, which might easily have turned to bitterness if he had not had the strength of character to rise above it. As it was, he took refuge in a narrow circle of friends, consisting mainly of his

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own pupils, and threw his whole energy into the work of teaching and guiding them. Yet even in dealing with his pupils his method was peculiar to himself. Notwithstanding his wide knowledge of classical literature and philosophy, he was not one of those teachers who are filled with new ideas as to their subject and who infect others with their own interest in it. He seemed rather to adopt a critical attitude towards those whom he taught, to observe and study them, to set himself to check false tendencies in them, and to stimulate them in the direction in which he thought they would be most effective. He was eagerly watchful for indications of capacity, and wherever he discerned it, he made large demands, and would hardly admit any plea of inability to realize them. I think all pupils of Jowett agree in this description of his watchful and *exigeant* attitude towards them. Of course, he sometimes made mistakes in the tasks he sought to impose upon individuals, but he was not much dissatisfied if they took other lines than he recommended, provided always they showed efficiency in some direction. He was always hopeful where he saw any kind of energy, and he often showed an unusual liking and tolerance for *mauvais sujets* who had this redeeming quality. This method of his rendered it possible for him to influence and help men of the most varied characters and tendencies; but he was, perhaps, most successful with men of a temperament opposite to his own, who were not thrown back upon themselves by his reserve and his leaving the initiative so much in their hands. Yet almost invariably—at least during the years when he was a college tutor and therefore in close individual intercourse with those whom he taught—he established very close and enduring relations of friendship with his pupils. His real interest in their progress both in and beyond the University, and his delicate remembrance and appreciation of their circumstances, inevitably produced a sense of gratitude and a personal regard such as is seldom felt for even the best of teachers.

In a generally appreciative account of Jowett, Mr. Swinburne quotes in relation to him the phrase of Sir Walter

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Scott,—"After all, the man was mortal and had been a schoolmaster." There is a point in the joke, though a harmless one. There was nothing pedantic or assuming in Jowett; but his personal attitude to his friends was undoubtedly affected by the fact that he had so long absorbed himself in the work of a college tutor and that so many of his friends were his former pupils. In reading over his letters one is conscious that he lived under a certain strain of responsibility, and that he was always thinking how by warning or encouragement he might give a stimulus to their energies. Though often masked by humor or playfulness, there rarely fails some word aimed with subtle intention and intelligent sympathy at the strength or weakness of his correspondent. This freedom of speech, however, rarely gave offence, supported as it was by an evident personal interest in those he was addressing. The superficial sympathy we usually give to our friends is often one of the cheapest forms of self-indulgence, and it is something rare to meet with one who refuses to sympathize except on the highest terms, or whose sympathy is at the same time a kind of demand that we should continue to deserve it. Jowett's motto was always, "Love without weakness."

Jowett's intellectual characteristics it is perhaps even harder to describe. Like many men at the present time, he started with certain strong beliefs which he had gradually to disentangle from their earliest form and to remould by conscious reflection. Born in a circle which was deeply influenced by the methodistic pietism of the last century, he retained throughout life much of its religious spirit, even when he had ceased to hold by many of the doctrines of its creed. Hence, he never could see in Sacerdotalism anything but superstition; or, if for a time he was impressed by the early fervors of the Tractarian movement, he very soon reacted against it. His religious feeling was concentrated upon the inner life, and hardly depended in any degree upon outward forms; and his creed tended with the advance of years to become less definite and to gather itself up in one or two comprehensive articles—in a belief in the existence of God and in the

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Christ-ideal. It may be said of him in the language of Tennyson, who, perhaps, gave the nearest expression to Jowett's religious ideas, that "his faith had centre everywhere, nor cared to fix itself to form." He had learnt the full lesson of modern criticism on its negative side, and did not much trust its attempts at reconstruction; and what he substituted for the positive doctrines of which it deprived him was not a new system of belief, but rather an intuitive apprehension of the ethical and religious aspects of life. This practical faith of his showed itself in many subtle and penetrative utterances, but he never tried, and never perhaps cared, to reduce it to one connected and coherent statement. In fact, his mind had no affinity for system of any kind, and having cast off his early dogmatism, he hardly felt the need of any substitute for it. Thus he seemed to find it easiest to breathe in an atmosphere of thought which was too rare for others, and the effort after system and connection of ideas appeared to him rather as an attempt to bind the spirit than as the satisfaction of an intellectual want. His treatment of great questions never takes the form of an attempt to think them out consecutively, but rather of a series of glances at truth from various points of view, even sometimes from points of view somewhat inconsistent with each other (a good example may be found in his remarks on the ideal and the real Christ given on p. 85 of the "Life," vol. ii., or those on "The New Christianity" on p. 311 of the same volume). Perhaps we might express his mental attitude by saying that he had a sense or feeling of the whole, but that he had no definite wish or tendency to raise this feeling into thought. Hence, what was for him a satisfactory expression of his convictions might seem to others like a collection of ἀπορίαι, or conflicting views that wait for reconciliation. From philosophy, especially the philosophies of Plato and Hegel, he gained much, but he seemed hardly to care for their dialectic or for their effort after intellectual synthesis, but only for their manifold views of life and their fertile suggestions as to man's spiritual nature and history. What indeed he prized most in other writers was what is the best in his own work, the inspired gleams of

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insight, the vivid and epigrammatic expressions of particular aspects of truth, and he prized them still more if they were lighted up with a touch of humor.

In modification of this view it may be stated—what the biography has made clear—that there was a considerable though gradual change in Jowett's intellectual attitude as he grew older. In the earlier part of his life he was eager to direct students to the new sources of thought opened by the German philosophy and theology. It may be said that for many years the leading interest of his life and the chief object of his writings was that the Church of England should be brought face to face with the results of science and historical criticism, and should be prepared to accept any change in the traditional views which was necessitated thereby. The greatest danger to the religious and ethical life of England, he was never weary of repeating, lay in a rooted carelessness about the truth. His attitude of mind is very vividly presented in some of the letters written at the time when he was contemplating the project of a second series of "Essays and Reviews." (See xxii., pp. 440–444.) Nor can it be said that at any time he substantially modified, still less directly renounced, this way of thinking. But it can hardly be doubted that after he became Master of the College, the practical tendency gained more and more predominance over the speculative or scientific tendency. The question, "What will make these young men effective and useful in their future life?" seemed to become all-important, till it hardly left room for an interest—or, at least, for the former keenness of interest—in truth for itself. This was even a cause of difference as to the methods of education between him and men like Green who agreed with him most nearly in their general aims of life. In particular, Jowett became increasingly jealous of metaphysical and theological speculation, which seemed to him often to carry men away so far from the beaten path that they ceased to be able to reconcile themselves to the conditions of the ordinary work of life. And he was not willing to admit that any such danger must be incurred in teaching them to live for ideal aims. In connection with this I may refer to a curious double im-

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pression which Jowett produced upon those around him. To many who did not come into very close relations with him, he seemed to be too much a man of the world, whose highest aim for those in whom he was interested lay in the direction of outward and tangible success, first in the schools and then in their profession. He seemed even to allow his personal judgment of individuals to be too much affected by such success. On the other hand, upon his inner circle of friends he produced a unique impression of unworldliness, of delicate purity of soul, and remoteness from ordinary motives. Both impressions were founded upon truth. Jowett certainly lived, if any one ever lived, the ideal life, in continual effort after perfection in himself and others. In not a few of his later letters he seems even to rejoice, like Plato's Cephalos, in old age, because of its freedom from selfish fears and hopes, almost because it leaves nothing to live for but the good of others. Yet on the other hand he seemed in thinking of the future life of his pupils to cling to immediate advantages and successes, to regard them as the main opportunities for efficiency and usefulness, and to be nervously afraid of any line of study or action which would bring with it an immediate failure. The real source, however, of this apparent worldliness of view was the fear lest young men should waste life in dreams or mar it by impracticableness. It may be doubted whether in some cases Jowett did not carry this fear too far and give legitimate ground for misunderstanding. But the mistake, if it was a mistake, was mainly due to an effort to get beyond the usual conventional separation of the Church from the world or of the pursuit of ideal ends from practical usefulness.

Jowett was one of the few men who leave upon us the distinct stamp of an individual force without any weakening of the outline by the intrusion of what is conventional and commonplace. His intellectual and moral originality, his single-minded devotion to public ends,—above all, to the well-being of the University and the College over which he presided,—his integrity and consistency with himself, his great powers of working and getting others to work for the objects he sought, his wonderful memory for the characters and cir-

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cumstances of his old pupils and his steadfast interest in their welfare—these, with all the individual traits of severity and gentleness, of earnestness and humor, which characterized him, indelibly impressed the image of his personality upon all with whom he was brought into near relations. Perhaps not the least remarkable of his gifts, and that which prevented him from being ever less than himself, was his courage. Few men had a better claim to have inscribed on their graves the epitaph which the Regent Morton pronounced upon John Knox: "Here lies one who never feared the face of mortal man." So marked a character and so resolute a will could not fail sometimes to excite opposition, and oftentimes to be misunderstood. Some found him a dangerous opponent, others a severe critic who did not hesitate to say what he thought without sparing or disguise; and he had undoubtedly imperious ways, which excited a natural irritation. But no one could come near enough to see him as he really was without being impressed with the purity and dignity of his character and the fixity of his resolve to subordinate every personal consideration to public ends. His so-called worldliness was, as I have indicated, in the main due to a persistent effort to bring ideal aims into the practical life of the world. Perhaps in this point of view we might fairly regard him as one of the first examples of a new type of human character in which the sagacity and efficiency of the man of the world was combined with a devotion to the well-being of others such as has not often been surpassed by any of the Saints.

EDWARD CAIRD.

BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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THE RELATION OF PESSIMISM TO ULTIMATE PHILOSOPHY.

THE object of this paper will be to show that logically Pessimism should be taken in a far wider and more fundamental sense than is commonly assigned to it, and that when this is done, it forms an attitude towards the ultimate questions of philosophy which is not susceptible of being resolved into any other, and cannot be refuted, but only accepted or rejected.

In attempting to establish this view, it will be convenient to start by determining what we are to understand by the term Pessimism. It has been customary to subordinate the treatment of the subject too much to the particular views of representative pessimist writers, and to pay too little regard to the logical connection of the pessimist positions. Hence, a belief has become current that Pessimism might be summed up in the assertion that life was not worth living, because in it the pains predominated over the pleasures, and the whole question was thus rendered one of the possibility and result of the hedonistic calculus. Now, it is true that the doctrines of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann lend themselves to such a narrowing of the issue, but I believe that it is possible to demonstrate the essential shallowness and logical inadequacy of a transition which is psychologically so easy as to have been made almost universally.

In the argument that life is not worth living because it involves an excess of pain, the second clause states a reason for the first, and, if it is proved, the conclusion inevitably follows. What has not been observed, however, is that even if it should *not* be proved, the conclusion may yet be true, because it may rest on other reasons. To argue that because one ground for a conclusion is unsound, the conclusion itself cannot be established, would evidently be nothing else than the familiar logical fallacy of denying the antecedent—until it has been shown that no other grounds are possible. But this is not

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the case here. The condemnation of life, which Pessimism essays to pronounce, does not necessarily rest on a single basis: it forms an attitude of thought which has been linked with the assertion of the predominance of pain only by an accident of historical development. It is quite possible to condemn life on various grounds without holding it to be predominantly painful. It is possible to condemn it, not because it has too little pleasure, but because it has too little of the other ends which are recognized as good in themselves, because it has too little virtue or knowledge or beauty or duration. Life may shock us into a denial of its value also by its moral, its æsthetic, its intellectual deficiencies: it may seem so brief, so nauseatingly petty and contemptible that the game is not worth the candle. In all such cases the Pessimism cuts itself adrift from its supposed hedonist basis, and, even where the hedonist standard is retained, it need not be of an egoistic character. It may be sympathy with the misery of others that tempts us like the Buddha, like the Preacher in Thomson's "City of Dreadful Night," to condemn life. Again, it is possible to argue, more subtly, that the unhappiness is the effect rather than the cause of the worthlessness of life. It is "not that life is valueless because it is unhappy, but that it is unhappy because it is valueless." But what enables man thus to apply to life the standards by which it is condemned? Nothing surely but the fact that he is capable of framing an ideal of worth, an ideal of something worth striving for and of holding it up to reality as a mirror in which to behold its deficiencies. It is because we form ideal standards which alone bestow true value upon life, that we can condemn it because it nowhere allows us to attain perfect happiness or full knowledge or complete goodness or æsthetic harmony.

Now, it is evident that the deficiencies in life which the formation of those ideals enables us to detect will act as a potent stimulus to progress so long as the deficiencies seem comparatively small and the ideals appear attainable; if, however, we allow our ideals to outgrow our means of reaching them, the chasm between them and the actual will become

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too deep to be bridged by hope; we shall despair of attaining our heart's desire and bitterly condemn the inadequacy of the actual. Thus Pessimism will ever hover like a dark cloud over the path of progress, ready to oppress with gloom alike the cowardice that despairs and the temerity that outstrips, prematurely and recklessly, the limitations of the practicable. It is a natural and almost inevitable phase in spiritual development, which results whenever any object of desire is found to be unattainable, and it has no exclusive affinity for the details of a pettifogging calculation of probable pleasures and pains. The sole reason why the question of Pessimism has mostly been debated on a hedonistic basis is because Happiness is the one ideal which is universally comprehended, which allures by its elusive glitter even the coarsest and most commonplace of men.

Having thus freed Pessimism from its entanglement in hedonistic disputes, we may proceed to determine its deepest nature. That nature would seem to consist in the denial of the *value* of life, in whatever terms and by whatever standards it may be formulated. If Pessimism springs from the experience of pain, it will deny the value of life because happiness is unattainable; if from moral indignation, because goodness is unattainable; if from æsthetic disgust, because beauty is unattainable; if from scepticism, because knowledge is unattainable. But in each case the value of life will be denied. It makes no difference to Pessimism whether a man despair because the world is so miserable, or so bad, or so hideous, or so inscrutable.

It follows from this that Pessimism is essentially a certain definite attitude towards the great and well-recognized class of judgments which are known as judgments of Value (*Werturteile*). Now, judgments of Value are possible about everything that is experienced, and are contrasted with judgments of Fact in that they do not inquire what a thing *is*, but what it *is worth*. And, like the judgments of Fact, alike whether they are ethical, æsthetical, or merely emotional or affective, they are primarily relative,—*i.e.*, they assert that something has value for this purpose or that, for this aspect or that of

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human nature. But just as the logical judgments must ultimately be accommodated in a coherent *system* of Truth, so the judgments of Value must ultimately all be referred to some supremely valuable end of action, or *Summum Bonum.* It will be possible then to estimate life as a Whole by this supreme standard of Value, and to discuss whether it satisfies it or not.

As the result of such discussion, only three alternatives seem thinkable:

I. We may conclude that Life is adequate to the attainment of the supreme end of action, and that, consequently, it has value and is worth living. That is the position taken by every form of Optimism.

II. We may decide that Life is inadequate to meet the requirements of the standard applied to it; that, consequently, it has no value, and so is not worth living. That is the conclusion implied in every form of Pessimism.

III. We may object on principle to the attempt to answer the question, and contend that it should not be raised, arguing, *e.g.*, that it does not follow from the fact that the value of everything in life may be determined, that we can determine the value of life as a whole. That may be called the *agnostic* or—with a reference to the Kantian denial of metaphysics and its analogous answer to the ultimate question of knowledge—the *critical* answer.

It is worth pointing out that these three modes of treating the ultimate question of Value correspond exactly to the ultimate modes of answering the question as to the ultimate Fact. We answer the final problem of theoretic knowledge also in three ways: (1) We may declare that existence is ultimately knowable, and explain its nature in more or less tentative systems of constructive metaphysics. (2) We may deny that in the end anything can be known. That is the sceptical attitude. (3) We may protest that human knowledge is not competent to solve its ultimate problems, and has no right to raise the question. That is the attitude of a "Criticism" for which the ultimate metaphysical truth is shrouded in the unfathomable obscurity of the Thing-in-itself, and which, Tan-

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talus-like, is yet forever tormented by the phantom of a satisfaction which it believes to be hopelessly beyond its reach.

Whichever kind of ultimate question, then, we raise, whether that of the nature of ultimate facts or that of their valuation, three alternatives seem possible. But we can hardly avoid asking further whether they are all equally tenable. That is a difficult question which I cannot here discuss exhaustively. The proper academic thing to do would be, I suppose, either to evade an answer altogether or to decide in favor of the third alternative,—which is nearly as unsatisfactory as no answer at all,—and to finish up with a learned sneer at those who venture on "dogmatic" conclusions. But, for once, I should like to dare to be dogmatic—at least to some extent —and to indicate some reasons for eliminating that third alternative.

For it seems to me that it reduces itself to the second, that "no answer" is equivalent to an answer in the negative. Nor can I see why, if judgments of Value are rightly and properly made, they should not be applicable to the scheme of things as a whole. Certainly we make this assumption in the case of the judgments of intellectual Value,—*i.e.*, in determining the value of our judgments of Fact. We assume that because judgments of relative truth and falsity are made, the former can ultimately be fitted into a coherent and congruous system of Truth. But if we are entitled to hold that there is Truth, and not merely judgments relatively true,—in other words, that the ideal of Truth is valid of Reality,—why should we not be equally entitled to affirm an equal validity for the ideals of Goodness and Happiness? If Experience as a whole can be judged true or false, coherent or incoherent, why should it not be judged as a whole good or bad? At all events, it cannot be taken for granted, without attempt at argument, that human judgments of good and bad mean nothing to the whole, while (equally human) judgments of true and false may be relied upon to extract its inmost mysteries.

And, moreover, the attempt to draw such a distinction would seem to break down even on the theoretic side. Granted that our theoretical account of the world had denied

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to judgments of Value all ultimate significance, yet the fact would remain that such judgments were made and formed an integral part of life. They would remain, therefore, as an inexplicable factor in the world. And the more we realized the importance of this factor and the manner in which it permeates all our activities and directs even the intellect which is seeking to deny it, the more doubtful we should become whether we had explained anything while we left this unexplained. That is, we should inevitably be impelled towards scepticism on the theoretic side, and the practical reflex of scepticism is, as I have elsewhere shown, nothing else than Pessimism.*

It remains to ask whether the problems of Value or of Fact are more ultimate, and whether ultimately the one may not be subordinated to the other. I believe that they may and must, although once more I can only very briefly indicate the ground for this conclusion. I shall confine myself to observing that ἡ διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, that the human mind is essentially purposive, that in its activity the judgments and ideals of Value supply the motive power to the judgments of Fact, and that, in the absence of anything valuable to be reached by them, no reason can be assigned why such judgments should be made. Hence, judgments of Fact, in spite of their apparent logical independence, seem psychologically to be rendered possible by and rest on judgments of Value, and the question, What is life worth? becomes the most ultimate of all. Thus, with respect to that question, Optimism and Pessimism seem to supply the sole alternatives; nor does it seem feasible still further to reduce their multiplicity to unity by alleging any formal ground for subordinating Pessimism to Optimism. For, as we have seen, the same ideals which, while they are regarded as attainable, confer Value upon existence, once they are despaired of, plunge us into irremediable Pessimism. The most that can be said is that just as in logical judgments negation results from the failure of an affirmation, just as scepticism springs from a painfully

* "Riddles of the Sphinx," ch. 3, 4.

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achieved distrust of knowledge, so Pessimism is always *secondary*, and results from the breakdown of some optimistic scheme of Value. But even so it would seem to follow that Pessimism must be theoretically possible so long as such a scheme of Value can be felt to be inadequate and rejected; that is, so long as there persists a breach between the ideal and the actual.

What, then, is the practical conclusion to which the argument conducts us? It has vindicated for the question of Pessimism a position of paramount theoretic importance which would entail a far more serious treatment than is generally accorded to it in the teaching of philosophy. And in view of the vast accumulations of uncoördinated and uncorrelated knowledge which Philosophy has in these days to think over and digest, in order that mankind may not utterly lose its bearings in the cosmos, philosophers may well shrink from taking up the burden of a problem of such magnitude and difficulty as that of Pessimism. But even if Philosophy could renounce its task of giving a rational account of every phase of experience, I should yet hesitate to hold that its acceptance of this problem would be pure loss, or in the end would prove detrimental to its true interests. To assume responsibility is potentially to acquire power, and no question is better calculated than this of Pessimism to make Philosophy a power in human life, for none can bring it into closer contact with the actual problems of men's lives. And does not the whole history of its past show that Philosophy has never been more flourishing and influential than in periods when it has seemed to make some response to the outcry of the human soul to the question, What shall I do to be saved? If, then, Philosophy takes courage to do its duty, if it addresses itself to the question of the Value of Life and grapples with the Demon of Despair that besets the souls of so many, who shall say that there is not still in store for it a career of unexampled splendor among the forces that mould the destinies of mankind?

F. C. S. Schiller.

Cornell University.

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OUR SOCIAL AND ETHICAL SOLIDARITY.

SOCIETY is now generally conceived as an organism. This conception has come to include not only the ordered externalities of social life, but also the vital interdependence of the individuals constituting the social community.

The proof of the organic solidarity of the divers components that make up society is here based on more or less salient points of analogy obtaining between the social fabric and the vital structure of the living individuals composing it. On the strength of it society is declared to consist of interdependently functioning units, in essentially the same manner as an animal is seen to consist of interdependently functioning integrant units of texture.

It is true our mere living together, in mutual dependence on one another's divers social functions, suggests of itself the conception of organization. And in this sense Aristotle already looked upon man as a born ξῶον πολιτικον, as constitutionally a member of a body politic, much in the same way as ants, bees, and other animals are constitutionally of a social nature.

Other philosophers, however, have, on the contrary, firmly believed that man lived originally in a state of nature in which no social community existed,—a social compact having been subsequently entered into by conscious agreement between the individuals taking part in it. And who can tell whether primitive man may not have roamed the forests singly or in pairs like other wild animals.

Now it is by no means a matter of indifference to human welfare what kind of idea prevails among us regarding the nature of the bond which links us socially together. To become convinced of the practical importance of current conceptions of society, we need only remember what eminently effective parts the theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau have actually played in modern history.

Indeed, the puzzle where the constitutional limits of sepa-

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rate individuality end, and where those of collective sociality begin, has perplexed not only biologists in their peaceful pursuits, but has involved mankind at large in interminable fratricidal contentions.

Social organizations, such as church and state, have conjointly or separately struggled to be recognized as the veritable body of which human individuals are mere subordinate members; in which they were indeed expected wholly to merge their individual being. Against such sweeping pretension the enrolled individuals have from time to time risen to assert their personal autonomy. Of such individualistic revolt puritanism and democracy are conspicuous examples.

In our own day the divers and often seriously clashing claims of individualism and socialism are pressing more urgently than ever for rational consideration. It is, therefore, not irrelevant to inquire whether the prevalent conception of society being an organism can help us effectively to harmonize those seemingly antagonistic claims.

When at present society is declared to be an organism, it is not meant that the individuals composing it have consciously organized it; nor merely that they are by nature destined to live in social communion. It is meant that we human beings by force of our ingrained constitution form of necessity part of an integral social structure in essentially the same manner as the sundry organs of a living being, or its sundry structural units form part of an integral vital structure.

This out-and-out organic interpretation of society is evidently pregnant with momentous practical implications. Before actually adopting it for practical guidance, it behooves us, therefore, to make sure that it is true to nature, that the theoretical conception corresponds to reality.

It amounts here to no radical difference whether the analogy drawn between the organic interdependence of human beings in society and the interdependence of the parts in the vital organism be considered as obtaining in the sphere of pure intelligence, as stoutly maintained by idealists, or whether it be considered to obtain primordially in the sense-revealed constitution of the human organism and its social medium, as

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insisted upon by naturalists. In both cases the conception is based on our experience of the only organic structure we have directly knowledge of, and this is the perceptible body of organic beings.

In order to establish a correct analogy between the vital and the social organism, we have consequently first to ascertain by what means the sundry organs or the sundry ultimate units come to form integrant parts of the organism as a whole, and how they come to exercise their divers functions in co-operative subserviency to its needs as an integral being. Without this positive information we are hardly in a position to use the analogy in elucidation of the true nature of society, much less to employ it for the practical purpose of shaping social institution in agreement with it.

It does here nowise suffice to shift the analogy to be established into the barren realm of formal logic, where the relation of constituent parts to a conceptual whole can in a general way be deductively determined. Nor does it suffice to assume outright that, as the organism is an indiscerptible totality whose constituent parts receive their significance solely from their relation to the whole, so in the same manner has society to be regarded as an indiscerptible totality whose constituent units receive their significance solely from their relation to the whole. It would be no less futile to attempt to deduce logically from the formal relation of parts to a whole the actual relation of individuals to society than it would be to attempt to deduce in the same way the relation of the liver or the brain to the organism of which they form part. And, on the other hand, it seems rather questionable whether a cook or a lawgiver can rightly be said to be related to society in essentially the same way as the liver or the brain are related to the organism. A cook or a lawgiver do obviously not exist exclusively as means towards an end to be attained outside themselves, as is actually the case with the liver and the brain.

Human beings form constituent units of society, not merely by force of the interdependency of their divers external functions, but also, and more radically still, by force of their mental

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interdependence. It is, in fact, exclusively through such mental interdependence, through such innate dependence of humanly organized minds upon one another for their very existence as such, and for the possible efficiency of their function; it is through this mutual dependency of their minds upon one another that men are social and ethical beings. Without it man would be a soulless, thoughtless, irresponsible animal, and human society and its ethical bearings non-existent.

Here, in our search after the true foundation of social and ethical solidarity, we are confronted by the much-vexed yet still open problem, how different units come to be constitutionally destined to enter into interdependent relations so as aimfully to form an organically efficient whole. How, in our case, a separate human individual comes to be so constituted as to form a complemental part in the composition of the larger whole called society. This consideration of innate reciprocal dependence in the constitution of a larger whole involves the entire teleological riddle, the puzzle,—namely, how the integral constitution of a whole, eventually to be formed, can possibly act as a so-called final cause, act as the chief determining cause of the nature, disposition, and function of the constituent units that enter into its formation.

Kant sought to argue away teleology in nature by declaring it to be a peculiar mode of our conception of a certain order of things. He held that every occurrence in nature being strictly dependent on immediate or so-called efficient causation, final causation could not possibly enter into the system of nature. And recently, much in the way of Empedocles of old, natural selection has been believed more particularly to reduce all seeming teleology in organic nature to mechanical or, at least, to efficient causation. In fact, the principal aim of our present scientific interpretation of nature is to attribute all its occurrences to adequate mechanical causation.

Natural science, when it interprets organization as resulting thus simply from a peculiar rearrangement of so many pre-existing material units moved by so much pre-existing energy,

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misses in its explanation all that is most essential to an adequate understanding of the case. To be told that we consist of nothing but a peculiar rearrangement of so many indestructible atoms of C, O, H, and N, moved by so many units of indestructible energy, is hardly more in keeping with the real state of things than to be told that we consist of nothing but such utterly evanescent stuff as consciousness is made of. The fact here overlooked, the essential fact, is that in the process of organic development new modes of aimful energy, manifest in specific modes of vital reaction of the organism in relation to its medium, come creatively into existence. All that is most characteristic of vital organization and its activity, all that constitutes its specific nature, merges thus newly produced into being, resulting from potencies not previously realized. This amounts not altogether to a creation out of nothing; but it is a coming into existence of efficiencies previously non-existent.

It is evident that—explain it as we may—a living being in relation to its organic and inorganic environment is found to be out and out teleologically developed. Its organization is preconcertedly constituted for life in a specific medium. And the development of an organism from a reproductive germ is obviously teleologically predetermined by the nature of the organism to be developed therefrom. The exact plan of the whole being, eventually to be formed as a product of nature, enters here somehow as a final cause in its reproduction.

The question now is, how far society can in the same sense be said to be the final cause of its own organization. We have to find out how far the nature of the individuals constituting society and the disposition of its external appurtenances are determined by itself as an integral entity.

It seems certain that groups of human beings, living without mutual contact in different localities, tend to fall into essentially similar organization, mentally and physically. This sameness of social organization, with its all but identical outcomes in culture, is a fact so striking in its broad features and even in its minute details, that it can be only accounted

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for by assuming inherent tendencies in human nature necessarily leading to it.

Viewed in this light, the analogy between society and the vital organism would, however, hold good, not as between the organic interdependence of the constituent units of society and that of the constituent elements of the organism, but between the gradual development of social life and the phyletic development of living beings in relation to their environment. The so-called growth of society can therefore not rightly be compared to the growth of an individual organism, but only to the development of vital organization in the course of phyletic evolution.

This, however, is not what is generally meant when society is said to be an organism. It is then meant that society is constituted by individual men falling conjointly into the formation of a definite "superorganic" structure in essentially the same way as the individual elements of our body fall conjointly into the formation of its organic structure.

This altogether fatalistic and automatic interpretation of the organization of society was rendered doubly plausible when the leading analogy had been reversed by biologists. This time it was the established state or social community which in its turn had to serve as prototype in the attempt analogically to illustrate the nature of vital organization. The living organism was now declared to be in all verity a social community, in which a vast number of autonomous individuals, the so-called cells, are dividing among themselves the divers functions that have to be performed in order to keep the organism as a whole in efficient trim.

Under this aspect the teleological riddle grew more perplexing than ever. For it remained utterly incomprehensible how a vast assemblage of divers autonomous beings, wholly devoid of perception and conception, could possibly range themselves in perfect preconcerted order, so as faithfully to reproduce together the highly complex unitary organization of a definite prototype, and then minister diversely and yet conjointly to its needs as an indiscerptible being.

This view, amounting to a miraculous consensus of uncon-

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scious agents, was nevertheless almost inevitably forced upon investigators, when under the microscope the complex organism was seen to be composed of seemingly independent cell-beings, and was observed to be developed from a germ-cell through its multiplication by means of cumulative self-division. However incomprehensible the fact, and indeed ludicrous the idea, that highly organized beings,—our own unitary being with all its exalted faculties among the rest,—that these high-wrought lives were after all only automatically constituted assemblages of myriads of all but senseless elementary animalcules; however personally degrading; this eminently mystical view came by force of seemingly correct observation to be, nevertheless, the established doctrine concerning vital organization.

Lately, however, the complete organic equipment of so-called unicellular beings, together with the discovery that the protoplasm, the living substance, of plants and animals, forms in reality a continuous substratum of life; these significant experiences have effectively disproved the theory that the complex organism consists of elementary autonomous constituents, and have led to the far more satisfactory conclusion that the organism is a unitary being. As Strassburger expresses it: "Dass somit die Pflanze ähnlich wie das Thier einen einheitlichen, lebendigen Organismus bildet."

Herewith the analogy sought to be established between society and its constituent human units on the one side and the organism and its constituent cell-units on the other side, breaks completely down and may be definitely dismissed.

Vital organization is not brought about like social organization through the consensus of autonomous units. It is wrought within a unitary being, whose organic differentiations and specifications were gradually elaborated through interaction with the medium. The end of vital organization is realized in the co-operative efficiency of its constituents parts in total subserviency to the organism as an integral being, whilst the true end of social organization among us human beings is realized in the social consciousness of each constituent individual.

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As regards the social solidarity of lower animals, it would seem hardly more dependent on the social consciousness of the constituent individuals, than the begetting of their offspring and the elaborately aimful provisions for its future welfare. Here preservation of the individual and the race appears to be the only concern of social as well as of individual life.

In this connection it may be plausibly asserted that social faculties, though manifest as conscious states, are in fact developed through vital interaction with the medium in which man finds himself cast, just as organic structure is developed through vital interaction with a given medium; and that, consequently, social as well as vital development are, after all, merely effects of efficient causation into which no final causation, no preconcerted organic plan, nor volitional direction on our part, enter as determining factors. Under this aspect, a power, not ourselves, and outside the organism, seems to be shaping social and ethical development.

We are thus brought face to face with the inmost mystery of teleology, from which with inevitable philosophical insistence all prototypal and archetypal world conceptions emanate, such as Platonism, Hegelianism, and their innumerable modifications.

It is, at least, clear that in so-called evolution, phyletic and social, no such pre-existing structural prototype is giving direction to their formative tendencies, as is found to be the case with regard to the formative tendencies of the reproductive germ of an organism. Notwithstanding the current contention as to the priority of the hen or the egg, it is certain that the pre-established structure of the hen enters somehow as the principal determining factor in the development of the egg into a chicken. The egg derives its definite formative tendencies from the fully-developed organism of which it has formed part, and in this way the structural plan of the pre-existing organism acts as final cause in the development of its reproductive germ.

Nothing remotely resembling this absolute dependence on what is to be developed upon what has already been devel-

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oped takes place in phyletic and social evolution. Here something is, as it were, tentatively striving to be developed which has no pre-existing prototype from which it derives its formative tendencies.

This fact of creative new-becoming, belonging so completely to a different order from that of mere reproduction, has to be well borne in mind if we desire to arrive at correct conclusions concerning development in general. No profounder, no more essential distinction can be found in the entire compass of nature. Progressive organic development, bringing social development along with it, has to be regarded as an actual realization of a higher mode of being by means of formative tendencies, which are not merely reproducing something already realized, but that lie latent and unfulfilled in whatever it may be which is constituting and energizing the perceptible world. Somehow there must potentially dwell in the primordial world material, if that which eventually comes to affect our senses may so be called; there must dwell in it a capacity of developing under the toilsome stress of interaction into higher and higher modes of being.

In contemplating the fact of actual new formation or aimful creative development, it lies near to transcend altogether the sphere of physical causation, efficient and final. Some directing efficiency of a hyper-physical kind seems here planfully to force the given world-material into definite, higher combinations, evidenced by higher modes of activity. To account for this teleological elaboration, the usual recourse is to seek to establish an analogy between our own intelligent formation and volitional execution of plans and a similar though far more exalted activity on the part of a supreme Intelligence. The apparently unconscious teleological construction of the objects constituting the perceptible universe is then held to be effected in conformity with a pre-existing plan in the mind of a supreme Artificer. Or, as extreme idealists will have it, our own imperfect striving after totality of comprehension, giving rise to the illusive time-and-space world of sense apparitions, has its pre-existing archetype in the eternal totality of universal Intelligence in which all existence is teleologically

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unified. Whether our intelligent comprehension of creation can, however, rightly be said to have any affinity with the activity of an intelligence, by force of whose potency creation is actually realized, depends upon the validity of the analogy between our merely reproductively apprehending intelligence and a productively creating potency.

The immediate question before us is, Have we legitimate reason to conclude, by force of analogy with our own doings, that a preconcerted plan in the mind of a supreme Artificer is being volitionally executed in vital and social development? Are vital and social development the result of design on the part of a supreme Intelligence?

Let us examine with unbiased scrutiny what actual resemblance there can be traced between the relation of our mental plans to their structural realization on the one hand and the agencies actually operative in vital and social development on the other. Here we have to be careful not to allow our reasoning to be entangled in a "vicious circle." With Kant we have to admit that we cannot legitimately use the analogy between our aimful execution of plans and the aimful construction of natural products to prove the existence of a supreme Artificer, and then, *vice versa*, assume the existence of a supreme Artificer in order to explain the aimful construction of natural products.*

Analogical reasoning has to proceed from what is directly known to what is to be explained thereby. Now, can there rightly be said to exist the remotest likeness between the action of our intelligence and volition upon our natural surroundings and the constructive agencies operative in their actual production?

It is not difficult to perceive that an impassable gulf is di-

* "When in natural science and its contents there is introduced the concept of Deity to explain design in nature, and such natural design is then again used to prove the existence of a Deity, there is left no true inward consistency in either science." ("Theology and Natural Science.") "This delusive reasoning in a circle brings uncertainty to both by confusing their limits." ("Kritik d. Teleolog. Urtheilskraft," "Von dem Princip der Teleologie als innerem Princip der Naturwissenschaft.")

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viding the intelligent and volitional use we make of the agencies we find already operative in the perceptible universe, and the process by which these agencies attain their constructive results. We can, for instance, informed by previous experience, set out with the aim of "producing" water by bringing together oxygen and hydrogen, and sending an electric shock through the mixture. But our intelligence and volition, as mental states, have nothing whatever in common with that which is active in the constructive transformation which in reality takes place. They add no kind of efficiency to the natural agencies, nor are they in any way akin to them. Our intelligence and our volition are, in fact, utterly powerless to impart the least actual efficiency to natural objects. All efficiency manifest in nature is inherent in the perceptible world-material, and cannot be placed in remotest analogy with any kind of mental faculty. Whatever is efficiently underlying actual creation has no sameness of nature with what we know as our intelligence and volition.*

When we construct an edifice, or are said to create a work of art, we utilize in the execution of the mental plan existing substances and their given properties. Everything which imparts actual efficiency to these substances, and enduring reality to the constructed work, is inherent in the perceptible material. Previous experience enables us mentally to forecast arrangements and effects attainable by manipulating the given material in definite ways. In such manipulation machinery may play as effective a part as our own motor organs. Our activity in

* It is altogether on the mistaken ascription of constitutive power to our in reality forceless intelligence that transcendental Idealism is based. In fact, nothing of purely mental consistency has the least constitutive power in nature. Intelligence does nowise constitute nature, neither in Kant's limited sense, nor in Hegel's thoroughgoing version. It merely apprehends symbolically the representative system of nature organically constituted in us during phyletic evolution, and revealed as our mental microcosm in our lapsing moments of conscious awareness. And as our own mentality is utterly powerless to constitute anything in nature, or to affect as such other beings, it stands to reason that an analogically hypostatized mind of whatever highest order must necessarily be just as powerless to constitute anything in nature or to affect other beings. Consequently, transcendental Idealism is a radically mistaken world-conception.

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the construction of works of industry or art is, therefore, so far as efficient energy is concerned, a matter of mere mechanical co-operation. Nothing of the nature of mind enters as efficient energy into the process. Mind, as such, furnishes us merely with a representative ideal forecast of the work to be executed. It affords but a forceless inner awareness of what in reality has been, or can be, wrought through the forces by which perceptible objects exist and are visibly transformed.

We are beings organized out and out in correlation to our environment; beings endowed with a representative consciousness in which random time-scattered experience becomes systematized and available as memory, enabling us to construct ideal forecasts. Such ideal forecasts are, however, realizable only in measure as they correspond to potentialities immanent in outside nature; potentialities that may become actual through our disposition of the efficiencies involving them.

Our volition, as a coefficient factor in nature, consists solely in the organic power we have of moving at will certain of our organs, those, namely, which bring us into direct relation with the outside world. It is this organic faculty of motor self-determination that enables us to use our representative mental microcosm as guidance in our vital intercourse with the outside world. In order to execute a certain plan, we perform a definite series of voluntary movements in agreement with the representative mental forecast. And we succeed in measure as the forecast has been truly representative of results attainable through efficiencies appertaining to the mentally symbolized reality.

We are conscious of the existence and efficiencies of the extra-mental macrocosm only through the representative mental microcosm which phyletic and individual experience have organized in us. In order to conduct ourselves sanely, judiciously, fruitfully, our mental view has of necessity to correspond to the efficiencies underlying extra-mental reality.

Intelligence and volition, however marvellous their function in the economy of life, are, after all, but vicarious manifesta-

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tions. Their conscious play affords but a system of signs symbolic of our relation to a transcendent reality,—a reality whose creative potency is welling beyond all consciousness from the inscrutable source of being and becoming. It is certain, then, that nothing analogous to what we know as our intelligence can possibly be efficient as constitutive energy in vital and social organization. Intelligence can therefore nowise be attributed to the efficiencies that constitute the perceptible world.

Yet it is very evident that these same efficiencies may, for all this, be made to produce effects upon us not belonging to their purely physical activity,—effects that are essentially intellectual. A phonograph sets going mechanically a specially graduated series of vibrations. These have only an infinitesimal mechanical effect on the extra-mental world. To a human hearer they may convey information of exceeding importance. A work of art has for the artistically susceptible an ideal import incommensurably transcending the physical efficiencies which constitute its sense-compelling existence in the outside world. It is clear, then, that if to us human beings sense-aroused perceptions are only vicariously significative of the transcendent extra-mental reality compelling them, it is also true that the sense-compelling efficiences of the extra-mental world may come to serve us, *vice versa*, as mere signs symbolic of a transcendent mental significance. In fact, human culture is out and out wrought by means of external signs significative of mental affections.

Of these symbolic means of expression and communication linguistic signs are by far the most potent. They are so by being always and everywhere produceable at will, and by being through organic association significative of the sundry constituents of our mental microcosm. So important are they that they constitute the medium through which our thinking is not merely conveyed, but actually realized.

Our intelligence, far from being itself a reality-constituting power, is, in fact, dependent for its very existence and actual condition on embodiment in symbolic signs furnished by the sense-affecting efficiences of the extra-mental world. Elimi-

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nate all extra-mental means of expression and where could our vaunted intelligence be found?

Only by means of physical signs can we intelligently realize and intelligibly express and communicate the imperceptible experiences of our inner life. It is solely through such volitional designation by discriminative signs that we intelligently apperceive the existence, the relations, and the import of the multifarious constituents of our conscious microcosm, as it emanates from its organic matrix.

It is incontestable that the present mental condition of our race has been gradually attained through a process of incessant interaction, carried on by innumerable generations between their organic being and the outside world, including, of course, interaction with kindred beings. Mental organization has indivisibly formed part of the organic elaboration of our entire being. Its special existence is obviously a result of the same process of progressive creation of which our entire organic being is the perceptible outcome.

The real import of this our being, its own worth in the scale of existence, as victoriously established through its vital toil in interaction with the world at large; this cumulated organic wealth has found specialized structural realization in an organ in which all inner efficiencies and outer influences centre and are systematically unified. That which essentially constitutes our personality, and what we know of the outside world, rests organically secured in this central organ. Our self-consciousness, as well as our world-consciousness, is demonstrably an outcome of its activity,—the activity, namely, of that extra-conscious existent which has power through sense-affection to arouse in us the percept we call a brain. It is self-evident, however, that we can form no adequate conception whatever of the real, self-consisting nature of that which thus affects our senses. The aroused percept in us, the brain we perceive, is but a symbolically revealed semblance of the real, power-endowed existent. But through inner and outer experience we know with sufficient certainty that this sense-revealed existent is a gradually developed and marvellously efficient self- and world-manifesting organ.

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Our organization is throughout, down to its minutest structural constitution, teleologically complemental to its relations with the outside world: the digestive organs to food, the lungs to air, the organs of locomotion to the ground to be gone over, those of prehension to what has to be grasped, those of attack and defence to prey and enemies, the organs of sense to the diverse sense-affecting influences. And no less is our inner life, consciously manifest as emotion, thought, and volition, complemental to relations organically established between ourselves and the outside world. Of such inner-life-relations, those binding us to our fellow-beings come to gain more and more predominant sway. However ideal such altruistic sentiments may appear, we should never forget that they are grounded in reciprocal organic dependence. The living being, by force of his organization, is essentially a product of progressive generation, which links him organically to other members of his race. The most fundamentally complemental among these self-transcending organic connections with kindred beings is evidently the sexual relation. It involves the perpetuation of the race, rendering possible its phyletic development. Next to it, and in consequence of it, emerges the parental relation, giving rise to the family, the primitive social community.

It is in this actual procreative kinship that our altruistic nature is rooted. These organically complemental relations, primordially established without conscious concurrence, come in the course of vital development to incite more and more intense and significant concomitant emotions in their complemental bearers. And it is the rational realization of the self-transcending significance of these reciprocal emotions which forms the groundwork of our social and ethical consciousness.

By means of outward physical signs, the social emotions, which otherwise would remain unrecognized, find their mutually intelligible expression. This faculty of imparting to other like beings, through the agency of sense-compelling signs, the concerns of our sense-occluded inner life, and, in return, sympathetically to apprehend, by means of similar signs, the concerns of their inner life,—this wondrous faculty

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of sympathetic divination is that which constitutes us social beings and enables us to become moral agents.

Ethical consciousness manifests itself normally in a more and more complete and extensive recognition of the essential conaturalness of fellow-beings, as bearers of the same wealth and worth of life we individually are conscious of; in the recognition of what is now significantly called the brotherhood of man.

This altruistic consciousness does not descend to us as a mere ideal inspiration from surmised empyreal heights. It is —it cannot be too often asserted—firmly and perceptibly rooted in organic solidarity; in the flesh-and-blood solidarity not only of those immediately related to us, not only of those who happen at present livingly to embody the inherited wealth of progressive organization, but pre-eminently in the organic solidarity of past, present, and future generations.

It is in all verity the faithful stability of vital organization which, amidst a constant flux of constituent elements, succeeds in preserving all through life what we call our personal identity. And it is this same perpetuating potency which, amidst the constant flux of individuated beings, is preserving with like fidelity from generation to generation the essential identity of human nature. In this light our self-rounded personality appears but a transient embodiment of the victorious attainments of endless vital toil. However personally glorious our human consciousness may be, we are but constituent elements of humanity at large. And it is because of this generically organized, this common vital humanity in us, that our personal consciousness is instinct with hyper-individual, with eternalizing aspirations.

Our individual development from infancy to maturity, from unconscious childhood to conscious membership in a social and ethical order of existence, epitomizes human progress in the past, and significantly points to higher and higher achievement in the future. The inheritance by each of us of all the laboriously acquired organic wealth and worth of human nature constitutes us bearers of a transcendent possession only provisionally intrusted to us for safe-keeping; and, further-

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more, in compliance with the bent of progressive realization, intrusted to us for enhanced transmission to posterity.

Being thus constitutionally appointed to the stewardship of life, on whose faithful administration all human worth and progress are vitally, immanently dependent; from this organically assigned mission flows rationally our moral responsibility, our imperative ethical duty, the mysterious moral "ought," the solemn super-individual injunction.

Failure to comply with the creative bent of the ethical demand, self-willed squandering of the inherited gifts of life, leads relentlessly, speedily, to degradation and deterioration. And mere relinquishment of progressive aspirations is sure before long to be followed by stagnation into rigid grooves of all but instinctive animality.

To sum up: Social and ethical solidarity rest fundamentally on vital organization. Like all other vital development, progress of their existing condition is wrought by toilsomely acquired increments of organic elaboration. And this is effected through interaction of the individual with his social medium. It is in this laborious way that the increasingly reciprocal relations which constitute the growing solidarity of social and ethical sentiments become in us human individuals more and more fully organized. And they make themselves felt as organically realized in our social and ethical consciousness, when they urge to conduct in agreement with the organized propensities. What is commonly called character consists essentially in such structurally established propensities. And it is because of this structual consolidation and fixation that individual character is so insistent and persistent. Education, with its elaborate appurtenances, accomplishes its aim solely by modifying organic structure, so that it may potentially embody its teachings.

Without pre-established vital structure, in which mental potentialities inhere, consciousness of whatever kind is nonexistent. Whatever is not actually organized in the visible structure of the living human being has, so far as he himself is concerned, no sort of reality. A person is color-blind because a specific region of his organic structure has remained

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undeveloped, failing thereby appropriately to react on the stimulating influences that normally arouse color-sensations. It is not otherwise with the morally obtuse, the morally idiotic. They are devoid of ethical consciousness simply because ethical propensities have failed to become organized in their brain. And for no other cause are animals deprived of moral consciousness. If we all happened to be thus deficient in cerebral organization, surely morality among us would be altogether non-existent.

Yet, though vital organization can be proved to be the indispensable substratum of all consciousness, and with it of all actual social and ethical realization, we have no slightest clew as how it comes so to be. The mystery of being and becoming, the supreme mystery of progressive creation, remains wholly inscrutable. We have no faculty enabling us intelligently to apprehend the creative potency through which nature is existing and undergoing its toilsome transmutations. And it is through activity of this same inscrutable potency that the progressive increments of mental, and therewith of social and ethical development, are structurally realized. Higher and higher efficiencies are thus creatively superadded to what perceptually appears to us as nothing but more and more complex molecular combinations of certain chemical elements.

From its structural matrix our consciousness emerges full-fashioned, a microcosmic revelation in which the gathered experience of our race and of our own inner life, together with the time- and space-scattered influences of the great outside world, have become symbolically harmonized into simultaneous presence.

In this all-revealing focus of conscious awareness, in which inner and outer experience concordantly, significantly, creatively blend, there opens a glorious vista into a world of ideal aspirations, wherein those premonitions arise that betoken, as yet unfulfilled ideal, a state of social and ethical perfection we most devoutly long to see realized in actual life.

Let us then circumspectly, rationally, beware that these ideal premonitions are truly reflecting the glory of a higher

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state, so as to merit the creative sanction of progressive organic realization; a sanction without which ideal thought of whatever kind vanishes as idle dream into traceless vacancy.

EDMUND MONTGOMERY.

HEMPSTEAD, TEXAS.

SOME OF THE LEADING IDEAS OF COMTE'S POSITIVISM.*

I. IF we try to form the idea of a divine Society or community of men—and by a divine Society I mean one that is perfect—we may, without incurring the reproach of manufacturing a Utopia, say this much of it. It must have a perfect Harmony or unity of all its members, and a perfect variety; and the more intense and thorough the harmony is, the more so must the variety be. A perfect Society would have an intense oneness, but this oneness would hold amid an infinite variety of character and experience on the part of its individual members. In musical art, when instruments of many kinds sound different notes, we may have a symphony which is one of the most magnificent expressions of superpersonal feeling that humanity knows: such would be the harmony of a perfect Society, and such is the dream of the world.

Looking round on the world as it is, what do we seem to see? We seem to see only a chaos of conflicting elements,—individual men and classes of men. Our communities are battle-grounds; interests and experiences clash together; each one seems able to benefit itself only at the expense of others. Popular agitators industriously instil this idea into the public mind, and a multitude of causes, practical and theoretical, work together to make it survive. Hence we find that the problem of determining the right course in legislation and social action is continually being made to take this form: to balance against one another certain interests which are

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* Lecture delivered before the London Ethical Society.

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supposed to be conflicting, and to do justice to both in their inevitable opposition. In private life it is generally the "interests" or "rights" of two or more individuals; in political life, of different classes. That this is really the essence of every practical problem of social life is implicitly asserted by thinkers of high authority; for instance, by Mr. Spencer, in his work on "Justice," and in the concluding chapters of his "Data of Ethics," and by Professor Sidgwick, in the concluding chapters of his "Methods of Ethics." I shall not try to define the theory of Society which is implied; we can distinguish it by its result,—it is the theory which results in every practical problem being regarded as one of compromise between the conflicting interests or rights of different members of Society.

Those who say this have not said the last word. Looking more intently at human society as it is, we see that all who constitute it seem to have *one common root*, in spite of all their conflict and strife. Their essential being is the same, their destiny is the same, as is their origin, and what constitutes goodness in the one constitutes goodness in the other. These simple matters of fact have suggested another view of Society,—a view which the modern world has been learning chiefly from Auguste Comte and from his contemporary Hegel. This theory has been most effectively set forth by one of Comte's keenest critics, Dr. James Martineau, who adopts it as his own.*

"The process of social evolution so implicates together the individual agent and his fellows that we can scarce divide the causal factors into individual and social, inner and outer. *Bodily*, no doubt, each man stands there by himself, while his family are grouped separately around him; but *spiritually* he is not himself without them, and the major part of his individuality is relative to them, as theirs is relative to him. He has no self which is not reflected in them and of which they are not reflections; and this reveals itself by a kind of moral amputation, if death should snatch them away and put his *selfhood* to the test of loneliness. It is the same with the larger groups which enclose him in their sympathetic embrace. His country, with its history and its institutions, and all

* See "Types of Ethical Theory," volume ii., *Hedonism with Evolution*, § 7. At the close of the above quotation I have introduced a few phrases, but without in any way changing the author's meaning.

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that these imply, is not external to himself: its life-blood courses through his veins, inseparably mingled with his own. The social union is most inadequately represented as a compact or tacit bargain, subsisting among separate units, agreeing to combine for specific purposes and for limited times, and then disbanding again to their several isolations. It is no such forensic abstraction, devised as a cement for mechanically conceived components; but a concrete though spiritual form of life, penetrating and partly constituting all persons belonging to it. . . . What we call a conflict between a private and a public interest, and treat as a dissension between a man's inner self and an outward society, is not really a wrestling-match between two independent organisms or personalities, unless it comes to physical rebellion and war. The inner man is himself the scene of the living strife; the public interest that pleads with him is *his* interest, too; the society that withstands him is *his* society; it is no foreign and intrusive power that confronts and stops his calculating prudence, or the madness of his pleasure or his passion, but his own share of an altruistic reason and love that live and throb in other hearts and minds as well."

Because men are thus "members of one body,"—because their intelligences, interests, rights, duties, and desires are thus bound up together,—it is superficial and misleading to regard any problem of life as simply one of compromise between mutually opposing forces. The conflict when truly estimated is not between *my* interest or what is good for me and *yours;* it is between different elements or aspects of *our common* good. Our common good must surely include and embrace three things: the growth of intelligence and the realization of scientific knowledge; the growth of our capacity to appreciate and create the beautiful; and the growth of our capacity to perform those more directly social duties which we generally distinguish as practical. A complete idea of our highest good seems to demand that these three shall be harmonious and at one. The conditions of modern civilization in its present state are continually making them stand in absolute opposition to one another.

In stating this view of the nature of Society, and drawing these conclusions from it, I have gone beyond the doctrine of Comte, and corrected certain defects which it seems to present. Comte insists truly that the social union is a concrete spiritual life penetrating its members; but when we ask, What is the bond of this union? through what sides of our nature does this life live and realize itself? he seems to say it is in *feeling*

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only; it is an affair of the "heart" alone. Man's life is divided between two sets of "innate" impulses,—the egoistic and the altruistic,—which are capable of acting independently of each other and of the intelligence. Originally the selfish feelings were by far the stronger; but the influence of circumstances and social experiences have partially suppressed them and allowed more freedom of growth to the unselfish springs. The ideal of the future is consummated when the latter are supreme and the former annihilated. The only use of the intelligence is to find a means to the satisfaction of one or the other of these two classes of feelings. The result of Comte's view—as Dr. Edward Caird has shown—is, that "the intellectual life by itself is regarded as an unsocial, even a selfish existence; for as reason is guided by no definite objective aim derived from itself, it must find its real motive in the satisfaction of personal vanity and selfishness, whenever it is not subjected to the yoke of the altruistic affections." * To say that the social side of our nature lies only in feeling, is plainly a one-sided view. We can set over against it an opposite one-sidedness: that the social side of our nature is found only in intelligence,—that everything which binds us to our fellow-men, all social sympathy and insight, is the product of intelligence alone, while feeling is peculiar to the individual and is a principle of separation and isolation. I do not say that this second view has ever been really held; but many thinkers have spoken and written as if they held it. How are we to judge between these two extremes? This brings us to consider one of the most important *tests of truth* that is open to us, and one which at the present day we need to apply in every direction. For it is constantly happening in the history of human thought that on every problem of importance two extreme conclusions are formed and maintained in opposition to one another. This is especially the case in questions of political and social ethics, and of philosophy.

Aristotle teaches us that in every such case what is required

* A crude expression of a similar view seems to form one of the main contentions of Kidd's "Social Evolution."

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is το διορίζειν the rational discrimination which enables us to find a middle way between the two extremes. I hasten to add an explanation, lest this should seem the merest barren commonplace. There are two ways of finding a mean between two extremes. One of them is simply to take what the two extreme views have in common, and throw away all their differences. As a general rule, the differences are so extensive—as between the extreme form of State-socialism and the extreme form of Individualism—that the only "mean" which we can get between them by this way amounts to nothing at all: we have only a barren "suspense of judgment." This is sometimes treated as if it were the special mark of profound thought and of a mind free from prejudice. I fear that in many cases it is only the mark of intellectual indolence or cowardice. But there is another method of finding a middle way,—a middle way which does not contain less than either of the extremes, but more than either. This was the "mean" that Aristotle had in view; and to reach it, it is essential that we should be reasonable or rational. This does not mean that we should always be arguing,—endeavoring to pass from premises to conclusions by discursive argument; the most reasonable portion of the community does not consist of the people who are constantly engaged in reasoning. It is the best result of a genuine education—a genuine training of the mind—so to *widen* the mind on all its sides that it is capable of this kind of rational discrimination. It takes the whole nature of man—not merely the analytical understanding—to find the true mean between the extremes. To do this we must rise above them both, find the truth that there is in each, and include it in a higher truth. It is never easy to do this; but whenever we can do it with two opposing doctrines or beliefs, we may be sure we have gone beyond them both to a deeper truth. The value of their conflict and their opposition is just to suggest the need for the deeper truth, and sometimes also to suggest the way to reach it.

The case I was speaking of, before this digression, is a comparatively simple one. We found two opposite assertions: that the only social bond between men is one of feeling, while

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reason is a principle of selfishness and isolation; and the exact opposite of this, where the words "reason" and "feeling" have changed places. The middle way is to regard the "social impulse" as a mark of our whole nature on every side of it: a tendency uprising from the very roots of our being and expressing itself in every direction of mental activity. Our intelligence is not a mere calculating machine, for calculating means to ends outside itself; it has a structure and laws of its own, as a living organism has. Reason is social, inasmuch as my reason cannot work unless it works together with the reason of my fellow-men, for its structure and its laws are identical in all of us. In this way reason carries me beyond myself and unites my life with other lives. On the other hand, along with the unity there must be the difference; in order that reason may go to work in knowledge there must be different personalities to work it out; my reason is my own, your reason is your own, though in all it has a common root. Just in the same sense, feeling is social. Each man's emotions and feelings are his own, and yet in them he is carried beyond himself, and cannot rest unless in reason and feeling alike his life is in harmony with other lives. We are in fact *in the service* of an Ideal of Personality, a supreme good, which appeals alike to all sides of our nature, and requires the united activities of many different personalities,—the unity and the difference being equally necessary.

This brings us to consider another defect in Comte's view. He regards the egoistic and altruistic desires as two distinct impulses of our nature,—distinct in such a way that the selfish impulses may entirely disappear in the course of social progress, and the unselfish tendencies be left in their purity. This seems a noble and lofty conception, but in reality it rests on confusion and is contradicted by experience. Taken quite seriously, what does it mean? That in a perfect society any individual man, when considering his duty, would think of himself as on the one side, and the community of his fellow-men as on the other; and that he would regard himself as worth nothing except as their tool or organ, as working

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wholly for them, as using himself up in their service. The same idea is involved in Comte's dictum, "the individual is an abstraction, nothing is real but Humanity." The individual is nothing, and therefore he ought to regard himself as worth nothing except as a tool in the service of others. In such a state of things social life would be impossible, for each man's object in life would contradict that of every other man. The truth is, that in making an absolute separation between the selfish and unselfish impulses of our nature Comte is partly denying what he is most anxious to affirm,—the unity of Society. By "making an absolute separation," I mean regarding the one as capable of existing without the other, and the conflict between them as capable of solution only by denying one of them. Of course I am not saying that there is no difference and no apparent conflict between them; the fact that there is this difference and apparent conflict constitutes the most serious problem of life. This practical problem needs to be solved in the same way as the theoretical problems I was speaking of just now; not by accepting one of the extremes as all-sufficient and denying the other, but by finding a middle way which includes the truth and justice of both. And as I have said, this practical problem seems to become much more intelligible when we understand it as arising out of a conflict, or a partial and limited conflict, between different forms of the supreme good or supreme Ideal of life, and not between the interests of different classes of men. In other words, what we have to seek is a *common good.* Whatever be the different ways in which men may seek their own good or the good of others—whatever divergence and difference there may seem to be between these two—we have to take our stand upon this, that no man can find the highest good for himself unless he so lives as to help others to find that same good. This seems the primary condition of realizing the end and aim of life, and this is the practical meaning of the unity of Society.

We must therefore regard it as a serious exaggeration to say with Comte that the individual is an abstraction and that he is made what he is by Society. We have seen how each

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man is carried beyond himself and can only live a human life when in relation to others like himself; but this relation does not *make* him,—the individual is not manufactured by Society. If we are to say that a man is made what he is by his surroundings, we must extend his "surroundings" so as to include the whole universe of reality,—all time and all existence; and this is a purely metaphysical question. If by "surroundings" we meant the solidarity and continuity of Society, then it is no more true to say that a life is made by its surroundings than to say that thought is made by language. As Green has well said, "social life is to personality what language is to thought." Thought is more than language, it has deeper roots in consciousness; yet language as the expression of thought has a controlling influence upon it. It seems to me that many social reformers show a tendency to exaggerate greatly the influence which social surroundings have upon the individual lives of men; and hence they exaggerate the influence which social reform will have in moulding those lives. Hence, again, they are mislead into speaking as if we could *manufacture better men* by simply changing the outward order of Society.

We must remember, too, that the doctrine of social unity on which we have been dwelling does not afford positive guidance for social action in the future. It only implies that isolation of any kind is impossible, that men (to be men) must exist in relation to one another, that their relations must take definite forms and not be a chaos; it does not show how these relations ought to be organized in the details of real social life. The two practical tendencies in this matter may be distinguished as individualism and institutionalism (if I may coin a word). The individualism that I here refer to never dreams of denying the necessity of a social organization. It takes as its ideal the completest development of individual lives. Institutionalism * takes as its ideal the completest development of state machinery, and (in general terms) of what are called "social institutions."

II. I spoke just now of Comte's view of the limited nature

* "Socialism" seems to me to be a thoroughly question-begging term.

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of reason; limited—in the sphere of conduct—to finding means to satisfy feelings. He limits it correspondingly in the sphere of theoretical knowledge. Scientific knowledge deals only with certain relations among "phenomena,"—that is, among the particular facts which our senses seem to give us, and the relations are limited to those of coexistence and succession, resemblance and difference. These are the only principles of connection among "phenomena" in the Positivist world; and the ideal of scientific knowledge is to codify these relations as systematically as possible. The famous "law of the three stages" declares that this is the final goal of knowledge from the historical as well as from the theoretical point of view. Comte thinks he can trace a historical passage from the theological to the metaphysical ways of explaining the world, and from the metaphysical to the "positive." To deal with the Positivist contention from the theoretical point of view would require some detailed investigations into the Critical Theory of Knowledge; but even from the historical point of view it is contradicted by the facts.

All experience shows that ideas are like seeds,—they must either die and vanish or go on to grow; they cannot abide unchanged. If they seem to survive unchanged,—in the form of religious or political creeds or of "established" scientific theories,—it is only their verbal expression that is fixed; and if the ideas are really fruitful, if they are capable through criticism of giving birth to new ideas, then they inevitably tend to break up their fixed expression and demand its restatement. The crystallized, clear-cut expression must be inadequate to the thought. And the thought itself may be inadequate to the reality which it endeavors to express or represent. For although thought is a real function or activity of the human mind, with a structure and laws of its own, yet it may be very imperfectly aware of its own nature and aims; and, again, the whole mind is not *merely* a thinking activity, but is more; and these other functions of our nature may, and often do, grow and develop more fully than the thinking function, so that the latter fails to comprehend them, and the intellectual expression which it gives to them may be thor-

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oughly inadequate. We may say that this is the case with every religious movement of the deeper and more vital sort, particularly in its earlier stages. On the other hand, the intellectual functions may be in advance of the other sides of the man's nature; and the result of this will depend entirely on the extent to which the intellect is aware of its own principles and ideals. If it takes a superficial, inadequate view of these—as Positivism does—it will engage in mere destructive criticism, which finally it will endeavor to direct upon itself, ending in Scepticism. The more we think about it the more clearly we see that the whole development of thought is quite adverse to anything as purely *static* as is the Positivist ideal of knowledge.

When speaking of the "middle way," we saw that in the intellectual world, as in the physical, the main condition of progress seems to be criticism, competition, and conflict; in the realm of thought we see unmistakably a "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest." It is because human thinkers defend different and conflicting beliefs and theories —because here one thing is upheld, there the opposite—that the attainment of truth is possible; for this alone suggests the need for general principles of criticism. It counts for nothing that this or that individual man—or the leading thinkers of this or that particular age—give up the effort and despair of real knowledge; the human race does not give it up, but attacks its problems with renewed energy again and ever again, with undying, irresistible confidence in its power of reaching real knowledge at last. And reaching real knowledge means being able to think consistently about the world and make it intelligible and rational. I say "*make* it rational," for science is not limited to understanding things by way of dissection or *post-mortem* examination of what is given to it. One whole side of its work is, indeed, of this kind; thus physical science would explain what we call a *rose* by reducing it to an enormously complex group of conditions which in the last resort consist simply of *modes of motion.* In this process, what we know as the rose has disappeared; we have only the mechanical conditions of its appearance. But even

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in this process we see how untrue it is to say that science consists simply in finding the laws of coexistence and succession among what the Positivist calls "phenomena." One might almost say that science begins by destroying the so-called phenomenon, and going on to deal with something else instead of it. The phenomenon is precisely what *physical* science does not explain and cannot explain, for it leaves out of account the thinking mind which experiences the phenomenon. But science is not limited to this purely analytical or dissecting disposition. Human intelligence—this is the burden of Kant's and Hegel's doctrine of knowledge—*brings with it* principles by which it explains the world, and without which there could be no explanation.* Perhaps the deepest of these principles is the systematic unity of the world,—*i.e.*, the idea that we only understand a thing by seeing the ways in which it is connected with and depends upon other things. In brief, the clue which Kant has placed in our hands leads to a point of view from which the Positivist limitations of scientific knowledge are seen to be essentially irrational.

Again, what is the "metaphysics" or philosophy upon which Comte pours such contempt? He understands it to mean an attempt to explain things by abstract ideas, which are treated as if they were verily existing causes producing the things. Yet the best result of this despised "metaphysics," in modern times, has been to destroy forever the possibility of that mistake by explaining the origin of it in a way in which Positivism never can. But I pass this by, in order to explain what philosophy practically is. We have been speaking of the incessant conflict of current modes of thought,—scientific, sociological, political, ethical, religious. It is this conflict that makes the thoughtful part of the community feel the need of a philosophy of life; it is far from being always an intellectual luxury—so to speak—even for the individual. But while it may sometimes be this for him, the conflict of which I have spoken makes it an absolute

* Tyndall's "Essay on the Use of the Imagination in Science" seems to involve a recognition of this.

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necessity for the race. Philosophy has been defined as the unification of knowledge; and this means that it is an attempt to find reliable principles by which to criticise the conflicting modes of thought that form so large a part of our intellectual and social environment,—to criticise them by bringing to light the truth that is in them. If truth is always and everywhere a matter of degree,—if no error, which has any meaning at all, can be wholly false, and no finite truth can be quite true,—then the problem of philosophical criticism will be to disengage the truth contained or implied in those discordant modes of thought. Philosophical criticism is therefore destructive only of erroneous or inadequate forms; it is fundamentally constructive, inasmuch as its aim is to let the truth which sought to express itself in those forms have fuller and less restricted expression. Hence philosophy does not consist of a group of theories to be set beside those already current in science and common life, and to be made a source of mere destructive criticism directed upon the latter from without; whatever "new" truth philosophy may bring to light is shown to be implied or involved in the thought and knowledge upon which we act every day. In Professor Sidgwick's words, the "premises" of philosophy consist of "the different aggregates of what is taken to be knowledge (or reasoned and systematic thought, so far as this is a wider term than knowledge) in the thoughtful part of the community to which the philosophizing individual belongs."

It is curious that neither evolutionists nor associationists have endeavored to "explain" how it is that πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει, how it is that inevitably, "by nature," all men endeavor to understand and comprehend things for the sake of understanding them. Positivism itself does homage to this tendency, and practically acknowledges its ideal as supreme; and the problem, what is its significance? Whence comes it? presses for solution. Underlaying it is the native conviction that *the activity of our nature* which manifests itself in the attainment and realization of truth is one form of the highest good for man; and this, so far as it goes, is in essential harmony with the religious view of man's life and destiny.

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For I will venture to affirm that all the best religious thinking of modern times has this in common,—to regard God as revealed through or manifested in the *human race:* either in the whole history and achievements and ideals of humanity, or in one man, one personal life, which is pictorially or symbolically taken as the type of humanity at its best, as embodying the human Ideal. Comte's deification of humanity is a partial recognition of this great truth, that God is revealed through man. Revealed *through* man; for we do not say with Comte, that God is only a name for the highest achievements of our race in the past and our loftiest idea of its possibilities in the future; we use the word God to represent the deepest of realities, the abiding foundation of all existence, which reveals itself in the inspiring power of our highest rational ideals. The best deeds of the human race are only broken lights of a divine reality; but, though *broken*, they are *lights*,—lights proceeding from one great light.*

The root of the errors in Comte's system of Positivism lies in his wrong view of reason,—the nature and laws of intelligence. It is this which makes him say that the bond between man and man is only one of feeling; this which makes him say that nature is only an orderly succession of "phenomena;" this which makes him separate nature from man and treat it as a foreign power.

Let me, in conclusion, introduce a question which brings to a point the various criticisms already expressed. Religious thought, as we have seen, emphasizes the greatness of the race to which we belong; the greatness of what it has already accomplished, and the far more exceeding and eternal greatness of its possibilities and its destiny—compared with which even its present state is one of insignificance and unworthiness. How can this be reconciled with the discoveries of modern science as to the extent of the physical universe, and the utterly insignificant place held in it by the world on which we live? We must answer, that the enormous distances be-

* Christianity, as it seems to me, involves this principle more positively and definitely than other religions, and therefore has the power, above all others, of becoming a great world-movement.

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tween the different worlds do not prove that human spirits on this world are insignificant; they prove the opposite. For, as I have expressed it elsewhere, "which is greater—the immensity of the universe as a bare, dead fact, or the mind of man who has succeeded in grasping and understanding that immensity? The vastness that is supposed to be so terrible is a vastness that the mind of man in a sense has made for itself; it is man who has found his way to a real knowledge of it, against every deceptive appearance of his senses. His senses showed him the universe as a spangled dome of blue crystal, covering a small tract of sea and land; by the work of his own reason he has succeeded in grasping the truth." The Hebrew psalmist said, "The heavens declare the glory of God;" Comte denied it and said, they declare the glory of Newton and Kepler; and surely so they do. But the two sayings do not contradict one another; that which declares the glory of man thereby declares the glory of God.

S. H. MELLONE.

EDINBURGH.

THE HISTORY AND SPIRIT OF CHINESE ETHICS.

I.

THE only ethical system that has any practical importance in China is Confucianism. For twenty-five centuries it has been the life and spirit of the dragon kingdom; while Tauism, a contemporary system, though it has given rise to much interesting literature, has not exerted any noticeable influence upon the Chinese race. This is because Confucianism is a practical system of morals and readily appeals to the mind of the common people; while Tauism is exceedingly speculative and beyond the grasp of the popular understanding. The former is still the religion of China and is a living force for moral guidance, while the latter is a mere philosophy and literature. In attempting to show, therefore, the spirit of Chinese Ethics, I shall leave Tauism out of consideration, and confine myself to the quintessence of Confucianism during

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the twenty centuries from the time of its founder to the time when its doctrinal development reached its culmination.

CONFUCIUS.

Chinese Ethics before Confucius was known as a system of "Music and Etiquette." Music was used to moderate the savage character of the people and etiquette to regulate their conduct. Later, when the Chinese population had increased, largely through the immigration of foreign tribes, these tribes brought with them habits which were incongruous with the simple customs of China; and, in consequence of this, most of the old usage of music and etiquette was gradually replaced by foreign customs, and the struggle for existence grew more intense than before.

Confucius, who was born 551 B. C., regretted the degenerate condition of morals in his country and tried in vain to revive the old system of music and etiquette. He visited one prince after another to remind him of the moral duty of mankind, but his preaching had no effect. After his death his disciples wrote the "Lun Yu,"—the "Discourses of Confucius,"—which is the foundation of Chinese Ethics.

The key-note of Confucianism is Love. The "Lun Yu" is but an explanation of love. Confucius said, "If man does not love his neighbors, what is the use of music and etiquette?" (Pa ék, No. 3.) Confucius regarded music and etiquette as means and love as the end. Hence, if a man does not love his neighbors, music and etiquette become useless ceremonies. In another place Confucius emphasized the importance of love: "If the *will* be set on Love, there will be no practice of wickedness. . . . An ideal man can never act contrary to Love, even while he is taking a meal. He reminds himself of it even in moments of haste or danger." (Li Jin, No. 4.) Tau is, according to Confucius, a man's vocation, and Love is the kernel of "Tau."*

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* "Tau," "Li," and "Chang." "Tau" means literally path, "Li" reason, and "Chang" sincerity or truth.

Etymologically "Tau" means head of walk (procession), hence the best conduct; "Li" means town of jewels, hence purity or truth, and "Chang" means

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The Chinese word "Jin," which literally means humanity, is used in the original text to denote the idea of Love,—the moral ideal,—which the late Professor Drummond calls "the greatest thing in the world." This word "Jin" is not so commonly used in China as the word "love" in England or America. Where the English-speaking people say, "Love your parents," the Chinese say, "Be pious to your parents." Where the former say, "Love your children," the latter say, "Be pitiful to your children." Where the Americans and Englishmen say, "Love your wife," the Chinese say, "Be kind to your wife." In reality, the Chinese word "Jin" is a purely abstract term and needs a definition. Confucius gave various definitions of it to different disciples, as seen in the following extracts:

Confucius said to his disciple, Fan Wei, "The virtue of Love is to be obtained through great perseverance." (Yung Yé, No. 6.) To Yén Yuen he said, "The general affection is Love." (Yén Yuen, No. 12.) In another place he said to the same disciple, "Be mindful as you stay in your house, be reverential as you attend to your daily business, and be sincere to man; do not abandon these principles even though you live among savages." (Yén Yuen, No. 12.) To Tiong Kiong he said, "As you go out of doors, behave yourself as if you were meeting a great guest, and let your people so act as if they were attending a great ceremony. Do not do to others that which you would not wish others to do to yourself." (Yén Yuen, No. 12.)

In another place Confucius emphasized this idea of the Golden Rule, which, singularly, is put in negative terms, by saying, "Now the man who possesses the virtue of love, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others;

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complete word, hence the highest reason or truth. When "Tau" and "Li" are coupled together, the compound word means ethical reason, or simply reason. When "Tau" is suffixed to "Chang," the compound word means ethical order. When "Tau" is prefixed by the word "Tien" (Heaven), it means God's moral order, and when "Li" is prefixed by the same word it means God's principle. In short, "Tau" means truth which man ought to follow, "Li" means truth in things as well as in beings, and "Chang" means truth in mind.

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wishing to obtain a goal himself, he seeks to let others attain the goal." (Yung Yé, No. 6.) Further he said, "To subdue one's self and return to etiquette is the way of love. . . . Do not speak that which is contrary to etiquette; do not do that which is contrary to etiquette." (Yén Yuen, No. 12.)

As to the application of this principle of Love, Confucius teaches us to begin with those who are nearest and dearest, then to apply it to distant relatives and to strangers. Hence piety is, according to him, the first step to love. By piety he means not only affection but also reverence. Thus he said, "While parents are alive serve them with etiquette; when dead bury them with etiquette; and afterwards adore them with etiquette." (Wei Chăng, No. 2.) This teaching has become so universal among the Chinese people that their adoration of ancestors has led Western travellers to misinterpret Confucianism and to represent it as a religion based on ancestor worship. In reality, however, the adoration of ancestors is a mere expression of love and piety in the form of a ceremony.

TSZ-SI.*

Tsz-Si is the second successor of Confucius. Unlike his predecessors, he entered into metaphysical discussion. The tenor of his book, called "Chung Yung" is, therefore, very mystical. According to him, the universe can be explained by one word, "Chàng,"—that is, truth. Without truth, says he, there would be nothing, for truth is both the beginning and the end of things, and also the order of the cosmos. Truth, he maintains, is also in man. It is the nature conferred upon man by Heaven. One of the most important sayings of Tsz-Si is this, "Truth is human nature and man is love." Truth and love, says he, are, however, overwrapped by external elements or impure and selfish motives, which are external as compared to the real nature of man, which is pure and unselfish. A jewel loses its brightness when covered by mud. By wiping off the mud and cleaning the jewel we re-

* Tsz-Si, son of Kung-Ki, and grandson of Confucius, of whose doctrines he became one of the most conspicuous expositors. Born about 500 B.C.—"Chinese Readers' Manual," No. 321.

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store its brightness. Even so man ought to make his nature shine by constant polish. Its brilliancy is truth and love. Let truth and love, teaches Tsz-Si, be manifested in the relation between master and subject, between parent and child, between husband and wife, between elders and youth, between friend and friend. These manifestations are loyalty and justice, piety and affection, fidelity and decorum, respect and fondness, sincerity and kindness.

Thus, "Chàng," truth, is Tsz-Si's final explanation of both the cosmical and the ethical order. His system of truth supplements the love theory of Confucius and gives Confucianism a metaphysical foundation.

YANG AND MO.

Following Tsz-Si there arose two schools of extremists, one led by Yang Chu * and another by Moti.† The former advocated a system of egoism, the latter a system of altruism. Like Gautama Buddha, Yang Chu had a pessimistic conception of human life. But the conclusion he reached was entirely different from Buddhism. His conception of human life may be summed up as follows: Life is short and uncertain. There is not one in a thousand who lives a hundred years. The life of both the young and aged is uncomfortable, owing to their physical weakness; and even among youth we find many who are ill. Those who are well must sleep half the time, and those who are awake are often the victims of oppression. On the whole, the pleasurable part of a man's life does not exceed ten years. Even during this short period he is compelled to strive for honor and esteem. But what use is honor and esteem to him after his death? While alive he may be proud of his honor, but when he dies his body is no longer susceptible of any pleasure. Therefore let us satisfy

* Yang Chu, a philosopher of the fourth or fifth century B.C.—"Chinese Readers' Manual," No. 881.

† Meh Ti, a celebrated philosopher and founder of a school in metaphysics. His precise epoch is uncertain, but it is commonly assigned to the period intervening between the ages of Confucius and Mencius, or between the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. Ibid., No. 485.

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all that we wish for in this life. If death approaches, let it come; and if we die, let the body decay. We thus see that Yang Chu was a narrow-minded agnostic and a short-sighted egoist. His theory of pleasure reminds us of Epicureanism.

Diametrically opposed to Yang Chu, Moti expounded a theistic and altruistic doctrine. He said, "We must obey the will of Heaven.* Since Heaven desires mutual interest and love, and disapproves of mutual hatred and disturbance, we should love each other. How do we know that this is the will of Heaven? Because mutual interest and love benefit all mankind." (Moti Hwat-i, No. 4.)

Obviously, Moti did not have any deeper conception of Heaven than Tsz-Si, who used the word "Heaven," for the sake of convenience, to express the universality of truth and the origin of human nature. Moti's saying, that "we must obey the will of Heaven," is strikingly similar to the Christian view; but, instead of emphasizing this point, he goes on to say that mutual love is the will of Heaven, because it is beneficial to all mankind. "Heaven," then, merely becomes an idle word.

MENCIUS.†

Mencius, a disciple of Tsz-Si's, who rose for the defence of Confucianism against Yang's heresy, created a new period in the history of Chinese ethics by bringing the question of human nature, or conscience, into prominence. He said,

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* Moti's "Will of Heaven" (literally translated):

"We should do that which Heaven wishes.

"We should not do that which Heaven does not wish.

"What does Heaven wish and what does Heaven not wish?

"Heaven wishes, assuredly, the mutual love and interest of men; and does not wish mutual hatred and disturbance among men.

"How do we know that Heaven wishes the mutual love and interest of men and not mutual hatred and disturbance?

"Because in this way love and interest become reciprocally corporated.

"How do we know that Heaven wishes reciprocally corporated love and interest?

"Because in this way the support and existence of mankind become reciprocally corporated."

† Meng Ko, or Meng Tsze, Latinized as Mencius, B.C. 372–289.—"Chinese Readers' Manual," No. 494.

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"That man's original nature is good is as true a law as that water seeks the lowest level." (Mencius Kao-Tsz, No. 1.) In order to prove this law, Mencius appealed to the actual facts. "Behold," says he, "even a child loves his parents, repents his mistakes, respects his elders, and judges right and wrong. He loves his parents not because of his previous experience but because of his natural propensity; he repents his mistakes not because of his experience but because of a personal conviction which is the expression of his inner nature. He respects his elders not from any previous experience but from a natural instinct. And, finally, he judges right and wrong not through experience but because he has a faculty of judgment." Therefore, according to Mencius, every person has four aptitudes,—namely, 1. sympathy; 2. repentance; 3. courtesy; 4. judgment, and these four aptitudes are capable of developing into the four principal virtues. Thus, he said, "an aptitude * for sympathy is the potentiality † of love; for repentance is the potentiality of righteousness; for courtesy is the potentiality of etiquette; and, finally, an aptitude for judgment is the potentiality of wisdom." (Kong Sung Cheu, No. 1.) If no obstacle stands in the way of the moral progress of man, these potentialities are bound to develop, because, says Mencius, man has both the power and wisdom of conscience, which enable him to attend to his moral discipline.

Indifference or idleness is one of the many obstacles. Mencius said, "By seeking we gain virtues, and by neglecting we lose them." (Tsin Sin, No. 1.) In emphasizing the importance of conscious moral discipline, he alluded to the art of chess-playing. "Now chess-playing is but a small art, but without his mind being given and his will bent to it, a man cannot succeed." (Kao-Tsz, No. 1.) Even so, man, by being thoughtless and indifferent, cannot realize his original nature, which is perfect.

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* In the original text, the word "heart" is used in the place of "aptitude."

† In the original text, the word "beginning" is used in the place of "potentiality."

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Passion is another obstacle. Mencius said, "Mind can be enlarged best by moderating lust." (Tsin Sin, No. 2.)

Besides the removal of moral obstacles, Mencius emphasized the importance of moral enthusiasm and courage. He said, "I would develop my moral feeling unbound,—that feeling which is the greatest and strongest, that feeling which being rightly developed is harmless,—the feeling which fills the space between heaven and earth. Such a noble feeling is the important ingredient of righteousness and moral order. Without it, a moral being is as if starved already." (Kong Sung Cheu.) Only with such a strong emotion—courage and enthusiasm—can we realize our original nature, which is at once the sublimest and greatest task. If we attain this nature nothing can mislead us, for we are then perfect. Mencius said, "By comprehending our mind thoroughly we know our nature; by knowing our nature we know Heaven." (Tsin Sin, No. 1.)

Such is Mencius's doctrine of human nature, which reminds us of the Hindoo philosophy of Atman and Maya. Atman is the soul of man, but it is at the same time the *Brahma—i.e.*, absolute reality or god. Maya is illusion or the phenomenal world which veils the Atman. Now, according to Mencius, human nature is perfect by itself. It is, however, deeply hidden beneath disturbing elements; wherefore man walks in delusion and indulges in sensual pleasure, malice, and crime. Are not these two systems of philosophy strikingly similar? Of course, Mencius does not go so far as to say that the nature of man is identical with God; nor does he assert the existence of an immortal soul; furthermore, he does not say that the disturbing elements are so extensive and refractory as the Hindoo thinkers assert concerning Maya. Mencius had, like many other Chinese thinkers, a metaphysical bent, but he avoided the problem of theology and mysticism as much as possible. It is, however, precisely on this account that his doctrine, though less profound, has more practical value than the Hindoo metaphysics.

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SÜN-TSZ.*

In direct opposition to the doctrine of Mencius, Sün-Tsz founded a new system of ethics by maintaining that the original nature of man is essentially wicked and egoistic. If man were left to his natural growth, he would become a crude, rough creature. The altruistic heart, or moral conduct, is the result of artificial training under the system of etiquette, and not of human nature itself. Sün-Tsz said, "Etiquette† regulates the emotions, the will, and the intellect of man; without etiquette his emotions, will, and intellect remain disorderly. Etiquette makes man calm and peaceful. With etiquette his manners become graceful, while without it they grow barbarous. Hence a man who does not observe etiquette is a brute; and likewise a nation which has no system of etiquette is in a state of constant war." (Sün Shan Pien, No. 2.)

Sün-Tsz's ethics has three important aspects,—namely, (1) that human nature is essentially wicked; (2) that human nature is essentially egoistic, and (3) that the moral character of man is the result of his past experience. The first proposition resembles the rationalistic interpretation of original sin, that the natural instinct of man is towards vice; while the second and third are similar to the ethics of the Spencerian school. Of course, the system of Sün-Tsz is not so highly developed as modern Hedonism, which attempts to explain the origin of morals by the theory of evolution. As to the origin of moral precepts, Sün-Tsz contradicts his own theory.

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* Sün Kwang, commonly called Sün-Tsze or the Philosopher Sün, a public officer of the state of Chao, 3d century B.C.—"Chinese Readers' Manual," No. 649.

† Sün-Tsz's "Etiquette." (Literally translated.)

Now passion, will, and intellect become orderly with etiquette, but disorderly without it.

Sleeping, eating, dressing, acting, and resting become moderate and calm with etiquette, but without it disorderly.

Life, countenance, feature, movement, and walking become graceful with etiquette, but without it these become barbarous, obstinate, rude, and disagreeable to other men.

Therefore, without etiquette there is no person; without etiquette there is no successful business, and without etiquette there is no peaceful nation.

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He said, "Heaven and earth are the foundations of life; etiquette is the foundation of peace; and ideal men are the originators of etiquette." (Wang Chi, No. 9.) But how could ideal men create moral precepts unless their minds were of a different order from those of the common people, unless they possessed that higher faculty which we call conscience? Does he mean by ideal men supernatural beings? Does he not admit that any person can become an ideal man? If he, like all other Chinese thinkers, agrees to this, he would have to deny that ideal men had a supernatural birth, and to admit, on the contrary, that the ancient sages sprang from the common people, and that they possessed the faculty of conscience, since moral precepts cannot be the product of a character that is essentially bad. If he admits the existence of conscience in man, he will have to accept either partially or wholly the ethics of Mencius and the intuitional origin of moral precept.

II.

In 255 B.C., Che-Wang-Te, the conqueror of all China, condemned the philosophers, burned all their books, and buried their bodies alive. Consequently, the study of Confucianism was discontinued for two generations, until the despotic dynasty was destroyed by Liu Hang, of Han, in 206 B.C.

Liu Hang, who afterwards became Emperor of China, encouraged the study of Confucianism and excavated many classical books from the walls of the temples. The classical students in China, like modern ethnologists, endeavored to discover the meaning of the excavated documents, among which were the philosophical works of Confucianism and Tauism. These two doctrines conflicted on many important points, and the classical students became very much confused. The Emperor, in order to encourage Confucianism, prohibited the study of Tauism. For many hundred years after this Chinese scholars wasted their time dogmatizing concerning Confucianism.

From the middle of the Tang dynasty (618 to 907 A.D.) the Chinese government granted freedom of thought. Imme-

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diately Tauism was revived and Buddhism spread over all China; while, on the other hand, Confucianism underwent critical examination, and its dogmas were speedily undermined by the liberal interpretation of the critics. Let me give a brief history of Confucian speculation from the middle of the Tang dynasty to the end of the Ming dynasty—(800 to 1600 A.D.), the period during which the civilization of China reached its high-water mark.

CHOW LIEN KI.

In order to give a metaphysical air to Confucianism, Chow Lien Ki,* born in the eleventh century, developed the ancient cosmology taught by Confucius and the sages, and founded the famous cosmology known as Tai Chi To Swat. We are not concerned here, however, to dwell upon his cosmology, but wish to speak of his ethics, which was largely influenced by Buddhism. His system of ethics may be summed up in the following sentence: *Absolute truth is absolute calmness.* Evidently Chow tried to unite Tsz-Si's doctrine of truth with Buddha's doctrine of Nirvana, which means absolute calmness. Like Tsz-Si, he maintains that truth is the basis of all the virtues. Love, justice, etiquette, wisdom, and truthfulness are manifestations of truth,—the inner nature of man. If man remains unmoved by any external object he keeps himself absolutely calm, then his inner nature will manifest itself. Thus, according to Chow, calmness is the necessary condition for realizing truth.

CHANG HUNG CHU.

Chang followed the system of Chow, and established a partly monistic and partly dualistic doctrine. According to him, the world is derived from One, which is "Seng,"—nature. Nature is invisible, yet omnipresent. It is absolutely calm and transcends our knowledge; yet it is in us as well as in things. In man nature is thinly covered by Chi, substances, while in animals nature is thickly covered. Only when we have removed this substance do we wholly realize nature, which is absolute

* Chow Tun-i, A.D. 1017–1073, commonly designated as Chow Tsze, or the Philosopher Chow. From a favorite place of abode he adopted the designation of Pieh Hau, of Lien ki.—"Chinese Readers' Manual," No. 73.

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truth.* ("Chăng Măng Chăng Mung," "Chăng Măng Tai Hŏ Pien," and "Yŭ Lu.") The desire to satisfy the mouth, stomach, nose, ears, and eyes is the work of substance. Therefore Chang teaches us to suppress our desires, and strive to be unselfish, passionless, pious, kind, and loving, for by renouncing all our worldly desires we shall gain absolute enlightenment and become possessed of wisdom. Wisdom is the manifestation of Truth, which transcends the knowledge acquired through our experience.

Later, Teng-i Chwang emphasized the monistic doctrine of Chang, and went so far as to say that the mind of man is the same as the mind of heaven and earth,—that is, the universe, and a truth in one thing is the truth in all things. Therefore, by knowing our own minds thoroughly, we realize the absolute truth of the universe.

CHU KWAI AM.

Let us now turn our attention from the Confucianists under the Tang dynasty to those under the Sung dynasty, who en-

* "Chi" and "Seng." The Chinese word "Chi" means two entirely different things. It means some invisible substance which exists in space, and from which all visible things are made. It also means the passion of man, which is supposed to be the work of the invisible substance, or the work of form and body.

The Chinese word "Seng" means literally human nature, but it does not connote any idea of animal instinct as such. On the contrary, it connotes the idea of the highest order of human thought and feeling. It means conscience, what Professor C. C. Everett calls "super-rational instinct," and also what the Christians understand by the word "spirit." Thus, "Seng" is, according to the average Chinese thinker, the origin of goodness, while "Chi" is the origin of evil. The first is creative force, the second the created. Any newly-made thing is fresh, clean, and beautiful, but old things, as a rule, are subject to decay, destruction, and corruption. Even so creative force is always fresh, but created secondary force is demoralizing. Tsz-Si regarded "Seng" as a commandment of heaven, and identified it with "Chang," truth, which is the order of the universe. Mencius comes near identifying "Seng" with heaven by saying, "By knowing our mind thoroughly we know our 'Seng;' by knowing 'Seng' we know heaven." Heaven and God are synonymous in the Chinese language. Therefore, "Seng" signifies, when its identity with heaven is established, a creative force. Chang says the world is the creation of One, which is "Seng." So Yong Ming also says, "There is only one ultimate reality in this world, which is our mind." "But our mind," he says in another place, "is 'Seng,' and 'Seng' is truth."

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deavored to unite psychology and ethics and studied the former in order to explain ethical truth. Chu Kwai Am said, "Mind is the *spiritual master*, and nature is the Tauri (truth or order) of mind." (Answer to Kiong Shu Kwan.) "The nature of man is nothing but truth, which is universal and not a private matter." (Answer to Lian Tsz Kwai.) "There is no mistaken truth beneath heaven, and no mistaken nature in man." (Yü Yao.) "In this world there are positive and negative things and five orders of matter, all intermingled and confused; but behind them there is a guiding principle or truth." (Yü Yao.) "Man has also five orders of emotion, but his nature guides them in the right direction. Nature and substance do not exist separately; for without substance there will be no form, and without the form there would be no place where the nature could operate." (Answer to Lin Tak Kiu.)

Why, then, is there good and evil? In regard to the conception of good and evil, Chu differs from his predecessor, Chang. He believed it wrong to say that nature is the source of goodness and substance the source of evil. If nature and substance are inseparable, how could the one be the source of good and the other the source of evil? Chu has a system of his own. According to him, mind is like water, for calmness is the true nature of mind as well as of water. The calmness of mind is the source of goodness, and the calmness of water is a state of peace. For when external objects interfere with man his calmness becomes disturbed and evil thoughts arise, just as when the wind blows angry waves rise on the surface of the water. Therefore, he said we must retain our original calmness by keeping our minds vigilant. In order to keep our minds vigilant, we must know the nature of mind. If we wish to know the nature of mind, it is best to study the law of all things, because the nature of mind is law of all things, the truth of the universe. (Kwan Sin Swat and Tai Hio Chu.) Thus Chu drew a very interesting conclusion which resembles the modern philosophy of monism.

It was, however, in opposition to this principle that Luh Siang San and Wang Yong Ming founded a new school of dealism in China.

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WANG YONG MING.

Yong Ming, who was born in the last part of the Ming dynasty and swayed the intellectual circle in China for half a century or so, derived his idealistic conception from Mencius, Luh Siang San, and the Buddhists. He said, "There is only one ultimate reality in this world,—namely, our mind. Without our mind, there would be no thing, no truth, no righteousness." (Yü Yao.) The law of things, the righteousness of conduct, and the goodness of our thought are different aspects of our mind, which is truth itself. If we act in harmony with this truth, our conduct is always right. If, on the contrary, we are selfish, we disturb the purity of our original nature,—the truth. It is by the power of our original nature that we can pass a moral judgment and can attain the various virtues, such as piety, loyalty, honesty, and love. Only by having this nature do we know when we meet our parents how to be good to them; when we meet our brothers how to be kind to them. A real knowing is doing,—the actualization of what we know. If we see a person falling into a well, our conscience will immediately command us to save him, and we do so. All virtuous deeds are the result of conscience or wisdom. We can develop wisdom without any assistance from the external world, for wisdom is in us and not in things; it is our original nature and nothing else. (As to this passage, see Twang Sip Lu.) "The mind of a holy man is filled with conscience, hence, we cannot add even the weight of a feather to it. The mind of the common people is like a storage of jewels and dust. They must cast the dust aside and polish the jewels." (Answer to Hwang Long Hian.) By polishing the jewels he means, be sincere and truthful to the mind (as is taught in Chung Yung), and also try to understand the law of things (as is taught in Tai Hio). Does the law of things, however, exist outside of our minds? Nay, says Yong Ming. These laws are in our minds. What, then, is our mind? "Our mind is nature and nature is truth. If we are conscious of piety and loyalty, then we hold the truth of piety and loyalty in our minds. Our mind, though small, holds all the laws of the

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universe. Truth, though present in all things, is nothing else than our mind. Chu said that we must realize truth through the external world if we could not find it in our internal world. But this is making a dualism of truth." (Yü Lu.)

After Wang Yong Ming a school of realism arose. Liu Ship San, a prominent realist, maintains that the universe is the world of substance; mind as such is but a product of such substance; and a certain nature in the mind is but the working order of the substance, which is neither good nor bad; for good is poise and evil is lack of poise or excess.

Materialism in China, however, not being supported by physical science like materialism in modern Europe, did not make much progress. With Wang Yong Ming the metaphysical speculation of Confucianism reached its culmination. Like many other things in China, her moral philosophy, instead of making any further progress, deteriorated. In Japan, Chinese metaphysics was not received with enthusiasm. During the past three centuries the Confucianists in Japan have refused to follow Wang Yong Ming, and have insisted on the dogmatic interpretation of Confucius.

KEIJIRO NAKAMURA.

TOKYO, JAPAN.

DISCUSSION.

THE NATURE OF PLEASURE.

DR. PATTEN, in his "Explanation" in answer to Professor Caldwell's comments on his "Theory of Social Forces," falls into the usual error of most persons who attempt to discuss the utilitarian philosophy. He says that Herbert Spencer's "life of 'unalloyed pleasure'" "would restrict our activities." He draws a picture of his own of what such a life would be, and says, "Such a hothouse life is the necessary result of the growth of our sensory concepts and of the resulting limitation which knowledge puts on activity." In this he loses sight of the essential nature and only correct definition of pleasure,—viz., the normal exercise of the faculties. Pleasure consists entirely of activity. There is nothing "static" about it. The only philosopher who has gone to the

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bottom of the subject is Schopenhauer, and I am surprised that such a student of Schopenhauer as Professor Caldwell should have failed in his "reply" to clear up this essential point.

The truth is, as Schopenhauer shows, that pleasure consists in the satisfaction of desire, actual or potential; that desire is a special form of pain, as proved by the universal effort to put an end to it, and that it is this putting an end to desire,—*i.e.*, satisfying it, that yields, or rather, constitutes pleasure. But this can only be accomplished through activity. It is this sense of successful effort which yields all the reward, and that life which secures the greatest pleasure is the most active. The most unendurable of all pains is ennui,—*Langeweile*, as Schopenhauer has so graphically painted it. This is the coddled life of inactivity that Dr. Patten pictures as one of "unalloyed pleasure." All that Schopenhauer failed to see was that the satisfaction of desire may have *duration*, or at least may consist of such a prolonged series of repeated satisfactions following one another at inappreciably short intervals, that it cannot be distinguished from continuous pleasure. He missed this essential point because in his time experimental psychology was unknown, by which it has since been demonstrated in the laboratory that every psychic phenomenon *occupies time*.*

The failure to perceive this principle was the one vulnerable spot in the utilitarian philosophy, and John Stuart Mill's "paradox of hedonism," which rests on this failure, as does the present reasoning of Dr. Patten, has given the opponents of utilitarianism a vantage ground which its defenders need not and should not surrender.

LESTER F. WARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

* This demonstration constitutes the "refutation of pessimism," as I pointed out in "The Psychic Factors of Civilization," Chapter xi.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

MAN'S PLACE IN THE COSMOS, and other Essays. By Professor Andrew Seth. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood, 1897.

Some of these essays have already been published in "Blackwood's Magazine," the "Contemporary Review," and elsewhere. The essay, however, entitled "The 'New' Psychology and Automatism" is here published for the first time, and is well worthy of the place assigned to it along with the brilliant article on Huxley's "Romanes Lecture," which opens the book, and the important criticism of Mr. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality," which occupies the middle of it.

The title and table of contents suggest metaphysical rather than ethical discussions, and would hardly seem to justify any extended notice in this JOURNAL, but the circumstance to which the author appeals in his preface as giving unity to these essays also indicates their importance for ethics. The view of the Cosmos here set forth rests, we are told, "upon a conviction of the absolute value of the ethical life." In order to understand the world we must take our stand upon Mind and Will. "Man as rational and in virtue of self-conscious reason the free shaper of his own destiny furnishes us with our only indefeasible standard of value." And again: "Inexplicable in a sense as man's personal agency is, nay, the one perpetual miracle, it is nevertheless our surest datum, and our only clue to the mystery of existence." While seeming to be only distantly concerned with the science of ethics, these essays thus touch it at a vital point,—the point at which the problem of the reality of will and self-conscious intelligence emerges.

The first essay shows with much literary grace that while Professor Huxley, in contrast to some other "naturalists," is undoubtedly right in emphasizing the distinction between nature and morality,—between action which is determined by forces which act as a *vis a tergo* and action determined by conscious purpose,—he is wrong in supposing that this distinction is an ultimate and impassible one or that "the cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends." How can nature be said to be indifferent to moral purpose when it has directed all its forces to produce it?

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"Nature is made better by no means,
But nature makes that means."

Instead, therefore, of saying that upon naturalistic suppositions morality is inexplicable, we ought to say that nature itself is inexplicable except upon the presupposition of morality. Mr. Leslie Stephen and Mr. Herbert Spencer have already shown that human morality is foreshadowed in the natural life of the animals. Professor Seth goes further: morality is not only an element in cosmic life, it is the reality of it. We can only understand the part in relation to the whole; we can only understand the process of evolution in the light of the end of self-conscious personality towards which it has been making.

The essay on the New Psychology aims at showing that Münsterberg's philosophical conclusions from the subtle analysis to which he subjects the psychical and physiological accompaniments of volition are really a *petitio principii*. We may admit that there is no element of "content" in the mind corresponding to what we call volition without admitting that the mind consists merely of content (presentations and ideas) and feeling. As a matter of fact, those who hold that the soul is a centre of self-determining activity found their contention not upon the existence of a special kind of sensation,—call it sense of innervation or what not (to do so would indeed be to resolve will into presentation and give up the whole point),—but upon the impossibility of explaining the facts of our mental and moral life except upon the supposition of a third element over and above ideas and feelings. Perhaps Professor Seth hardly does justice to the service that Münsterberg and others have done in bringing out this point, and thus placing the issue upon its proper basis. Yet he is undoubtedly right in his contention that as the controversy now stands Münsterberg's argument does not seem to deserve the respect it has received from Mr. Bradley and other English philosophers.

In the criticism of Mr. Bradley's "New Theory of the Absolute," Professor Seth calls attention to the double strain that runs through Mr. Bradley's work on "Appearance and Reality." He shows that sometimes the emphasis falls upon "appearance." Things as we know them are mere appearance. Reality falls on the side of the absolute. The divisions and determinations which we make are the result of abstract thought (Spinoza's imagination), nothing is real but as it is taken up in the absolute. At other times

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Mr. Bradley remembers that appearances have each their own degree of reality in virtue of the extent to which they have attained to inner harmony. Following the former of these paths, he tends to fall back into the "pit of undifferentiated substance out of which Hegel dug philosophy." Only in following the latter does he put himself in line with the later and sounder developments of idealist philosophy. But even on his idealist or Hegelian side, Mr. Bradley, according to Professor Seth, leaves a good deal to be desired. For when he comes to define for us the nature of the absolute itself as representing the highest degree of reality, he gives us nothing but negatives. It is non-personal, non-moral, non-volitional, non-intellectual. The best way of conceiving of it is not in terms of our highest, but of our lowest experience,—the undifferentiated feeling with which our soul's life begins rather than in the self-conscious will and intelligence which is its goal. This new form of agnosticism Professor Seth condemns, in spite of its saving clauses, on the ground that our intellectual and moral life rests upon the belief in the reality of the ideals of knowledge and goodness, and nothing can be metaphysically satisfactory which throws doubt upon it.

So far we may agree with him in his criticism of the Spinozistic and agnostic tendency of Mr. Bradley's speculations, but he seems to stand on more doubtful ground when, turning to certain false prophets of Hegelianism who seem to him to identify too directly the human with the divine, man's limited experience with the absolute, Professor Seth seeks to draw a distinction in the interest of the transcendence of the absolute between the "Absolute in itself," which with all modern idealists he rejects, and the "Absolute-for-itself" which he thinks must be retained. As against Bradley, he maintains that we know reality in knowing the world; as against these false teachers, he maintains that in knowing reality we do not know it as God knows it, and therefore cannot in any sense *be* God.

Putting aside the view that no Hegelian now holds (did any one ever hold it?) that our human consciousness exhausts the being of Him in whom all fulness dwells, the question at issue is whether the form of consciousness which is represented by the best moments of human experience is one which does or does not admit us into the mind and will of God? Do we at such moments really become one with God as all the mystics have believed, or are we still in the outer sanctuary of what is merely human? Professor Seth's distinction of an absolute-for-itself, which is never an absolute for us, would seem to imply that the latter is the true answer. Yet, if this is the case,

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in what respect are we better off for the substitution of this new Unknown for the old one? Reality must surely be the world as it is to God, and if in these highest moments of insight we do not in some sense enter into his mind and become one with him, it is difficult to say in what sense we can be said to know Reality at all. It is right and necessary to maintain the transcendence of the absolute reality, but is it necessary, in order to do so, to reassert, in however modified a form, the dualisms out of which as well as out of Spinozistic Pantheism it is the merit of Hegel to have dug philosophy?

Those who are inclined to fall back into this dualism will do well to remember the fine sentence in Jowett's Biography, "Be not deceived. God is not other than He is seen to be in this world, if we rightly understand the indications that he gives of Himself."

The volume closes with an essay on "Mr. Balfour and his Critics." Frankly, this essay seems to the present writer unfortunate. To one who had less sympathy with Professor Seth's general point of view than he has, it might even suggest that the author's heart is not after all in the philosophy of which he is elsewhere so brilliant an exponent. The indulgence with which the "Foundations of Belief" is treated, coming after the strict account demanded of Mr. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality," suggests uncomfortably that Mr. Balfour may steal a horse while the Hegelian may not look over the wall. It has been said of Green's method as applied to Hume that it would have sufficed to have pulled any philosophy to pieces. One might say of the method that Professor Seth here employs that it would suffice to put any fragments together into a consistent philosophy. *Sympathetic* criticism we all understand. It consists in the attempt to do justice to a great writer by developing the principles he has clearly conceived and which constitute the body of his teaching with greater consistency than he himself has been able to do. But the species of criticism illustrated in this defence is something quite different. Here the inconsistencies of a radically unsound writer are passed over; isolated expressions are emphasized, and the misuse of terms explained (as Lamb explained Coleridge's metaphysics), as Mr. Balfour's pun, all with the object of showing that he is not so bad as his idealist critics make out, and that by looking a little deeper they may be convinced that he really meant the same as they do themselves. It would indeed be surprising if so able and alert a mind as Mr. Balfour's had remained wholly untouched by ideas which since the time of Kant have been the commonplaces of the schools.

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But to say that he reflects these ideas in single passages is one thing, to claim that critics like the late William Wallace, Mr. Bosanquet, and Principal Fairbairn have one and all been mistaken as to the main drift of his contentions, is quite another. When we hear that Mr. Balfour has performed the remarkable feat of working his way from a different starting-point and by a different route to a fundamental agreement with Kant and Hegel, we put it down to the friendly bias of an indulgent critic; but when we further find the great philosophy of the Kritiques contrasted as a clumsy and pedantic structure veiled in mediæval obscurity (p. 279) with the light grace and convincing lucidity of the English essayist, the reader will be inclined to ask whether for the moment Professor Seth has not mistaken the picturesque pool among the rocks with its pretty shells and sea-weeds for the great sea which has left it there. It is possible, of course, to prefer the clearness and shallowness of the one to the depth and mystery of the other, but Professor Seth would be the first under other circumstances to condemn so superficial a taste.

With regard to the general contention of Mr. Balfour's book, we may agree with Professor Seth that the test of philosophic truth is that it works; in other words, that life as we know it, or as in our best moments we should wish it to be, can be built upon it. But prior to the application of this test, we must ask ourselves what is life as we know it, and what is it that as human beings we require that it should be. It is because Mr. Balfour applies it without any serious attempt to answer these preliminary questions that his critics find his results so unsatisfactory, and refuse to see underneath his brilliant paradoxes any important contribution to philosophy.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

ΛΟΓΙΑ ΙΗΣΟΥ. SAYINGS OF OUR LORD. From an Early Greek Papyrus Discovered and Edited, with Translation and Commentary, by Bernard P. Grenfell, M.A., sometime Craven Fellow in the University of Oxford, Fellow of Queen's College; and Arthur S. Hunt, M.A., sometime Craven Fellow in the University of Oxford, Senior Demy of Magdalen College. With two plates. Published for the Egyptian Exploration Fund by Henry Frowde, Amen Corner, London, E. C., 1897. 8vo. Pp. 20.

This pamphlet, containing the eight "sayings of Jesus," recently discovered at Oxyrynchus in Egypt, is a model of conscien-

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tious, scholarly editing, putting before the world, in the most convenient form, the text of these sayings and the known facts with reference to their discovery and relations. It is an admirable basis for the combinative forces of scholarship and criticism to go to work upon.

The papyrus containing the sayings belongs to the third century, is 5¾ x 3¾, is written on both sides, and is considerably damaged. The sayings, as arranged and translated by the editors, are as follows:

(1) . . . and thou shalt see clearly to cast out the mote that is in thy brother's eye (fragmentary).

(2) Jesus saith, Except ye fast to the world, ye shall in nowise find the kingdom of God; and except ye keep the Sabbath, ye shall not see the Father.

(3) Jesus saith, I stood in the midst of the world, and in the flesh was I seen of them, and I found all men drunken, and none found I athirst among them, and my soul grieveth over the sons of men, because they are blind in their heart . . . (fragmentary).

(4) . . . poverty . . . (fragmentary).

(5) Jesus saith, Wherever there are . . . and there is one alone, I am with him. Raise the stone, and there thou shalt find me, cleave the wood, and there am I (fragmentary).

(6) Jesus saith, A prophet is not acceptable in his own country, neither dôth a physician work cures upon them that know him.

(7) Jesus saith, A city built upon the top of a high hill and stablished, can neither fall nor be hid.

(8) Almost entirely obliterated.

With respect to these sayings, the following facts may be regarded as certain:

(1) They belong to a period at least a century and a half earlier than any manuscript of the New Testament that we possess.

(2) They are copied from one or more older written documents. This is shown by the fact that each begins with "Jesus says" (λέγει), and not with "Jesus said," as would certainly have been the case, had they been original records.

(3) They form part of a work which contained sayings by various authors. Had it contained sayings by Jesus alone, this would have been stated once for all in the title, or at the beginning (*cf.* Stobæus's "Florilegium").

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(4) They give us sayings of Jesus in forms older than those that appear in our gospels.

Of the eight sayings, three—(1), (6), (7)—have parallels in our gospels,—all of them in Matthew, two of them in Luke, one of them in Mark and John. With (1) *cf.* Luke vi. 42; Matthew vii. 5. With (6) Matthew xiii. 57; Mark vi. 4; Luke iv. 24; John iv. 44. With (7) Matthew v. 14 (*cf.* vii. 24, 25). The text of (1) and (6) comes closer to that of Luke than to that of Matthew. No. (5), for part of which the editors find a parallel in Matthew xviii. 20, has, as we shall see, an entirely different meaning.

The sayings having no parallel in our gospels are (2), (3), (4), (5), (8). In (2), the phrase "Except ye fast to the world" (ἐὰν μὴ νηστεύσητε τὸν κόσμον) is grammatically indefensible (since νηστεύω does not take a direct object), gives no reasonable meaning, and violates the Hebrew parallelism, which the saying is plainly meant to exhibit. The editors see that the difficulty lies in the word κόσμον (world), which they retain only because they cannot suggest any amendment compatible with the (somewhat obscure) characters of the text. After a careful examination of these in the *fac simile*, it seems to me that the true reading is not κόσμον, but ἱλασμόν. This sets everything right. The saying then reads: "Except ye fast during the (Day of) Atonement, ye shall in nowise find the Kingdom of God; and unless ye keep the Sabbath (literally, sabbathize during the Sabbath), ye shall not see the Father." Here grammar, sense, and parallelism are perfect. In Leviticus xxv. 9, the LXX call the Day of Atonement ἡ ἡμέρα τοῦ ἱλασμοῦ, and we need not doubt that it was often named briefly ὁ ἱλασμός. That this was the chief fast we know from Josephus, who calls it simply ἡ τῆς νηστείας ἡμέρα, the Day of Fasting (Antiq., XIV., iv. 3).

No. (3) is obviously supposed to be uttered by Jesus after his resurrection. This is proved not only by the aorists ἔστην, ὤφθην, εὗρον, but also by the words ἐν σαρκί = in flesh. These he could not have used while yet in the flesh. The doubtful letters at the end, και . . . βλεις, almost irresistibly suggest καὶ ἀμβλεῖς τῷ νῷ αὐτῶν, "and dull in their understanding." (*Cf.* Matthew v. 6; John i. 10; Matthew xiii. 14 *sq.*) No. (5) is at once the most important and the most puzzling of all the sayings. The first half is fragmentary, the legible words suggesting a sense which leaves it entirely disconnected from the second half, while the latter, as so

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disconnected, suggests gross pantheistic notions, foreign not only to the known teachings of Jesus but also to Hebrew and early Christian thought altogether. The following emendations, which leave all the legible letters in their proper places, and supply all the illegible ones, remove both of these difficulties: *λέγει Ἰησοῦς, ὅπου ἐὰν ὦσιν πάντες μισόθεοι καὶ πιστὸς εἷς ἐστιν μόνος κάτω, ἐγὼ εἰμι μετ' αὐτοῦ κτλ.* The whole saying will then read: Jesus saith, Wherever all are God-haters, and there is one only believer below [*i.e.*, in the grave], I am with him. Raise the stone [that closes the tomb], and there thou shalt find me, cleave the wood [that closes the compartment containing the body], and there am I. Perhaps we ought to read *κεἰ* for *καί*; but I do not think that this is absolutely necessary.

Nos. (5) and (8) are obviously new sayings, but they are too fragmentary to suggest emendation. In (8) we ought perhaps to read *ἀκούεις εἰς τὸ ἓν ὠτίον σου* = Thou hearest with thy one ear.

So much for the text. Turning now to what is expressed in it, we find that two of the three sayings having parallels in our gospels contain additions absent from these. No. (6) adds "neither doth a physician work cures upon them that know him." This turns the saying into a complete parallelism, which gives it, as so completed, a strong claim to authenticity. One can easily understand how the second member came to be dropped in the Greek world, where physicians were notoriously in the habit of curing their own acquaintances. No. (7) bears every mark of originality and authenticity. It was probably curtailed to make it fit its place in Matthew's gospel, where the words "and stablished" and "fall" would be irrelevant. The saying may have originally referred to Jerusalem, as likely to tempt capture, and yet to stand a long siege.

In the new sayings there are three things that call for special attention, as throwing new light on early Christian belief.

(1) In (2) we find Jesus maintaining that the observance of Jewish fasts and feasts is essential to salvation. In spite of his well authenticated saying that "the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath" (Mark ii. 27), there is no reason to doubt the correctness of this. Though Jesus, in the later part of his career, no doubt, condemned the formal, Pharisaic mode of observing the Sabbath and other ordinances of the "Mosaic" Law, it is quite clear that he never had any intention of abrogating or rejecting it. (See Matthew v. 17, 18; Luke xvi. 17. In the former passage

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we ought to read, I came not to abrogate, but to complete.) The breach with the law was due to Paul.

(2) In (3) it is clearly implied that Jesus, after his resurrection, was not "in flesh" (ἐν σαρκί). This saying, therefore, must have been taken from some ancient gospel, or other document, which, like Paul's epistles (see 1 Corinthians xv. 42–44), did not yet teach the resurrection of the flesh (see Chiappelli, "La Dottrina della Resurrezione della Carne nei primi Secoli della Chiesa," Naples, 1894).

In (5), if my emendations are correct, we meet the notion that Jesus will remain in the grave with the faithful dead. This thought is not altogether foreign to Paul (see Romans vi. 4; Colossians ii. 12), though with him it is rather figurative.

Looking back upon these sayings as a whole, and realizing that the date of the manuscript authorizes no conclusion as to their date, we can hardly fail to recognize that they are drawn from some document or documents representing a very primitive and Jewish form of Christianity, a phase showing no trace of Greek influence. Those of them having parallels in our gospels are almost certainly in form more ancient than these, while some of the others, notably (2), are strongly Ebionitic.

For many reasons, which cannot be here stated, I am strongly inclined to the belief that these sayings were, one and all, copied from the "Gospel according to the Hebrews," which St. Jerome held to be the Hebrew (or Aramaic) original of the Gospel according to Matthew (see Harnack, "Chronologie der altchristlichen Litteratur bis auf Eusebius," vol. i., pp. 633 *sqq.*), but which was different enough from the latter to induce him to translate it into both Greek and Latin, notwithstanding that an older Greek version of it was current in Egypt in the time of Origen, in the first half of the third century. There are good reasons for believing that this was the only gospel accepted by the Jewish Christians; and, if the Christians of Oxyrynchus were Jews, as seems likely, it would be their only gospel. I may perhaps be allowed to add that I believe this gospel to have been one of the documents used by Luke in the composition of his gospel, and to have been combined with miracle-abounding gospel of Mark (with considerable omissions from both) to form the Gospel according to Matthew.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

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THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL. An Introduction to Political Science, with special reference to the Socialistic and Individualistic Theories. By William Sharp McKechnie, M.A., LL.B.; Lecturer on Constitutional Law and History in the University of Glasgow. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons, 1896. Pp. xv., 451.

The author of this book has attempted its own valuation, and it is one we should be inclined (with a certain reservation) to accept. "The double character of the essay, as, on the one hand, an introduction to political science in general, and, on the other hand, a detailed investigation of Socialism and Individualism from a stand-point which identifies itself with neither, may, it is hoped, render it of some use to the students of social philosophy, of constitutional history, or of systematic politics, by bringing within reasonable compass information otherwise accessible only in the many bulky volumes of a somewhat scattered literature."

Certainly, so far as concerns the "theory of the state," Mr. McKechnie has used his materials to good purpose, and has combined the results of modern investigation, both philosophical and legal, into a rational and coherent whole. His discussions of "the organic nature of the state," of the distinction between the "state" and the "government," of the different kinds of "sovereignty," are particularly sound, and adapted for the use of students. His handling, however, of "the province of law and government" seems less unexceptionable. Its principles are excellent enough,—"all absolute dualisms between state and individual, coercion and liberty, authority and originality, must be abandoned,"—nor can any exception be taken to the general form of the solution he proposes. But in identifying Socialism with one extreme of an absolute dualism, he certainly misconceives its general tendency, and endeavors to absolutize just that phase or application of Socialism which seems to us to possess least significance and least permanence. Socialism or Individualism, regarded as exclusive social systems, are, of course, futile and unmeaning abstractions: any form of social organization which does not develop the individual members of the community is as self-defeating as any form of individual liberty which does not result in a higher form of common life. There is no meaning in a socialistic or individualistic or any "solution" of social problems which implies that the complexity of human society can be adjusted to any simple or abstract

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principle. There is, therefore, a certain inconsistency in the author's representation of Socialism. If he is right in his description of its essence, then it is difficult to see how it can serve as an integral element in the "organic solution." When it is being attacked, it is described, in a question-begging sense, as "the undue subordination of individuality to the community." When it is accepted as an element in the "organic solution," it appears as "the force of integration" or "the sovereignty of the whole." The "Socialism" which figures in the author's criticism of the "Socialistic solution" is not Socialism, but the abuse of it; and the question arises, why (except for polemical purposes) Socialism should be used, as it is by the author, for the abuse of itself. It is significant that the "sense of subordination to the whole" was completely absent from the original conception of Socialism. Continental Socialism was actually criticised by Mazzini from the stand-point of the essentially individualistic theories of the state and individual upon which it rested. The meaning which Socialism seems to convey to philosophers is the creation of philosophers themselves. They have used it for the purposes of a convenient logical antithesis, which is not necessarily so much as suggested by its actual conception; and even when continental Socialism came more and more to express its method in terms of a somewhat rigid industrial organization and regimentation, the idea of "voluntary co-operation" was still held to be more distinctive of Socialism than either State industry or State control. The term "socialist" was originally used to distinguish the social from the political reformer: it was so used by the Owenites, by Proudhon, by the Christian Socialists, and in this case survives in the statement that "we are all socialists now." The conception as so used certainly does not involve any action of the State or Government; and even the German socialist would be astonished to hear that he "seeks to place everything under the direct management of the ordinary civil authorities." The author may reply that Socialism has now come to mean, in modern England at least, "State Socialism," or more precisely "government" Socialism. But when the Fabian Society, for instance, speaks of State Socialism, it most certainly does not mean "a severe *régime* of government control," or "an absolute government directing with inquisitorial and irresistible sway every detail of human life." For in the first place, the "state" means to the socialist the self-governing community; in the second place, it is more distinctively embodied in the form of the co-operative

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municipality or parish than any "state" machinery (in narrow sense); and, in the third place, it is simply a theory of the management of certain particular kinds of industry, just those kinds which most demand and most admit of collective organization. The Socialism which can be described as Mr. McKechnie describes it is the merest chimera, made partly in France, partly in Germany, but always by philosophers, or (which often seems to be the same thing in this context) the man in the street. State Socialism is again made identical with the abolition of private property, whereas it really aims at the abolition or restriction of a particular form of property, namely, "the means of production," which it would "socialize" in such a way that the property an individual could enjoy would be the direct and immediate result of earning. The whole point of economic Socialism (from this point of view) lies in its attempt to restore to the worker the means of production from which he has gradually been divorced,—a process which has ended in making him dependent upon the individuals who happen to be in possession. The situation at Lord Penrhyn's quarries is a much clearer explanation of what Socialism means, and contains a deeper logic of Socialism than any of the so-called "logics" of Socialism that philosophers may invent. The logic of Communism is, of course, a very different matter, and does mean just that kind of dependence which Socialism does not.

Generally, we may say that the author's tendency to look at "Socialism" from the political rather than the economic side results in his missing the point of Socialism. It is not only that he fails to understand the real basis or the actual form of the "system" he describes, but he also makes the fundamental mistake of regarding Socialism as a system rather than a "regulative idea" of action,—an idea which can only be applied with judgment, that is, as circumstances and relations require, and an idea which exists —and exists much more distinctively—in other forms than that of "State ownership." Mr. McKechnie distinguishes three forms of "government interference," which, again, it may be remarked, is only one aspect or method of Socialism. (1) State ownership, or "Socialism strictly so-called;" (2) government administration or regimentation; (3) legislative control. He considers that the distinction of his own position lies in his vindication of the superiority of "indirect government control" to "direct government management," and in his insistence upon this distinction as "the keystone of a system of practical politics;" and he hazards the conjecture

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that "future progress may be at once towards a more minute state control" and a diminution of "administrative management." The distinction is important, and it is appositely illustrated; but these are certainly not exclusive methods, and they are certainly all methods of practical Socialism. The method of giving effect to the popular control of industry differs according to the nature and circumstances of the problem. The only immediate method of "Socializing" the industry of miners or seamen that is open to the practical Socialist is that of enforcing by legal definition the social responsibility of private owners. The seaman would, at any rate, not be altogether dependent on the owner for his safety, though he would still remain dependent on him for other conditions of employment. It is an instalment of social freedom, and is so far Socialism; for the seaman has, by the exercise of his influence as a member of the political community, secured so much control over the conditions of his labor. The tram-worker may secure still further control by getting the tram-service either regulated or administered by the municipality of which he is a member. The difference would be between a completely socialized and an incompletely socialized industry. Whether "indirect government control"—what I should prefer to call indirect popular control—is to be regarded as Socialism, depends upon the degree to which popular control is made its explicit object. As it is expressed by the authors of the Fabian Essays, Socialists regard "the necessity of vesting the organization and material of production in a state identified with the whole people by complete democracy" as "the capitol to which all roads lead." That is to say, an act of Parliament is "Socialist" to the extent to which it brings the private disposition of land and capital more and more within the control of the community (parish, municipality, or nation); and there are many ways of applying this idea short of State ownership. Mr. McKechnie would find in the Fabian Report (Tract 70) a definition of State Socialism which shows that the expression is used by Socialists in a sense so elliptical as to cover methods of action which are usually considered its conventional "contraries." The essence of economic Socialism lies in its attempt —through associated action by individuals, as groups of producers or consumers, or as members of the same municipality or nation— to secure the members of the community from economic dependence upon the private owners of the land and capital of the community. Such a conception explains the community of economic purpose underlying Trade-Unionism, Co-operation, municipal So-

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cialism and State Socialism, and the more this community of purpose is consciously recognized the closer these movements will come together and take their place in the Socialist whole. And it is just because the author has not faced the economic situation and the intimate connection between political and social democracy, that his attempts to "offer contributions towards the solution of some of the problems to which both systems (Socialism and Individualism) address themselves" seems to my mind to possess more scholastic or academic than practical or actual interest; and it is perhaps significant that such a comparatively belated question as that of "free education" should be taken as an illustration of the new political method rather than such a question as that of the hours of labor, old-age pensions, the housing of the poor, or insurance against industrial accidents and disease; the truth being that none of these questions lend themselves so easily to abstract political dialectic. The author claims to have viewed the problems of statesmanship in the light of "one philosophical conception," but the problems of statesmanship are more and more directly economic (indirectly economic they have always been), and it is just the economic conception—the recognition, indeed, of an economic problem at all—which is conspicuously absent from the writer's method. "In subordinating its economic to its political aspects," he has surely cut himself off from any satisfactory or actual treatment of the problem with which Socialism is concerned. A practical philosophy, ethical or political, which does not recognize the economic basis of sociology, seems to my mind singularly abstract and tediously doctrinaire. But I must confess that, with this general exception, which others may not think as vital as I do, Mr. McKechnie's book seems to me to deserve the hearty appreciation which it has generally received.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

DIE ENTWICKLUNGSTHEORETISCHE IDEE SOCIALER GERECHTIGKEIT: EINE KRITIK UND ERGÄNZUNG DER SOCIALTHEORIE HERBERT SPENCERS. Von J. M. Bösch, Docent der Philosophie an der Hochschule Zürich. Zürich-Oberstrass: Verlag von E. Speidel, 1896. Pp. iv., 247.

The author of this work hails Mr. Herbert Spencer as a giant among the literary opponents of socialism, and he rightly points out that Mr. Spencer's attitude on this question is free from all sus-

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picion of bias due to a desire to be on the side of the wealthy, the fashionable, and the orthodox; for Mr. Spencer has not hesitated to oppose prevalent opinions in England in the matter of colonial expansion and—what requires, or at least required, more courage—in the matter of religious belief and sentiment. Whether Mr. Spencer's social and political theories may not be unconsciously influenced by bias of a different kind, Dr. Bösch has not thought fit to inquire. It might perhaps be suggested that Mr. Spencer's attendance in his early days on Quaker meetings had left an indelible impression on his mind; for his social ethics are precisely the social ethics of the Quakers with all their good qualities and nearly all their limitations of outlook. Individual independence and self-reliance, the demand to be left alone by the state, an intense horror of war combined with a firm belief in the rightness of unfettered industrial competition—here is the early creed of personal rights which has never changed or been modified, but is simply joined on to the philosophical principle of evolution to which Mr. Spencer attained later. Of various inconsistencies between Mr. Spencer's individualism and his evolutionism Dr. Bösch seems partially aware; his criticism, however, is not applied to the basis of Mr. Spencer's social philosophy, but only to some of its practical applications. A careful analysis of Mr. Spencer's "Justice" is given; and the correspondence of reward to service, of benefits to merits, is accepted as the highest principle of social organization. Some criticism might well have been bestowed on the ambiguities of this principle and on the absolute character of the antithesis which Mr. Spencer asserts between the ethics of the family and the ethics of the state. But the writer seems to accept Mr. Spencer's particular form of evolutionary utilitarianism as perfectly satisfactory in its general outlines, and as only requiring supplement and correction in the details of its application to practical problems. He evidently wishes to accept the Spencerian theory of use-inheritance and hopes that advancing biological science will provide the proof which, he admits, is as yet lacking. A considerable part of the book before us is occupied with a defence, on the basis of orthodox political economy, of the inheritance of property and of the taking of interest as a supplement to Mr. Spencer's theory of social justice. But when Dr. Bösch comes to deal with the application of the theory to present social and political problems he breaks away from Mr. Spencer's guidance. He points out very clearly that the principle of the correspondence of service and reward is inconsist-

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ent with a policy of *laissez faire*. He approves, as might be expected from a Swiss citizen, of factory legislation and, very decidedly, of state education: he advocates the state ownership of railways and other "natural monopolies." He looks upon the state ownership of land and the abolition of individual speculation in ground-values not merely as an ideal of "absolute ethics," but as a practical reform to be worked for in the near future. He admits the difficulties; but in an interesting calculation he shows that, if the Swiss government were to purchase at its market value all the land (the sites of towns included) in Switzerland, the transaction would probably be a profitable one to the community; since, if there is a continuance of peace in Europe, rent will rise and interest will fall. A great European war, by raising interest, would, he admits, make the transaction disastrous to the state. In suggesting that the state might compete as an economic producer with "trusts" and companies, Dr. Bösch makes a much more questionable proposal (p. 225). Would it be fair to the taxpayers to make them take the risk of competition? A good deal of the argument in the book is of more directly economic than ethical interest,—though it is right to keep the two aspects together. On the whole, this disciple of Mr. Spencer approves a very considerable amount of collectivism, though he entirely rejects the communistic ideal of equal sharings of unequal earnings. The authors, besides Mr. Spencer, who are most frequently referred to are Hume and John Stuart Mill. Buckle and Huxley are also quoted. It is odd that a writer, evidently familiar with English social and economic works, should refer to Malthus as a *Scotch* clergyman.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

GOVERNMENT AND PARTIES IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE. By A. Lawrence Lowell. 2 vols. 8vo. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1897. Price, $5.

The intrinsic merits of the work of Mr. Lowell give but an inadequate measure of the significance of these two volumes. Judged from the stand-point of the method of political science, they represent a departure from the traditional line of research; a new tendency which promises to give us a clearer and truer view of the development of political institutions. The dominance of the Austinian school threatened to reduce the science of politics to a barren dialecticism. The influence of biology on the social

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sciences, together with the emphasis of the subjective or psychological basis of social life, have given us a new school of political science, or rather a new method of treating political phenomena. The purely legal discussions which characterize the writings of Austin and his followers are gradually being supplanted by a study of the actual working of the various forms of government and an analysis of the ideas and ideals which furnish the motive power to political action. Political institutions are examined primarily with reference to their function and, secondarily, with reference to their form. Thus the established order is reversed. If any further doubts as to the fruitfulness of this method of research still exist, Mr. Lowell's book will quickly set them at rest. He has given us a clear and dispassionate description of the conditions of political life in the countries of Continental Europe. From the vast amount of material thus collected the author has drawn comparatively few conclusions. In fact, the failure to draw such conclusions is the only important defect of the work. No doubt the relation of descriptive analysis to philosophical discussion was carefully weighed by the author. One cannot help but regret that the decision was unfavorable to the latter. The value of the work would thus have been greatly enhanced.

A comparative study of the actual working of political institutions, of the status of political opinion and the activity of political parties in the countries of Western Europe demonstrates the necessity of great care and caution in the use of the fundamental terms of political science. In no other field of human thought has there been anything like the same confusion of terms. A still greater danger is the tendency to reason from terms rather than from facts, to meet a complex political problem with a formula rather than with an impartial examination of the requirements of the case. Mr. Lowell gives us ample material to judge of the unfortunate effects of this tendency. We are here face to face with one of the weak points in contemporaneous political life. In the United States we probably suffer less in this respect than other nations. France offers the most conspicuous example of the influence of political catchwords, phrases, and formulæ. The electorate must be constantly fed with high sounding phrases in which the words "*liberté*," "*égalité*," and "*solidarité*"—which latter term seems to have supplanted "*fraternité*"—must occupy an important place. Propositions which would otherwise receive but little recognition, or even arouse antagonism, are swallowed when sufficiently sugar-coated.

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It is only necessary to read the declaration of principles issued by candidates for office. It is safe to say that seventy-five per cent., when reduced to lowest terms, mean absolutely nothing. The possibility of juggling with terms stands in inverse ratio to the level of political education of the people. The ability to distinguish the important from the unimportant in politics, to separate the practicable from the utopian, has scarcely been developed in France. The tendency to remain content with pure generalities is characteristic of political infancy. The reaction of this state of public opinion upon the constitution and activity of political parties is admirably described by the author. The difficulty of grouping political sentiment about great practical questions of policy leads to the splitting up of parties into a great number of groups, each with its particular catchword.

In the discussion of political parties, the author gives us an extremely suggestive analysis of the differences in interests represented in different countries. The distinction between the horizontal and vertical division of political society explains many of the most complex phenomena of political life. Where the line of division of political parties corresponds to the dividing line of social classes, the conditions for the success of popular government are lacking. On the other hand, where political development has led to the fusion of classes and even the disappearance of strictly class lines in the formation of political parties, the conditions requisite for that form of association and co-operation between classes indispensable to popular government are assured. Within the limits of a review, it is only possible to touch upon one or two of the many interesting questions discussed by the author. A work of this importance, which for the first time gives us an inside view of political activity in Europe, deserves to be carefully read by every one interested in political progress.

L. S. Rowe.

University of Pennsylvania.

Juvenile Offenders. By W. D. Morrison. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1897.

It is very desirable that greater interest should be taken by the community in general in the large and varied class of children dealt with in this book. It appears most opportunely, for the Commission on Reformatories and Industrial Schools has issued its report, and the subject may now be thoroughly studied by whoso will

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take the trouble. Mr. Morrison's experience enables him to speak with authority, and to make many practical suggestions towards a wiser and more humane treatment of the juvenile offender.

The book is divided into two parts,—the first dealing with the conditions of juvenile crime, the second with the treatment of it. The effect of sex and age upon juvenile crime, the physical and mental condition of young offenders, their parentage and economic surroundings, are all carefully and thoroughly examined and considered, with the result that the question resolves itself into one of the best means of educating children to become useful members of the community.

As might be expected of one having so much practical experience, Mr. Morrison is not a very ardent believer in institutions and the State. "The discipline of a somewhat inferior home," he writes, "is always better than the discipline of an institution, and the efforts of parental solicitude are much more likely to be effectual in the ultimate reclamation of a wayward child than any kind of State machinery." Nevertheless, the cases are numerous in which corrective influences cannot be brought to bear upon the child except in an institution, and much careful consideration is needed to make these efficient. The first step required, Mr. Morrison thinks, is their better classification, which will enable a juvenile to be sent to the right sort of institution. At present the difference between different kinds of schools is so badly defined that criminal children mingle freely with those who are merely neglected, and mere babies are subjected to the same routine and discipline as youths with an advanced knowledge of the shady side of life. "In reformatory schools, children under ten years of age are associated with youths of eighteen and twenty. In industrial schools infants under six are sometimes mixed up with boys of fifteen and sixteen."

But in addition to the need for better classification of the schools, Mr. Morrison urges strongly the necessity for more individual consideration of each case. The character, disposition, and circumstances (including the past history) of every child must be taken into account if our treatment of it is to have any success. Under our present system they drift into the various reformatories and industrial schools very much at haphazard; it is the disposition of the magistrate who happens to be on the bench, not that of the child, which determines what course of treatment it shall go through.

The same principle of individualization must be applied after the

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child enters upon his institutional life, and for this reason the system of large schools is condemned. The schools must be small enough to admit of really personal relations between the authorities and the children under their charge.

One important point comes out clearly, both in Mr. Morrison's book and in the Blue Book referred to before,—*i.e.*, that the care of the children should not cease as soon as they leave the walls of the institution. A more complete system of "after-care" would go far to prevent the recurrence of crime which is so sad a feature among juvenile offenders. This is a work which could and should be done largely by voluntary agencies, which would undertake that every child should have at least one friend to look to for support when he begins the hard battle of life on his own account.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

BRITISH MORALISTS: Being Selections from Writers principally of the Eighteenth Century. Edited, with an Introduction and Analytical Index, by L. A. Selby-Bigge, M.A., formerly Fellow and Lecturer of University College, Oxford. In two volumes. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1897. Pp. lxx., 425, 451.

The selections here given are on a somewhat extensive scale. The principal ethical writings of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, S. Clarke, Price, and Adam Smith are represented with great fulness. Considerable extracts are given also from Bentham, Balguy, John Brown, John Clarke, John Gay, Kames, and Wollaston; and shorter passages from Hobbes, Cudworth, Locke, Mandeville, and Paley. There is also an introductory Essay of nearly sixty pages, a Bibliographical Note, and an extensive Index of terms used by the leading writers.

"A book of selections," says the editor, "is never quite satisfactory. Even if it is wanted, its execution may easily be found fault with. When all is irrevocably in print, one feels how much better it might have been done,—how niggardly one has been to one author, how stupidly indulgent to another, how badly proportioned is the whole, and how awkwardly arranged." A candid reviewer must, I fear, admit that he partly recognizes the justice of these self-accusations. The task undertaken is a difficult one, and it can hardly be said that it is quite successfully executed. The selections are not so arranged as to bring out clearly either the

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relative importance of the writers or their relations to one another. It is unfortunate, also, that, in the case of the longer extracts, it is not always made obvious to what extent the texts are incompletely given. Omissions are generally indicated by asterisks; but at several points these have not been inserted.

The introductory essay, also, though containing good and suggestive material, impresses one as scrappy and ill-arranged. Indeed, the order in which the writers are arranged in this introductory part seems to be almost the reverse of that in which they are placed in the body of the book. The general line of criticism is largely based on that of Green.

The Bibliographical Note is similarly unsatisfactory. If Cudworth* and Hobbes are to be included, why not Henry More? And why should none of the writings of Hobbes be given but "Human Nature" and "Leviathan"? Why should Reid's "Enquiry into the Human Mind," or even his "Essay on Quantity," be included among ethical writings? Or, if the latter is to be included on account of its very slight reference to an ethical question, why not also the "Essays on the Intellectual Powers," which have a chapter on the question "whether morality be capable of demonstration"? On the whole, one cannot but conclude that the list is somewhat arbitrary.

The Index of topics given at the end, which is very full, and seems to be carefully drawn out, will probably be found of more value to the student than any other part of the book. Even here one hardly knows why Gassendi should have the benefit of a Latinized name, while Descartes has not; but this is a small point.

On the whole, however, in spite of the defects that have been indicated, these volumes can hardly fail to be of great assistance to students of ethics, by bringing together in a convenient form several of the most important works of the English moralists of the last century.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

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* "Cudworth belongs to the period," says Mr. Selby-Bigge in his Preface, "because his ethical work was not published till 1731." Surely this implies a very strange view of the circumstances which determined a writer's place in the history of thought.

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CHRISTIANITY AND IDEALISM. By John Watson, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. xxxviii., 216.

This is the first volume which has appeared of a series of philosophical works which the Philosophical Union of the University of California proposes to publish. The series is edited by Professor Howison, who contributes a prefatory note on the plan of the series. The "dominant tone of the Union," he tells us, "is affirmative and idealistic." It is held by many of the members "that the only safety for human practice henceforth, the practice of each or the practice of all, lies in founding it on a philosophic criticism that shall be luminous, unrelenting, penetrating to the bottom, and that yet, just because of this unsparing thoroughness, will affirm the reality of all those moral beliefs and religious hopes on which the achievements of western civilization have hitherto rested, and by the undermining of which the stability of society now threatens to give way."

Dr. Watson begins with a chapter on the connection of morality and religion, which he regards as extremely intimate. "There can be no morality without the belief in a life higher than sense and passion, and this belief must draw its support from faith in a divine principle which insures victory to the higher life." That is to say, it is impossible to be on the side of virtue unless you are sure of winning. If this is the truth, the Philosophical Union may reasonably be alarmed for the stability of society.

The second and third chapters deal with the Greek and Jewish ideals. It is scarcely possible to say anything new on such a subject in a popular treatise. Dr. Watson explains the main features of both religions in a clear and interesting manner, and passes on, in his fourth chapter, to the Christian ideal. This he endeavors to extract entirely from the teachings of Jesus himself, without reference to his successors, a method which can scarcely be considered adequate. In the next chapter, on Mediæval Christianity, he seems to regard all the work of the Fathers and Schoolmen as either useless or positively injurious.

Passing to the second part of the book, "Modern Idealism in its Relation to the Christian Ideal of Life," we have a chapter devoted to a "Statement and Defence of Idealism." Here Dr. Watson deals, in the first place, with Mr. Balfour's criticisms, but not, as it seems to me, very successfully. His position appears

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to be almost identical with Green's. Dr. Watson then proceeds to criticise Mr. Bradley. This seems a grave mistake. Either this book was intended to be popular or it was not. In the latter case, it is difficult to justify chapters ii.–v., which are nothing but a popular summary. On the other hand, an attempt to refute Mr. Bradley's doctrine of the That and the What should not be made in fifteen pages of a text-book.

This is followed by a chapter on "Idealism in Relation to Agnosticism and the Special Sciences," which contains a discussion of the possibility of non-Euclidian space, and the book is concluded by a chapter on "Idealism and Christianity."

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

Philosophy of Theism: Being the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1895–1896. Second Series. By Alexander Campbell Fraser, LL.D., Hon. D.C.L., Oxford; Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. William Blackwood & Sons: Edinburgh and London, 1896. Pp. xiii., 288.

In the first series of his Gifford lectures, Professor Fraser arrived at the conclusion that in man, as a self-conscious and self-determining agent, is to be found the best key we possess to the solution of the ultimate problem of the universe. In this second series he first deals with "the moral and intellectual *rationale* of Theism," and then proceeds to examine, from various points of view, the "chief enigma of theistic faith," the problem of evil.

The leading thought of the whole volume is that all our dealings with the world imply ultimately "moral faith" in the trustworthiness of the final principle of the universe. In working out this thought, Professor Fraser follows the order of the traditional "proofs" of the being of God. Change in nature finds its explanation in "continuous divine activity." Causation resolves itself into "intending will." And this, because moral experience reveals "will as the only absolutely originative cause of change that can be discerned." From this it follows that scientific thought about nature is not destructive of religious thought; on the contrary, these two ways of thinking "really strengthen one another." In his chapter on the ontological "proof," Professor Fraser includes a brief and interesting discussion of the Hegelian

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philosophy. His principal criticism is that that philosophy leaves no place for the individual person as a moral agent.

The latter portion of the book deals mainly with the problem of evil. The central thought is that the ordinary statement of the problem involves an unproved assumption. The question, Why does God permit evil, tacitly assumes that a *necessitated* absence of evil must be in itself good. The possibility of moral goodness implies the possibility of moral badness.

There can be no doubt that the volume contains a very able and impressive treatment of several of the most important aspects and problems of Theism. A criticism of this treatment as a whole may perhaps be thrown into the form of a question, Does Professor Fraser heap too great a burden upon "moral faith"? He answers this criticism implicitly by the statement (p. 274) that "moral faith is deeper than the deepest possible intellectual doubt, and presupposed in all that is reasonable." But, to make this answer perfectly satisfactory, is there not need of a more thorough-going idealism, in the interpretation of nature, than any to which Professor Fraser seems willing to commit himself?

CHARLES F. D'ARCY.

BALLYMENA, IRELAND.

CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND THEISM. By R. M. Wenley, M.A., D.Phil. (Glas.), D.Sc. (Edin.), Senior Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan, etc. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1897. Pp. x., 202.

This little book describes and criticises some of the more important theological opinions of the present day, and concludes with an account of the author's own philosophical position.

Speculative theology, represented more especially by the present Master of Balliol's "Evolution of Religion" and Dr. Pfleiderer's "Gifford Lectures," is outlined and discussed. The outline is drawn clearly enough, the discussion is interesting if somewhat inadequate.

Ritschlian theology seems to me to receive more satisfactory treatment. Its place in modern thought and its principal tenets are well indicated. The criticism which follows is convincing.

Professor Wenley's own treatment of the theistic problem is somewhat perplexing. It is hard to reconcile the position he adopts in his criticism of the speculative theologians with the doctrine of his concluding chapters. His criticism rests mainly on

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the ground that speculative theology destroys personal religion by making the individual a mere stage in an intellectual process. But when he comes to state his own position as an idealist, and has to deal with the difficult question of solipsism, he cuts the Gordian knot by asserting that "within *his own* self-consciousness" man "cannot but include the self-consciousness of his neighbors." How that is possible, if the self-principle is to be regarded as anything but an abstract intellectual formula, he does not pause to explain. His further assertion that "a purely personal experience is inconceivable," however important for psychology, can hardly be said to touch the great philosophical question with which he is dealing.

Professor Wenley's whole treatment of these great topics is rapid and sketchy. But in the course of his book he throws out many bright sayings and suggestive thoughts.

CHARLES F. D'ARCY.

BALLYMENA, IRELAND.

ZELLER'S ARISTOTLE. Translated by B. F. C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead. In two volumes. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.

At last we have a translation of Zeller's Aristotle in English, and what is more a very accurate and readable translation. Some years ago this would have been a priceless boon to students of Greek philosophy, and it is impossible not to regret that it has been so long delayed. Much has been done for the study of Aristotle since the original work was published, and it is a little provoking to find hardly any recognition of this in the volumes before us, with the exception of some stray references to the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* and the like. Every one knows with what care Dr. Zeller keeps his work up to date, and it is unfortunate that there was not a new edition of the original before the translation was made. I do not know whether Dr. Zeller intends to bring out a new edition. If he does, we have waited so long that we might have waited a little longer. If he does not, we must be thankful for what we have got. It is better late than never.

It will probably be of most interest to the readers of this JOURNAL, if I make some remarks upon that part of the work which deals with the "Ethics." It is to be regretted, I think, that Zeller gives his countenance to the view that the "Ethics" deals with the

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individual and the "Politics" with the state (p. 136, *n.* 3). The fact is surely that the discussion of individual ἦθος only comes into the "Ethics" at all because it has been shown that the Good for Man—the true subject of the work—can only be realized if the lawgiver sets himself to produce good ἤθη (or "manners") in the citizens. Nor is it right to quote in support of the traditional view the words δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα (1141 b. 29); for that is merely a popular notion which Aristotle himself rejects. The definition of "virtue" hn p. 163 requires considerable revision. To translate ἕξις προαιρετική by *Beschaffenheit des Willens* or *quality of the will* is to introduce a wholly foreign idea into Aristotle's system. The definition goes on—"which preserves the mean suitably to our nature." The German here is *die Mitte hält*, which does not mean "preserves the mean," but "keeps to the mean." The next phrase, "conformably to a reasonable definition," is unfortunate. Zeller's *gemäss einer vernünftigen Bestimmung* means, I suppose, "in conformity with a rational determination," which is nearer the meaning of the Greek. Yet even the original is based on the wrong reading ὡρισμένη (for ὡρισμένῃ), and we are left to suppose that it is the ἕξις that is determined and not the μεσότης.

What strikes one most, however, is the inadequacy of our current terminology, derived though it is from Aristotle, to bring out the real meaning of the writer. *Tugend* is almost an adequate rendering of ἀρετή, but "virtue" is hopeless. Fancy calling wit (εὐτραπελία) virtue! The distinction between "moral" and "intellectual virtue" suggests something quite different from what Aristotle meant. If we might adopt a suggestion of Professor Mackenzie's for the translation of the German "Sittlichkeit," it would be nearer the mark to say "goodness of manners" and "goodness of mind." However, a translation is not the proper place for innovations of this kind, and Messrs. Costelloe and Muirhead have doubtless done right in keeping to the traditional terminology.

May I add that it would have been a blessing if the translators had seen their way to "burden" the work with a "verbal index," even if it were not quite "exhaustive." It so happens that all Zeller's most valuable work is in the foot-notes, and the difficulty of finding the right one is very great.

JOHN BURNET.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGION. By Frank Byron Jevons, M.A., Litt. D., Classical Tutor in the University of Durham. London: Methuen & Co. Pp. 415.

This book is the third number of a series of "Theological Handbooks" which are being issued under the editorship of Dr. Robertson, of Durham. It treats of early religion from the point of view of Anthropology and Folk-lore. The author claims that it is the first attempt that has been made in any language to "summarize the results of recent anthropology, to estimate their bearing upon religious problems, and to weave the whole into a connected history of early religion." Dr. Jevons deals in a highly interesting manner with such topics as Sympathetic Magic, Taboo, Totemism, Fetichism, Ancestor Worship, etc. From these institutions is traced the growth of Monotheism. For Dr. Jevons holds that the principle of evolution applies to religion; though the course of evolution need not be uniformly upward, relapse being sufficiently common in the history of religion. Thus it is quite conceivable that Totemism was a degeneration from some simpler form of faith, an amorphous monotheism. In fact, the author says that it was only amongst one people of the earth, the Jews, that this primitive religion developed into something higher. Everywhere else it degenerated into the grosser form of animal worship. Dr. Jevons points out that, "though evolution is universal, progress is exceptional." It is impossible, however, to summarize the book here. It is crammed full of facts gathered from all sources, and may be strongly recommended to every one interested in the growth of primitive religion and the development of early religious institutions.

W. F. TROTTER.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THE CLUE TO THE AGES. Part I. By Ernest Judson Page. London: Baptist Tract and Book Society. Pp. xii., 283.

In this volume the author criticises the Evolutionary Hypothesis as applied to the higher life of man, and rejects it in favor of his own theory of Creation by Principle. At odd intervals in the discussion he contrives to drag in a comparison of the respective merits of an established and a non-established church to the disadvantage of the former. Mr. Page is, to say the least of it, eccentric. The *parabola* is stated to be "symbolic of man's moral

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nature" (page 272). In a chapter on "The Unification of the Universe" he demonstrates to his own satisfaction by means of *conic sections* the trustworthiness of the Biblical account of the age of the world, and the freedom of the will! The book is extremely crude, not to say quite unintelligible, in places. The following is a sample: "The infinitesimal multiplied by infinity gives unity. The infinite principle operates in primitive nebulosity, and creates the infinitesimal atom. Multiply this by infinity, and you get unity. Unity is the characteristic ratio of the parabola symbolic of man's moral life. Man is the unit of the Universe." (Page 272.) A companion volume, entitled "Recreation by Principle," is promised.

W. F. TROTTER.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY: A Hand-book for Students of Psychology, Logic, Ethics, Æsthetics, and General Philosophy. By Oswald Külpe, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Würzburg. Translated by W. B. Pillsbury and E. B. Titchener, of Cornell University. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897.

This is an attempt to indicate the general nature of philosophy, its relations to the sciences, the divisions into which its subject-matter falls, and the chief divergent schools that tend to arise in its treatment. Külpe divides philosophy into A. The General Philosophical Disciplines (Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Logic); B. The Special Philosophical Disciplines (Natural Philosophy, Psychology, Ethics and the Philosophy of Law, Æsthetics, the Philosophy of Religion, the Philosophy of History). The schools of philosophy are classified as A. Metaphysical Schools (among which we find the headings Singularism and Pluralism, Materialism, Spiritualism, Dualism, Monism, Mechanism and Teleology, Determinism and Indeterminism, the Theological Schools in Metaphysics, the Psychological Schools in Metaphysics); B. Epistemological Schools (including the following: Rationalism, Empiricism and Criticism, Dogmatism, Scepticism, Positivism and Criticism, Idealism, Realism and Phenomenalism); C. Ethical Schools (including Theories of the Origin of Morality, the Ethics of Reflection and the Ethics of Feeling, Individualism and Universalism, Subjectivism and Objectivism). A book of this kind, in which the relations of the various departments of philosophy and the various

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schools of thought are worked out in a well-informed and careful way, can hardly fail to be of considerable use to students of the subject. Nor can it be called a mere compendium. It includes valuable discussions as well as accurate summaries. At the same time, it may be doubted whether the help which it will render to the student is very great. The discussions are probably too fragmentary to be convincing, and it is to be feared that the elaborate subdivisions of the subject will in many cases be more confusing than enlightening. The principles on which these divisions are made do not seem sufficiently clear. They appear to me to be intricate without being exhaustive. The book may, however, be safely recommended as the work of a thoroughly competent thinker, and as dealing in a sympathetic spirit with the most opposite points of view. The general tone of the book is admirable.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY. By Bertrand Russell. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897. Pp. 204.

This book consists of six lecturers delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science, together with a bibliography and an interesting appendix on the attitude of Social Democracy towards the Woman Question in Germany. The author has been very successful in combining an account of the theory upon which Social Democracy supposes itself to be based, with the history of its actual development under the very difficult political conditions of Germany. The subject is an interesting one, treated in an interesting manner; but perhaps what chiefly attracts the reader is to compare the very different products of the Marxian seed as sown in English and German soils. The German clings with all the fidelity of the feudal retainer to the teachings of his master: to the German Social Democrat it is sufficient to say "thus spoke Karl Marx," and no further proof is required. Marx said that in all branches of production large businesses tend to replace small ones, therefore they do (see p. 153); and if any branch of production does not do so, why, then, it must be made to, and, having accepted Marx with closed eyes, they carry out the conclusions from his fictitious premises with a blind, relentless logic which enforces admiration in spite of its perversity. No doubt, it is their obstinate consistency which will not allow them to compromise with the enemy, nor to lend an ear to "Danaos dona ferentes," and which enables them to swallow even the hard

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fact of the continued existence of the peasant proprietor—no doubt it is this consistency which gives them their strength. The people can understand a doctrine which has been consistently preached and practised for more than a generation, and will support it while it remains unchanged. It has become for them, as Mr. Russell says, a religion. But for that very reason to introduce into it the English light-hearted insincerity would be fatal to its stability, and would probably reduce it to the wavering game of expediency which is played by English Socialists. "It is to be hoped," writes Mr. Russell, discussing the future of German Social Democracy, "that, like other religious bodies, like the two chief leaders at the last Congress, they will lose something in logical acumen, and adopt, in their political activity, maxims really inconsistent with their fundamental principles, but necessitated by practical exigencies, and reconciled by some more or less fallacious line of reasoning." Very likely the adoption of such a plan of campaign might be followed by many much needed concessions, but would it not bring also the downfall of Social Democracy?

That Mr. Russell advocates this compromising policy as a friend, and not as an insidious enemy, is clear; but, on the whole, he preserves the attitude of the impartial historian throughout, and his intimate knowledge of the subject has enabled him to produce a book which will be very useful to the student.

H. BOSANQUET.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS. By Professor Sidgwick. Second edition, revised throughout. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

[The additions and alterations, though numerous, are mostly of a minor kind. An appendix is added, containing an enlarged discussion of Austin's view of Sovereignty. The total amount of additional matter amounts to over thirty pages. Considering that the aim of the book is to "expound, within a convenient compass, . . . the chief general considerations that enter into the rational discussion of political questions in modern states," it seems doubtful whether any such enlargement was desirable; but the advanced student of politics will, of course, be glad to have a somewhat more extended statement of Dr. Sidgwick's views on particular points. The work as a whole seems still to have the defect of being much too large for an elementary treatise, and too incomplete for an advanced treatise on the principles of politics. Whether it is not a still more serious defect that the whole point of view is based on the ideas of Bentham and his school instead of on those of Aristotle and Hegel, may be a matter of opinion. It must

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at least strike most readers as odd that the names of Hegel and Green are not even mentioned. Still, it is no doubt much the most satisfactory treatise on politics that we have. For a general criticism of the whole work by Professor Ritchie, see Vol. II., No. 2, of this JOURNAL.]

ESSAYS ON LIBERALISM. By Six Oxford Men. [Hilaire Belloc, F. W. Hirst, J. A. Simon, J. S. Phillimore, J. L. Hammond, and P. J. Macdonell.] London, Paris, and Melbourne: Cassell & Co., 1897.

[A significant little book, written by some of the leaders of opinion among recent graduates at Oxford. "Six years ago," they say, "undergraduate Oxford tended to be Tory or Socialist; since that time we have seen an extraordinarily strong Liberal movement absorb, with one or two remarkable exceptions, most of those who care for political discussions or debates." The essays give, naturally enough, occasional signs of immaturity, but are of great interest from the clue they afford to the ideas of Oxford men "under five and twenty." The criticisms on Socialism, coupled with a plea for the extension of compulsory education, are especially noteworthy. The duty of the state to create and maintain free citizens is the dominant note throughout the book.]

MACHIAVELLI: the Romanes Lecture, delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre (Oxford), June 2, 1897. By the Right Hon. John Morley, M.P., etc. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1897. ["If one were to put the case for the Machiavellian philosophy in a modern way, it would, I suppose, be something of this kind: Nature does not work by moral rules. Nature, 'red in tooth and claw,' does by system all that good men by system avoid. . . . War, again, is not conducted by moral rules. To declare war is to suspend not merely *habeas corpus* but the Ten Commandments, and some other good commandments besides. . . . Why should the ruler of a state be bound by a moral code from which the soldier is free? Why should not he have the benefit of what has been called the 'evolutionary beatitude,'—Blessed are the strong, for they shall prey on the weak?" "Such," says Mr. Morley, "is the defence of reason of state, of the worship of nation and empire. Everything that policy requires, justice sanctions. There are no crimes in politics, only blunders. 'The man of action is essentially conscienceless' (*Goethe*)." "Yet the world," he goes on, "in spite of a thousand mischances, and at tortoise-pace, has steadily moved away from him. . . . The modern conception of a state has long made it a moral person, capable of right and wrong, just as are the individuals composing it." The whole discourse is very interesting and instructive.]

LECTURES AND REMAINS OF RICHARD LEWIS NETTLESHIP, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford. Edited, with a biographical sketch, by Professor A. C. Bradley, M.A., and Mr. G. R. Benson, M.A. In two volumes. London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897. [The first volume contains the biographical sketch (about fifty pages), short miscellaneous papers and extracts from letters (about one hundred pages), lectures on logic. Plato's conception of goodness and the good. The second volume contains lectures on the Republic of Plato. Readers of Mr. Nettleship's famous essay on education will find the second volume particularly interesting in connection with it; but it is hardly necessary to say that the whole book will be of great value to students of philosophy.]

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INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY: a Hand-Book for Students. By Oswald Külpe. Translated by W. B. Pillsbury and E. B. Titchener. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY: an Analysis of the Phenomena of Association and of Social Organization. By Professor F. H. Giddings, M.A. Third edition. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

THE THEORY OF SOCIALIZATION: a Syllabus of Sociological Principles, for the use of College and University Classes. By the same. With reference to the third edition of "The Principles of Sociology." London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

THE DESTINIES OF DEMOCRACY. By the same. Reprinted from the *Political Science Quarterly*. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1897. [An interesting review of Mr. Lecky's "Democracy and Liberty."]

THE TEACHING OF MORALITY IN THE FAMILY AND THE SCHOOL. By Mrs. Sophie Bryant, D.Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MORAL SELF. By B. Bosanquet. London and New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897.

A MANUAL OF ETHICS. By J. S. Mackenzie, M.A. Third edition, revised, enlarged, and in part rewritten. University Correspondence College Press. London: W. B. Clive; New York: Hinds & Noble, 1897. [Divided into five parts: *Introduction; Book I.*, Prolegomena, chiefly psychological; *Book II.*, Theories of the Moral Standard; *Book III.*, The Moral Life; *Concluding Chapter*, Ethics and Metaphysics. There are new chapters on the Evolution of Conduct, the Growth of the Moral Judgment, the Development of Ethical Thought, the Types of Ethical Theory, and the Bearing of Theory on Practice. There are also a number of smaller additions and alterations.]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS. By M. Ribot. (*Contemporary Science Series.*) London: Walter Scott, 1897.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE'S WERKE. Zweite Abtheilung. Band XI., *Schriften und Entwürfe*, 1876–1880. Band XII., *Schriften und Entwürfe*, 1881–1885. Leipzig: C. G. Neumann, 1897.

THE KINDERGARTEN SYSTEM: its Origin and Development, as seen in the Life of Friedrich Froebel. Translated and Adapted from the Work of Alexander Bruno Hanschmann, for the use of English Kindergarten Students, by Fanny Franks. With an Appendix on "The Education of Man." London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: C. W. Bardeen, 1897.

HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT: on the Lines of Modern Evolution. By John Beattie Crozier. Vol. I. Greek and Hindoo Thought; Græco-Roman Paganism; Judaism; and Christianity down to the Closing of the Schools of Athens by Justinian. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.

A SURVEY OF GREEK CIVILIZATION. By Professor J. P. Mahaffy, D.D., D.C.L. London: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

MORAL EVOLUTION. By Professor George Harris. London: James Clarke & Co., 1897.

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THE CHANCES OF DEATH, and other Studies in Evolution. By Professor Karl Pearson, M.A., F.R.S. In two volumes. London and New York: Edward Arnold, 1897.

LECTURES IN THE LYCEUM; or Aristotle's Ethics for English Readers. Edited by St. George Stock. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.

FORECASTS OF THE COMING CENTURY. By a Decade of Writers. Edited by Edward Carpenter. Manchester: The Labor Press Limited, 1897. [A volume of socialistic essays. Among the writers are A. R. Wallace, William Morris, H. S. Salt, and Bernard Shaw.]

JEWISH IDEALS, *and other Essays*. By Joseph Jacobs. London: David Nutt; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896. [Contains essays on "Jewish Ideals," "The God of Israel: a History" (perhaps the most interesting point here is the way in which Jewish religious ideas are connected with Stoicism and Spinozism), "Mordecai: a Protest against the Critics," "Browning's Theology," etc.]

A JEWISH STATE: an Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question. By Theodor Herzel, LL.D. Translated into English by Sylvie d'Avigdor. London: David Nutt, 1896.

THE RATIONALIST'S MANUAL. In two parts. Part I.—Theology: Its Superstitions and Origin. Part II.—Rationalism: Its Philosophy and Ethics. By Aletheia, M.D. London: Watts & Co., 1897. Pp. 140. [Sadly marred by Biblical criticism of a rather old-fashioned type.]

GLEANINGS OF PAST YEARS: 1885–96. Vol. VIII. *Theological and Ecclesiastical.* By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., etc. London: John Murray, 1897.

ARNOLD OF RUGBY: His School Life and Contributions to Education. Edited by J. J. Findlay, M.A. With an Introduction by the Lord Bishop of Hereford. London: C. J. Clay & Sons, 1897.

THE BLIGHT OF RESPECTABILITY: an Anatomy of the Disease and a Theory of Curative Treatment. By Geoffrey Mortimer. London: The University Press, 1897.

THE PHYSIOCRATS: Six Lectures on the French Économistes of the Eighteenth Century. By Henry Higgs. London: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY: What ought it to be? By Henry W. Wolff. London: P. S. King & Son, 1897.

A CREED FOR CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS. By the Very Rev. C. W. Stubbs, D.D., Dean of Ely. London: W. Reeves, 1897.

REPORT OF AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONDITION OF THE UNEMPLOYED, conducted under the Toynbee Trust. By A. V. Woodworth. London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1897.

THE EXTINCTION OF WAR, POVERTY, AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES. Containing Essays on *Home Rule and Federation; Can War be Suppressed? State Remedies for Poverty;* and *The Extinction of Infectious Diseases.* By a Doctor of Medicine, Author of "The Elements of Social Science." London: E. Truelove, 1897.

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THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF BENJAMIN JOWETT, M.A., Master of Balliol College, Oxford. By Evelyn Abbott, M.A., LL.D., and Lewis Campbell, M.A., LL.D. With Portraits and other Illustrations. In two volumes. London: John Murray, 1897.

ESSAYS. By George John Romanes. Edited by Principal C. Lloyd Morgan. London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1897.

CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND THEISM. By Professor R. M. Wenley. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1897.

RECENT ADVANCES IN THEISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By James Lindsay. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood & Sons, 1897.

MOODS: *Their Mental and Physical Character.* By E. Phillips. London: J. & A. Churchill, 1897.

THE ETHICS OF JOHN STUART MILL. Edited, with Introductory Essays, by Charles Douglas, M.A., D.Sc. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1897.

ESSAYS AND SPEECHES. By William Samuel Lilly, Honorary Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge. London: Chapman & Hall, 1897. [Contains Essays on "Alexander Pope," "Professor Green," "John Henry Newman," "The Temporal Power of the Pope," "The Making of Germany," "Literature and National Life," "The New Spirit in History." Also, an Appendix, containing an Essay on "The Temporal Power of the Pope," by Signor Crispi. The volume is dedicated, in terms of warm eulogy, to Mr. C. S. Devas.]

GRUNDLEGUNG FÜR EINE MODERNE PRAKTISCH-ETHISCHE LEBENSANSCHAUUNG (nationale und ideale Sittenlehre). Von Dr. Johannes Unold. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1896.

KRITISCHE GRUNDLEGUNG DER ETHIK ALS POSITIVER WISSENSCHAFT. Von Dr. med. Wilhelm Stern. Berlin: Ferd. Dümler, 1897.

SYSTEM DER WERTTHEORIE. I. Band: *Allegemeine Werttheorie.* Psychologie des Begehrens. Leipzig: Reisland, 1897.

ETHISCH-SOCIAL WISSENSCHAFTLICHE VORTRAGSKURSE. Veranstaltet von den ethischen Gesellschaften in Deutschland, Oesterreich, und der Schweiz; herausgegeben von der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für ethische Cultur. (Züricher Reden.) Bern: A. Siebert, 1896:

Bis jetz erscheinen: I. Band: *Ethische Principienlehre.* Von Dr. Harald Höffding, Professor an der Universität zu Kopenhagen. II. Band: *Die ersten Moralunterweisungen für Kinder.* Von Dr. Rudolph Penzig, Docent an der Humboldt-Akademie zu Berlin. III. Band: *Über Erziehung.* Von Oberst. a. D.M. von Egidy, Berlin. IV. Band. Socialismus und sociale Bewegung im 19. Jahrhundert. Von Werner Sombart, Professor an der Universität Breslau. V. Band: *Volkstümliche Universitätsbewegung.* Von Dr. Emil Reich, Privatdocent für Philosophie an der Universität Wien.

DIE PROBLEME DER MENSCHLICHEN WIRTSCHAFT. Von Dr. Theodor Hertzka. I. Band: *Das Problem der Gütererzeugung.* Berlin: Dümler, 1897.

KOSMODICEE. Von Pelzelt-Nervin. Leipzig und Wien: DENTICKE. 1897. [Versuch Optimismus wie Pessimismus auf eine wissenschaftliche Grundlage

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zu stellen, durch allseitige Erörterung des Glückproblems im Leben des Individuums wie im Leben der Menscheit und Darlegung des Sinnes in welchem der Begriff "sittliche Weltordnung" anwenbar ist. Ausgezeichnet durch Strenge der Beweisführung, Reichtum des Materials und ethischen Ernst der Gesinnung.]

DIE SOCIALE FRAGE IM LICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE: Vorlesungen über Socialphilosophie und ihre Geschichte. Von Dr. Ludwig Stein. Stuttgart: Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, 1897.

WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT, nach der materialistischen Geschichts-auffassung. Von Dr. Rudolf Stammler, Professor an der Universität Halle. Leipzig: Veit, 1896.

DER ARBEITERSCHUTZ. Von Dr. Kuno Frankenstein. Leipzig, 1896.

AGRARPOLITIK: ein Lehrbuch. Von Lujo Brentano. I. Theil: *Theoretische Einleitung*. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1897.

SOCIOLOGIE ET MORALE. Par Marcet Bernès. Paris: Giard et Brière, 1897.

LA LIBERTÉ, L'EGALITÉ ET LA FRATERNITÉ. Par M. Domanski. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie, 1897.

LES LOIS OUVRIÈRES DEVANT LE PARLEMENT ANGLAIS. Par Jacques Dumas. Paris: Larose, 1897.

ENQUÊTE SUR LA QUESTION SOCIALE EN L'EUROPE. Par Jules Huret. Paris: Perrin, 1897.

L'OPPOSITION UNIVERSELLE: Essai d'une Théorie des Contraires. Par G. Tarde. Paris: Alcan, 1897.

IL MATERIALISMO STORICO E LO STATO. Di C. F. Ferraris. Palermo: Sandron, 1897.

LA PROPRIETÀ FORDIARIA E LA QUESTIONE SOCIALE. Di Achille Loria. Verona: Fratelli Drucher, 1897.

I DISERADATI E I LORO DIRITTI. Di Pietro Pellegrini. Borgo a Mozzano: Tipografia Editrice N. Vannini, 1897.

LA PSICOLOGIA NEL SISTEMA DELLE SCIENZE. Di N. R. D'Alfonso. Roma: Societa Editrice Dante Alighieri, 1897.

NATURWISSENSCHAFTLICHE WOCHENSCHRIFT. Berlin, Sonntag den 11 April, 1897. [Contains "Herrenmoral und ethische Evolution," von Dr. Hans Schmidkunz, being, for the most part, an exposition of F. Nietzsche's ideas.]

MIND: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. New Series, No. 23; July, 1897. London: Williams & Norgate. [The July number of *Mind* contains several articles that are of interest to students of ethics, notably one by Mr. A. F. Shand on "Types of Will," and one on "Aristotle's Theory of Incontinence,—A Contribution to Practical Ethics," by Mr. W. H. Fairbrother. There is also a "Reply to Mr. Muirhead's Criticism" (on practical ethics), by Mrs. Bain, a review of Mr. Stout's "Analytic Psychology," by Professor Josiah Royce, etc. Mr. B. Russell has an article "On the Relations of Number and Quantity," which contains, among other things, some valuable remarks on the Hedonistic Calculus.]

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1898.

THE ETHICAL BASIS OF COLLECTIVISM.

THE Socialistic creed, as has been pointed out in one of the ablest expositions of its ethical tendency, has been subject like other creeds to the law of evolution. Both in its economic, its historical, and its ethical doctrine it has shown developments which to the hostile critic are mere proofs of internal disruption or perhaps insincerity, while to the more sympathetic they are rather signs of a healthy vitality. We are not here concerned with the systematic exposition of this development, but rather with an attempt to appreciate the phase at present reached. A brief reference, however, to some more primitive forms of Socialistic theory will help by way of comparison.

In its primitive form Socialism appears as a development of the Rousseauite principle of equality, and as such received its most scientific exposition in the Marxian doctrine of surplus value. The value of a commodity being measured, on this theory, by the quantity of labor required to produce it, it followed that all wealth was due to the laborer. But of the wealth that he produced the laborer only received a small proportion; in fact, in accordance with Ricardo's "iron law," which the Marxians accepted, only just enough to keep him alive and enable him to replenish the laboring population. The margin by which his actual product exceeded this "subsistence minimum" was wrongfully absorbed by the

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capitalist and landlord, who had done nothing to bring it into existence. This exploitation of the laborer by the absorption of the surplus value of his industry was the inherent injustice of the capitalist *régime*. Now it is easy to riddle the economics of this theory with criticism. Value is not measured by labor alone. Between laborers there are qualitative as well as quantitative differences. The function of the captain of industry must be recognized as wholly distinct from that of the capitalist, and capital itself cannot justly be considered as contributing nothing to the production of wealth. But with all this destructive criticism it is easy to overlook the elements of truth contained in Marx's teaching. Marx lays down a certain ideal of abstract justice, which, like other abstract ideals, cannot be properly understood while it remains abstract, but nevertheless has its place in any true and comprehensive conception of social progress. The prevalent intellectual tendency of our time is to distrust abstract arguments. It is a tendency which has been growing for nearly a hundred years, and is in the main a natural enough reaction against the methods of the eighteenth century, while in England it appeals with especial force to the national dislike of anything which savors of theory or logic. But it is time to recognize that in its present form this tendency plays directly into the hands of political inertia. The upholder of things as they are does not require an ideal, because he does not need to be constructive. He has only to sit still and challenge the world to move him. At the present day he professes but little faith even in the past. He does not seriously believe in monarchy or aristocracy, or established churches, or anything but the security of his dividends. As long as he can rebut attack, his position is intellectually secure, and on the whole he finds his best weapon of defence in the cultivated and good-humored scepticism of which Mr. Balfour is the natural representative. Only let reason and logic be weak enough and the established fact will remain standing by mere force of inertia. Let us then weaken reason; let us prove that proof is non-existent; that there is no ideal beyond the actual, and that the laws of right and

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wrong have no validity except as expressions of the existing order. Now, when the reformer admits these positions, as under the influence of the historical method and the spirit of relativity he has become prone to do, he is simply allowing his teeth to be drawn. An ideal is as necessary to the reformer as the established fact is to the conservative. Unless he knows precisely where he is going and what he expects to find when he gets there, he is a ship without steam and without rudder. A progressive movement, in short, must have an ideal, and an ethical ideal for the future must be in so far abstract as it is not yet realized and embodied in social institutions.

Furthermore, an ethical ideal cannot be based merely on existing tendencies. The existing tendency can take care of itself, and those Socialists make a very great blunder who base their position upon a fatalistic interpretation of history. If Socialism is coming of itself, why should any one incur the obloquy of calling himself a Socialist, or put himself to any trouble in securing the advent of the inevitable? Undoubtedly any sane theory of progress must take existing tendencies into account; but, so far from being dominated by these tendencies, it will seek to use them for its own purposes. There is not one tendency at work in society but many, and no one can say which of them is dominant until after the event. But any one who cares can say which he wishes to prevail, which tendencies or what elements in any given tendency seem to him to make for good and which for evil, and can shape his practical course accordingly. The true attitude of the ideal to the actual is that of a selective agency working like natural selection in the organic world upon such materials as come to hand, fostering what there is of good in each direction, and so framing a plan of action which is neither dominated by the facts nor removed from all contact with them, but is rather the expression of such possibilities of improvement as we find in the actual condition of things.

Of these actual conditions, one permanent constituent, it is apt to be forgotten, is the moral consciousness of men. The

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conceptions of justice, equality, liberty, or humanity have been forces to be reckoned with in the last one hundred years of European history. And we can go a step further. These conceptions represent certain sides or aspects of the moral consciousness of mankind; and if that moral consciousness has any sort of validity, it must be capable of constituting a harmonious ethical order in which all its claims find satisfaction. When treated in isolation, indeed, the principles of justice and benevolence, or liberty and authority, or any others that we like to take, are apt, as moralists know, to harden themselves into exclusive and often partially incompatible rules. The more philosophic view being necessarily an attempt to harmonize is bound to wear something of a destructive aspect. It rubs off the corners of hard crystallizations of moral thought, and reduces all "absolute" rights and duties to a proper subserviency to some more general conception around which the whole of the moral consciousness may be taken to centre. Thus all the so-called natural rights may be shown to be relative to and limited by considerations of social welfare. But it is a mistake to pause here as though the task of philosophy were complete, when in fact it has only just begun. For the real problem is to find the place which each right and each duty recognized by the plain man would take in the system of rights and duties of which it is to be a part. It is not enough to say that the right of equality, the right to live and work, the prescriptive right of property are to be judged and measured by what is good for society as a whole. We want to know what place these rights would have in a sound conception of social welfare as attainable in Western Europe in the twentieth century, and, without pretending to any complete solution, I think we can say this much: that no conception of social welfare can be final in which these spontaneous, deep-lying, and constantly recurring claims of the moral consciousness do not find a legitimate satisfaction. We cannot make the principle of liberty or that of equality the sole touchstone by which an existing or an ideal scheme of society can be tested, but in Western Europe a society which wholly ignores either of them is doomed to failure.

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The problem is to find a synthesis in which these and other such conceptions can live at peace with one another, being, as Aristotle would say, neither in excess nor in defect, but in that mean which is the good or rather the best. We conclude that in any true conception of social welfare those "abstract" ideas of rights and duties which faithfully formulate real though one-sided claims of the moral consciousness must, with whatever modifications, find legitimate scope and satisfaction.

It is thus with the abstract justice of the Marxian Socialism. The doctrine that the products of industry should belong to the producers contains a truth which should not be overlooked merely because we have discovered that it is not the whole truth. In the same way the doctrines of surplus value is, as Marx stated it, an incorrect analysis of the facts, but it contains elements which a true and complete doctrine must embrace. It remains true that wealth does not go to its producers alone, but in large measure to non-productive classes, and that this is in part the reason why the immense development of our material resources has done so little to remove poverty from among us. And it follows that the institution of inherited property, enabling its owners to draw rent and interest not earned by their own exertions, must necessarily be called in question in any attempt to remodel the industrial system upon principles of equity.

But abstract justice is not the only thing to be considered. Equality is not the sole aim and object of society, though in some form or other it is a necessary element in any ethical ideal, since it stands for the truth that there is a common humanity deeper than all our superficial distinctions. But to model our political principles on this idea alone is just like modelling them on liberty alone, or on authority alone, or on prescription alone. The result is hopelessly one-sided, and the dreariness of the mechanical schemes of Socialism which from time to time appear may be taken as indicating the necessary failure of the abstract method. It is a trite charge against the Socialist that he would merely reduce all mankind to a dead level of mediocrity, and, as applying to a

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system based on equality and nothing else, the accusation must be allowed some weight. An equality pursued as the sole end of government would be as dead as any other social ideal when isolated from the complementary conceptions of the social order. Equality is good in the sense that without it social and political life are poor things, not in the sense that social and political life exist only to secure it to the exclusion of every other consideration.

What we may call the fallacy of the abstract ideal is pushed to its furthest and most repulsive point when the economic mechanism of the Socialist theory is made into the ultimate end and object of the whole movement. This is done not only by critics, but by supporters of Socialism, and from both points of view is one of the gravest dangers of the situation. It is no doubt a necessary piece of mechanism that the functions of government should be in some degree extended, and in view of the Individualist theories which still linger on Socialists are often forced to contend for the abstract right to extend them to fields which they do not at present cover. Hence a temptation to hail any and every extension of State authority, whatever its principle or its object as a triumph for Socialism. Even the Agricultural Rating Act is hailed by the incautious or the paradoxically inclined as marking a step onward in the march of Collectivist ideas, and a measure designed to assist the clergy in maintaining an undivided authority over the administration of public funds is hailed as at least a blow to *laissez faire* Liberalism. This is *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*, for the sake of Socialism to lose all hold of the reasons which make us Socialists. Nothing could be more threatening to the best hopes of human progress than an increase of the powers of government associated with a lowering of its principles. Neither a diminished nor an increased regimentation is an end in itself. Either may be good or bad according as the government in question is or is not likely to make a good use of its powers. And in point of historical fact this probability has decided the attitude of democratic reformers. As long as the government represented a narrow and reactionary class, its action in economic matters was naturally

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opposed to the popular interest—witness Protection and the Combination Laws. The popular party was naturally in permanent opposition, and sought reasonably enough to curtail and restrict an authority which they could not hope to control. When the basis of government was changed and the legislature became responsible to the people as a whole, the consistent democrat modified his position. He is no longer in permanent opposition, but sees in the central authority a machine which he may hope to control in the interest of the public. Hence for the democrat the old *laissez faire* position is no longer logically tenable. But there is no need to run into the opposite extreme and applaud the running of the machine merely because it is a machine and is being run. Some Socialists, it would seem, have yet to learn that their synthesis must include all the elements of value represented by the older Liberalism. The State Socialism of Bismarck might have taught them something in this respect.

The true end of Socialism, then, is in the first place ethical. It is not the subordination of the man to the machine of State, but the use of the State for ethical, that is to say human, ends. Politics, it still seems necessary to repeat, are rightfully subordinate to ethics. They exist for the sake of human life, and in the modern world human life is wider and richer than State life. Now the essence of the ethical end is that it tries to comprehend human life on all sides, as a house in which there are many mansions, comprehensive in its possibilities, comprehensive also in its needs. Hence the ethical is necessarily opposed to the abstract view as represented by any single political dogma. How, then, are we to understand it?

An answer may be found if we remember that in a sense the ethical or human view is precisely that which in certain relations and for certain purposes we all understand. We are all human beings, and are all brought into direct contact with other human beings in the various personal relations of life. Without being philosophers and without any capacity for formulating general principles, we are all forced to some understanding of human life, its nature, and its needs,

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and to some interest in its fortunes. And our personal relations, from the simplest and closest to the most complex and remote, tend to fall into two classes. In the struggle for existence and the fruits of existence our fellow-men are at once our most formidable rivals and our most potent allies. Love and hate, as Empedocles discovered, are the principles that govern the world. It has been the mistake of many modern Evolutionists to eliminate love from consideration, and to leave hate, rivalry, competition as the sole spring of movement in organic life. The truth is rather that hate, and war, and the struggle for self belong essentially to the inorganic sphere. It is precisely so far as divergent claims are not adjusted, as individuals are not organized into associations, as mutual dependence is not realized, that rivalry remains the principal means of subsistence and success. But from the lowest stages of organic life upward to civilized man there is an advance of integration which is constantly replacing the struggle of isolated atoms by the harmonious concurrence of interdependent parts. The lowest kind of compound animal is, I suppose, the cell colony, in which the association of parts is so loose that any component cell can emigrate when it chooses and live its own independent life. The loss of a limb matters little to the starfish and not as much as might be supposed to the limb. Even in the lower vertebrates, like the frog, the lower nerve centres retain a considerable degree of independence. But always as we mount the animal scale we come to a closer organization, in which, as between the myriads of living units which constitute the body, competition is reduced to very narrow limits, the health of the whole is essential to the life of each, and the cells secure their own maintenance by co-operating in the support of the entire body. In the relations of animals and of human beings to one another a somewhat similar development can be traced. Social life at any stage is a more or less organized structure as the case may be, and progress consists in the development of organization. At every stage competition is the law of unorganized, co-operation of organized, life.

I can perhaps best explain this by making clear what I do

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not mean. I do not mean that the best state is that in which liberty is subordinated to order and progress left to take care of itself. I do not mean that the higher the social state the more complete is the sacrifice of the individual to common ends. On the contrary, such a constitution of society, though it may be necessary in a state of siege, is just the negation of the organic idea as I would wish it to be conceived. A mechanical unity is as much opposed to organic co-operation as is anarchy itself, which is, indeed, its natural correlative. The true conception of an organic society is one in which the best life of each man is and is felt to be bound up with the best life of his fellow-citizens. It is that in which the soul in bringing forth its fruit may be said, after Browning, to

> Forward the general deed of man,
> And each of the many helps to recruit
> The life of the race by a general plan,
> Each living his own to boot.

As I shall at once be told that this is pretty but chimerical, and that you can no more eliminate repulsion and antagonism from human life than from the like poles of two magnets, I would invite attention to certain general tendencies of organic evolution which seem to have been too much neglected, and which go to show that the organic conception of society is a natural deduction from all that we know of those evolutionary forces which make for progress. I shall try to show that while evolution is not the same thing as progress, there is such a thing as progress in evolution; and it will be convenient to state in advance how this progress is to be conceived and on what it must be taken to rest. An evolutionary process as such consists merely in the development of one type into another, and there is no necessity that the second type should be any higher in the scale of creation than the first, if the term higher is to carry any sense of value as appreciated by human intelligence. For the success of the new type is determined merely by natural selection, that is, by the advantages possessed by this or that individual in the struggle for existence, whatever those advantages may be. It thus comes about as the result of a blind clash of forces, and not

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in accordance with a rational plan of organization. This must be so as far as the reign of competition extends and individual lives are not related to one another according to any comprehensive scheme. But it will also be clear that such a correlation of the individuals of a species may be one among other methods by which a type may be preserved. And where the germ of such a correlation exists, it may be fostered by natural selection, like any other quality advantageous to the species. The natural organ of such organization is what at least in its higher developments we call the moral intelligence, in virtue of which the individual makes the good of this social group, and ultimately of the whole species to which he belongs, an object of supreme interest to himself. As this intelligence develops it comes to dominate the methods of natural selection, first suspending the struggle between individuals, and, secondly, substituting direct and purposive effort towards the good of the whole for the method of maintaining the type by the clash of atoms. Now what we call *progress* in evolution, or the evolution of higher types, we take to be identical with the advance of organization. History, if it has a meaning, is a record of the process by which elements of value and rational purpose have come to make themselves good by organized coherence. What we call the progressive organization of life is therefore for us an evolutionary process, and the only evolutionary process of value.

We will illustrate this position first in reference to the deficiencies of natural selection regarded as an agent in improvement. There is a process known as the Law of Compensation,* which is generally acknowledged as a factor in the organic world, but has not, as far as I am aware, received the minute and careful study which it deserves. It may be explained roughly in this way. The tendency of the struggle for existence is to preserve an organism in virtue of some one or some very few eminent qualifications. An animal which has the average health and vitality of its species, but is a little stronger

* More generally, it is the law of Correlated Variation. The cases of "compensation" comprise all that need be noted for our purpose.

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or a little faster, or has a harder shell or a sharper tooth, will have a sufficient advantage to determine the success of its descendants. But in developing any one of these advantages it may, and in many cases must, lose others. Strength, for example, almost of necessity involves bulk and weight, and if a given species is the prey of some materially stronger animal, variation in strength will make little difference to the chances of survival enjoyed by its members, while extra speed will be a most important point. In such a case, therefore, strength is likely to be sacrificed to speed, and we get a race developed like the deer, which is progressively less capable of standing up to its adversary, but more successful in running away. This is the law of compensatory sacrifice. The deer has, so to say, specialized on swiftness, and in doing so has abandoned strength. In the same way the human hand can be adapted to guiding the plough or to twisting ends of thread, but hardly to both at once. It must sacrifice one power to gain another.

Observe next that, as to the value of the qualities by which a type is preserved, natural selection exhibits a fine indifference. A conquers B and survives, but whether the result will be to produce a better or worse, a less or a more developed species can only be determined after the event. There is no greater or more common blunder than to treat natural selection as essentially an agent of progress. Whatever else progress may be, it at least involves a fuller and more many-sided life. But one of the commonest methods of maintaining yourself in the organic world is by reducing your wants, and therefore your capabilities, to a lower and a lower level, so that you may live without the supplies which you have not strength or intelligence or energy to gain. The lower type underbids the higher, so to say, and the species degenerates. It is a circumstance too little noted, that, whereas among all higher animals man the highest is everywhere dominant beyond dispute, it is only the low, miserable, degraded bacillus that wages war with him on equal terms, and in some places may be almost said to conquer and expel him. So great is the power of the deteriorated.

Speaking generally, we may put it that natural selection is

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solely concerned with immediate success. You may possess qualities which, if you had but time to work them out, would ensure you lasting success and a place for your descendants above all competitors. But if while laying your plans you are accidentally eaten up, your long distance qualities, so to call them, will be of little avail, and your competitor, who has no brains, but a hard shell or quick legs, will survive and inherit your land. Hence we get this principle of progress in evolution. In so far as a type is forced to adapt itself to immediate necessities by the use of qualities incompatible with higher development there will be no progress, but merely change and perhaps deterioration of type. But if its higher qualities are strong enough to meet the exigencies of preservation from hour to hour, they will make of their exercise a means of development, and a higher type will be reached in which the best capabilities of the lower are realized and are dominant. In a word, in any evolution a new type will be higher or lower not according as it succeeds or fails, but according to the quality through which success is achieved.

If we take this fairly obvious principle in connection with the law of compensation, a further result is reached. If a perfect life is to be realized, the quality on which we rely for present safety must not involve the sacrifice of any other quality necessary to a more complete and satisfactory development. If the fulness of animal vigor is to be obtained, strength must not be sacrificed to swiftness, nor either of them to a length of neck, useful merely for gathering palm leaves inaccessible to better proportioned creatures. If a satisfactory social life is to be attained, the immediate necessities of order must not be allowed to crush the spirit of independence. Human history, indeed, and human biography are a long series of comments on the Law of Compensation. The great men who do not manifest the defects of their qualities may be almost counted on the fingers. And it is the same with every type of civilization, and perhaps with every movement which has arisen to correct recognized defects. I will take a single instance. The most signal defect in the intellectual achievements of the ancient world was what may be described as a

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certain want of sense of the infinite, a tendency to contentment with the actual, and a disposition to make existing civilization the measure of all things. The gap was filled by Oriental religions, and finally by Christianity, and the adoption of some such religious scheme was a necessary preliminary to any future move forward. Yet in the form it took the new movement involved the break up of civilization, the disappearance of secular learning, the Inquisition, and the religious wars—in fine, some fifteen or sixteen centuries of delay before Western civilization could claim to be even on a level with the ancient world. On a smaller scale we have the same problem constantly before us in political life. The Liberalizing movement, for example, brought its own Nemesis in the opposition to the Factory Acts, and Socialist schemes, as we have seen, are liable to corresponding dangers.

All this is not mentioned by way of argument on behalf of Collectivism or any other plans of improvement, but merely as illustrating by contrast that gradual organization of life which we have taken to be the dominant feature of progressive development, and in which the Law of Compensation is slowly replaced by a more and more complete harmony among all the faculties employed. As life becomes rational, conduct tends to fall into a more or less coherent whole dominated by common principles and comprehensive ends. The occasions of the moment, even the obstacles and troubles of life, become means of grace to the resolute and intelligent will. Just as a little child makes every detail of its life into a game or a drama or a ritual, so the maturer man turns every occasion, sad or joyful, to rational account, and works out what is in him by its aid. But, as we saw before, the greatest of man's rivals are his fellow-men, and it is principally in his dealings with them that the difficulties of maintaining a constant hold on a rational or spiritual order appear.

The simplest way of maintaining your own position is the way of the strong man armed. The easiest way of getting through the crowd is the infallible process employed by Mr. Alfred Jingle, of elbowing the countenances of its component

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members. And this primitive process, like other primitive processes, survives to the present day, to which, indeed, it has been reserved to glorify it as the royal road not merely to individual, but to social salvation. Rivalry, competition, the direct effort of each for himself to the exclusion of others, is in this view the way to secure the survival of the fittest. It is undoubtedly the way to secure the survival of those who are fittest to survive by that method, that is to say, the strongest and most self-willed and most unscrupulous, the man of blood and iron, the man of craft and guile. But it is utterly incompatible with anything like organization in social life as we have understood the term. And if there is anything like a social harmony possible, if, that is, society is capable of development to a better and a fuller life, it must be rather on the principle of love than of hate, by the recognition of the interdependence of its members rather than by their exclusiveness and mutual opposition. In short, the easiest and most obvious life consists in fighting for your own hand, and is exclusive of others and their interests. It may prosper to any extent, but it does not advance civilization. The higher and more difficult life is so to say inclusive of others. Their interests and hopes and feelings are a part of its own, incorporated in its own scheme, and bound up with its own happiness. It is harder to maintain, but, however short-lived, contributes something to the general purpose of the human race, the ultimate dominance of reason in things. Such a life can be lived in greater or less perfection by any individual according to his good pleasure at any time. But to attempt it may involve the extreme of self-sacrifice, since there is no one so much hated as a friend of men. But it is also possible that this spirit may prevail little by little in society itself, shared more or less consciously by all men, and capable of being carried further even by those who are not heroes or saints. This, according to our contention, is the true line of social progress, the development of that rational organization of life in which men freely recognize their interdependence, and the best life for each is understood to be that which is best for those around him. The attempt to shape

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our social customs and institutions in this spirit is the aim and the principle of Collectivism.

Thus, to sum up this portion of our argument, so far as life is "inorganic," qualities are constantly developed to meet the exigencies of the moment which prove incompatible with the permanent requirements of a full and harmonious development, and individuals survive by fighting for themselves to the exclusion of the rest of their species. So far as life becomes "organized," all the qualities used by the individual tend to harmonious and uninterrupted development, while the life of the individual harmonizes similarly with that of the whole. It need hardly be said that the two harmonies are connected, since the higher qualities of the individual are precisely those by which his union with society is effected. Progress, then, as we understand it, consists in the steps whereby this "inclusive" or "organic" principle gradually makes itself good in the world of living beings against the "exclusive" tendencies of disorganization.

The conception of life which we have been trying to make clear is in no sense a new one, nor in any way the invention of Collectivism. On the contrary, it is part of our contention that it is as old as the ethical consciousness of man, and, indeed, expresses that which is distinctively ethical in a consciousness in which there is much that is adventitious, accidental, and inharmonious. For what passes as the moral consciousness of mankind is no more purely and unreservedly moral than mankind itself. It is a highly complex product of very various sentiments, many of them beautiful, most of them respectable, but some of them irrational and ugly. To make sure of this, it is only necessary to take the average moral sentiment of workaday life, consider not the phrases which it employs, but the application which it makes of them, and compare it with any well known example of the genuine ethical spirit, say the Sermon on the Mount, which comes almost as near as is humanly possible to unalloyed ethical truth. The difference resolves itself into this, that whereas the Sermon on the Mount is an expression of pure love, the average moral sentiment is an expression of regard for others

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tempered by rivalry and fear. It is a compromise between the primitive struggle for existence and the sense of an identical nature and purpose. Hence, to illustrate by a single point, its regard for success as such, and its contempt and dislike of failure, its feeble criticism of successful violence and its self-righteous zeal in devising fresh degradation for those who are already disgraced. There can be little doubt that the average moral man thoroughly enjoys the punishment of an offender and feels his own righteousness enhanced thereby. Objection to cruelty seems to be a comparatively modern feeling, still in its infancy, and limited to a small percentage of people. An unauthorized shot at a rabbit is still a far more serious offence than beating a child with a poker, and *pecca fortiter* remains a tolerably safe motto. In the same spirit, when the average man talks of honor he is not really thinking of a moral quality, but of something which makes a man respected and feared by others, which puts him beyond the reach of insult or injury. It is only in this sense that a duel can be called an affair of honor, and it is in just the same sense that a nation's honor is thought to be more seriously menaced by a frank admission that it has done a wrong, than by the most unscrupulous use of force against the people that it has injured. In short, force, self-assertion, and all that contributes to the market value of man or woman, are natural objects of admiration for the consciousness which is immersed in the struggle for existence, and remain constantly at strife with the ideas of love, self-surrender, and mutual service which arise with the dawning consciousness of a common human nature.

This consciousness, we have said, is probably common in some shape or form to the whole race, but, as the historical student of ethics is aware, it is limited in its primitive form to a narrow circle. From the first, human development has been determined more by the competition of groups than by the rivalry of individuals. Natural selection, as operating on individuals, has probably had little to do with the advance of civilization; but the success of one family, one tribe, one city, or one nation in the struggle with another has been a potent

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and constant influence. Now within certain groups rivalry is and always has been replaced in the main by co-operation. The family is by so much the most conspicuous example of what I mean that I will consider it alone. Imperfect, like other things human, it is nevertheless a striking and widespread example of the ethical spirit which I have tried to describe,—that is to say, it is a little society where the common welfare lies very close to the heart of each member, where self-sacrifice is cheerfully recognized as an honorable duty, and where the good of each is so much an object of real anxiety that more thought is taken for the weak than for the strong, and the deficiencies of any member are matter of honest regret rather than of secret satisfaction. If we pass outside the family to the relations of the average man to his immediate circle, we still find, if we are not prejudiced by cynicism, a good deal of the same spirit; at least, there is much genuine kindliness and good-will, and a tolerably high standard of honor in mutual dealings. Now moral progress, so far as there has been any, has consisted primarily in levelling up the standard of conduct towards mankind in general to something like the level commonly realized in the narrower relationships which we have mentioned. The process has been described by Green, in a well-known chapter, as the extension of the area of the common good. From the evolutionist point of view, it is the substitution of co-operation for competition, of the inclusive for the exclusive method of maintaining life and achieving progress. Undoubtedly some advance has been made in this respect, if we compare the ancient world with modern civilization. We no longer make slaves of white men, and, with regard to Matabele and others, we at least pay a tribute to principle by calling it forced labor. In fact, it is proved already, and will go near to be thought shortly that there should be limits to our brutality in dealing with what we pleasantly call the inferior races. It may be said (if I may be allowed another reference to Aristotle) that in these respects we have only advanced from the stage of *ἀκολασία* to that of *ἀκρασία*. Certain general principles of humanity are pretty widely admitted, but all sorts of ingenious devices are in-

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vented to avert their application in practice, and hence the moral warfare in our age is mainly a struggle against the almost inexhaustible resources of sophistry. In this spirit ecclesiastical authorities will tell us that the Sermon on the Mount is not meant to be taken literally. The authority is admitted, but its decisions conveniently made void. In the same way measures to prevent laundry women working more than fourteen hours a day are obstructed by the benevolent interest suddenly developed by fashionable ladies in the poor widow whose livelihood is threatened if she is not allowed to make herself a slave. Still, it is something to get first principles widely acknowledged. It indicates a certain advance, however small, and it is a promise of more, however slow. The cynical may say that it has developed hypocrisy in high places to a degree which will make the Victorian era proverbial as the epoch of Pharisaism, but all this is without doubt transitional. Our era will be at least equally conspicuous for the development of a genuine feeling for every kind of social improvement, the strength of which is measured by the very ingenuity shown in combating it.

Still, when all is said and done, it must be admitted that the standing paradox of the moral consciousness is the gap between what we may roughly call its personal and its impersonal dealings. The callousness with which the best of good fellows will acquiesce in outrages which he does not directly witness must always come with something of surprise. The indifference of kind-hearted men to massive suffering, the apathy with which loving fathers and mothers contemplate the massacre of children, is an ever renewed miracle like the sunrise or the burst of spring. Philip II. of Spain was an affectionate father, and Abdul Hamid is said to be loved in his own harem. And after all, why not? Is the gulf so deep between instigation and acquiescence in a crime, between active outrage and indifference? *Pecca fortiter.* Let us at least respect success and put it one step above the mixture of cynicism, apathy, and cowardice which constitutes the only rival form of statesmanship known to our generation.

We take it, then, that the distinctly ethical consciousness,

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with its principle of mutual aid and its spirit of love and good-will, is a widespread force acting on nearly all men, but operative in a narrow sphere. And moral progress consists in directly or indirectly widening its influence. Not that it supersedes the reign of brute force, but rather that it qualifies it by some tincture of the human spirit. We continue to play a game against one another, but the rules of the game are gradually modified in the interests of humanity. Every such limitation of war and competition is a gain, and in the economic sphere such limitations as are imposed by Factory Acts, sanitary regulations, and even perhaps poor laws, have long been admitted as the most important applications of the Collectivist principle in modern legislation. They run parallel with the abolition of explosive bullets and the protection of the wounded and other regulations of war by the Geneva Convention. When all the world is one family, the millennium will have been reached. Short of that it is possible to moralize rivalry, and possibly, in the spirit of the inclusive method, to turn it into a means of grace. The writer already referred to has pointed out that in Collectivist Ethics emulation in the public service would naturally supersede competition for private gain.

The Collectivist has been supposed, absurdly enough, to put material comfort above character, but the truth is that the question between him and his critics is not whether character is important, but what sort of character is desirable. On this point the Collectivist has his own view, and, as to his critic's conception of what is admirable in character, it is a very strong view. Hard self-reliance does not especially appeal to him, and among those things which may be injurious to character he would reckon the constant repression of the natural movements of kindness. Nor is the Collectivist unaware that individuals are responsible agents and must in a great degree take the consequences of their misdeeds. But I think he would limit the evil consequences to those which are really necessary or essential to the interests of society, and he would certainly take very special care that they should not fall upon those connected with the wrong-doer or

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upon any one but the wrong-doer himself. When children are in question, the principle of responsibility cuts two ways; for, if we take a responsibility off the parent by saving the child, we neglect a common responsibility if we leave the child to its fate. And if the one course impairs the character of the parent, how does the other affect our own? What it finally would throw upon society, and what it would leave to the individual, is a matter which Collectivism has to thresh out in each case upon its own merits; but there can be no doubt that its general tendency is so to organize life as to make its responsibilities much more definite and a good deal less easy to escape.

To bring the somewhat diversified strands of our argument together, we may say first that the tendency of modern Collectivism is to absorb the abstract ideals of earlier political theories into a comprehensive and distinctly ethical system. This ethical system is based on the substitution of the principle of peace on earth and good-will towards men for the principle of rivalry and war. It thus aims at extending a process which has always been going on so far as moral progress has been a reality, that of qualifying the methods of competition by the social spirit realized in the more intimate personal relations. And in so doing it reveals itself as a phase in a still wider evolutionary process, whereby in the higher races a purposive and intelligent organization of life, inclusive of the whole species, is gradually substituted for the war of all against all by which the survival of types is determined at a lower stage.

L. T. HOBHOUSE.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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DETERRENT PUNISHMENT.

THE nature of legal punishment has been so frequently discussed that the subject has lost something of its original freshness, yet the difficulties that surround it, and the importance that attaches to it, were never more clearly appreciated than now. The general features of the problem are easily understood. There are certain ends which legal punishment seems to effect, or to aid in effecting, and these may be regarded as principles which, so far, regulate its use. The end may be conceived as deterrent, in the sense in which we shall use that term,—to deter others from committing the crime for which the criminal is seen by society to suffer. Or it may be reformatory, to improve the morals of the sufferer. Or it may be preventive, in the sense of placing the criminal in such a position as to render it impossible for him to repeat his offence,—perhaps for a long time, perhaps forever. Or it may be vindictive, to execute vengeance against him. Or it may be to satisfy some claim of abstract justice which society conceives itself to possess, and, of course, is not admitted to be the outcome of vindictive animosity. These and other ends suggest themselves, some of them perhaps merely to be rejected as inadequate to afford any explanation of the problem, but most of them as undoubtedly real factors in social life. And, accordingly, the popular view seems to be that they all represent some aspect of the truth; so that, to find a connection between them, to pass from this or that theory of punishment to a theory which will hold good generally, is the second phase of the problem, which is infinitely more difficult than the first.

Now, it may be maintained that the spirit of modern times has obviously passed beyond a merely vindictive principle of punishment; indeed, revenge is not punishment at all. Historically, the elaboration of instruments of vengeance may be interesting in this connection, but theoretically it hardly concerns us. The repression of the criminal's freedom, again, is

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mainly of importance in its bearing on the conceptions of the new school of criminology. To this subject we shall return, but it may be passed over until we have considered the more orthodox points of view. If, then, we seek to determine the question in what is generally called the practical way, which means that the idea of abstract justice is too vague and metaphysical to be of much value, we are left with the two main objects of reforming the criminal and of deterring others from crime. And, when these two ideas are set against one another in the political arena, victory is almost certain to be with the latter. The reformation of the criminal is rather a moral than a legal or political aim. On the other hand, to deter from crime is of the utmost political importance, and, as a matter of fact, we believe that our punishments do, to a large extent, work out their aim in that way. At any rate, the deterrent end appeals very strongly to common sense. And so the deterrent end itself must be made a matter of investigation. The effect of the punishment of the criminal on society in general, and on the criminal class in particular, can only be tested by experience, and every method of deterring must have its limits and modifications. One axiom generally accepted, however, even by conservatives in such matters, is, that while the deterrent effect of punishment is not necessarily increased by an increase in severity, it depends largely on the absolute accuracy with which it is administered. That he should be sent to prison when he is caught in the act is a fact which the burglar accepts as part of the law of nature. It excites no animosity in his mind. But that he should be always caught is a condition under which his business cannot possibly be carried on.

But, admitting the force of deterrency from the practical point of view, it is often argued that this gives no answer, explicitly at least, to the question why the State should punish at all. It does not explicitly satisfy the demand for justice. Can we unite the idea of social justice with that which we have been considering? Can we dominate the whole with an idea of retribution, or of penalty, which shall give it a logical basis? A well-known answer is, that in punishment

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the criminal's own act is seen returning on himself. The punishment of the criminal is just, because it expresses his own will as a rational being; for in his act is involved a universal element which by the act is set up as law. In punishment, which is, as it were, the injury of an injury, he receives his right. On the other hand, the reply which is made to such a line of argument is equally well known. We hear that retributive punishment is a mere phrase; a logical subtlety which, if it can do no harm, can at the same time do no good. It moves in a circle beyond the actual, and can never reach a concrete punishment at all. It seems very desirable, however, to bring the edges of the two theories together; to satisfy justice and yet not lose hold of the generalizations of experience. For, undoubtedly, it is difficult to believe that retributive justice is simply a combination of reformation and deterrency with a dash of vindictiveness thrown in. We may advance some way towards our object by considering a particular penalty, not as an isolated occurrence, but as part of a permanent system which exists in the State. The existence of this permanent system requires, perhaps, to be emphasized. The inter-relation of rights soon becomes obvious when we consider particular rights reflectively, and the systematic basis of punishment would be more often thrust into prominence by juridical writers than it is were it not for the fact that our present punishments are not nearly so systematic as we feel they ought to be. Hence, although we often hear criticism directed against the want of system in our punishments, the fact which that want reveals, the systematic nature of punishment, tends to be forgotten. Of course it may be readily admitted that a kind of systematic treatment is conceivable which is by no means desirable. To make punishment too rigid, to determine all its details by inflexible rule, to destroy that consideration of the particular circumstances of the case which at present in some degree animates it, would be a loss and not a gain. Nevertheless, a permanent system must be assumed; and if we conceive of the criminal as deliberately placing himself in conditions which, by the movement of society,—the same society which guarantees him liberty,—

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necessarily result in his punishment, then we can conceive of his act as returning upon himself.

The conception of justice implied in such a phrase as the "justice of punishment" may be treated in many ways. Green's view of just punishment will suggest itself. The conception of the just, according to him, means that complex of social conditions which for each individual is necessary to enable him to realize his capacity for contributing to the social good. And the future maintenance of right must require that the criminal should be dealt with as he is in the punishment. But the precise form of words is, in our opinion, quite unimportant. However we may phrase it, when we are called upon to cross the line from justice to threats, we can only do so by following the tendency which leads us to break up legal life into a complex of rights—to break up our social environment into a complex of social conditions—and to regulate our punishments in relation to those rights, mainly by their deterrent effect. If this involves the abandonment of any synthesis with the true idea of justice, then deterrent punishment must be treated on that basis. The threat, however, always appears to be something more than a threat; it is a social threat, directed primarily against all; it involves an appeal to the conviction, or inference, that the soul of society is just, that the criminal is social.

The fact is that any conception of justice which we may form for working purposes has a necessary relation to life as we are living it, and to society as we find it, that forces us to fill up our ideal with a certain amount of detail which it may be difficult to justify from a merely abstract point of view. Conditions are assumed which, although relatively permanent, need not always wear the same aspect; and this tends to make us emphasize the contrast between abstract justice and concrete justice as embodied in the institutions of our time; between the abstract right to punish and such an explanation of justice as has been suggested. But the right to punish is, after all, an abstraction. If, for the time being, we look upon the social organism as complete and whole, then that system of punishment which the maintenance of its rights

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demands is just. And if, on the other hand, we deny this conclusion, because it attributes a false completeness to the social organism, then we must fall back upon the idea of such justice being merely an expression of intrinsic justice. But in that case it is not legitimate to contrast the right to punish, as if it were something beyond the sphere of social life, with our interpretation of social justice. They both suffer from the same defect.

The general relation between the deterrent and the reformatory aims seems, in the popular estimation, to be more easily determined. If it is not the business of the State to seek active methods of promoting private morality, it is also unnecessary for it to attempt actively to effect the moral reformation of the criminal. But it ought, at least, not to hinder his reformation. A punishment which renders reformation difficult is, therefore, generally considered not desirable; but the reformatory end is the subordinate one. Whether this argument affords a valid objection to capital punishment is a matter of dispute. If we substitute repentance for reformation, it apparently does not; and it seems reasonable that the reformatory end should only be allowed to enter into our calculations when it does not conflict positively with the larger ends.

Two principles of practical interest should be noted, as they form a basis of many of the maxims which are believed in by upholders of deterrency. The first is, that although punishments should terrorize, they should not brutalize. Thus, it may be maintained that, relatively, the punishments of death and imprisonment as practised among us do not have a brutalizing tendency, and that punishment by mutilation or torture would. On the border line we may place flogging. Again, it is well known that in civilized communities certain forms of crime linger, or perhaps break out, in certain localities when the rest of the community is comparatively free from them. These are generally of a brutal class, such as assaults on women and children. The true causes of these phenomena have perhaps been overlooked, but there is undoubtedly a tendency to deal sharply with such crimes,

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and even to advocate the employment of coarser methods of punishment for them than would be sanctioned elsewhere. The argument is, though its validity may be doubted, that a mild use of coarser methods is more effective in such special cases, and therefore, in the long run, more merciful. In the second place, however, we must avoid making crime romantic. Any method of punishment which excites morbid sentimentality is an evil. There appears to be a class of persons who are eager to see romance in crimes of every description; nor can we allow the fact that they are numerically weak in proportion to the whole population, to blind us to the consideration that they are frequently living on the border line between criminality and non-criminality, and therefore specially capable of being influenced the one way or the other.

Such ideas are commonplace. In the views to which the members of the school of criminologists popularly known as Italian have given expression we may find an interesting contrast. Here an attempt is made to correct the whole theory of criminal law by means of scientific results. It is difficult, indeed, to characterize the movement generally; for the value of it, like that of all similar movements, lies largely in principles which must be worked out through relative antagonism and amid much discussion. Different views are necessarily taken of the value of existing criminal systems, and the adoption of new stand-points is constantly being advocated. For it may be admitted that the results of anthropological and sociological investigation must be brought to bear on the practical problems of crime, and that punishment, though one instrument, is by no means the only instrument, for social defence, without much positive progress being made. The Honorable Oliver Wendell Holmes, in speaking of the movement at the dedication of the new hall of the Boston University School of Law recently, referred to the well-known formula, that we must consider the criminal rather than the crime, and proceeded to point out that there was weighty authority for the belief that not the nature of the crime, but the dangerousness of the criminal, must form the only legal criterion. This summary, perhaps, may lead us to ask ourselves how far every

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form of compromise must be rejected as antagonistic to the new spirit,—an important question. Again, Professor Lioy, of Naples, in his general account, emphasizes the stress now laid on the *incorrigibility* of the criminal; and the partial reaction which has set in against the older phases of the movement is well represented by the works of Signor Alimena, now being published at Turin.

We must focus our attention, however, and we shall do so by directing it to Professor Ferri's position, which the English edition of his "Criminal Sociology" has brought into prominence. According to him, the criminal types are five in number,—criminal madmen, born criminals, criminals by contracted habits, occasional criminals, and criminals of passion; a scheme evolved, in a measure, from the twofold division of habitual and occasional criminals with which we are familiar. All the chief classifications of criminals may, he maintains, be brought into line with his own, which gives a more general value to his results. There are three strata in society, again, from his point of view. The first, the highest, is composed of persons who are organically upright and commit no crimes; the second is the lowest and the nursery of born criminals, for whom no punishments, so far as they are legally deterrent, are of value; and the third is formed by the class of persons between the two, who can be deterred and for whom punishment is psychologically useful. Thus the territory is marked out for scientific workers. But, coming closer to legal categories, we may ask, What is his conception of the efficacy of punishment? It is that punishment, as a means of repression, possesses essentially a negative value, because it has not the same influence on all anthropological types of criminals, and because its use is mainly to preclude the serious mischief which would result from impunity. "Impunity would lead to a demoralization of the popular conscience in regard to crimes and offences, to an increase of the profound lack of foresight in criminals, and to a removal of the present impediment to fresh crimes during the term of incarceration" (p. 109). This attitude is one which may be adopted by all, and the definition of it constitutes one of the most interesting portions of the

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book. True, we may dissent from the statement that "the least measure of progress with reforms which prevent crime is a hundred times more useful and profitable than the publication of an entire penal code" (p. 135) as savoring of exaggeration; but the point, after all, is not of vital importance, because we desire both remedies, the one without prejudice to the other.

Keeping to the legal side of the subject, however, we find that the most important conception put forward is that of *indeterminate punishment* (p. 207). In its most moderate aspect the scheme proposes that, although punishment should be made indeterminate, it should only be so relatively; that is to say, a maximum and minimum of punishment should be fixed in the sentence. The more thorough-going innovators, however, desire that punishment should be at first quite indeterminate, and should be rendered definite in successive steps by persons qualified to judge how the criminal progresses. The first proposal is made as a sort of compromise with the older system, and, in my view, might well be supported. It leaves the law with much of its present publicity, dignity, and openness of method. On the other hand, it is maintained that such a compromise is quite impracticable, and the conception of indeterminate segregation, as Professor Ferri would have it, is that, when the conditions of the criminal and of his act show that reparation by itself is not sufficient, the judge should only have to pronounce an indefinite detention in the lunatic asylum, the prison for incorrigibles, the penal colony, or such an institution; then permanent commissions would see to and determine the successive steps by which the offender was detained; and thus, it is argued, the oblivion which follows the convict on conviction under the old system would be satisfactorily obviated.

Again, following this principle of indefinite segregation, there is the principle of indemnification, which may take two forms,—of a fine payable to the State or of reparation to the injured persons. As regards the latter, the State is to indemnify the injured person and recoup itself from the criminal. Thus, if society is applying the principle that the individual

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ought always to be held responsible for his crimes, it is also applying the counter-doctrine that he ought always to be indemnified for the crimes of which he is a victim. So, at least, runs the argument. Here we find, in a measure, the healing up of the old division between public crime and private injury, and an apparent return to the ideas of the past. A measure which would involve the criminal indemnifying his victim, or something similar, has often been advocated from the more strictly juridical point of view, and its practical end recommends it to a class of students by whom indefinite punishment, or at any rate the thorough application of the idea, would, on account of its vagueness, want of power to grip the public mind, and liability to corrupt influences, be condemned. The question of how to make the criminal more profitable to society than he is is a very important one. It is succinctly treated in an article in this JOURNAL for October, 1891, by Dr. Tönnies, of Kiel, in which a moderate view of criminological reform is persuasively presented.

Lastly, the means of defence must, according to Professor Ferri, be worked out in relation to the various criminal types; and here, in his view, a distinction must be made between the proposals before us and the so-called individualization of punishment which prison experts have advocated in America, as the latter idea is impracticable.

It would be useless even for the members of the classic school to deny that in the details of punishment—on the question of form—many instructive ideas are being put forward, and that experiments are being made in America and elsewhere which are of the utmost importance. The difficulties which attend prison administration seem to be great. In providing suggestions and facts which may lead to a better penal organization in detail probably the most useful work of the new movement will be found. Where the defects of that organization lie and how they are to be remedied are questions which can only be solved by much patient work, and every investigation which keeps the facts well in line is a step in the right direction. But in estimating the value of the progress which has been made and is embodied in existing

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institutions, and in preparing for the future, the difficulty of the subject, especially as regards types, must not be forgotten. "Of all the problems which the human race has had to confront," says Dr. Hunter significantly, in his "Roman Law," "the greatest, perhaps, is to know what conduct is really injurious to mankind and what is the best way to secure good conduct. Scarcely less important is it to know the degree in which conduct is injurious. On all these points early societies had everything to learn."

On the other hand, whether the best arguments which can be brought forward for or against such an institution as trial by jury (which Professor Ferri attacks) are not so general in their nature as to fall beyond the scope of a special criminal science has to be considered. As regards lawyers as a class, they assuredly have no sentimental attraction for this form of trial. The old quarrel between the poets and the philosophers is as nothing compared to the old quarrel between the amateurs and the professionals. But if a Churchman could maintain that he would rather see England free than England sober, the lawyers must be allowed the opinion that they would rather that the people should feel that they were free than that they should have the highest possible refinement of judicial justice.

The most sensational question which occurs in this connection is, perhaps, that of capital punishment, to which we have already referred. Even Professor Ferri admits that it has been exhausted from the intellectual stand-point and has passed into the region of prejudice. As an instrument of elimination capital punishment is of no practical value, and popular opinion will never allow it to become so. It is probably as a means of terror that it must stand or fall. No doubt there is an air of poetical justice about it, and no doubt it seems to embody, for some minds, the power of the law; but a further question is, whether it does adequately deter those whom it is meant to affect directly. The latter point is doubtful. Its usefulness, if it is useful, seems rather to lie in its indirect effect; it forms, as it were, the culmination of the penal system; it proclaims that not even life itself will be re-

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garded as sacred in those who utterly outrage society. And in any country where its employment, though authorized, is systematically evaded it is useless.

The criminal law—to gather up our criticism—must, before all things, be a workable system, and to render it workable regulations and conceptions have to be acted on which are not so exact as, ideally, we might desire. Analytical distinctions have to be introduced,—notably the distinction between the ordinary and the abnormal man. This is the real rock of offence to the upholders of the existence of graduated criminal types. The distinctions which the law upholds may be seen to have been treated too absolutely when we have advanced a stage in general progress. The tendency of the reformer is always to urge that new and apparently more refined distinctions be substituted for those formerly employed; and he is right in doing so provided the social organization can really apply the new methods. Even then, however, it is unnecessary to be uncompromisingly severe on the past. Now, the principle of indeterminate segregation in accordance with criminal types is one which it is very difficult to judge as such, but it is not unreasonable that it should excite our fears. The scientific spirit is bold and uncompromising. The modern world will never tolerate a court which pretends to sit in judgment on men's mere thoughts as opposed to their actions. But is it possible that we could tolerate a court which, even in a qualified way, sat in judgment, not upon men's thoughts, but upon their mere dispositions and tendencies? That is the danger, although it seems probable that the fixing of a maximum and minimum of punishment in the sentence would practically do much towards obviating it. And, whether this be so or not, it can hardly be disputed that the idea of indeterminate punishment, in some form or other, is becoming more and more actualized in society.

The new line of thought, then, may perhaps be said to cut the deterrent theory obliquely. It is, but only in a very modified way, reformatory. It is more truly preventive. It cannot be assumed that it would necessarily be favorable to the criminal from the criminal's own point of view. Of course,

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even for the criminal, all may ultimately be for the best. But the claims of society are resolutely set against his claims, and, in so far as this idea is consistently carried out, a lapse in the direction of mere sentimentality is precluded. The idea of "doses" of punishment, which has been so frequently ridiculed, meant at least this: that there was a penalty which the criminal had to pay, and when he had paid it the debt was cancelled. On the deterrent theory any "dose" given him was for the good of all. This whole conception, be it right or wrong, is being strenuously attacked. Prevention, in its scientific sense, is swallowing it up. Hence the great stress laid upon those social reforms which are technically called penal substitutes; the assertion that such substitutes have never been properly studied until now, and the glorification of them at the expense of legal codes. Prevention is said to be primary, repression secondary, and in a wide and general sense this may be admitted. But if it be recognized, as it appears to be, that repression is, in its right place, nothing less than a social necessity, the reiteration of the comparison, when repression is under consideration, tends to confuse the issue. A social necessity which involves the liberties of men can never be called unimportant.

W. A. Wall.

Glasgow.

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THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF RELIGION.

CAN anything new be said on such a well-worn subject as the nature of religion? If I did not think that there could, I should not attempt it. My point of view may not be new, but I have not met with it. I shall not begin in the usual way by enumerating the various theories of religion, but shall proceed at once to set forth my particular theory.

My thesis is that *religion is a substitute in the rational world for instinct in the subrational world.* But when I say *religion*, I mean, as my title implies, the essential element of religion, which is a very different thing from what is popularly understood by religion. For, while all that is embraced in existing religions of both civilized and uncivilized races is doubtless legitimate and belongs to religion in the sense of having been produced by it, the greater part of it has been superadded to the original nucleus, and this to such an extent that the latter has been lost from view. This process of enveloping the kernel of the religious idea takes place so early that it is difficult to find it even in the most rudimentary religions. Nevertheless it has always been present and active, and to those who understand its nature its workings can be seen at all stages. It is, in fact, intuitively perceived by all, as is evidenced by the almost universal recognition that religion is something good, and this in the face of all the evil that has been done in its name.

The task of unmasking religion is not an easy one. The external garb it wears has come to belong to it. It is organically connected with the primitive form, secreted, as it were, from its tissues, like the shell of a mollusk or the carapace of a tortoise. The alteration that has taken place in religion is not properly a development. It may be compared to the modification that certain plants have undergone at the hands of man. It has been artificially transformed and made to depart from the original type. It always bears the marks of some kind of reasoning, however erroneous.

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Although religion is mainly a product of reason, it would be impossible to elucidate its real nature without going much farther back in the history of mind than the origin of the rational faculty, even after conceding all the claims that have been made for the antiquity of that faculty. It may be true, as is asserted of both life and mind, that no point can be indicated at which reason actually began, yet we must recognize that there was a time when it was not. For all the purposes to be subserved in the present discussion it may be said to have begun with man, leaving the question open as to when man himself began. For whatever earlier and feebler states of the rational faculty may have existed, it was only in man that it was sufficiently marked to make religion possible. *Per contra*, no type of human creature has thus far been discovered in which that faculty was not strong enough to generate the religious sentiment.

Anything so universal must surely have a cause in the nature of things. This cause is, of course, psychic, and before it can be understood it is necessary to consider still simpler phenomena. It would be hopeless to attempt an explanation of the rational faculty until the psychic faculty itself was first explained. The reason is a late derivative product, and no clear grasp of its nature can be gained until the nature of mind is first understood. I do not profess to have any unknown secret as to the nature of mind. The biological origin of mind I shall assume to be established, and the principle underlying it need be only briefly set forth. The primordial element of mind is not reason, but *feeling*. A sense of the agreeable and the disagreeable, however feeble, must be assumed as the primary condition to the preservation of the class of organisms in which this sense inheres. This incipient *algedonism* lies at the very foundation of the entire series of psychic phenomena. It is the basis of psychology.

Living things differ from non-living in requiring some means of preservation. They are made up of delicate, colloidal, unstable constituents which are easily destroyed. The organic compounds consist not only of elements of the most complex inorganic compounds, but also of elements of other

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organic compounds of lower orders, in a rising scale of complexity. Organized bodies are formed out of the highest and most unstable of these latter, such as protein, albumen, and hemoglobin, making substances so complex that their chemical formulas cannot be written. Protoplasm is the primordial organized substance,—the "physical basis of life,"—but it is as much more isomeric and unstable as it is more complex than any of its organic constituents, so that there may be hundreds of different kinds of protoplasm, varying according to a sort of permutation of their organic elements. The very essence of the life principle results from the fact that, in consequence of the relatively immense size of the molecules of protoplasm, due to this recompounding of the already highly complex molecules of organic compounds, the molecular activities of the units are converted into molar activities of the product. This is the only rational explanation I can frame of the phenomena of spontaneous movement, or motility.* Structures, therefore, thus composed, however simple biologically, are exceedingly complex chemically, and this complexity is accompanied by an instability so great that every particle of organized matter is constantly undergoing change by the process called *metabolism*, which is nothing less than the continual falling back of its molecules from the high-tension plane required to constitute life to some lower chemical plane, and the equally unceasing supply of these "waste" elements by a reproductive power inherent in the living mass.

When we consider, therefore, the extreme perishability of organized beings, it is easy to see that for life to exist every possible means must be employed for their protection. The advanced biology of to-day makes it no longer necessary to call in intelligent design to explain these means. In fact, at the same time that the nature of living substance was being revealed by science there was being discovered the natural principle that makes it possible. That principle is natural selection, and we now know that, in conformity with

* I first proposed this theory in 1882. See the *American Naturalist*, Vol. XVI., December, 1882, p. 978.

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that principle, only such organic beings have persisted as have been furnished with some adequate means of self-preservation. There are many such means. Plants possess protective structures of various kinds, and not generally having the power of spontaneous locomotion, which so greatly increases the dangers of most animal forms, they are able to exist without true sensibility to pain. Having for their function to absorb inorganic matter, chiefly in the gaseous or liquid form, they do not require the spur of appetite to impel the pursuit of nourishment. Animals, too, possess numerous other means of protection, such as shells and bony coverings, in addition to sensitiveness. Great fertility performs the same office by constantly filling the places of those that succumb. But in the case of plastic organisms endowed with the power of spontaneous locomotion and compelled to subsist on organic matter, there can be no question that the great and paramount mode of self-preservation is the one pointed out, —viz., susceptibility to pleasure and pain.

This twofold or algedonic character was necessary, for it was not enough merely to escape the destructive agencies of an impinging and more or less hostile environment. There was an internal destructive agent far more fatal than the external ones,—viz., the very waste of tissue above described as incident to the nature itself of living substance. Metabolism could not go on unless every molecule that fell back to a lower, non-living plane was replaced by another raised to the plane of life by the nutritive powers of the organism. It was not alone necessary to avoid dangers; it was equally necessary to seek supplies. But these expressions, closely examined, are seen in each case to involve an ellipsis. They illustrate the tendency to speak of feeling in terms of function. As a matter of fact, it is not danger that is avoided nor nourishment that is sought. The thing shunned is pain, and the thing pursued is pleasure. Safety and nutrition are the indirect or consequential results. The organism knows nothing of these. They are secured by a sort of adjustment of circumstances, a contract, as it were, between Nature and Life. It may also be looked at as a kind of "pre-established har-

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mony" between things wholly dissimilar, by which the one shall always coincide with the other. It is analogous to the harmony between the hands of a watch turned by different wheels at different rates but perfectly adjusted, or to the action of the "cut-off" adjusted to that of the piston in a steam-engine. In short, the principle is that of *adaptation*, which may be conceived in a neuter as well as in an active sense. The adaptations of man are active and *telic*, those of nature are self-adjusting and *genetic*, but the result is the same; and the mechanisms evolved by nature so closely resemble those designed by man that it is only in late years, and now only by special students of nature, that the distinction pointed out has been perceived.

For present purposes even this distinction is immaterial, and if any prefer to regard this great primary bio-psychic adaptation as the work of design, this will not affect the conclusions to be reached. It is only necessary clearly to grasp the truth that, on the one hand, the class of beings under consideration came into possession of a faculty unknown to all other objects, which led them to distinguish the agreeable from the disagreeable and to seek the one and shun the other, and that, on the other hand, those things or acts which possessed the quality of agreeableness were in the main such as supplied the needs of existence, while those which were disagreeable were such as endangered existence. This primordial adaptation, when compared with the multitudinous adaptations familiar in every department of organic life, is found not to differ from these in its essential character. The principle of all organic adaptation is one. That principle is natural selection, and it began to act at the earliest beginnings of life. It may be looked upon as a process of trial and error,—*i.e.*, of trying every conceivable device for rendering vital existence possible and for making it safer and fuller, and the selection of such, and such only, as secured these results. Such experiments usually take the form of structural modifications; but the essential thing is advantageousness, and if this is secured by immaterial qualities these are as legitimate subjects for selection as physical organs. At bottom it comes to the same

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thing, since every psychic attribute is the result of some modification in the nerve tissues. In the case under consideration the device belonged to this latter class, resulting in an immaterial quality which may be called *feeling*, restricting the term to the intensive form already described, and excluding the indifferent form which later played so great a *rôle* as the basis of the perceptive faculty.* The object may be said to have been to *induce* the creature to perform the acts that would preserve its existence, and no other device is conceivable than the one that was actually adopted. Had no such quality been possible in nature, we seem compelled to assume that animal life would never have been developed.

An adaptation implies two terms. In the present case one of these terms was the action of the organism, while the other was its preservation. Activity may be looked upon as the means and existence as the end. Every device possesses this nature. A telic device, or invention, is the adoption of a means for the attainment of an end foreseen by the designer, and there need be no resemblance between the means and the end. It is the same with genetic devices, if such an expression is admissible. An organ is not at all like its product, any more than is a machine. The product of a machine or mechanism is the foreseen end or purpose. In genetic mechanisms the end is not foreseen, but from the poverty of language to designate genetic products we are compelled to speak of them as the purposes or objects of the mechanisms.

There is, however, a word in biological language which avoids the implication of design. That word is *function*, and the end or purpose of an organ is the function it performs. In the case under consideration, therefore, feeling, which is the means, has for its function the preservation of life. The antithesis, therefore, is constantly between feeling and function.†

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* Cf. "The Psychic Factors of Civilization." Boston, 1893, pp. 16, 21, 39.

† I have been making use of this antithesis regularly in all my works and writings and insisting upon its fundamental nature, and it was not till quite recently that I learned that the principle was not generally understood by non-biological readers. It has always seemed so clear and simple to me that I have never before gone into a logical analysis of it, for fear of being unnecessarily ele-

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While function, in this sense of anything that tends to preserve, continue, or better existence, is thus clearly the end for which feeling was developed, this is true only from the highly general standpoint of the world at large. It is not true from the standpoint of the creature. The end of the creature is feeling itself. Just here is the origin of the great bio-psychic dualism that is indissolubly connected with the entire sentient world. It is as manifest in the highest types of human beings as it is in the amœba. It is the most fundamental antinomy in the world of living things.

The adaptation between feeling and function is so nearly complete that the absolute dissimilarity of the two terms has been universally overlooked. The assumption on the part of biologists of a natural or necessary relation between them is naïve. It is to be classed along with the dictum of "common sense" as to the knowledge the mind possesses of the external world, the supposed identity of mental conceptions with things conceived, of noumena with phenomena. It was this popular misconception, observed by me from the outset, that led me to liken the adaptation of feeling to function to the "pre-established harmony" of Leibnitz.* At the beginning the adaptation must have been virtually perfect, and throughout the lower forms of life it is very complete. Just as the origin

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mentary. But I observed that even so clear a thinker as Professor John Dewey stumbled over it (*Psychological Review*, Vol. I., No. 4, July, 1894, p. 403), and the sociologist who has best understood and most appreciated my contributions to that science, Dr. Albion W. Small, in a private letter from which he kindly allows me to quote, said, "I have felt all along that you have had connotations in mind which, when explained, would put a different look on your propositions about 'feeling and function,' but I am quite sure you have not expressed them so that we can do justice to your idea. My impression is that you have taken for granted some familiarity with certain technical concepts in biology, and that terms which carry a commonplace meaning with you somehow lose important parts of their content among people not acquainted with that biological usage." In view of all this I feel that I need not apologize for setting forth all the steps in the logical process by which I somewhat intuitively reached this principle seventeen years ago (see *Science*, original series, Vol. I., New York, October 23, 1880, p. 210).

* "Dynamic Sociology." New York, 1883, Vol. I., pp. 469, 602; Vol. II., p. 121.

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itself of sentient life depended upon the closeness of the adaptation, so the continuance and development of this type of life has constantly required the maintenance of this harmony. It is not generally perceived that there is a strong tendency to depart from it. The organism itself has no inherent reason for maintaining it. Its end being feeling, it has no motive to pursue other ends. If, in a changing environment, it is impelled to perform acts that are opposed to its safety or that of its race, it will perform them in harmony with the inexorable law of its nature. The penalty for such acts is extinction, and this has, in fact, been the fate of millions of beings. The organic world has developed under a law which may be called *the elimination of the wayward.*

But nature is full of resources. As structures developed feeling was intensified, and the increase of feeling was attended with increased waywardness and violation of cosmic law. Immediate impulses could no longer be trusted. With higher organization the conditions of existence grew more delicate and precarious. The simple pursuit of food and safety was no longer sufficient. Provision must be made for a longer period of helplessness in the young, and also for future supplies against climatal changes. A curb must be put to the now fully developed *will.* The next great step, necessary to secure these ends, was the origin of *instinct.* Instinct may be looked upon as a device of nature to make the organism desire to perform acts that subserve function, but which would not otherwise be desired. It consists in a readjustment of the nerve plexuses so that acts shall become pleasurable which do not directly satisfy an immediate want. Without these nervous readjustments which lead the creature to act in ways which, from its own standpoint would be illogical, but which in fact make for preservation, it would perpetually pursue pleasures that lead to destruction. But instincts, too, were developed under the law of advantage, or the survival of the fittest, and the obdurate types that refused to adopt them were crowded out of existence.

There is less difference than is generally supposed between simple functions and instincts. Both came into existence in

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the same way, only the latter represent a higher and more complicated condition. This truth has been clearly expressed by M. Letourneau. He says:

"Chez les animaux, même chez les animaux supérieurs et chez le premier d'entre eux, l'homme, il existe quantité de coordinations de mouvements, si profondément inscrites dans les centres nerveux, qu'elles sont en même temps inconscientes et indispensables au maintien de la vie; ce ne sont pas des instincts, ce sont des fonctions. Quand la série des actes, enrégistrée dans les centres nerveux, se rapport au genre d'existence de l'animal, lui dicte qu'il en ait ou non conscience, une certaine conduite dans la vie, il en résulte ce que nous appelons des instincts. Mais, au fond, la raison biologique des fonctions et des instincts est la même." *

Life is a frail and delicate thing, and in the course of its history it has passed through several ordeals. The first of these was when plastic organisms were created, endowed with locomotion, and dependent for subsistence on organic matter, the condition to the existence of which was feeling, as above described. This was the origin of mind. The second ordeal was when the will † had so strongly asserted itself that existence was put in jeopardy. This was remedied by the development of instincts. Passing over minor ones, we come at last to an ordeal still more severe than any of the previous ones. In the natural upward march of the psychic faculty feeling became at length so potent and its demands so imperative that the direct efforts hitherto employed in its satisfaction no longer sufficed, and a new device was gradually elaborated that should secure the ends of the creature with far greater success. This was the "indirect method of conation," ‡ and to the affective faculty was now added the perceptive faculty. The intellect was developed as an aid to the will.§

There is a close analogy, or something much more than an analogy, between the action of the intellectual faculty and that of instinct. Although the method is very different, the

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* "L'Evolution de la Morale," 2e éd., Paris, 1894, p. 34.

† See "Psychic Factors of Civilization," Chapters viii.–xiv.

‡ "Dynamic Sociology," Vol. II., p. 99.

§ "Psychic Factors," Part II.

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purpose is the same, and the general result accomplished by the two faculties is identical,—viz., increased efficiency in securing the satisfaction of desire. We saw that instinct had the effect of making the creature desire to act in ways in which it would not otherwise have acted,—*i.e.*, to act illogically, viewed from the strictly individual standpoint. Now, every indirect action is also, from the same point of view, an illogical action.* Intellect, too, like instinct, changes the direction of desire. It leads the agent to desire the means instead of the end, otherwise, under the laws of the mechanics of mind, there could be no action.†

But this immense gain, from the standpoint of the individual, almost immediately commenced to threaten the destruction of the race of beings to which this faculty had been committed. It was now so easy to secure the satisfaction of desire, and desires had grown so manifold and so vehement, a larger and larger proportion of them not being adapted to function, many, indeed, being directly opposed to it, that obviously, if, under this new dispensation, everything were allowed to go on without restraint, the race of rational beings must quickly run its course and come to naught. Fortunately, this very perceptive faculty, which was being so freely employed in the interest of feeling regardless of function, was also capable of dimly and intuitively *perceiving* the dangers to which it was leading. Along with the individual mind working thus egoistically for the individual's end, keenly pointing out the ways in which pain could be thwarted and pleasure assured, there was also working, broadly, deeply, and subconsciously, what may be properly called a collective or social mind, solemnly warning against the danger, and authoritatively inhibiting all race-destroying actions. A new device, analogous in many respects to instinct on the lower plane, was gradually developed and perfected *pari passu* with the reason on the higher plane. This device was *religion.*

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* See "Dynamic Sociology," Vol. II., p. 380.

† I have fully explained this principle in a previous article. See *The Monist*, Vol. V., Chicago, January, 1895, pp. 255, 256.

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Religion is, therefore, as my thesis asserts, the substitute among rational beings for instinct among irrational beings. Just as the intellect was developed for the purpose of enabling feeling beings to satisfy by indirect methods desires which they could not satisfy by direct methods, so religion came forward as a more powerful curb to the excesses into which this new egoistic agent would have otherwise plunged its unguided possessors, and for which instinct would have proved wholly inadequate.

It is customary to regard instinct as a substitute for reason, but in so far as there is truth in this view it is in an entirely different sense from that in which the terms are here employed. It is possible that the modifications of nerve structure which result in preservative instincts may receive their initial impulse from a dim consciousness of the necessity for the acts which the instincts impel, so that instincts may be said to rest primarily upon a form of awareness that cannot be generically distinguished from incipient reason. It is also true that many of the acts that are dictated by instinct are the same that would have been dictated by a fully developed reason, had such existed, so that instincts seem to embody a sort of collective wisdom which the individual creatures do not possess. But neither of these assumptions is required by a full comprehension of the law of natural selection, and acts apparently the most intelligent may be accounted for under that law on the part of creatures wholly devoid of intelligence. It is therefore perfectly scientific to look upon instincts as the exclusive products of genetic forces. It is certain from their eminently conservative character that they constitute the necessary curb to the rapidly growing passions of psychically evolving creatures which without them would have inevitably whelmed them in destruction, and which, in obedience to the universal biologic law of the elimination of the wayward, actually did doom to extinction a far greater number than instinct had the power to save.

After the appearance of reason upon the scene, passion not certainly having diminished, but having continued to increase, the new power of gratifying passion only served to multiply

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the dangers that beset the triumphant legatees of this rich heritage. The very method by which intellect works, far too rapid to give time for the development of instincts, precluded for all future time the employment of this safeguard. A new safeguard must be found commensurate with the forces to be held in check, otherwise the fate of the majority of its predecessors must await the dominant race. Religion, in the primitive and fundamental sense in which the term is here employed, was such a safeguard.

What, then, is religion? If we assume, as I shall do, that it is natural and not supernatural,—*i.e.*, that it grew out of the nature of man, and was not given to him from without, it seems altogether probable that it was mainly a product of reason. It arose simultaneously with the rational faculty, but, as that faculty without some check was essentially destructive, this would have been the case even if reason had had no part in the development of religion; if, for example, religion, like instinct, had been wholly due to natural selection. It is not necessary to discuss this point, but personally I am disposed to ascribe it to the joint action of natural selection and reason. These two influences are inversely proportional. The very feeblest forms of reason, while they might cause wide departures from the path of safe activity, could scarcely work out a plan of salvation. At this stage, when the human organism was mainly animal, the survival of the fittest might ultimately result in the development of structural tendencies to the inhibition of destructive actions. Such tendencies would embody the germs of the religious sentiment. They might be called *religious instincts*, but they would differ from normal instincts in merely restraining unsafe activities instead of producing safe ones. In fact, this is the essential characteristic of religion as distinguished from instinct, that it is negative or restrictive, while instinct is positive and constructive.

If the beginnings of religion were genetic, unconscious, and non-rational, this must have constituted a brief and almost hypothetical stage. With the developing faculty which made the satisfaction of desire so easy, there must have also grown

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up an increasing sense of the danger of such unbridled satisfaction. The evil effects of excesses could not have escaped observation. As one after another fell a prey to passion and dropped out of the group, a feeling of the necessity of preventing this grew with the strengthening reason and ultimately took form. This sense, although it must have inhered in the individual mind, was essentially a group sense, and the action in which it resulted was group action. The deep-felt necessity of saving the race inspired the invention and adoption of means to that end. The religious sentiment must be distinguished from its products. The sense of race safety is its very kernel. The primary purpose of religion was at the beginning and always has remained *salvation.* It simply says to the wayward self-seeker, "Thou shalt not," and all the Decalogues have this negative form. But it must enforce its decrees. Even a sense of the penalty for race-destroying acts was powerless to prevent their performance. Some kind of organized system, coercive in its nature, was necessary. The group mind of every race has proved capable of devising such a system. Such are the various religious systems of the world. Whence have they derived their sanction?

There is one fact which all races and peoples, however primitive, and all mankind, however enlightened, have universally recognized. This fact is that there is a power outside themselves which is beyond their control. Rude peoples, living as they always do, in direct contact with nature, are constantly brought into relations with this power and made to feel much more strongly than do civilized races their complete subjection to it. It is this sense of helplessness before the majesty of the environment which, if it is not religion itself, is the foundation upon which all religion is built. It is the *point d'appui* of the group sentiment of safety, that upon which the group reason lays hold to restrain the dangerous activities of the individual reason. Teachers of religion have, I believe, a faint perception of this truth, and at long intervals a more or less definite expression of it may be detected in their utterances, usually, however, so muffled in the blanket of doctrinal language as to be scarcely heard. The following passage is the clearest that has yet come to my notice:

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"If you analyze religion—not my religion, but religion itself—you will find that the essential idea which is its very soul, inheres in the relation which exists between man and the infinite power manifested in the universe above him, no matter what your theory of the universe may be. . . . If you study the lowest type of religion that we are able to discover anywhere on the face of the earth, you will find that the people of that time were thinking of themselves and of some mysterious power not themselves,—some power that held their lives, their destiny, their happiness in its hands; and the object of their religion consisted in getting into right relations with this power. And this getting into right relations with the god has been the one object and aim of religion in every age of the world, and no change of thought can possibly outgrow it. So long as men love, think, and feel, have fears and hopes, so long as the universe stands and is the manifestation as now of this inscrutable power, so long man must be conscious that his life, his health, his sanity, his prosperity, his all, depends upon knowing something about this power, and getting, so far as possible, into right relations with it. Paul may talk about being reconciled to God, and Herbert Spencer may talk about being adjusted to our environment, both are seeking after one and the same thing, which is the knowledge of this power and right relations to it."*

Philosophers, too, have occasionally, though rarely, caught a glimpse of this truth, and of such adumbrations I will give one of the least shadowy:

"D'une part, toutes nos inclinations se rallient sous la seule affection qui puisse les discipliner: d'une autre part, toutes nos conceptions se coordonnent d'après un spectacle independant de nous. En même temps, cette économie extérieure devient la base directe de notre conduite, toujours destinée à la subir dignement ou à la modifier sagement. L'être se trouve ainsi lié, en dedans et au dehors, par l'entière convergence de ses sentiments et de ses pensées vers la puissance supérieure qui détermine ses actes. Alors il y a vraiment *religion*, c'est à dire unité complète, tous les moteurs internes étant coordonnés entre eux, et leur ensemble librement soumis à la fatalité extérieure. . . . Telle est l'issue finale du grand dualisme positif entre l'organisme et le milieu, ou plutôt entre l'homme et le monde, ou, mieux encore, entre l'humanité et la terre."†

It must be remembered that with primitive man the unknown was vast. He was absolutely ignorant of the stupendous forces of nature playing about him. It is no part of my purpose to trace the growth of religions out of religion. This has been tried many times, but the history has never seemed

* From a sermon preached by the Rev. Minot J. Savage, D.D., on the 3d of December, 1893, at Washington, D. C., which has not been published. It wa reported in full by Mr. Victor Louis Mason, who has kindly shown me his notes, from which I make the above extract.

† Auguste Comte, "Politique Positive," Vol. II., p. 18.

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to me to go back to religion itself. Dr. Edward B. Tylor, than whom no one has more ably treated this class of subjects, has reviewed all known primitive religions, and he arrived at what he aptly styled the "minimum definition" of religion,—viz., "belief in spiritual beings" * Doubtless from the standpoint of the ethnographer this definition is the simplest that could be formulated. It satisfies all the requirements of a natural history of man; but from the standpoint of general or cosmical philosophy it falls far short of a principle that can explain the phenomena of religion. Belief in spiritual beings is not religion itself, but a consequence of religion. It grew out of the fact upon which I have insisted, that the race was in danger from unknown and uncontrollable agencies, and the same faculty that perceived this also sought to explain it. Spirits, ghosts, fetishes, gods,—these were only explanations, deductions, conclusions, products of the dread of the unknown. *Primos in orbe deos fecit timor.* Mythology is philosophy. Theology and science start from the same stake.

It remains to point out how religion took the place of instinct on this higher rational plane, and served effectually to check the evils that reason had so greatly multiplied. Although the *sense of dependence* above described is that which made religious systems possible, it could no more manifest its saving virtues without an organ than a sensory system can act without a motor system. Every human thought, in order to accomplish any purpose, must develop a mechanism through which it can work. Every human institution is the product of a thought. The thought went before and produced the institution. The institution is the mechanical embodiment of the thought. It was so with religious institutions. The religious idea, as I have endeavored to sketch it, worked on the group, on society (for association was taking place at the same time), and in the normal way developed the appropriate organ for its expression, the necessary mechanism for its realization. Religion as an institution is a different thing from religion as an idea. The institution arose like all

* "Primitive Culture." London, 1871, Vol. I., p. 383.

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other human institutions, as a product of the social forces brought into equilibrium for the storage and economical expenditure of social energy.* As such it was effective in accomplishing its purpose,—*i.e.*, in performing its function.

In the great dualism of life, religion is the champion of function against feeling, of the race against the individual. It is race reason working for function against individual reason working for feeling. It represents the primordial conservatism of mankind. There has never been a time when the desires of men did not impel them to perform acts destructive to the race. The mandate of individual reason is to obtain satisfaction. Interest is its only guide, the interest of the individual. Now, it constantly happens that acts which are in the interest of the individual are against that of the race. A man may pursue egoistic ends successfully during life by acts that do not react upon himself or tend to do so, and yet his whole course may be inimical to society at large. Most self-seeking is of this nature. The fine maxims to the contrary, and the stories in the Sunday-school books, are merely myths invented by religion to deter from self-seeking. So long as any continue to believe them they have this effect by inspiring fear of consequences or hope of reward for good deeds. But the truly wise no longer believe that "the way of transgressors is hard," or that "the righteous are never forsaken." The same book that teaches these things also teaches that "he that seeketh findeth," and the persistent seeker after his personal advantage usually succeeds in finding it. Says John Stuart Mill:

"The very idea of distributive justice, or of any proportionality between success and merit, or between success and exertion, is in the present state of society so manifestly chimerical as to be relegated to the regions of romance. . . . If persons are helped in their worldly career by their virtues, so are they, and perhaps quite as often, by their vices: by servility and sycophancy, by hard-hearted and close-fisted selfishness, by the permitted lies and tricks of trade, by gambling speculations, not seldom by downright knavery." †

* I have developed this principle in an article entitled "The Mechanics of Society." See the *American Journal of Sociology* for September, 1896, Vol. II., No. 2, pp. 234–254.

† *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. XXXI. (New Series, Vol. XXV.), 1879, p. 226.

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Not that there are not vices which react upon the individual and ruin him, but these are the results of irrational impulses. The class of actions here under consideration is that of rational calculation aimed at self-satisfaction. Such actions are opposed to the safety of society because the gain to self is chiefly at the expense of others, and the number injured is far greater than the number benefited. The algebraic sum is a loss of social efficiency and a menace to the race. All forms of exploitation of the many by the few come under this head. The evil is twofold. It affects the existing group and it affects the future. It need not at all affect the individual either at the time or at any other time. Such also are all destructive actions that waste the accumulations of time and labor.

Another important class, and the one that religion earliest grappled with and still contends against, results from the powerful reproductive passion. It was possible for primitive peoples to pursue this form of satisfaction egoistically, to lead unregulated, promiscuous lives, with no concern for the functional consequences, and the result would be that while no evils might attend the individuals so acting, while the male sex at least might have considerable to gain and little to lose, the offspring would be neglected and would perish and the race would be, if not destroyed, at least so reduced in strength as to become a prey to other races that had learned to regulate this class of conduct. Religion has been the chief agent in the organization of marriage systems and in establishing the family relation upon which society so largely rests.

But it is needless to multiply examples. Suffice it to say that the mission of religion was to restrain the will. It represented the race and the future; it denied the claims of feeling; it demanded sacrifice. It may be called the *social instinct.* But there are two things commonly claimed for it that form no part of its purpose. These are *altruism* and *progress.* Although the natural enemy of egoism because race-destructive, and although perpetually enjoining group action and social action, religion in its essence has nothing to do with sympathy, or any other kind of 'pathy. It deals with func-

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tion, not feeling, and simply serves Dame Nature in her great cosmic scheme of preserving, perpetuating, and increasing life. If to these can be added the perfectionment of living beings, this is only because such perfectionment is a means to the supreme end. It has no reference to the deepening or heightening of the quality of sentiment. Anything in existing religions that seems to contradict this statement is something superadded to religion itself—some late graft upon the original stock—and belongs to a modern period.

As regards progress, the case is still clearer, and here we encounter a singular paradox. Religion may be regarded as the guardian of order, but not for the purpose of securing progress. The progress of the world has consisted entirely in the degree to which the claims of feeling have commanded recognition. What is meant by progress when speaking of man is never the mere increase in the number of human beings. The attempt thus to define it was Mr. Kidd's fatal mistake.* In so far as it ever refers to the perfection of the human type progress has in view man's capacity to enjoy. Social progress consists in the better realization of the power to satisfy want. Æsthetic progress is the increase and refinement of tastes and the increased opportunity to gratify them. All forms of progress are so many victories of the will over nature, of feeling over function. It is in the nature of religion to resist these tendencies. They are centrifugal, and therefore dangerous. Religion is the force of social gravitation that holds the social world in its orbit. The primary analogy is this cosmic one which likens religion to the gravitant and reason to the radiant forces of the universe. Upon this I need not dwell. But there is a biologic analogy which comes much nearer home, and which it is important to note. This likens religion to heredity and reason to variation in the organic world. The former preserves the type while the latter modifies it; the one tends to fix the species, the other to transform it. Biologists are now familiar with this great antithesis which inheres in the entire history of

* "Social Evolution," by Benjamin Kidd. London and New York, 1894.

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life. Even Goethe gave expression to it, and in the following form:

"Die Idee der Metamorphose ist gleich der *vis centrifuga* und würde sich ins Unendliche verlieren, wäre ihr nicht ein Gegengewicht zugeben: ich meine den Specificationstrieb, das zähe Beharrlichkeitsvermögen dessen, was einmal zur Wirklichkeit gekommen, eine *vis centripeta*, welcher in ihrem tiefsten Grunde keine Aeusserlichkeit etwas anhaben kann."*

Von Baer arrived at the same truth independently, and the transformist school of biologists have shown that adaptation and modification are the products of the law of variation held in check by the power of heredity. Human progress has followed a precisely similar course, and has been the product of the law of reason held in check by the power of religion. When, therefore, we say that religion is non-progressive, we mean nothing more than when we say that heredity is non-progressive. But for the law of variation there would certainly be no organic development, and if religion worked alone there could be no human progress. But, on the other hand, it could be said that without the hereditary check the organic world would be whirled out of existence by the unrestrained tendency to vary, and, similarly, without the religious check the human race would have been borne to destruction by the extravagant vagaries of the unbridled reason. It is not progress that either heredity or religion opposes, but change, and progress in both the organic and social realms is a compromise between centripetal and centrifugal forces. Cosmic, organic, and superorganic evolution takes place according to one principle,—the principle of organization, which consists in the natural storage and economic expenditure of energy through progressively higher products of these harmoniously interacting antagonistic forces.†

Another point of view from which this fundamental an-

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* Goethe, "Metamorphose der Thiere."

† I have worked out these principles in several articles. See, especially, "Cosmic and Organic Evolution," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. XI., October, 1877, pp. 672–682; "The Natural Storage of Energy," *The Monist*, Vol. V., January, 1895, pp. 247–263; "The Mechanics of Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II., September, 1896, pp. 234–254.

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tithesis may be contemplated is that of economics. That science deals exclusively with *utility*. Religion may be said to be diametrically opposed to it in that it deals exclusively with *necessity*.* This explains its superior sanction. The primary requisite is to live. If existence is lost all is lost. It is useless to discuss degrees of enjoyment until life is first secure. As a matter of fact, man has been thus far chiefly engaged in a struggle for existence. It is only in the later stages of social development, and among the most favored classes of society, that there has been any energy left to expend in efforts to be happy. The mass is everywhere exhausting all its energies in the effort to live. This is largely due to social and moral restraints, to exploitation by the egoistic reason of the specially endowed or favorably circumstanced. Formerly it was chiefly oppression,—*i.e.*, the exploitation of the governing class. The priesthoods that have embodied the germ of religion have contributed their share, and the essential conservatism of religion has usually allied it with the "powers that be." Man's struggles for liberty, of which human history is chiefly the record, have consisted simply in so many assertions of the claims of feeling against function, so many demands of utility upon necessity. Human progress has consisted in the reluctant concession of such of these claims and demands as did not threaten existence.

Throughout western Europe and America this struggle is chiefly over. The ruling class is at the feet of the Demos and the power of the priesthood is broken. But a new kind of oppression has taken the place of the old. A new set of rulers has come forward. The owners of the means of subsistence now dictate to the masses. The struggle for existence goes on as before, and, as before, it is the egoistic reason, coupled with the accident of position and backed by the whole body of proprietary law, that is able to exploit the mass not favored by these conditions. The "labor question" of to-day is a new assertion of the claims of feeling

* I use these terms in the sense in which they were defined by me in the *American Journal of Sociology* for March, 1896, Vol. I., p. 627.

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against function, a renewed demand of utility upon necessity. It is essentially utilitarian, and economists are just beginning to understand that their science is dynamic, and that "consumption," *i.e.*, enjoyment, *i.e.*, feeling, constitutes its true basis. To all of which religion, from its very nature, is opposed.

Here, however, an important qualification is to be noted. The mind naturally tends to leave out the steps by which it has arrived at results. This tendency was mentioned in the early part of this paper, where it was shown that it is not nourishment that the animal seeks, but pleasure; not death or destruction that it fears or flies from, but pain. Now, just as we habitually speak of feeling in terms of function and neglect the important step that lies between them, so in speaking of religion as opposed to pleasure we employ a similar ellipsis. It is not pleasure that religion opposes, but danger; and pleasure is so often dangerous, especially in the earlier stages of existence,—in the state that Dr. Patten has so expressively denominated a "pain economy," *—that the two are ultimately confounded. This explains the next point to be considered.

It belongs to the true nature of religion constantly to yield to the demands of reason and of feeling. It is no reproach to it that it has so yielded. Its opposition, as we have seen, is not based on any hostility to pleasure *per se*. It is only as a source of danger that it attacks it. Its mission is not to destroy, but to conserve. It is not pleasure itself that is bad, but the acts it produces. Selfish greed is execrable, but the fruits of honest toil are noble. Promiscuity is hateful, but wedlock is sacred. Just as gravitation must compromise with radiation to produce an orb of space, just as heredity must compromise with variation to develop an organic being, just as function must compromise with feeling to make an animal world possible, just as instinct must compromise with will to secure the highest animal development, so, on the same gen-

* See his "Theory of Social Forces." Supplement to the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* for January, 1896.

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eral principle, and in strict continuation of this same grand series of cosmic steps, must religion yield to the demands of reason wherever they are safe before anything worth conserving can be produced by man.

It is true that many of the late derivative products that call themselves religions do combat pleasure *per se*, but, as I have shown, these are artificially distorted forms, and such doctrines are excrescences that have grown out of the normal religious trunk. They are so far removed from the region of healthy circulation that the very ground of the doctrines is lost sight of, and the means that true religion employs are mistaken for its end. All forms of religious austerity, of self-abnegation, asceticism, puritanism, etc., are abnormal growths of this kind, and, like certain anatomical organs that once had a purpose, but are no longer needed, they have become pathologic. This tendency to survival is universal. The persistence of the obsolete is a principle of the organic and superorganic worlds alike. The anchoret hates pleasure for the same reason that the miser loves money.

It follows that the recognition of the claims of reason to the full satisfaction of feeling must be yielded by religion as fast as adequate guaranties are furnished that everything useful thus far created at so great expense shall be conserved; and the most ardent votary of progress ought to admit that without such guaranty it should not be yielded. The question, therefore, naturally arises, Will religion ever cease to furnish a necessary check to the extravagances of reason and of passion? We saw that religion has its sanction in the mystery of the universe, that it is the vastness of the unknown that furnishes it its hold upon mankind. Will that chasm ever be closed? Shall science, brushing aside one after another the cobwebs that obscure the vaults of nature, at last so completely lay bare her secrets that no hidden terrors will remain? Are science and religion, which, as we saw, started together, but which have so widely diverged in their course, destined to converge and ultimately to coalesce? Will science finally swallow up religion, assume its functions, and stand wholly in its stead? We can only answer these questions by noting

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the history of science thus far, by considering its long series of conquests and the steady but orderly recoil of religion as the guaranties of safety were one after another placed in its hands. Noting this, and comparing the condition of the vanguard of civilization with that of its dark beginning, it seems impossible to doubt, not that religion is ever to disappear, but that it will ultimately put all confidence in reason and cease to raise its voice against the realization on the part of man of the fullest capabilities of his nature.

Numerous objections may of course be raised by the captious to the general theory above outlined. I shall only attempt to anticipate one of these. Some, I fancy, will say that it is not religion that I am describing, but ethics. I think I can show that this is not the case. No two things have been more hopelessly confused than ethics and religion. By way of clearing up this confusion, it should be stated at the outset that ethics is wholly concerned with feeling,* while, as I have shown in this article, religion is wholly concerned with function. Pleasure and pain furnish the only basis for a moral quality, while religion has nothing to do with pleasure and pain, but is solely devoted to the maintenance of life. It is exclusively a cosmical agent. In so far, then, as moral philosophers have occupied themselves with this latter problem they have been dealing with religion, and whenever religious teachers talk of happiness and misery they are encroaching upon the domain of ethics. Superficial observers may say that religion chiefly deals with happiness and misery —in another world. Two of the great religions of the world do, in fact, deal mainly with this aspect, but they do not thereby refute the above statements. The doctrine of immortality is one of those late grafts upon the primary stock of religion to which reference has been made. Moreover, it is one of the chief concessions that religion has been compelled to make to the demands of reason for the recognition of the claims of feeling, a concession which was found to be altogether safe.

* I have furnished a demonstration of this statement in another paper. See INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for July, 1896, Vol. VI., pp. 443, 444.

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These demands had become irresistible in the days of Plato, and the creation of a future state in which feeling should be everything was one of the most sweeping of the whole series of compromises between religion and reason. By it religion saved itself from being completely set aside by the rational will of a determined race, while reason accepted it in the face of its unthinkable assumption of a beginning without an end, an eternity exclusively *a parte post.*

It has been argued that Western peoples are proved by this to be less logical than the Orientals, with their philosophically superior doctrines of transmigration and nirvana, but this is probably not the case, and the explanation is to be sought in the greater power of the egoistic will of the Western world, which rudely thrusts aside all subtle points of logic and makes them wholly subordinate to considerations of interest. The doctrine of immortality, like all the other dogmas of modern faiths, has no connection with the essentials of religion, although it was a necessary phase in the history of the vicissitudes that religion has been compelled to pass through.

I will conclude with a personal remark. Much has been said on the subject of a reconciliation of science and religion. I have not been one of the reconcilers; but if the definition of religion which I have here formulated is correct, it embodies a reconciliation far more complete than any that have been hitherto proposed. If it seems to differ from the view of religion that I have formerly expressed, it is because, in common with most others, I have heretofore taken the actual condition of religion as representing its real nature. I am far from saying that there is anything essentially incorrect in this, and it may well be that what I have here called religion ought to go by some other name. If it is not religion, it is without a name. The name is certainly a matter of little moment. If I have described something that has hitherto escaped attention, I am quite willing another shall give it a name. But that I have in the present essay outlined a chapter still to be written in the history of life, of mind, and of man, I shall remain convinced until clearly shown to be in error.

LESTER F. WARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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SOME PRESUPPOSITIONS FOR A HISTORY OF MORAL PROGRESS IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES, A.D.

(1) *Moral progress occurs when either the natural tendencies of the individuals composing a community, or their environment, have been modified for the better.* Human nature, as those must believe who accept Weissmann's doctrine of heredity, can really improve only when the state of civilization favors the perpetuation of the superior variations and the extinction of the inferior. A continuous process of weeding is necessary even to prevent decline, for if any nation existed in which natural selection were wholly inoperative, that nation would not remain stationary, but would deteriorate, there being always a tendency to revert to an older and inferior type. Unless, therefore, the population is recruited from the superior types in a larger proportion than from the inferior, each generation will be, as regards natural endowments, inferior to its predecessor. Natural selection is, however, not the only force to be taken into account. Acquired characteristics cannot, it appears, be transmitted; but acquired knowledge and experience, whether scientific or moral, can be and are; so that it is possible for a race which is constitutionally inferior to be more richly endowed with wisdom for the conduct of life than another in which natural selection has acted more beneficently. Those religious, moral, and political ideas which have a profound influence upon conduct, and give each civilization its character, struggle for life among themselves much as living creatures do, the "fittest" surviving.

(2) *There may be a healthy evolution of ideas while there is no racial progress but deterioration.* History supplies several examples of this: but such a state of things cannot last long. The two factors of progress must always act and react upon each other; a decaying race will gradually lose or pervert its moral inheritance; while on the other hand a truly progressive

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race is the best field for true progress in morality, science, and art.

(3) A state may be tempted by the prospect of immediate advantage, or compelled, for defence against aggression, to follow a course of development very prejudicial to true moral and intellectual progress. *Immediate needs may demand the sacrifice of long hopes*, or a lower success may be achieved at the cost of a higher. We may go farther, and say that a state has to pay for every achievement with its heart's blood. Just as the human organism is in constant danger of being poisoned by the products of its own activity, so the disease of which a nation or a civilization dies may have been the main factor in its most conspicuous triumphs. "Nicht jeden Wochenschluss macht Gott die Zeche." There are some very old contests which are not yet decided,—the rivalry of Europe and Asia, for example. The most strenuous, complex, expensive type of civilization is at present the victor; but the last word may yet rest with the cheap races of the East.

(4) *Stress of competition is generally a cause of progress, but sometimes of decay.* If trees grows too close, they spoil each other's growth, and the whole wood is stunted. A *régime* of unlimited and unregulated competition should issue in the survival of a proletariat of laborers with the habits of Chinese, exploited by employers with the methods of modern sweaters. Mr. Kidd does not see this; and this is, in my opinion, one of the main defects in his study of social evolution. On the other hand, relaxation of pressure is generally a cause of decline; but it need not be so always, as Mr. Kidd supposes. For (*a*) racial improvement may be effected (as it is to a slight extent among the intelligent classes already) by *rational* selection; and (*b*) the evolution of *ideas* may go on all the better when the industrial stress is relaxed.

(5) *The most brilliant eras follow rather than coincide with those of real racial progress.* During its most brilliant productive periods, a nation is probably living upon its capital. The great principles of anabolism and catabolism, as explained by Messrs. Geddes and Thomson in their work on "The Evolution of Sex," apply to social as well as to in-

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dividual organisms. A good historical example is furnished by Greece in the fifth century B.C. This epoch, splendid as it was, was really the beginning of the breaking up of the Hellenic race. Mediæval Italy is another good instance. People often make the serious mistake of regarding the license and corruption of such catabolic periods as a sign or even a cause of their intellectual brilliance; whereas, in truth, these are the characteristics of a society which is squandering its stores.

(6) *Periods of corruption are often symptomatic of political and social disintegration, not of racial decay.* In such cases the license and profligacy will appear chiefly in one class, while in another fresh and healthy ideas may be growing. On the other hand, periods of primitive simplicity and purity, if they ever exist, are for the most part times when the recognized obligations of morality are not very far from the natural instincts: they are times when men are "alive without the law," in St. Paul's phrase.

(7) *Historical crises, convulsions, or cataclysms resemble the cataracts on a great river, which add nothing to the volume of its water.*

(8) *Religious movements always arise from social needs.* Suffering reveals to man the inadequacy of his present institutions and of the ideas which they embody; soon new ideas dawn upon him, leading him to fresh hopes and aspirations. At first the contrast between the *civitas Dei* and the world seems very sharp; but by degrees the new ideas begin to shape institutions, and "the world" no longer appears wholly evil. As this process continues, the new ideas begin, as it were, to stand on their own feet, without supernatural sanction, and what we call an irreligious age results. But soon the social structure again shows signs of breaking at various points; men see once more that they have not reached their goal, nor solved the great problems of human life: once more they reflect, aspire, and pray, until new heights become visible amid the clouds, and new ideals arise, in accordance with which the framework of society must be gradually adjusted.

(9) *In speaking of Christianity, we must always distinguish*

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between the religion as it is in its essence and potentiality and the forms which it has actually assumed in the lives and minds of its professors. It is obviously in the first sense only that any religion can claim to be absolute. And here two curious features in the history of religious evolution may be mentioned, which have not yet, I think, been adequately dealt with. First, in the history of Christianity, at any rate, we must recognize the existence of a kind of instinct or guidance which again and again made the leaders of the Church wiser than they knew. In no case can it be seriously urged that the "heretical" party proved to be in the right. (I speak, of course, of the early centuries.) "Opinionis commenta delet dies; naturæ indicia confirmat." Next, religions have a remarkable tendency to what biologists call atavism, or reversion to an earlier and discarded type. Christianity arose, as we all know, very largely as a protest against the traditionalism, formalism, and sacerdotalism of the Jewish hierarchy. But then, after nearly strangling these vipers, like an infant Hercules, in her cradle, the Church proceeded to nurse them in her bosom; and to this day there is not a single Christian community which is not more Jewish than the New Testament. Exactly in the same way, Neoplatonism, in its essence a pure idealistic philosophy, but wholly Greek, as I believe, in its origin, retained Homer and Hesiod as *its* Old Testament!

(10) Can we give a *natural* explanation of the appearance of the highest religion two thousand years ago? I think it must be found in the unparalleled favorableness of the circumstances, constituting together the "fulness of time" of which St. Paul speaks. This natural explanation is not irreligious. Nothing can be revealed till there are eyes to see it, and we must suppose that God, being good, will always reveal Himself at the earliest possible moment. And, moreover, Christianity only claims finality as being itself a principle of growth and development. The parables of the grain of mustard seed, and of the corn of wheat, the declaration of Christ, "I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now," above all the promise of the indwelling Spirit, "the Guide unto all truth," give a clearer expression to the idea of devel-

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opment than it had before received. Christianity thus conceived can never be transcended, though it may from time to time assume transient phases which have to be left behind. From this point of view, it is, of course, true that, in Justin's words, "those before Christ who lived in correspondence with the eternal Reason were Christians, though they were not called so;" but those who follow this line of argument are perhaps in some danger of falling into the unfairness censured by Goethe, who complained that Christian apologists strip the finest feathers from all the fowls of the air to adorn their own bird of paradise.

(11) *The Church in the second and third centuries was a reform party in the Roman Empire, which aimed at the reconstruction of society on ethical principles.* It was a new and original experiment,—this of making the public conscience the basis of a social organization. The Church grasped two facts of the highest importance,—first, that an organization of social life was imperatively necessary; and, second, that nothing was to be hoped for from either the imperial government or any of the popular religions. Neoplatonism tried to rebuild the old religions on the basis of the empire; but both the foundation and the materials were rotten, and the attempt failed. Christianity set up an *imperium in imperio*, governed by organized public opinion, and succeeded, until the unfortunate alliance with Imperialism, which dates from the Edict of Milan, crippled her energies, and perhaps ended for a long period the beneficent activity of her organization as a civilizing and reforming power.

(12) Amid the deep disillusionment and despondency which had overtaken the Roman Empire, all thoughtful men were laboring to find some remedy for what seemed like a mortal sickness. With a true diagnosis men turned to those problems which arise immediately out of the two great primary instincts, —self-preservation and reproduction. The old civilization had been recklessly wasteful in both these matters, attaching very little value to human life, and permitting every kind of abuse in the indulgence of appetite. Some new sanction was imperatively necessary which should regulate both on a sounder basis.

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(*a*) *Growing sense of the value of human life.* The maxim "homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto" was a great discovery; and so was Juvenal's dictum, "nulla umquam de morte hominis cunctatio longa est." Historians have done scant justice to the humanitarian movement in Greece, which, perhaps, began with Euripides, and which seems to have found expression in the comedies of Menander. The victory of Rome threw this movement back at least two centuries; it is not till the latter half of the first century A.D. that we find a spirit so humane and philanthropic in the Latin world. Christianity, with its doctrine of individual souls, each having an infinite value, exercised an immediate and powerful influence in stopping the waste of human lives: infanticide, abortion, gladiatorial shows, suicide, military massacres, were all alike condemned by the Church, on the ground that no wanton expenditure of human life may be called a *vile damnum;* and there was even a strong feeling among Christians that military service was unlawful. In the long run these doctrines were bound to stop the depopulation of Europe; though, as will be shown presently, the effect could not be manifested at once.

(It has been objected—*e.g.*, by Professor Flint—that the philosophy of history produced by Christianity was "excessively one-sided," because it allowed the significance of industry, commerce, and wealth—all the very important economic side of history—to drop out of sight. The same indictment has been brought against Neoplatonism. But the fault was that of the age, not of the religion or the philosophy. As Professor H. Nettleship said in this JOURNAL (January, 1892, Vol. II., page 225), under the Roman empire "the principles of political economy were not understood at all, taxation was based upon wrong principles, and scientific knowledge was not to any great extent applied to beneficent inventions." Christianity has proved, in the course of time, that it is capable of turning out Quakers and Scotchmen as genuine products of some of its principles; and if it is worth while to defend Neoplatonism against the charge of being "unpractical," it may be pointed out that mystics (*e.g.*, Plotinus, Henry

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More, and John Smith, of Cambridge) have generally been excellent men of business. We have no right to expect that a moral and religious revolution should cause Adam Smith to be incarnated fifteen hundred years before his time.)

(*b*) *Growing sense of the necessity of regulating sexual relations.* It is a curious question, to which apparently no answer can be given, when and why the human species lost the periodic instinct. This peculiarity in the human race, which Aristotle mentions with some complacency as a proof of our superiority to the brutes, is one cause of the extreme disorder which this appetite has always caused in civilized and uncivilized societies. Another cause is the saving of life which results whenever men associate together for mutual protection and help. I mean that in any kind of civilized society, if marriage soon after the age of puberty were universal, a large number of children would be born whom it would be impossible to keep alive. We may say, therefore, that the strength of this appetite is at best an inconvenience in any civilized community. In these circumstances man very soon began to use his reason to outwit nature. Superfluous children were got rid of by infanticide and abortion, and the unfortunate discovery of παιδεραστία seemed to offer another solution of the difficulty. With regard to this latter vice, Greek and Roman history shows that it did not always argue or cause moral depravity: among other great names, Sophocles, Euripides, Pindar, Zeno, Horace, and even Virgil, Augustus, and all his successors except Claudius, down to Antoninus Pius, have either confessed it or were suspected of it by their contemporaries: but Plato (in the *Laws*) speaks of it as "only recent" in Greece, and has already discerned its mischievous effects. From the point of view of the sociologist, it is the most disastrous of discoveries; it undoubtedly helped largely to depopulate Greece, and we have evidence of its prevalence in several other states which decayed,—the Etruscans (on the authority of Timæus and Theopompus), the Persians (Herodotus says παῤ Ἑλλησῶν μαθόντες), the Canaanites, the Tartars, the Arabians, and in modern times the Turks. In our period the necessity was widely felt of finding some sanction

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which should regulate these relations. Musonius and Epictetus are already found to maintain that no indulgence is justifiable outside monogamous marriage, and Marcus Aurelius, a hundred years later, thanks the gods that he "touched neither Benedicta nor Theodotus," with whom, in his young days, he had fallen in love. The Neoplatonist philosophers were for the most part celibates on principle; and the idea that even marriage is a lapse from purity was by no means confined to Christian monks. The teaching of the Christian Church was, of course, definite enough as regards practice, but it was found very difficult to frame cogent and consistent reasons for the legislation. There was a marked tendency, both within and outside of the sphere of Christian influence, to regard the act as in its nature contaminating, and only allowed in marriage in order to continue the species, or "to produce virgins," as Jerome puts it. This advocacy of celibacy was not due entirely to dualistic asceticisms. The principle of abstinence had to assert itself in a harsh and uncompromising form, as against the prevalent licentiousness: the *possibility* of the encratite life had to be established. Epictetus had said πρὸ γάμου εἰς δύναμιν καθαρευτέον: the Church must be able to add ἀλλὰ δύνασθε. Again, in the lives of the ascetics we trace the spontaneous recoil of a large portion of the body politic from the poison which was destroying it: perhaps in no other way could the disease be worked out of the system. It was a desperate remedy, of course, to sterilize the moral *élite* for some centuries: some may think, with Mr. Galton, that no disease could be worse than such social surgery, and that the brutality of the middle ages was the inevitable result of the monastic system. But, in the long run, the victory was probably worth the sacrifice. In the Teutonic countries, at any rate, the sexes now mix pretty freely without scandal or danger; and few will deny that this step towards real civilization is the fruit of the steady assertion of its practicability by the Church; though morality has here received a most important aid from the democratic principle of equality of consideration. (If any one doubts how much we owe to this latter principle in the matter of sexual

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relations, let him study what has lately been written about the state of morality in Russia, or, I regret to say, the exploits of the English settlers in Rhodesia.) But to return to the Roman empire in our period. The recoil from unbridled sensuality was, as I have said, instinctive, and, as usual in such cases, the instinct took the form of a bare prohibition under supernatural sanction: when the Fathers of the Church try to reason about it, they generally go wrong, extolling celibacy as the higher state, and degrading marriage. A modern moralist would, I suppose, take one of the two following lines of argument in dealing with a libertine: (*a*) "Society has a right to demand of its members, and its members have in certain circumstances the right to demand of each other, hard work and self-denial; but neither society at large, nor any of its members, has the right to demand, nor to encourage by offering payment, any service which maims the personality of him or her who offers it. The ultimate aim of society being that every member of it may have the opportunity of attaining the highest moral, intellectual, and physical development of which he or she is capable, any institution (and at present there are many) which thwarts this aim is essentially evil, and should only be tolerated where it is clearly unavoidable. The social evil in question involves, by common consent, degradation to one if not both parties, and sins most flagrantly against the ideal which society should put before itself. And it is in no way necessary: it is therefore detestable." (*b*) "The most distinctive doctrine of Christian ethics is that our nature is our enemy until we have conquered her: we must die before we can live; so only can we arrive at a reconciliation between flesh and spirit. Here, then, is the justification of the Christian legislation about social purity. For when the appetite is under control, we no longer wish to indulge it in loveless unions." It must be admitted that both these arguments apply in a much weakened form, if they apply at all, to those forms of concubinage which most resemble marriage: but we are not now considering the causes which lead to the omission of the legal or of the religious ceremony. The two lines of argument here suggested are both based on

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the Christian view of social and personal morality, and both were used by the early Church; but the leaders of the movement were often carried away by a fanaticism very closely analogous to that of our temperance advocates. Indeed, there are few more interesting parallels in the history of moral reform than that between the "total abstinence" propagandists in the fourth and following centuries and now in the nineteenth.

Some of these "presuppositions" are no doubt disputable, and I must apologize for having thrown them together in this short article σπυράδην καὶ ἀτάκτως. My object has been to suggest that there is room for a history of morals in this most interesting period, written on somewhat different lines from Mr. Lecky's justly celebrated work. Instead of beginning with a comparison of utilitarian and intuitional morality, it should first consider the conditions which determine the growth and decay of states, with especial reference to moral theory and practice, and should then try to form an estimate of the moral results to the population of the Roman empire of slavery, of miscegenation, of the fusion of nationalities, and of creed, and so forth. In short, the history of ideas during that period should be treated by sociological methods, as part of the natural history of mankind; and, writing as a Christian, I can see no reason why the Christian revelation should not be freely treated in the same manner as the other religious movements of the time. Those who, like Justin, Clement, and Origen, see the hand of the Divine Logos in all history will find nothing inconsistent in attempting a natural history of a revelation which they believe to be divine.

W. R. Inge.

Hertford College, Oxford.

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THE BEARING OF THE DOCTRINE OF SELECTION UPON THE SOCIAL PROBLEM.

How completely the attitude of cultivated circles towards the masses has changed in the course of a century is strikingly illustrated if we compare a significant remark in the "Wealth of Nations" with a weighty passage in Mr. Bryce's "American Commonwealth." In treating "Of the Wages of Labor," Adam Smith mentions what in his day was "the common complaint that luxury extends itself even to the lowest ranks of the people, and that the laboring poor will not now be contented with the same food, clothing, and lodgings which satisfied them in former times." He goes on in all seriousness, howbeit with a consciousness of running counter to the generally received opinion, to ask, "Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of the people to be regarded as an advantage or as an inconveniency to the society?"—a query he briefly answers, as might be expected, by affirming and substantiating the general benefit to society of a higher standard of wages. This citation from Adam Smith gives us an inkling of the prevalent feeling among the English upper classes in 1776 towards the "laboring poor." To-day but few would think seriously of raising such an issue as to the social benefit of high wages or of solemnly defending a thesis to modern ears so self-evident.

Contrasted with this echo from the past is Mr. Bryce's depiction of one of the distinguishing features of the public sentiment of the present age. After commenting on the way in which the triumphs of science have influenced us by enlarging our ideas of comfort, he adds, "Still greater has been the influence of a quickened moral sensitiveness and philanthropic sympathy. The sight of preventable evil is painful, and is felt as a reproach. He who preaches patience and reliance upon natural progress is thought callous. The sense of sin may, as theologians tell us, be declining, but the dislike to degrading and brutalizing vice is increasing; there is a

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warmer recognition of the responsibility of each man for his neighbor, and a more earnest zeal in works of moral reform."

So far am I from drawing any inferences flattering to our own age from the remarks of these two observers, that I freely confess that there is hardly less to condemn in the unctuous social sentimentality of this generation than in the selfish apathy of the last. Sentiment, after all, whether selfish or altruistic, is but the raw material of morality, and unless transfused by rational purpose is morally colorless. But what does appear from these remarks, both so representative of the two respective periods, is the changed attitude of the public mind towards social questions. It illustrates the contention so frequently made, that "the problem of social well-being is one which belongs peculiarly to the present time." The Sphinx has put tantalizing questions to other generations than our own; but to us her most common riddle is summed up in the so-called Social Problem. To state precisely what this problem is would require a long diagnosis, and such a diagnosis would probably issue in an attempt to unravel a plexus of mutually determining causes. Without attempting this nice task of social dissection, it is easy enough to sum up the external aspects of the case. Demos is grumbling over his lot, and Public Sentiment, instead of sharply telling him to accuse no man falsely and to be content with his wages, assures him of sympathy in his endeavors and interest in his condition. How much of this discontent is well founded is not here the question. But it may be worth our while to ask what considerations should determine our attitude towards the social problem. How high hopes of social betterment may we intelligently entertain? Or how complete must be the failure of reform before we may honorably throw away sword and shield and blindly submit to "the force not ourselves which makes for production"?

It is with an uneasy consciousness of bringing out of the economic treasure-house things old rather than new that I essay to revert to the law of selection as throwing a ray of light on this question. This law of selection is not indeed the only nor even the main determinant of one's attitude

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towards God or man. But some things that law does say most emphatically, and these things it may be worth our while to rephrase.

It is not very surprising that the law of survival through struggle has encountered some sturdy rebuffs. Its early conquest of many positive sciences was so complete and so speedy that its extensive sway was easily mistaken for universal dominion. The ore extracted to-day from the Darwinian lode does not seem to dwindle very perceptibly in amount, but the most cautious assayers have gauged pretty conclusively its quality. Weighed in the scales of an impartial philosophical analysis we discover in the law of selection only a clue to certain genetic processes and no final theory of the universe. The most complete articulation of phenomena upon the framework of Development could not affect the dictum of the great English idealist, that knowledge can never be a part or product of nature in the sense in which nature is said to be an object of knowledge. But when all this is admitted, the question arises whether for purposes of social study we have exhausted the significance of the fact of "selective slaughter." I do not think we have done so, nor do I know of any question whose solution would more greatly advance our knowledge of human society than the question how far and in what ways the law of selection acts among mankind.

Our conception of "animated nature" has been revolutionized by the recognized fact of selection. We no longer think of Providence as a Great Game-Keeper who "providentially caters for the sparrow;" and there are few, I suppose, who would longer deny that the seeds of potential life, animal and vegetable, are enormously in excess of the number that can possibly be maintained alive, and that the resulting intensity of competition for subsistence makes the world at once a cock-pit and *crêche* where none but the ablest conquer and perpetuate their kind. There are perhaps adumbrations of another order of things even in the province of animal life. Mr. Drummond thinks to find the altruistic microbe in very early forms of life, and Mr. Leslie Stephen points out "a

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system of tacit alliances" in the midst of this interminable conflict. Still, conflict is the rule and "tacit alliances" are admittedly the exception. And the question that presses home for answer is this: Does the law of selection operate in human society? does it prevail there in part, or unreservedly, or at all?

The answer is not difficult if we confine ourselves to general statements. This merciless struggle for mere existence is to some extent changed in human society, and the residual competitive process is altered so as generally to become a struggle for domination instead of a struggle for life. Such domination of the weak by the strong may be compatible with mutual service and profit. The area of competition is also narrowed so as no longer to cover the family circle. Within the family the weakest are by the sacrifices of the other members protected from the pitiless struggle to which the weak must succumb were family support withdrawn. So within the state the competitive plane has been raised, so that a predatory life to-day must be one of wits rather than of weapons. The competition of industry, where failure means loss of control over capital, has largely supplanted the competition of war, where failure meant slavery or death. Indeed, so altered and modified has the selective process in human society become that we may be tempted to believe this law of minor importance after all.

Such a conclusion, however, would be highly erroneous. The nature of the competitive struggle has been changed but in part, and the lower the descent we make in the social scale the harsher and more brutal becomes the aspect of the strife and the more apparent the proportion of those "unhappy persons who, in the great lottery of life, have drawn a blank." The higher mortality and the shorter average duration of life which characterize the "submerged tenth" as compared with the well-to-do classes (or which characterize the American negro as compared with the white race in this country), prove conclusively that on the margin of industrial society the unfit "perish," or, what comes to the same thing, they regularly meet an untimely end from the lack of adequate food, shelter,

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clothing, and care. If their death differs from that of the beasts that perish, it is because society has decreed that the possession of property rather than mere physical prowess shall be the condition of survival on the new plane of social competition.

This is a very sobering reflection. It may even be pronounced dismal, but we shall not get away from this elemental fact in human society by reviling the phrase which embodies the truth. Seen in this light, the hackneyed saw that God never makes a mouth without providing two hands to feed it becomes a silly attempt to plaster with an epigram a putrefying sore. And the same might be said of Southey's remark that Malthus's doctrine asserts that "God makes men and women faster than he can feed them."

If, then, it be true that the selective struggle on the margin of industrial society is only a prolonged and peaceable version of the cruder struggle for existence in the animal world, what bearing will this fact have upon the social problem,—upon the general interest in and demand for the betterment of the condition of the lower classes?

First, it precludes all optimistic anticipations for the future of society. By this I do not mean that we may entertain no hope of any essential social betterment. But by optimistic anticipations I mean such as apprehend that society in the future will see the disappearance of material want and its attendant suffering. We Americans are much too prone to indulge in unwarrantable expectations of a roseate hue. Our old men dream dreams and our young men see visions with astonishing facility. There is much in our history to explain or even to excuse this tendency on our part. The subjugation of a continent gave such ample scope to enterprise that we had all but forgotten that our territory was not boundless. We are reaching the end of our tether and the unusual constraint galls us bitterly. Still, we do not despair. It is an article of faith with nine out of ten of us that the world is constantly growing better and happier, and that the future is sure to see the dawn of general social prosperity. Whether, indeed, this old world of ours is growing better or happier is a puzzling riddle.

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The old reprobate seems, like many of us, to have his relapses into sin as well as his occasional fits of morality. Too often history shows the Puritan Commonwealth succeeded by the immorality of a Restoration to make us feel sure that the cosmic drift even in the long run is in any particular direction.

On one assumption the rigor of our first conclusion might perhaps be somewhat relaxed. If we could assume that the residual element of destructive competition in human society could be transmuted into the lively but non-lethiferous struggle for domination, there might be some ground for our taking an attitude, if not of optimism, at least of cheerful social anticipation. If the civilizing agencies of private property and family responsibility have largely localized social pressure, why may not the same trend of historic progress eliminate that pressure altogether? This suggestion the late Professor Huxley crushed in his lecture on Evolution and Ethics, where he said, "The cosmic nature born with us and, to a large extent, necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely ethical ends." No race has ever yet appeared in any clime where reckless multiplication has not ultimately created, at least among some classes of the people, an environment whose inevitable outcome was suffering and want. And to suppose that we or our children shall ever see the day when the social swamp will be thoroughly drained is to indulge in a pleasant day-dream which finds no warrant in reason and no counterpart in experience.

But, second, *the persistence of the selective process in society sanctions no fatalistic attitude towards social betterment.* It is perhaps not wonderful that those to whom the naturalistic processes of development are an adequate philosophy of life and who reject volitional freedom as a delusion should fall into a fatalistic temper of mind. But there are other phases of feeling which engender the same kind of indifferentism. Social egoism a century ago found in its distorted version of Malthusianism something it somehow had "loved long since, and lost awhile;" something which "parried the demand for

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reform and sheltered selfishness from question and from conscience by the interposition of an inevitable necessity." The feeling that it will be decidedly uncomfortable for us to help our neighbor is often the father of the conviction that it is really impossible to help him at all. The struggle for existence, we are apt to argue, is a hard fight, but, after all, it insures the survival of the best stock and the healthiest "social tissue." Or, our self-exculpatory *apologia* may take still another turn if we but dash it smartly with a cynical humor. Instead of pitying the inevitable misery of those who perish, or pampering the self-complacency of those who prosper, we may argue that the double process of survival and extinction is, after all, reciprocally beneficent to victor and vanquished. "The sheep," says Mr. Leslie Stephen, "that is preserved with a view to mutton gets the advantage, though he is not kept with a view to his own advantage. Of all the arguments for vegetarianism, none is so weak as the argument from humanity. The pig has a stronger interest than any one in the demand for bacon. If all the world were Jewish, there would be no pigs at all. He has to pay for his privileges by an early death, but he makes a good bargain of it. He dies young, and, though we can hardly infer the 'love of the gods,' we must admit that he gets a superior race of beings to attend to his comforts, moved by the strongest possible interest in his health and vigor, and induced by its own needs, perhaps, to make him a little too fat for comfort, but certainly also to see that he has a good sty and plenty to eat every day of his life."

Without attempting to answer *seriatim* these pessimistic views, it will be sufficient to indicate once for all why the fatalistic temper finds no warrant in the doctrine of selection as applied to society. The reason is simply this: that in the domain of social life there is no rigidly fixed boundary between the cosmic process and the ethical process, between the cut-throat struggle for existence and the elevated struggle for domination, between the natural body and the spiritual body, between the flesh and the spirit.

We may therefore with perfect consistency believe in the

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existence of the fight for life on the social frontier, and yet hope to push back the barbaric struggle into somewhat narrower confines. "Social progress," as Professor Huxley has said, "means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another which may be called the ethical process, the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the conditions which exist, but of those who are ethically the best." Rightly viewed, therefore, the doctrine of selection can be used neither to buttress social selfishness nor to justify social indifference. While the inevitableness of the struggle for life may sober our thinking on social problems, and while it may prompt us to disavow—perhaps regretfully—far-reaching schemes of social reform, it cannot wreck the ark of human hopes

"By making all the horizon dark."

Like St. Paul, "we are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed, but not in despair."

What has been said up to this point has borne chiefly on the frame of mind and temper in which we ought to view the possibility of social betterment. Nor is this a matter of small importance. But there is another—and a more practical—aspect of the doctrine of selection as applied to society, for this law is capable of concrete and explicit application to projects of social reform. We may put the case thus: *The doctrine of selection is a vantage-ground from which we may often view in true perspective social issues which, seen close on, are involved in obscurity and doubt.* Let us make sure that the scope of our proposition is understood. The doctrine of selection here means simply this, that the nearer races or individuals approach the level of the brutes, the more liable they are to the brute struggle for existence, and the more subject they become to the condition of "not enough to eat and liability to be eaten." This condition is not universal, but in one disguise or another it persists even in civilized society. It is not ineradicable, but it dies hard and disappears slowly. It is as much a part of the world of men as elasticity and extension are qualities of the world of matter. Again, when we assert

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that the recognition of this elementary fact gives us a vantage-ground from which to view social issues, we neither affirm nor imply that survival in the struggle for existence is the final norm of conduct. We do not identify all conduct which tends towards extinction with wrong conduct, nor all actions which promote survival with right conduct, though upon the higher planes of civilized life right action and successful action tend to coalesce. All that we intend to convey by the proposition is this, that selection through struggle is a quantity we cannot expect to eliminate from the social problem, and that therefore we must judge of social duty and social conduct with reference to the actual stage whereon mankind must act its part. Let us put upon duty, social as well as individual, the highest interpretation and the most transcendent worth; let us find her origin not "in the chance play of subjective sensibility or the far-off echo of ancestral lusts," but in the "bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world;" and still it is true that this lofty sense of duty must manifest itself in a world many of whose denizens "graze and wallow, breed and sleep," until they are cut down in swarms by pestilence or war, or more slowly and decorously removed by the invisible pressure of material want. The etiquette of a picnic is no model for the battle-field or the slaughter-house, and the stern requirements of social ethics must take into consideration other aspects of social regeneration than those which seek to relieve a momentary difficulty or seem to meet a temporary crisis. So far as society to-day is better off than primeval society, the uplift has come largely from two agencies: first, from the steady raising of the plane of competition so as to conform social rivalry to the moral conditions of mutual service; and second, from the persistent focusing of the residual pressure of destructive competition upon those who will not come up to the social and moral standard of an advanced civilization. Any plan of social reform which checks or neutralizes either tendency makes for darkness and not for light. The danger is that we may gauge plans of social betterment or reconstruction from too short-sighted a standpoint. It is against this danger that the doctrine of selection

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ought effectually to protect us. Let me illustrate this point by two examples, one domestic and one international. The collectivist is continually agitating against the institution of private property,—of private property in land or in the material instruments of production or distribution. He asserts with truth that private property is "a terrible right;" that its essence is its enforceable exclusiveness in possession and enjoyment; that it traverses ideal justice if by that we mean equality of opportunity; that in practice it means that ample stores of food and clothing are constantly in the magazines of every great city while thousands of its inhabitants "even unto this present hour both hunger and thirst" and "have no certain dwelling-place." Generous humanitarian sentiments revolt at the picture. Christian charity finds it intolerable, and rightly refuses to say it cannot be bettered. But let us beware lest in striking at the evils we deplore we destroy the institutions which render these very evils manageable. Property accentuates the differences between rich and poor, but it renders poverty a localized evil instead of an omnipresent pestilence. The institution of property, if it makes poverty possible, at least prevents it from becoming universal. "The more completely," says Professor Hadley in his "Economics," "you give the prudent and efficient man control of the results of his labor, the more do you localize the pressure of population upon subsistence and confine the effects of this pressure to a few. But give the children of the shiftless, by thoughtless charity or various systems of poor relief, the right to eat the substance of the efficient and prudent, and you will soon lose both the capital and the morality under which that capital has been created." We shall doubtless see in future marked changes in the dividing line between public and private property. But an assault on the principle of private property pure and simple is a plea for a return to barbarism, no matter whether the plea mask itself under the guise of a new coinage law or stalk in the robes of what is called "Christian socialism." Finally, I shall take an example of the way in which we might view an international obligation, provided we read our duty in the light of the doctrine of

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selection. If we consider the condition of affairs in the neighboring island of Cuba, we see a large part of the native population in arms against the Spanish government. The insurgents are fighting for independence,—with what prospect of success it is perhaps impossible to say. On what grounds are we to decide where our duty lies? Is a war for independence so holy a cause that where possible we are morally bound, without exception, to aid the insurgents? Suppose the inhabitants of British India revolted against their rulers; where ought our sympathies to be enlisted? Has independence never resulted in anarchy far worse than any tyranny? These considerations may not suffice to decide the case in point. Indeed, the world's outraged human sentiment might require us to interfere in Cuba in favor of neither party, but against both. But the point we are contending for is simply this, that no adequate weighing of our conduct is possible without reference to the struggle for survival between nations. Mere grounds of *primâ facie* justice or immediate sympathy are not enough. Sometimes, as the law of survival teaches us, it is impossible to interfere at all between contestants with any good results. Suppose a European naval commander on a voyage finds two savage tribes bent on immediate conflict. Is he to aid either or to fire on both? If the good Samaritan finds the Priest and Levite both angrily engaged in an internecine quarrel, he may often with a good conscience pass by on the other side. Sometimes the result of intervention in the affairs of other nations or races is involved in great obscurity; and when debating our duty as a nation we may remember that when one is lost in a fog and without a compass it is a good rule to stand perfectly still. Sometimes when intervention could be attempted with clean hands the probable accretion of unworthy motives and the demoralization attendant on war may outweigh the anticipated good, as the melancholy history of the Crusades proves. While there may be exceptions, therefore, the virtuous nation, like the virtuous man, tends to use force mainly in self-defence. These considerations do not, of course, comprise all the factors which should determine our national duty in cases of this

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kind, but they are considerations which demand careful attention in any intelligent determination of that duty, and they spring naturally from our viewing the matter from the standpoint of survival through selective struggle. The field truly is the world, but it is a world "that lieth in wickedness;" and to forego strategic advantage or to waste reformatory energy by refusing to view the world or society as they are is to squander our moral patrimony and to waste our moral resources.

WINTHROP MORE DANIELS.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

SUGGESTION AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL PROGRESS.

ONE of the remarkable potencies in human development to which investigators have just begun to apply the scientific method is the part played in social progress by the form of influence known as suggestion. We have here disclosed for us a deep-reaching influence of which it would be difficult to exaggerate the scope. Even after parental care has been brought to bear upon the child in the home, the grown individual still needs the action of a social environment, since it is the constant, the normal influence of this environment which holds him to the particular stage of civilization which his society represents. For without some such process, the social units could not be kept sufficiently like each other in mental and moral characteristics to enable them to co-operate for social ends. The influence thus exerted differs from that of hypnotic suggestion merely in the fact that, instead of being made to us in a cataleptic condition by an operator, it comes from the people with whom we associate and from the community in the midst of which we live.

Recognition of these social influences and of their moulding power raises the question of the attitude of society towards the social unit, and we are at once reminded of the fact that by a psychological law, the evidences of which abound, the

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opinion of a community tends to realize itself in the individual or the class upon whom it bears. The belief which men entertain regarding us, establishing itself in our minds as a perpetually renewed suggestion, modifies our personality, and in the end—unless we are strong enough to resist it—fashions our character and conduct into more or less of likeness with itself. The enormous importance of the social attitude in determining our character as individuals, and our value as such to society, is thus obvious. It is well understood, even by those who have not traced the phenomenon to social suggestion, that individual efficiency in any walk of life is at its maximum when the attitude of the community is most favorable. Equally true must it be that an unfavorable attitude—altogether apart from the question of its justice or injustice—must be harmful, not only to those against whom it is directed, but also to the community itself.

We see this first in the home. Here the injurious influences of pessimism are readily apparent. To constantly treat children as irredeemably bad—to habitually apply to them epithets which indicate a settled conviction of their wickedness—to surround them, in a word, with an atmosphere of moral pessimism—is to accustom them to the idea of their own depravity, to implant in their immature, impressionable minds the belief not only that badness is their normal condition, but that it is one from which they can never hope to emerge. As young people are much more susceptible to hypnotic influences than those more advanced in years, so they are more peculiarly open to suggestions coming from those in authority over them. To familiarize them, therefore, with the idea of their personal depravity, is to create by suggestion a bent of moral nature in the direction of depravity. A child constantly reminded of its inherent wickedness, and knowing that nothing save wickedness is expected of it,—that in the persistent pessimism of the parental attitude its lucid intervals of goodness must all go for nothing,—what tendency can such a child have towards self-improvement? With the very capacity for goodness denied it, the child must grow up fashioned more or less to the likeness of the pessimistic con-

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ception formed by its parental guides. And who can say how much recklessness in after life, how much persistent hardness of heart in anti-social attitudes, has not had its birth in the blighting pessimism of the home?

The same lesson is yielded in that second stage of preparation for social suggestion,—the school. Here the child receives a new set of influences having authoritative form, and here the tendencies imparted in the home are neutralized or intensified. Happily, there are teachers who know how to accustom even a backward child to the thought that he has within him possibilities almost infinite. But there are also pessimists in education who seem to delight in crushing in upon the pupil, mentally weak, the sense of its many deficiencies. To seize every opportunity to remind it that it is slow in this branch, incapable in that, positively dull and stupid in a third, is the blunder of the pedagogue who could not do worse were it his desire to brand his victim with mental incapacity for life. The moral paralysis of the individual which is threatened by pessimism only begins in the home; his intellectual paralysis is usually achieved once and for all in the badly ordered school-room.

But the period of tuition offers only a restricted scope for the possibilities of suggestion. For after the school comes the great world over which the evil of distrust in men hangs like a cloud. Here is the field, par excellence, of social influence visibly connected with the psychology of the lower life; for even the animals receive favorable or unfavorable suggestions from one another, and act accordingly. Our first cousin in the organic genealogy is wild because of its well-founded distrust of other animals. Brought into human surroundings and "domesticated," it gradually ceases to snarl and show its teeth,—forgets, as it were, to assume the attitude of defence on the approach of other animate beings,—for the reason that it now lives under peace conditions, is no longer afraid of its animal or human environment. When we call it "tamed," we really mean that it has the benefit of an optimistic attitude. It is the same truth which finds illustration in human societies. The pessimism of primitive peoples per-

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petually at war with each other stands naturally correlated with their low social condition. When every man's hand was against every other, and the main business of life was that of defence or attack, there could be no leisure for developing the arts of civilization. The germs of mutual trust between man and man, between one community and another, had to spring up before even the beginnings could be made of that industrial co-operation which now covers the planet with its net-work of railways and telegraph lines. And if anything were needed to show the injury which pessimism causes to the interests of social progress, it would be forthcoming in that universal acceptance of mutual faith of man in man as the principle which must lie at the foundation of all our modern commerce.

Humanity has made enormous progress since the days of the persecutions for witchcraft. Yet the pessimistic attitude of man towards his fellow is by no means a thing of the past. Though manifested in less violent forms, the distrust is no less wide-spread. And though while in some directions, as in the relations of trade, we show faith in men by our acts, in our thoughts we surround them with an atmosphere of suspicion. The high modern development of the quality of "smartness" protects most of us from the danger of being "taken in" by any outward semblance of moral or intellectual superiority, and the ease with which the colloquial epithet of "fraud" rises to the lips, is the suggestive mark of a much diffused mental attitude towards psychic values. In the moral dynamics of the world, qualities not widely possessed are rarely believed in; nor is credulity regarding the prevalence of evil wholly out of relation to the capacity for it. In these high civilizations, which only the Anglo-Saxon race has been able to produce, we tend to judge men by the worst that is in them rather than by the best. For our social gatherings, we have the pessimism of the secret whisper, of the malevolence that masks itself with smiles, of the kisses between women that stab like daggers. Everywhere, as Schiller sings,

> Es liebt die Welt das Glänzende zu schwarzen,
> Und das Erhabene im Staub zu ziehen.

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In politics we fear treachery from our associates, and impute base motives to our opponents. At the least disturbance of the normal flow of events, one's nation is in danger. Distrustful among themselves, men are pessimistic as a community. The foreigner, whether as an immigrant or as a government, is always seeking to gain advantage at the country's expense. And when a political issue is added to distrust in international relations, we get that product of the pessimistic attitude known as "jingoism."

Society has its classes whose mental habit, born of their function in civilization, inevitably tends to promote the darker views of life and human nature. There have been pessimists since the beginnings of literature, and we have had declarations that the world is evil in various tones from various voices. Since Job complained that his days were "swifter than a weaver's shuttle, and spent without hope," all forms of religious and philosophical pessimism have had a hearing, from Gnosticism, Manicheism, Augustinianism, down to modern orthodoxy. Calderon has assured us that "man's greatest crime is that he was born;" and A. de Lamartine asks querulously,

Quel crime avons-nous fait pour mériter de naître?

For Leopardi, life is "*amaro e noia*," and the world simply "*fango*,"—a piece of plain speaking which startles until we read in Eduard von Hartmann that description of the universe as "an agonizing blister on the all-pervading Being," which introduces us to realism in speculation as nothing else ever can.

This constant teaching of the evil of existence, even by philosophers who have a system to build up, or, again, by poets who see the world through the glasses of their personal experience, darkly, has not been without its influence in directing the energies of the reformer. But when it becomes injurious to the interests of the race, Nature herself condemns it. The utility of optimism in race perpetuation is incontestable. Upon the view that life is worth living, however inculcated or reached, all social progress finally depends. The great masses

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of mankind—despite Buddhism in the ancient world and Schopenhauerism in the modern—have held in this regard a sturdy and unfailing optimism. Men who, like Alexander von Humboldt, view marriage as a sin, and the propagation of children as a crime, may seem worthy of survival, if only on account of their intellectual eminence; yet their attitude towards race interests is simply a sentence of self-extinction. There never was a time in the conflict between the optimism of the physiological process and the pessimism of the intellect when Nature did not know how to take sides. And she has never been truer to herself than when, through the instrumentality of natural selection, she has safeguarded humanity from any form of doubt or unbelief which, realized in conduct, seriously threatened to impair that formidable pressure from below upward, the "will to live."

But while philosophical pessimism is active mainly in the sphere of the intellect, religious pessimism carries its influence deep down into the realm of feeling and conscience. From the beginning, men feared their environment, saw evil potencies in the multifarious forces of nature. The earliest gods were evil, and workers of evil. Even so cultured a nation as the Greeks believed in Furies who had a divinely appointed mission to torment mankind. The Buddhists taught the evil of human existence in so absolute a form that the only escape therefrom lay in self-annihilation. The pessimism of the Christian view is, historically speaking, only less pronounced. There are, it is true, the joys of Paradise, but over against these have been set the terrors of hell, and a conception of God not falling short, in cruelty and vindictiveness, of the most elementary ideas of deity held by barbarous peoples. It would not therefore be difficult to sustain the thesis that low conceptions of "the power outside us that makes for righteousness" have been responsible for much of the intellectual, social, above all, the moral inertia of past ages. Being representations conceived in the likeness of man, as he is at a given time, they not only tend to confirm him in his view of himself, but obtain, so to speak, a celestial sanction for a particular stage of social progress, and thus help to perpetuate that

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stage. It being impossible for the morality of men to rise higher than that of the gods they worship, human advance must always have been powerfully limited by systems of theology. We can easily understand how little individual liberty could have been promoted by the wide-spread belief in a deity who was conceived of as a tyrant; and why it is that even to-day the most uncompromising upholder of the necessity of divine retribution looks in vain for popular warmth in the cause of prison reform to an age which accepted Dante's description of hell as a plausible account of the attitude of the Deity towards mankind.

The most serious feature of the Christian system has been its doctrine of the inherent depravity of human nature. Through ages unlighted by a gleam of our modern knowledge, this thought of the natural, inevitable wickedness of man must have weighed on the human conscience like a nightmare. It would be difficult to over-estimate the effect for evil of the sense of sin maintained for centuries as a principle of human conduct. A few heroic souls here and there may have been spurred, through untold agonies, to what has been called "the higher life;" but the great mass of the people open to religious influences must have been held at the level of this low idea of their possibilities. A suggestion thus maintained with the whole power of the church and the force of public opinion could not but tend to realize itself. Belief in the wickedness of an individual or a community is psychologically not distinguishable from the expectation of wickedness, and the gradual moulding of the mind to familiarity with that expectation is an influence which only intellectual and moral giants could resist. Remembering, therefore, the tremendous power of social suggestion in the religious field, where the teaching of the church is reinforced by divine authority; recalling the sluggish moral life of the past, the comparatively recent emergence of mankind into tolerably humane social conditions, there seems far too much reason to fear that the pessimism of the historic religions has proved for many the high road, not to spiritual health, but to moral paralysis.

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The power of the minister of religion to promote the more discouraging views of human nature is unquestionable. That he is usually a pessimist *sans le vouloir* does not alter the fact that his interests lie in the direction of a robust belief in the reality of moral evil, of a saintly desire to hold it up to public reprobation. It is his function to pursue wickedness through all its disguises, to drag it from its lurking places, to bring it to the bar of righteousness for the good of mankind, the amelioration of the world. The motives of such a man are the highest. Yet his openness of mind to individual depravity and collective wrong-doing is to be measured, not only by aim, but also by result; not only by the good it may do, but also by its power to perpetuate evil through the potent influences of suggestion. It is in many ways useful to proclaim the ubiquitous presence of temptation, the ineradicable tendency of fallen, unaided man to yield thereto; yet the process is one calculated neither to supply the over-sensitive, self-tortured saint with the healthy calmness which his nature needs, nor to relieve the hardened sinner from the influence of the authoritative recognition of sin as his normal condition. That Satan is to be trodden down under our feet is a proposition which commands the immediate assent of all good people, but its constant reiteration through ages of the life of a church is apt to teach rather the permanence of the Satanic element than to hold out the prospect of its early, or even of its possible, elimination. And as antagonisms, whether physical or moral, are mutually self-involved and self-supporting, it may be wise for the over-pessimistic minister to ask himself how far his own warfare has gone towards stimulating that same "The world, the flesh, and the devil" to which his church undoubtedly owes something of its opportunities for aggressive virtue in the past.

There are certainly signs of a new order. To-day, cheerful influences radiate from pulpits out of which the doctrine of eternal damnation was once uttered in no uncertain tone. It is a far cry from Calvinism to Universalism. But the suggestion of dependence is still conveyed, even by preachers the most optimistic. For, much as a clergyman may insist on the

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final appeal to conscience,—much as he may point to the Scriptures as the common source, open to all, of knowledge and authority in religious matters,—there is gradually set up between him and his parishioner a relation that does not tend to qualify the latter as his own spiritual authority. The superior ease for both of such a relation is undoubted; yet the acquired habit of being sermonized at the end of every week into patches of goodness during the next seven days is a process which must be supplemented by much independence of character in the listener, if it is to lead in the direction of moral spontaneity.

Physicians constitute another class of men whose influence is pessimistic. As the clergyman is interested in the discovery and removal of spiritual evil, so the interests of the doctor lie in the diagnosis and elimination of corporeal evil. To say that the sudden and complete elimination of bodily ailments would work havoc with the physician's income is a truth that carries with it no reproach to a body of men who from the beginning have been distinguished for their unselfishness in the service of humanity. Doctors have a moral interest in the banishment of disease higher than that of their social position in the world; as a class, they allow no pecuniary considerations to stand between them and the relief of suffering. Yet disease is a necessity to them, first, by reason of the professional victories which it enables them to win, and next, for the ethical satisfaction afforded by the opportunities it brings of ministering to the deepest needs of their fellowmen. What is more, the very occupation of a doctor helps to promote in a community the belief in the reality of its diseases, as well as to confirm it in the view that disease is a permanent element of its life.

But we may go still deeper. As there is an occult realm of spiritual things which, passing ordinary comprehension, needs to be interpreted by an expert; so the domain of disease is one whose lore can only be reached by the average man through the physician. While, therefore, in the religious field men grow dependent upon the clergyman for knowledge on such abstruse themes as God, heaven, immortality; so the

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mass of the people in a community acquire a similar relation of dependence towards the doctors whom they habitually consult. That physicians are not financially interested in removing this dependence upon their ministrations is obvious. Friendly in an especial degree to popular enlightenment, their efforts are not exactly directed towards the qualifying of the average man for the medical care of his own body. As from the clergyman's point of view a man need not necessarily be his own spiritual adviser, so, from the point of view of the physician, the prudent member of society does well to avoid the risk of aspiring to become his own physiological and pathological expert.

The reality of the effect here described becomes more apparent when we recognize the large part played in disease by the mental element. A man knowing little or nothing of his own body—with no expert knowledge of the internal organs and processes by which his life is maintained—is easily made afraid by even slight disturbances of their normal working. For the untutored of all classes the realm of pathology is peopled by forms as terrible as ever haunted the religious imagination in the crudest days of theological speculation. It is unquestionable, as shown not only by the importance of the patent medicine trade, but also by medical advertisements in newspapers, that large numbers in every community pass their lives in a state of almost morbid anxiety regarding their bodily condition. A great number of so-called ailments have no existence save in the imagination of the patient himself; a great many more are of so slight a character as to need for their removal simply the mental cure, which, in perfect good faith, the druggist and the doctor so often co-operate to bring about. Even in cases of some seriousness, the function of the physician is admittedly that of "aiding nature." What aiding nature really means is sufficiently indicated by La Fontaine's fable of the effects respectively produced on their patients by the two physicians, Tant Pis and Tant Mieux. The regular call, the soothing word, the formally administered medicine, plenty of light, fresh air in abundance, judiciously chosen nourishment, these constitute, for a large proportion

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of patients, the whole thaumaturgy of the doctor who really knows his business. None the less is the physician bound to believe in the reality of the great bulk of the ailments that are brought to him for his personal attention. Given, therefore, the fact that ailments may be produced in a healthy body by the mere suggestion of them, one hazards nothing in saying that the Tant Pis attitude in disease, like the pessimistic attitude in religion, tends to realize itself alike in the individual and the community.

In the various moral agencies which modern societies maintain, the scope for the pessimistic attitude is enormous. And here, owing to the publicity gained, the influence of suggestion is all-pervasive. The tendency set up in impressionable minds to imitate an action or course of conduct powerfully realized has been shown in the most serious of the forms of evil with which great cities have to deal. All of us remember the story of the soldiers who committed suicide one after another in the same sentry-box owing to the suggestion given by the first act of homicide there by one of their number. We know, too, from the annals of English jurisprudence, that when minor offences were visited with the death penalty, men would go from witnessing a hanging and incur the same penalty by the commission of the same offence. That the powerfully realized knowledge of crime tends in weak minds to the commission of crime is now a psychological commonplace. And though men are less impelled to these imitative acts under the improved conditions of modern communities, the power of suggesting evil by the public punishment or denunciation of it still remains. There are men and women living, for example, who trace their first fall towards intemperance to the curiosity and fascination aroused at home by the absolute prohibition there of intoxicating liquors. The public condemnation of drinking habits, again, with the elaborate machinery which has been called into existence for their suppression, is to some extent, at any rate, the feeder of the very evil which it is sought to eliminate. We have only to recall the notorious effects of the public prohibition of indecent literature to be convinced that open

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antagonism, by means such as carry the suggestion of it all over the community, is neither the wisest nor the most efficacious means of suppression.

It is here difficult, moreover, to avoid the thought of a close connection between pessimism in moral matters and the zeal which is so often shown in this branch of social reform. The belief that Providence has committed the moral policing of the world to their care amounts with some almost to a monomania; and when such people, often the best in the community, once fairly take the universe on their shoulders, consequences more or less disastrous are inevitable. We get then the spasms of virtue to which all communities are liable; but we get also that stimulus to wickedness which follows the wide-spread and authoritative expectation of it. And in the result we are once more reminded that a population which is taught to depend for its moral stimulus upon the constant nagging of good people who mean it well, can have little of that spontaneous motion towards right conduct which is the life and soul of all morality worthy of the name.

There is, finally, the pessimism of the classes engaged in the maintenance of social order. We have here two branches,—legislative and executive,—and both of them, as functionaries, if not as individuals, naturally incline to a gloomy view of mankind. The tendency of law-giving is certainly not in the direction of the discovery of how many laws can be dispensed with: it is rather towards keeping pace with civilization by the making of new crimes. A good legislator cannot take chances: he must not, at least, err on the side of a too confiding trust in human nature. He can no more afford to believe in the absolute moral purity of mankind than the physician in its bodily, or the clergyman in its spiritual, health. A similar bent of mind is to be looked for in the police-officer. We need not, of course, see an unreasoning Javert in every gendarme we meet; nor is it necessary to attribute to our *agent de sureté* any of that belief in the ubiquitousness of crime which has been burlesqued in the ridicule cast upon the bogus detective agencies. Just as legislators are often optimistic in their individual capacity, so police-officers may

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be found who are themselves the severest critics of the system they administer. It is none the less true that as a class the executive officers of the law are not optimistic on the subject of human nature. Familiar with the frailties of men, and knowing bad men better than good, the myrmidon of the law would be more than human if he did not tend to see in mankind its worst rather than its best possibilities. And as he is often called upon to act in a quasi-judicial capacity, affecting people not yet accused of crime, or just delivered from its punishment, his official attitude may not be without its effect on his decisions. Without being interested in the perpetuation of wrong-doing, he none the less belongs to a class which finds its opportunities of professional activity in the constant recrudescence of the evil possibilities of human nature.

More serious still in its bearing on people convicted of crime is suggestion which comes from society itself. The one hope of reforming the criminal is that of arresting his progress from a temporary to a permanent anti-social attitude, —the hope of preventing him from going over irrevocably into the ranks of the enemy,—the hope of convincing him that he belongs, not to the forces of evil, but to those of good. Now it is this hope which social suggestion is continually working to defeat. Between the man convicted of crime and the rest of humanity society thrusts an enormous gulf. It teaches the convict that he is henceforth separate from his fellow-men by a total difference of kind. The first suggestion of this difference is conveyed by the atmosphere of the prison. Here the evil is not so much that a man comes into contact with other criminals who may be worse than himself, but that he has over and around him those suggestions of evil which ever work to realize themselves in his character. The gaol focuses on its unhappy occupant something at least of the shadow of the social discrimination outside. A still deeper gloom awaits him beyond the walls of the prison. His formal punishment over, he goes forth into society only to feel the crushing force of the new judgment he has earned by expiating his crime. The world sees in him only potentialities for evil: of what avail, against the mark it has authoritatively set

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on him, the germs of good that are within? Is it wonder that with nobody to believe in him he should lose faith in himself, or that the work of suggestion begun in the prison should realize itself in the stress of the hostile social attitude outside? A push from one, a kick from another, everywhere pitiless ostracism by the well-to-do and fortunate, and the result which each would shrink from compassing is brought about by all,—despair, suicide, ending in a pauper's grave; or a reckless, hard-hearted criminal, newly manufactured by society, to be a source of evil and a permanent charge on the state while he lives.

Enough has now been said to show that the pessimistic attitude is injurious to social progress, not because it recognizes the evil, but because it ignores the good there is in men. The masses of mankind have lived in the past under the influence of a social hypnosis which, denying to them all but a scant importance in the scheme of things, has made individual conduct a matter of little importance to the individual. We read of philosophical systems under whose teaching the stars have become

> Tyrants in your iron skies,
> Innumerable, pitiless, passionless eyes,
> Cold fires, yet with power to brand and burn
> His nothingness into man.

More deep reaching in its effect on human character has been the influence by which, relegated to classes and positions in the social hierarchy, men have been morally degraded. Were it possible to formulate the psychology of anti-social attitudes, it would be found that the individual has been led into them not by inordinate vanity, by overweening self-conceit, but by the low idea the social unit has been taught to form of himself. As a new attitude of society towards the man whom it notices or honors powerfully affects his view of himself,—leads to the self-recognition of possibilities of good in which he had never before believed,—so such a new attitude towards whole classes as shall raise them in their own estimation must act potently to the promotion of social welfare. Even the success of work like that of the college settlements,

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the Salvation Army, and of various philanthropic agencies, may be traced, not only to the material aid rendered, but also to the attitude which conveys the stimulus of a sense of personal worth even to the most neglected.

The same is true in the field of moral reform. The great need of the time is not the sense of sin, already over-emphasized, but a knowledge in men of their higher and better selves. In past ages society has been trying to get the best from individuals by expecting their worst; through centuries of psychological darkness regarding the conditions of human progress it has been endeavoring to promote social advance by means of moral degradation. It is only now that we are getting glimpses of a truer method. We are learning from the study of social suggestion, not only that we cannot improve the world by laying our chief emphasis on its evil, but that we shall equally fail to ameliorate human nature if we withhold from it the subtle encouragement of our belief in its inherent good. A new instrument of progress, unknown to the ages of exaggerated individualism, is now within our reach, and we are to use it, not to make moral automata of men, but to awaken in them the power, so far as may be, of a spontaneously moral life; not to accustom them to the moral slavery of dependence on the community for the impulse towards virtue, but to stimulate them to the self-development of whatever is best in human character and conduct. When society has learned how to utilize the great force at its command for the real ends of social progress, individuals and communities alike will find their strength in a mutual faith that shall remove mountains.

EDMUND NOBLE.

BOSTON, MASS.

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DISCUSSIONS.

MR. HERBERT SPENCER ON INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTIONS.*

The Editors of this JOURNAL have already expressed the feeling with which philosophical students, of whatever school, must approach the volume which contains the conclusion and consummation of the immense task Mr. Spencer set before himself six-and-thirty years ago,—the coping-stone of his philosophical labors and the fulfilment of the purpose of his life. It may be that Mr. Spencer is himself the last of the great system-builders: it may even be said that the philosophy of evolution itself discountenances the construction of systems, and that the real value of the Synthetic Philosophy lies not so much in its direct applicability to the detail of experience as in its power of giving a stimulus and inspiration to the several sciences. On the other hand, if a philosopher has found a comprehensive formula which he considers adequate to the explanation of any form of life or existence, he must endeavor to realize and verify its sufficiency by reviewing the variety of experience in the light of such a general principle. That in so doing a philosopher should make mistakes of detail does not invalidate the worth or adequacy of his formula. Hegel's philosophy of history and philosophy of nature are not by themselves sufficient to discredit the Hegelian philosophy. All we can demand is that the example of the method should not constitute a *primâ facie* case against the principle; and, further, that the interpretation attempted of different sets of facts should not be such as to obscure their specific character or distort their peculiar significance. The highly generalized formula of the cosmic process, if it is nothing more than a μάταιον εἶδος, must be applied to different subject-matters in the modified and appropriate form that is in each case demanded. The attempt to explain everything in the light of a comprehensive formula is at once a merit and a temptation; it is a method particularly liable to the defects of its qualities. Mr. Spencer is nothing if not synoptic, and the tendency to "think things together" may easily get in ad-

* "The Principles of Sociology." By Herbert Spencer. Vol. III. (Part VI., Ecclesiastical Institutions; Part VII., Professional Institutions; Part VIII., Industrial Institutions.) London: Williams & Norgate.

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vance of the equally imperative requirement to think things out. The idea of the unity and continuity of existence is and should be a regulative idea of science; but it may be purchased too cheaply, as it certainly may be applied too hastily. The spirit of analysis asserts itself against premature unification; as Aristotle puts it, there is always the temptation to "unify too much," so that unity comes to represent vagueness of analogy rather than identity in difference. The ideas of "organism" and "natural selection" are at all times suggestive: they have been applied to ethics with the best, but also with the worst, results. Properly applied, that is, with the modification required by the nature of the facts, they have broadened the study of morals and of society, and they have thrown light upon the explanation of ethical, social, and economic institutions. But the transference of such ideas from biology to sociology may mean an arrest rather than an advance of thought, and may result in mere vagueness or confusion, or even falsification. The "organic" view of society is valuable negatively and positively; chiefly, perhaps, negatively, as fatal to certain mechanical ideas of the relation between the state and the individual and corresponding political fallacies. But the conception has been used not only in a way to obscure the difference between a moral and a physiological organism, but to falsify the nature of society itself; and this attempt to conjure with "organism" and "natural selection" has been carried so far that philosophers have been tempted to deny that these conceptions have any value at all, and to cry, "Back to the pre-Spencerian moralists." The truth seems to lie somewhere between.

The real value of the application of such categories to moral ideas lies in the fact that they not only broaden but deepen the conception of morality itself. "Selection" works in the sphere of the moral and social life; but the instructive thing is the way in which the application of such an idea makes us realize the distinction, even more than the similarity, between "moral" and "natural" facts. That a social or moral fact has a physiological basis, and that this basis cannot be neglected, goes without saying; but this does not make such a fact a physiological fact, pure and simple. We want to know what further attribute it is which makes a fact moral or social. Society is an "organism;" but the social organism exists in the feeling, idea, or will of the individuals composing the community. Social progress is by "selection;" but the conscious, deliberate selection pursued by a progressive society is related to "natural selection" at least as much by way of contrast as of likeness. And

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so with phrases like "survival of the fittest:" the fittest in a moral order is more like the antithesis than the counterpart of the fittest in the physical order. And the danger of the transference of vague, uncritical, and unanalyzed conceptions to spheres in which their precise application has not been thought out, is that they at once become party catch-words or unmeaning symbols. There is a serious danger in an over-issue of this kind of inconvertible currency, and it easily becomes depreciated. Perhaps the nearest duty of criticism is to show not so much how these ideas apply to ethics and society, but how they do not. For it must be acknowledged that the tendency of Mr. Spencer's method (whether in his own hands or in those of his disciples), however suggestive and stimulating, has been detrimental to the positive method,—the method of analysis by appropriate conceptions. It would seem as if, as was said of Hegel's dialectic, the Synthetic Philosophy had to be done over again and from the beginning. Whatever may be said in disparagement of pre-evolutionary moralists or politico-philosophers, we sometimes feel that we have to return to them, if only to realize what a moral or political fact is, or if only to be reminded of the "phenomena" that have to be explained. Compare the opening of Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics" with the "Republic" of Plato or the "Ethics" of Aristotle, or with any great English moral or political treatise selected at random. The "biological" moralists seem to start at such an immense distance off human life, as we know it, that we find it difficult to realize their starting-point or the data they are analyzing.

Mr. Spencer's method has a deceptive facility, just because it lends itself to an inherent tendency of the human mind to find the explanation of something difficult in the terms of something else which is easier and more familiar. To a certain extent this is characteristic not only of all thinking, but of profound thinking. The power to see analogies through and in differences is an accepted evidence of philosophical power, as it is the acknowledged sign of the poet and the man of science. In a sense, moreover, all argument is more or less analogical, so far as it discovers points of identity between partially different things; but the specific value of analogical argument is of the lowest kind, just because it may vary from the most convincing proof to the most insignificant resemblance. Its whole value depends, first, on the amount and kind of identity; secondly, on the degree to which the person who uses it is clear as to its nature. In the form of an illustration of one

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thing by another, it arises out of the necessity of human thinking. In one way or other the human mind always helps itself to understand the world and itself by some kind of illustration, by seeing a thing in something else which happens to be more familiar. Just as the Greeks tried to realize moral ideas through art or geometry, the Jews through parables from nature, so the modern mind has recourse to the animal and vegetable world. So far as this tendency represents an attempt to realize the underlying unity and continuity of life, it is a gain in horizon, and is a safeguard against stiffness and narrowness of conception. But what it gains in wholeness of view, it tends to lose in analysis and discrimination. The tendency, therefore, legitimate and even indispensable as it is up to a certain point, is beset with great dangers, more particularly the danger of forgetting that the identity found, and rightly found, is an identity in difference. One of two results follow: either the symbol sinks into a mere symbol and becomes ultimately unmeaning, or the symbol gets substituted for that which it symbolizes. The conception of society as an organism is an illustration of both kinds of result. It follows that the synthetic method must be safeguarded by the analytical instinct, else it becomes an incitement to mental indolence or mental confusion, and may issue in results which are either too vague to be significant, or so abstract as to be positively false and misleading.

To apply these general observations to the volume before us, I will content myself by passing in review the last book ("Industrial Institutions"), partly because it is the only part which is new, partly because of the intrinsic interest of the subject, partly on account of the light it throws upon the claims somewhat confidently advanced in recent times on behalf of general sociology. It seems to me a striking illustration of the strength and the weakness, more particularly the weakness, of Mr. Spencer's method. The peculiar fallacies to which the method is liable are here more conspicuous and recognizable than elsewhere, and to this we must add (after Mr. Spencer) not only the philosophical but the personal bias, not only "intellectual" but "emotional" difficulties. Mr. Spencer is a "philosophical radical" almost before he is an evolutionist, and much of what Mr. Spencer writes about the church, trades-unionists, political and social tendencies, seems much more characteristic of Mr. Spencer than of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. Moreover, Mr. Spencer is writing about a subject-matter which is not only itself being continually modified and developed, but in regard to

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which special research and analysis has been peculiarly active and progressive. Mr. Spencer does not seem to have availed himself either of fresh facts or fresh information: it is true that he has read some recent books, but more to confirm than to correct preconceived ideas. For instance, he takes from Mr. and Mrs. Webb's "Trade-Unionism," or Mrs. Webb's "Co-operative Movement," the few "cuttings" that seem to suit his ideas, while he contents himself with regarding Bellamy's "Looking Backwards" as a sufficient guide to socialism.

The method as applied by Mr. Spencer to "Industrial Institutions" has all the defects of its qualities. There is the tendency (familiar to students of Mr. Spencer) to generalize from a single, and not too carefully analyzed, instance; there is the tendency to strain analogies and discover "parallels;" there is the tendency to generalize away the distinctive characters of specific phenomena; there is the tendency to substitute for "the subtlety of nature" fixed and set categories, resulting in unreal antitheses or alternatives; and, quite generally, there is the tendency to press abstractions and ignore distinctions, to think things "together" rather than to think them "out," and to think them together under highly generalized and abstract conceptions, or conceptions which are used without due regard to the conditions and limitations which make them appropriate.

I take at hazard some illustrations of results. Mr. Spencer connects the recent growth and spread of socialistic theories in England with the recrudescence of "militancy," and the reasoning by which he arrives at this familiar but curious "parallelism" is something of this kind. Socialism and militancy are "parallel" types of coerciveness and regimentation: as sufficient proof, if it were wanted, the coincidence of extreme militarism and extreme socialism is conspicuous in Germany. Having thus added a color of historical probability to an abstract generalization, Mr. Spencer boldly proceeds to verify it by an appeal to modern France and England. It is to be noted that Mr. Spencer does not seek an illustration from the Australasian colonies,—certainly not a very favorable illustration of the parallelism asserted. The whole position turns upon the conventional and, I may add, perfectly arbitrary representation of modern socialism as a system of quasi-military "regimentation." This is more false than true of German, as it is demonstrably untrue of English, socialism. There is certainly a connection between the revival of militancy and the spread of

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socialism. Socialism is quite generally a more and more conscious revolt against the monetary influence that expresses itself in militant finance, as in other phenomena of "commercial morality;" but that socialism and militarism should be represented as "parallel" forms of "the law of rhythm," or of backward oscillation, can only be counted to the perversities of *a priori* reasoning. This is an extreme instance of the extent to which Mr. Spencer's analogical method may miss the facts: the idea that the movement towards socialism may be a recoil from individualism could find no room in Mr. Spencer's philosophy.

Mr. Spencer devotes a chapter to "competition." His imagination is stimulated by the idea of the natural "organization of labor" in which competition results: "the interdependence of businesses" is a supreme case of the "law of integration,"—of progress from indefinite homogeneity to definite heterogeneity. The idea is familiar, though the language is imposing. But a more specific analysis of the operation of commercial competition might show that "the integration" is much more apparent than real; that it involves not only economic waste but economic precariousness, and that it tends to annihilate rather than to extend freedom of competition and equality of industrial opportunity. If we are to explain *obscurum per obscurius*, the law of integration might be applied to the growth of monopoly and combination even more fitly than to the ramification of business. "Integration" has actually been applied by students of Mr. Spencer to the way in which a railway company tends to become its own manufacturer, and quite generally to any process by which the middleman or contractor is eliminated. Anyhow, the tendency of the modern organization of industry seems to be the reverse of the condition contemplated by Mr. Spencer. Monopoly encroaches more and more upon competition between individual producers, whether under the form of monopolies of efficiency (as Krupp or Armstrong) or of local services, or of combination (as in syndicates and trusts). The organization of industry is, in fact, becoming more and more conscious, and the operation of chance "natural" competition becoming more and more restricted. To illustrate the pure action of "natural" competition, we have to go to industries which are in a condition of arrested development,—industries in which the phenomena of "sweating" and low living are conspicuous. The growth of monopoly, both in productive and distributive agencies, does not mean the elimination of competition, but only of a kind

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or form that is more rudimentary. The action of competition is modified, or even altered in form, but not suspended. In many cases it is shifted from competition between individual producers to competition between consumers and producers, or between different groups of producers; or, again, it yields to that form of emulation which is only another side of social co-operation. There is no monopoly, again, however favorably situated, which is altogether above or without any "natural" check from economic forces: the law of monopoly price, if less determinate than that of free competition, is not wholly indeterminate. Mr. Spencer, however, does not follow economic development beyond the point at which it ceases to be an apparent illustration of the general processes required by the law of evolution. He does not, for instance, carry the stage of "compound capitals" beyond the form of the ordinary joint-stock company (of which he gives an excellent characterization). The tendency of monopoly to encroach upon competition would presumably be set down to the "law of rhythm" or reaction; for what seems a forward movement to the student of industrialism is just what the philosopher of evolution tends, or feels bound, to regard as a form of "return movement."

The abstractness of Mr. Spencer's method is, perhaps, even better illustrated by his peculiarly rigid views of what I may call social alternatives. Mutual exclusiveness is a bad instrument of social, or, indeed, any logic. To Mr. Spencer, industrial organization must be either "voluntary" or "compulsory;" whereas it would be truer to say that it must be both. The social state must mean either "self-ownership" or "ownership by others;" whereas it would be truer to say that the social individual is both a means and an end. The idea of mutually exclusive alternatives is quite unreal as applied to the actualities of organic human life. It is not only fatal, it seems to me, to any concreteness of view, but it results in quite futile and unmeaning abstractions. Socialism, again, is regarded as a form of "ownership by others." This may be true of paternal or state socialism (as understood in Germany), but is eminently untrue of what socialism properly and really signifies,—that is, the principle of industrial democracy logically realized in practice. But Mr. Spencer seems to think that even the state is something not ourselves; that democracy is as much a form of "ownership by others" as an oligarchy; and that all "government" stands for "conservatism and officialism." Just so far as this is the case, industrial democracy is incompletely realized. It

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seems as difficult to get out of the philosophic, as out of the popular, mind the illusion that socialism has any "elective affinity" to bureaucracy. Socialism is coextensive with the whole idea of democracy and self-government, and yet most of the opposition to Socialist administration arises from the representation of it as only another form of oligarchic bureaucracy, with added weaknesses and disabilities of its own. Even such a generally intelligent student of modern socialism as Mr. Gonner permits himself to remark that socialism is independent of democracy. Socialistic administration proper would be no more "bureaucratic" than any genuine workman's co-operative store or productive society.

It would really seem as if the metaphysics of evolution have effaced the very idea and point of evolution itself. Anything less historical or evolutionary than Mr. Spencer's representation of "state interference"—a phrase which in a general sense is not only obsolete but meaningless—or of modern socialism it would be difficult to conceive. To Mr. Spencer there is only one type of a social "institution;" but it may be fairly said that nothing is less typical of modern socialism than Mr. Spencer's type of socialism. Modern socialism is based upon the idea of as complete a realization of political democracy as possible, as a necessary condition of "so socializing the industries of the community as to make the livelihood of the people entirely independent of private capitalism." ("Report on Fabian Policy.") Or, again,—

"The Fabian Society does not suggest that the state should monopolize industry as against private enterprise or individual initiative *further than may be necessary to make the livelihood of the people and their access to the sources of production completely independent of both.* The freedom of individuals to test the social value of new inventions; to initiate improved methods of production; to anticipate and lead public enterprise in catering for new social wants; to practise all arts, crafts, and professions independently; in short, to complete the social organization by adding the resources of private activity and judgment to those of public venture, is, subject to the above conditions, as highly valued by the Fabian Society as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or any other article in the charter of popular liberties." *

From all which it would appear that Mr. Spencer's conception of the socialist *régime* would be the stultification and not the fulfilment of the socialist idea. If socialism is worthy of so much

* Fabian Tract, No. 70, "Report on Fabian Policy," etc. The italics are mine.

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notice and attention, then it is worth understanding,—*a fortiori*, if it is thought worthy of refutation; and it may be said that the way, and the only way, to the understanding of socialism is the understanding of democracy. Many of the fallacies that beset the understanding of socialism are just those that beset the understanding of democracy.

All "government action"—let alone socialism—is, again, to Mr. Spencer, "restriction:" it may be with just as good reason be described as "liberation." Nothing is gained, and certainly a good deal is lost, by this method of making a partial aspect of a thing stand for the whole thing, which is just what we mean by abstraction (in a bad sense). But, still worse, "the restrictionist is the same in nature, whether he forbids free trade in commodities or whether he forbids free trade in labor." It is somewhat remarkable that the last word of Evolution should be so curiously belated. The distinction which Mr. Spencer regards as no distinction has been emphasized by the logic of facts; it has become even a strictly economic consideration that the exchange of human services is different from the exchange of immaterial commodities. A bale of cotton is not made worse by being bought in the cheapest market, but can the same be said of a human producer? But no: to Mr. Spencer one kind of state action is the same as any other kind, and a partial aspect of state action is the essence or idea of it at all times and under all circumstances, and whatever portion or extent of the community the "state" represents; and one kind of "regulation" or "restriction" is the same as any other kind. Is this the last result of "the philosophy of experience"? Surely, Bacon seems to have written the greater part of the "Novum Organum" in vain; and too true, it seems, that Burke is more quoted than read, and the "historic spirit" more often invoked than obeyed. Even that "blessed word" relativity seems to be *vox et præterea nihil.*

It will, however, be more interesting to review Mr. Spencer's judgment upon trades-unionism, co-operation, and socialism, as also his conclusions as to the present state and future destiny of industrialism.

Mr. Spencer makes no attempt to distinguish and co-ordinate the functions of these movements in the labor movement as a whole,*

* Compare and contrast Mr. Hobhouse's excellent and suggestive treatment in his book on "The Labor Movement."

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and (partly in consequence) his idea of them is curiously conventional and stereotyped.

Mr. Spencer on Trade-Unions.—In spite of the indebtedness which he records to Mr. and Mrs. Webb's "History of Trade-Unionism," Mr. Spencer is impelled by his method to find "various parallelisms" which "prove identity of nature between ancient and modern trade combinations." The "parallelisms" in question are quite superficial and insignificant compared with the divergencies: the function of craft-guilds in the mediæval and of trade-unions in the modern industrial system is anything but "parallel." Mr. Spencer is disposed to allow to trade-unions a relative justification as "natural to a passing phase of social evolution." He regards them, in fact, as provisional institutions, partly necessary, partly useful, and partly educational. But it cannot be said that the evolutionist philosophy throws the illumination we might expect on the economic significance of trade-unions. It exhibits a "return movement" to the venerable, but somewhat obsolete, argument against the influence of trade-unions upon wages. The argument depends partly on the treatment of labor as a mere commodity, which carries with it the failure to recognize the influence of wages on the standard of life, and the reciprocal influence of the standard of life upon wages; partly on the assumption that an increase of wages can only come out of an increase of price or decrease of profit, whereas it could be shown that, if it is followed by increased efficiency of production, an increase of wages would diminish cost and price, and may actually increase, or, at any rate, not diminish the profits of employers; and, lastly, it depends on the assumption that the policy of trade-unions essentially consists, not in maintaining and gradually advancing the standard of life, but in generally "forcing up" wages, and therefore the price of products, so that "the trade-union policy, carried out to the full, has the effect that every kind of wage-earner is taxed for the benefit of every other kind of wage-earner." The economics of the question are difficult and complicated, but Mr. Spencer does not seem to have followed the evolution of economic theory, or, indeed, of trade-union action. Nor, again, does he consider the trade-union method and principle of "collective" bargaining, or of boards of conciliation and judicial arbitration, or the legislative influence of trade-unions, all matters of modern importance. Finally, Mr. Spencer carries his refusal to distinguish between "services" and "commodities" to the extent of asserting that the underbidding of

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a unionist by a non-unionist, and the underbidding of one tradesman by another, are "transactions completely parallel in their essentials, of which the one is regarded (*sc.* by trade-unionists) as utterly illegitimate and the other as quite legitimate." There seems to be certainly something singularly unprogressive in the philosophy of evolution. There are cases in which either transaction might be equally illegitimate; but the implication of Mr. Spencer's position is only another form of the purely commercial view of human labor. Consistently with such a view, he expresses elsewhere his approval of letting out work by a kind of Dutch auction.

Mr. Spencer on Co-operation.—If Mr. Spencer's account falls short of the true inwardness of trade-unionism, it cannot be said that his appreciation of industrial co-operation is more adequate or significant. Here, again, he has adopted Mrs. Webb's "Co-operative Movement" as a "compendious statement of essentials;" but has not followed her treatment of "co-operative consumption" as the typical form—a kind of rude and initial outline—of the principle of industrial democracy, or of the organization of production by the consumers as opposed to the "profit-making" employer or middleman. Mr. Spencer regards the co-operative store as nothing more than a form of economical purchase, and, following the conventional tradition, confines the strict meaning and proper significance of co-operation to "co-operative production." In a passing reference to "the Christian Socialists," Mr. Spencer justifies their appeal to Christian teaching in the following statement—characteristic, perhaps, but sufficiently remarkable for a philosopher:

> "Though they did not propose to 'take no thought for the morrow,' or enjoin as a duty 'sell all thou hast and give to the poor,' yet their conception of social organization on a co-operative basis was pervaded by kindred disregard of economic principle and essential facts of human nature."

As Mr. Spencer is bound to believe in the economic harmonies of competition, he does not consider whether competition of the co-operative type is less precarious than the competition of the master-and-workman type of industry. On the other hand, he does not dwell upon the democratic aspect of co-operative production, though he seems to recognize it by implication; nor does he show that the principle of "labor association" or "copartnership" is much wider than the form of the self-governing workshop. Treating it under this form, he notes the obvious difficulties,—the "dif-

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ficulty of business management, adequately intelligent and honest" (a "chronic" difficulty, Mr. Spencer adds in a more characteristic than evolutionary spirit), and "the difficulty of preserving internal harmony." He has himself a scheme of "self-governing combination," which he thinks would meet the second difficulty: it is a scheme, briefly put, of co-operation carried on by piece-work. Such an arrangement conforms to the law of progressive freedom of choice, for "the workman's activity becomes entirely voluntary;" to the law of "progress from status to contract," for it is throughout based upon contract; and, lastly, it conforms to "the general law of species-life," and the law implied in the conception of justice,—"the law that reward should be proportionate to merit." It is at least doubtful how far, on the supposition of a *régime* of commercial competition, this system could be regarded as a pure instance of any of these "laws." Mr. Spencer himself recognizes that its practicality would depend on character; but, inasmuch as the co-operative is superior to the "master-and-workman" type of industrial organization, he trusts to the operation of natural selection for its ultimate prevalence.

This is a curiously unconscious recognition of the point of social democracy, and there is more than a family likeness between the results of evolution, according to Mr. Spencer, and the conclusions of such an avowedly socialist historian and speculator as Achille Leria. If Mr. Spencer had given as much attention to the substance as he has to the outward form of socialism, he might have discovered that he is a greater socialist than he knows. Socialism, no more than co-operative production, involves the abolition of the wage system, except so far as it implies the dependence of the wage-earner on the private possessor of land and capital. To quote again from the Report on Fabian policy: "Socialism means the organization and conduct of the necessary industries of the country, and the appropriation of all forms of economic rent of land and capital, by the nation as a whole, through the most suitable public authorities,—parochial, municipal, provincial, and central." The area of co-operation might vary from the smallest local association to that of the nation itself, and so far as it is genuinely democratic in method it embodies the idea of socialism: difference of scale would only mean difference of degree. Mr. Spencer, however, seems to contemplate a system of competitive "workshops," in competition not only with one another, but with "private capitalism." It is difficult to see how such a form of industry offers

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the prospect of a general economic solution; nor does it seem likely that the realization of industrial democracy will be advanced so much by "voluntary" as by parochial, municipal, and "state" socialism. It would be difficult, however, to overestimate the educational value of co-operative production, or its general suggestiveness; and it is certainly capable of further and of wider application. The limits which are set to its extension are such as are imposed not by human nature, but by an economic system which sets insuperable barriers to the organization of society on the basis of labor. Co-operative production is a part, but not the whole, of socialism.

Mr. Spencer's Scheme of Co-operation.—The point, again, of Mr. Spencer's industrial scheme seems to lie in its idea of remuneration by piece-work. It is doubtful whether such a principle is workable in practice or justifiable in theory. It seems to be an echo of the right of any person, or group of persons, to "the entire product of their labor." As against such an idea, socialism sets the idea of industrial solidarity. "It recognizes that wealth is social in its origin and must be social in its distribution, since the evolution of industry has made it impossible to distinguish the particular contribution that each person makes to the common product, or to ascertain its value." It is only the abstractness of Mr. Spencer's "law of justice" that gives it the appearance of justice; and as an ideal of individualistic justice it seems to fall short of social justice. Its logical realization would be not only fatal to the "co-operative spirit," but would tend to weaken the protection which labor, as a whole, has gained in the establishment of standard wages and trade-union conditions of industry.* Moreover, it suggests a false view of wages or property,—the true view being, as Mr. Bosanquet admirably expresses it, that "wages or property, one's share of the produce of society, is not there to reward one for doing work, but either to give one work to do, or to enable one to do it; and it is by that standard alone that its adequacy must be judged" ("Essays and Addresses," p. 65).

Mr. Spencer on Socialism.—Mr. Spencer's conception of social-

* It may be mentioned that Mr. Spencer's suggestion first saw the light in *Labour Copartnership*, a journal devoted to the cause of co-operative "production," based on the copartnership of the workers; but it was unfavorably received, partly on theoretical, partly on practical, grounds. It was also severely handled by Kropotkin in *Freedom*.

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ism is, as already implied, a crucial instance of the fixed ideas under which he regards industrial institutions: the prophet of evolution recognizes no evolution in socialism. He adopts the conventional idea of the socialistic *régime* as "simply another form of the bureaucratic *régime*," but does not explain the antagonism of German social democracy to "state socialism" and officialdom. He does not even too carefully distinguish socialism from certain forms of communism. "At the same time that it is biologically fatal, the doctrine of the socialists is psychologically absurd." Biologically fatal, because, by proposing to extend the *régime* of the family to the whole community, socialism favors "the fostering of the weak by the strong," and would therefore violate one great law of organic evolution by suspending the "natural relation between effort and benefit." Psychologically absurd, because it assumes "the character of all to be so noble that it causes continuous sacrifice of self to others, and so ignoble that it continually lets others sacrifice to self;" and, moreover, because it would "suspend the natural relation between the instinctive actions of parents and the welfare of the progeny,"—that is, by transferring children to the care of the state; and this is the other great law of organic evolution that "more or less fully the doctrine of collectivists, socialists, and communists" proposes to suspend. That there are and have been certain "proposals" to which this criticism applies, it would be useless to deny; but they are certainly not characteristic of the purpose or practice of collectivism. We are then shown that "the real human nature around us makes the irrationality of socialistic hopes still more conspicuous," and the reign of "maleficent selfishness" is depicted with Mr. Spencer's characteristically vigorous and encyclopædic touch. But it is difficult to see what is the use of these promiscuous and undiscriminating characterizations. The few pages in Mill's "Autobiography" upon socialist ideas and prospects, though they make no pretensions to even an appearance of scientific importance, show not only more insight into the meaning of socialism, but also more appreciation of the meaning of social evolution than all these loosely constructed and badly-aimed generalities.

Modern socialism does not put itself forward as a panacea for all human evil, but only as a remedy for the evils produced by a defective organization of industry and an unhealthy distribution of wealth. Its distinctive idea is that of practical industrial democracy. It aims at nothing more or less than the utmost possible achievement

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of democracy—political, social, and industrial—at making the life and livelihood of the people "entirely independent of private capitalism." In other words, it aims at the organization of society upon the basis of the free and independent labor of the members composing the community; and this, it is held, implies "the reorganization of society by the emancipation of land and industrial capital from individual and class ownership and the vesting of them in the community for the general benefit." (Fabian Basis.)

Mr. Spencer, in his chapter on "Co-operation," emphasizes the element of "coerciveness" in the "master-and-workmen type" of industry. In his chapter on "Socialism," however, he describes the modern industrial system as "one under which coerciveness approaches a minimum," and socialism, being "simply" a civil regimentation parallel to military regimentation,—it is odd how often "simply" occurs in the philosophy of evolution,—as a form, the worst form, of social coerciveness. But the whole point of socialism lies in its endeavor not only to make the livelihood of the workman independent of individual or class ownership of land and capital, but to gradually substitute a form of industrial organization in which practical equality of industrial opportunity would be combined with direct community of interest and with very much less "interference with personal liberty" than the present system involves.

Mr. Spencer might just as well urge that political democracy is only the substitute of one "master" for another; and his ideal of "self-ownership" could only be logically realized by every man on his own independent island,—a somewhat precarious form of personal freedom. When, however, he describes the ideal as "complete ownership of the unit and exercise over him of nothing more than passive influence by the aggregate," his language, however vague and philosophically unsatisfactory, seems to imply a conception of freedom that can only be actualized in and through a society in which all are equally means and ends.

Mr. Spencer on the Industrial Future.—Mr. Spencer is a pessimist as to the near, an optimist as to the distant future. He foresees the coming "rule of official classes," and this he regards as a "return movement,"—that is, to social restraint and dictation. He does not know how long this phase of social life—this rhythmic change—may last. Its issue will probably be various and uncertain, although generally disastrous. A military despotism may break the "intolerable strain" of the official classes, or, again, the

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laws of organic evolution will assert themselves in the gradual decay or "practical extinction" of the society, or its conquest by a less emasculated people, before whom "the socialistic organization will go down like a house of cards, as did that of the ancient Peruvians before a handful of Spaniards."

On the other hand:

"If the process of evolution, which, increasing throughout past time, has brought life to its present height, as we cannot but anticipate, then, amid all the rhythmical changes in each society, amid all the lives and deaths of nations, amid all the supplantings of race by race, there will go on that adaptation of human nature to the social state which began when savages first gathered together for mutual defence,—an adaptation finally complete."

The two views are combined in the idea of "relative" optimism; "the cosmic progress brings about retrogression as well as progression;" there is no uniform ascent from lower to higher, but only "an occasional production" of higher types, and social evolution "must, while producing step after step higher societies, leave outstanding many lower." Mr. Spencer, however, trusts to the primary process of "integration," which, having so far manifested itself in the formation of larger and larger nations, may culminate in a "peace-maintaining federation" of the highest nations, putting an end to internecine strife and to "the rebarbarization which is certainly undoing civilization." Then "there may be effectual progress towards that equilibrium between constitution and conditions, between inner faculties and outer requirements, implied by the final stage of evolution." All the great societies may at least "become similar in those cardinal traits which result from complete self-ownership of the unit and exercise over him of nothing more than passive influence by the aggregate."

"On the one hand, by continual repression of aggressive instincts and exercise of feelings which prompt ministration to public welfare, and, on the other hand, by the lapse of restraint, gradually becoming less necessary, there must be produced a kind of man so constituted that, while fulfilling his own desires, he fulfils also the social needs. . . . Long studies . . . have not caused me to recede from the belief expressed nearly fifty years ago: 'The ultimate individual will be one whose private requirements coincide with public ones. He will be that manner of man who, in spontaneously fulfilling his own nature, incidentally performs the functions of a social unit, and yet is only enabled so to fulfil his own nature by all others doing the like.'"

It is with this sentence that Mr. Spencer concludes the "Principles of Sociology," and it must be admitted that it is "a great

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word." Sociologists, as we know, disagree even more than other doctors, when they offer us guidance and direction; but the socialist has no ground of disagreement with Mr. Spencer's description of the principle of a completely adapted social state. For the whole object of socialism is to provide the economical mechanism which will satisfy the idea of economic harmony and equilibrium. Where the socialist differs from Mr. Spencer is in thinking that "socialistic" methods are helping to form and not to hinder such a future. It would seem that all social, like all moral, ideals tend to meet, when stated at their best. "The socialist" does not quarrel with the end, as stated by "the individualist," only with his judgment on the means; but "the individualist" not only quarrels with the means, but mistakes the aims of socialists, partly because socialists have mistaken them themselves. This is why we find ourselves disputing with Mr. Spencer at almost every point on the road to his "conclusion," and most heartily endorsing the conclusion itself. But we certainly cannot consider Mr. Spencer's book on "Industrial Institutions" a favorable example of the synthetic philosophy, or a good augury for the claims of "sociological" science. It seems to us a thing of shreds and patches, and, so far from impressing us with the advance of sociology, is continually suggestive of the different kinds of "bias" and "subjective difficulty" which Mr. Spencer has shown to affect the study of social science. It often reads like an expression of personal feeling and experience, under the appearance of a scientific demonstration; and it is to be regretted that Mr. Spencer should have given the weight of his great authority, as also of the authority of the "Synthetic Philosophy," to what we cannot help regarding as political and economical obscurantism. But this in no way diminishes our profound admiration of his devoted and disinterested labors, of the sincerity and earnestness of his purpose, of the breadth and dignity of his speculation, or of his signal services to the cause of commercial morality and national honor, of individual freedom and international peace.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE ETHICS OF JOHN STUART MILL. Edited with Introductory Essays by Charles Douglas, M.A., D.Sc., Lecturer and Assistant in Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1897. Pp. cxxvi., 233.

The object of this volume is to provide learners who are beginning the study of Ethics with Mill's chief ethical writings in a compact form. Besides a reprint of his "Utilitarianism" and "Logic of the Moral Sciences" (Book VI. of Mill's Logic) with an analysis, the book contains three Introductory Chapters entitled respectively *Ethics and Induction*, *Ethics and Psychology*, and *Ethics and Morality;* a brief Appendix of extracts from various writings of Mill's under the headings of (1) Causality and Induction, (2) and (3) Mill's Theory of the Self, and of the Relation of Morality to Nature, (4) his Estimate of Bentham, and, finally, an Index. The numerous foot-notes contain further quotations from Mill by way of illustration and elucidation of the text.

The Introductory Essays, which are "intended to guide the student in his interpretation and criticism of the ethical writings, and to connect these writings with Mill's philosophy as a whole, and with his place in the development of speculation," are interesting, sympathetic, and in many ways suggestive, and exhibit the possibility and value of bringing Mill's ethical theory into connection with his other philosophical views.

The attempt in Chapter I. to show how Mill's conception of logical method influenced his ethical view, seems to me, however, somewhat strained, both as regards the stress laid on the dependence of Mill's Ethics on his logic, and also as to the value of his logical method. Respect for Mill's intellectual force, and the fullest appreciation of his moral enthusiasm and earnestness and his unfailing candor, need not prevent our recognizing the profound unsatisfactoriness of his account of the relation between "Induction" and "Deduction,"—his ever-renewed and for himself hopeless, though for his readers most instructive, effort to combine inference to the unknown with certainty of proof—and the worse than feebleness of his attempt to base the utilitarian principle on "experience." Dr. Douglas does indeed notice that this

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effort of Mill's is "more than questionable." But I do not think his criticism suggests that the attempt to base first principles on facts, particulars, or experience, is necessarily foredoomed to failure.

It is true that in Essay II. he criticises the "psychological way of conceiving conduct" from which Mill's ethics starts,—Psychology being described as deliberately abstracting from the "subject-object relation which is characteristic of human experience,"—the "self-consciousness which is the determining principle" in the unity and objectivity of mental life, and speaks of Mill's perception of this (extra-psychological) "organic unity and continuity which characterize experience." But the only view of Psychology which seems to me acceptable is that which makes recognition of the subject-object relation its distinctive characteristic; and in spite of Mill's talk of a series aware of itself, etc., I do not feel at all assured that he did intend to abstract in Psychology from that relation; certainly he cannot both do this consistently and also recognize self-consciousness as the necessary principle of unity in mental life. Perhaps we might apply to Mill here a modification of his remark on Bentham (quoted p. 219) that "though there is possibly no one of them [*i.e.*, constituents of human nature] of the existence of which an acknowledgment might not be found in some corner of [his] writings, no conclusions are ever founded on the acknowledgment" of certain of these. It appears to be suggested that Mill's difficulties arise from neglect of the "principle of self-consciousness;" that they might be remedied, and Utilitarianism transformed into a satisfactory and non-utilitarian system by the recognition of this principle. But is any such simple solution possible? In his Logic, the relation between the General and the Particular landed Mill in hopeless and more or less obvious confusion; and in his Ethics, in addition to this difficulty from Particulars, there is the struggle between Self and Other, private Happiness and public Welfare, Interest and Duty, which Mill, in common with all previous moralists, had to feel and meet as best as he could. And the way in which he has met it is by an argument (involving both *Petitio Principii* and *Non Sequitur*) from the actual desire of each one for his own happiness, and that alone to the duty of desiring the general happiness. And the kind of "organic unity" that, at this time, is likely to be suggested by Dr. Douglas's remarks can scarcely be attributed to Mill; if we are led by the suggestion, are we not reading into him a meaning that could hardly

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even have occurred to him or his contemporaries? And, however much the "principle of self-consciousness" may be admitted, it can have no effect in improving or supplementing the appeal to facts, or experiences, or ideas which form part of a series,—being a necessary presupposition of any such fact, idea, or series.

Neither the strength nor the weakness of Mill's Utilitarianism seems to be sufficiently emphasized (and this is rather noticeably the case with reference to Bentham also), and no reference is made to the more recent elaboration of the doctrine in which Utilitarianism and Intuitionism are shown to be at one. In these points, and in what seems to me an attempt to read into Mill elements of an essentially modern view, I find the chief drawbacks to Dr. Douglas's exposition, as its chief merit is to be found in his sympathetic attitude towards Mill and generous recognition of all Mill's splendid intellectual and moral excellence as a thinker, and in the philosophical charm and value of his careful and instructive effort to exhibit each part of Mill's work in its connection with the rest of his life and thought.

E. E. C. Jones.

Girton College, Cambridge.

Pseudo-Philosophy at the End of the Nineteenth Century. By Hugh Mortimer Cecil. 1. An Irrationalist Trio—Kidd, Drummond, Balfour. London: The University Press, Limited, 16 John Street, Bedford Row, W. C., 1897. Pp. xvi., 308.

This book is written from a point of view violently anti-theistic, anti-theological, and above all anti-Christian, the author appearing to be an accepted champion of what Mr. Balfour would call "Naturalism," what he himself would call "Science" or "Rationalism." It purports to be an attempt to state and controvert the main contentions of "Social Evolution," "The Ascent of Man," and "The Foundations of Belief;" and since these three well-known books are occupied with some of the most difficult and disputed problems of life and thought, the attempt to evaluate them, familiar as they are, calls for a serious intellectual effort on the part of writer and reader.

It may be remarked that Mr. Kidd, Mr. Drummond, and Mr. Arthur Balfour are here treated as a "trio" only in the sense that the three essays in which their books are examined are brought together between the covers of a single volume; that they are all attacked by Mr. Hugh Mortimer Cecil and regarded by him as

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"modern champions of theology" who have endeavored to "capture the scientific fortress by the use of pseudo-scientific methods;" and, further, that they all receive similar usage at Mr. Cecil's hands, being quoted from at inordinate length and with frequent repetition, and treated with asperity, vituperation, and an unstinted imputation of stupidity, vulgarity, and dishonesty such as one had imagined to be out of fashion.

One ought perhaps to be always ready for the unexpected and the unexplained,—and the more, that it is not only in books, not only in "scientific" controversy, that we now and then see men in advanced stages of civilization hark back to modes of procedure fit only for their ancestors. Still, the unexplained everywhere calls for explanation; and it is not quite obvious why Mr. Cecil has written his book at this juncture; why he has written it in such a style, or who the public can be to whom he expects it to appeal. It must certainly be highly offensive to "Christians," who after all still exist in considerable numbers, and form a not unimportant section of the respectable and intelligent portion of the community. It is hardly likely to be studied by Mr. Herbert Spencer, who is somewhat ineffectively patronized in the last chapter, and it cannot be very attractive to Mr. Karl Pearson, who is alternately blamed and praised, while Professor Huxley, the other great "Rationalist" who is selected for qualified distinction, is unfortunately no longer among possible readers. It is not likely to appeal largely to students of "Science," who seem for the most part either to "despise and scoff" philosophy, or else to take orthodoxy under their "exiguous wing" (to quote Mr. Cecil); it is too "scientific" for philosophers, too stiff for the idle, too long for the busy, too pungent for a simple taste; and last, though not least, the books which it discusses have quite recently been widely read and most voluminously discussed. There is, however, no doubt that Mr. Cecil writes with considerable ability and genuine conviction, in a style which, while often trenchant not to say truculent, is generally clear and lively; also, that he has succeeded (though not, I think, with any striking originality) in pointing out many weak places in the views which he attacks. His book is from many points of view worth reading; his interest in philosophy is keen, and his logical acuteness great. But this does not lead him always to "define his terms" (a "counsel of perfection" which he frequently insists on), nor preserve him from occasional misstatements and contradictions; it does not prevent his being entangled

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by ambiguities of language; it does not help him always to perceive the precise confusion of thought to which the mistakes and incoherences which he notices are attributable; it does not enable him invariably to appreciate the scope of the theories which he criticises.

For instance, Mr. Cecil's meaning would have been clearer, and it would have been easier to estimate his merits and weaknesses, if he had given us careful definitions of the sense in which he uses or accepts such terms as scepticism, rational, reason, sanction, irrationalism, evolution, good, right,* not to mention scientific method, real world, things, matter, inference, experience, etc., terms which he uses constantly, and the meaning of which is very important for a right understanding of his view.

Again and again he speaks of Mr. Kidd's book as having been written with the object of persuading men, by a reasoned appeal, to act in a certain "irrational" manner, and so conduce to future progress; and then he gibes at the writer for using reason to persuade men to unreason, and for being so absurd as to think that his feeble assistance will aid the "great deep-seated evolutionary forces" to fulfil their task. But if Mr. Cecil had observed the meanings attached by Mr. Kidd to *Reason*, part of this taunt (and much of what he says in other passages) would be seen to lose point. And the laugh at attempting to assist evolution has no special appropriateness as against Mr. Kidd, whose book aims rather at being historic, analytic, and predictive than hortative.

Then, again, what does Mr. Cecil mean by "good"? On p. 121 he says, "If God can prevent the suffering [of the world] and will not, he is not *good*," and p. 171 speaks of "crediting God only with the *good*" in Nature (*cf.* also pp. 52, 142, 144). And at p. 115, in speaking of the problem of evil, it is plain that by evil he means pain, and elsewhere that by *bad* he means voluntarily productive of pain (*cf.* p. 122, etc.). In these places we have admission of a "problem of evil" (for what more is that than the recognition that evil exists of which we do not see the justification?) and reference to a standard of goodness and badness; while elsewhere he has said that to talk of a problem of evil is unmeaning, and has refused to allow such reference to a criterion, asserting that the "conception of progress as improvement

* He does indeed say (p. 42) that "evolution is constant change," but this is not the admissible or admitted sense of the word, and in other passages he gives and must give to it, a different and much fuller meaning.

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is altogether unscientific," and telling us not to "confuse" things by introducing a Being to whom *infinite goodness* is attributed, since *good* and *evil* are wholly relative.

And Mr. Balfour's appeal to consequences as a ground for accepting or rejecting certain views (which is a recognition of the supremacy of *Right*, a recognition of *practical* reason as something to which ultimate appeal must be made) is severely criticised by Mr. Cecil; but (1) in judging persons and actions to be good or bad he has himself acknowledged a standard of practical reason. (2) He seems sometimes to identify Right and True (accepting both practical and speculative standards), for he says, p. 198, "either biology is right or it is wrong. If it is wrong [= false], we will give up our theory. If it is right [= true], what harm [= wrong] can there be in teaching men the truth?" And unless we can identify the Right and the True, it is not self-evident that to teach the Truth is always Right. (3) Even if he gives up a distinctive practical standard, and says that Truth is all-sufficient, or at least more important than Happiness, he has still not got rid of a Practical Standard; he must still admit Right and Ought as contrasted with Fact (though subordinate to it). For he is constantly allowing—or rather insisting—that many men both judge falsely and speak falsely, and holds strongly that it would be better if they judged and spoke truly; indeed, while most severe with those whom he holds to be mistaken or dishonest, he is very ready to attribute falsity and insincerity.

He says, for instance, speaking of Mr. Balfour, "It is not for the man against whom the insinuation of insincerity has been whispered by reviewer after reviewer to talk of the ethical virtues that flow from the acceptance of Christianity;" as though the whispers and insinuations of a reviewer need be proof of anything whatever in the person reviewed. Indeed, it seems difficult to understand how any one whose eyes were not clouded by prejudice could read the "Foundations of Belief" and fail to perceive the rare sincerity of the writer. But we have not now to learn—though we always have to regret—that no man and no book (especially if in the van of progress) can be secure from injustice, or that blind misunderstanding and misrepresentation are continually putting hindrances in the way of that evolution towards what is better, which, however, in spite of all obstacles, seems on the whole steady and irresistible.

Mr. Cecil is, it is true, unsparing wherever he detects a flaw or

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error; but this seems inconsistent, since he is sometimes inclined to give up the objectivity even of truth (which no doubt is a sacrifice demanded by the method that tries to base knowledge on "particulars"). Indeed, his position appears peculiarly unsatisfactory, being precisely that Naturalism against which Mr. Balfour has argued, in all its instability and inevitable incoherence. Mr. Cecil has not, as far as I can see, by any means estimated the force either of the special argument against Naturalism or of the whole contention as to the foundations of science of which it is a part, and, in fact, believes himself to be still impregnable in that hopelessly ruined "fortress."

And he derides the argument from needs, and by a question-begging use of epithets presents the ever-renewed struggle in thought and practice as a contest between "Science" and "Religion," as a crude opposition of two forces, of which the one is always rational, and the other irrational, hypocritical, prejudiced, and violent; whereas, the truth is rather that the fight all along the line has been between different claimants to reason, different stages of Thought and Feeling,—a struggle that goes on also within the borders of Science itself, and within the very sanctuaries of Religion.

Mr. Kidd may have failed in his reading of "Evolution;" Mr. Drummond's attempt to interfuse the selfish struggle for existence with love and self-sacrifice and to transform the apparent evil of the world to good may have broken down; Mr. Balfour may have been less successful in championing orthodox Christianity than in exhibiting the necessary dependence of Science on Metaphysics; but they have at least done much, and in a reverent spirit, to rouse men's minds to intelligent interest in the great questions which concern the relation of Fact to Philosophy, of what *is* to what *ought* to be, of Man to Nature and to God.

E. E. C. Jones.

Girton College, Cambridge.

The Psychology of the Moral Self. By B. Bosanquet. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. viii., 132.

It may be gathered from internal evidence that this little book was first produced in the form of University Extension Lectures, like the author's previous "Essentials of Logic;" and it is no small distinction of that movement that, partly, perhaps, from the greater mental maturity of the audience than obtains in regular

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universities, it should have provoked two such text-books. Less successful than the earlier book, because it is less of one piece, and serves as a kind of introduction to several psychological works, this book has certainly one merit of a text-book, that of stimulating thought and whetting the reader's appetite to learn more of the subject from some of the larger works. But it is exceedingly brief, and lacking in illustration, and it will need ample commentary in some of its harder parts which are brief even to obscurity. The plan of the book is as follows: First comes an account of the nature of psychology as dealing with one aspect of all experience, then a general description of the nature of psychical events. After these preliminaries follow: a sketch of how we are conscious of things (the least lucid part of the book) and how our knowledge becomes organized (one of the best parts); a psychology of self-consciousness as opposed to consciousness of things; and in succession chapters on feeling, on volition and certain problems arising in connection therewith, on reasonable action, and, finally, on the relation of body and soul. It will be seen that a great deal of ground is covered. The frequent references to different writers, while they add to the usefulness of the book for the inquirer, give an impression of disconnectedness; but there is a definite thread of continuity. In describing the general nature of mind and the growth of cognition, Mr. Bosanquet expounds with much effectiveness the singleness or organic character or continuity of mind, which was magisterially formulated by Dr. Ward; and it is doubtless this same principle of organization by "identity of contents" as opposed to atomism and association which makes him insist later on that the moral ideal is not a question of egoism and altruism, but a question of who I am and others are; that the moral self is "the realization of a certain nature which is the outcome" of persons working together in society (p. 94 adapted). It must be confessed that in the crusade against the wickedness of atomism and associationism Mr. Bosanquet (with others) goes far towards putting mental processes out of the way as much as the associationists put "identity of content" out of the way. How do the logical "universals" which association is said to marry, get married? And how do we settle what sort of persons we include in our moral purview except by the action of these several persons enforcing their claims?

In so condensed a book, representing so much thinking and in so individual a form, many points call for remark, of which very

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few can be mentioned. In dealing with self-consciousness, it is suggested that successful self-assertion against objects may be its first germ, and later on, in Chapter VIII., when the question is raised whether society is necessary to the genesis of a moral self, the germ of moral feeling is found in the contrast of success and failure in the individual. This is a very interesting point, but Mr. Bosanquet seems not to press it, and to allow that neither self-consciousness nor the moral judgment arise practically without experience of the "we." He illustrates from Hegel, and adds this fine saying of his own: "If we compare self-consciousness in the bad sense (with the good sense of the term), we find that the term is used when the self is indeed aware of itself but cannot count upon a positive place, upon that definite recognition which constitutes its reality." His account of volition follows Professor James on the whole; accordingly, he does not admit the necessary antecedence of desire, comparing decision to the solution of a problem rather than a process which results from feeling. Abandoning psychology for a moment, he raises the question whether the moral self may include non-social elements (such as art or truth), and he concludes that "all the great contents of developed human self—truth, beauty, religion, and social morality—are all of them but modes of expression of the ideal self:" an elusive answer, it may well seem (though illustrated finely from Plato), since we learn neither what the ideal self means, not how its different modes of expression are related to each other. On the question of reasonable action, Mr. Bosanquet, in pursuance of his principle, finds reasonableness in "self-consistency," or "consistency with the whole of experience," a position which he reaches by criticism of Hume, Kant, and Professor Sidgwick. The discussion of altruism is very interesting, and still more the brief section on self-assertion and self-sacrifice. The reader wishes for much more, but perhaps this is the merit of the book that the tabloids of nutriment it supplies leave us with the desire of a further less condensed and more epicurean meal.

S. ALEXANDER.
THE OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

THE WILL TO BELIEVE, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. By William James. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897. Pp. xvii., 332.

Professor James is by common consent in the forefront of his science, and one may with some confidence regard this volume as

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in recent years the most striking and powerful product of American thought employed upon serious philosophy. It consists of ten essays. Four of these are, broadly speaking, devoted to the establishment and illustration of what the author calls "the liberty of believing,"—the momentous thesis that in the final problems of life and hope, in default of proof or refutation, a man may lawfully "will to believe" such things as alone to his thinking make the universe habitable for the soul. To these are added a really novel and refreshing treatment of "free-will," the conclusion of which is that we must elect for belief the "indeterminist" view of human action as the only worthy alternative; a briefly traced theory of ethics, according to which that is the best action which leads to the gratification of the most numerous or intense demands of sentient creatures, the demand of God by its greatness being paramount; two papers arguing with much force and apt illustration that genius is not produced by determinable social forces, but is an "accidental variation" whose beneficent results tend to be "preserved in the struggle for existence;" an unsparing attack on some doctrines and methods of Hegel; and a highly judicial but too brief review of the work of the Society for Psychical Research.

A dry and thin summary must be peculiarly false to a production whose foremost qualities are ingenuity of argument, range and richness of imagination, deep color of style, and volume of emotional appeal. The work teems with matter tempting or challenging to the critic. It is a human document calling for study of a singularly interesting tendency and temper, and it is a trenchant polemic against tenets whose defenders must make what answer or compromise they can. It is in both of these aspects—as student and in a measure as opponent—that I have permission from the editor of this JOURNAL to treat of the book in an article to be published in an early issue.

D. S. MILLER.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

IL SOCIALISMO E IL PENSIERO MODERNO, SAGGI. Di Alessandro Chiappelli. Firenze: Successori Le Monnier, 1897. 12mo. Pp. xiv., 342.

This handsome volume, charmingly dedicated to the learned Countess Caëtani-Lovatelli, contains seven essays on various aspects of socialism, in which the author is deeply interested, and which he hopes to direct into worthy channels. Their titles are

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these: (1) Patriotism and Socialism; (2) Darwinism and Socialism; (3) Socialism and Art; (4) Philosophy and Socialism; (5) Socialism and Pessimism; (6) the Moral Idea in Socialism; (7) Religion and Socialism.

Professor Chiappelli is one of the ablest and most liberal thinkers in Europe, a man who takes a profound interest in all ethical, political, religious, and economic movements, and has an extensive knowledge of them. The gist of these essays may be summed up in the closing words of the last of them: "To cast the ancient gold of the Christian idea into the new and living forms of modern culture and life—this is the noble and fruitful task of modern times." After reading this no one will be surprised to learn that the author is a "Christian socialist." This means that he utterly rejects the merely economic socialism of Marx and his followers, and would substitute for it a moral socialism, in which every man, loving his neighbor as himself, would religiously interest himself in the welfare of all mankind. This socialism is here presented, and insisted upon, under many aspects, and with great skill and enthusiasm, reminding us at times of Tolstoï, with whom the author seems to be deeply in sympathy. It is, indeed, "a consummation devoutly to be wished;" but whether it can ever be realized upon the basis of Christian supernaturalism and Christian moral heteronomy may very well be doubted. When we remove this supernaturalism and this heteronomy (which must ever be fatal to all true morality), what remains of Christianity but the simple spirit of humanity, which is surely far enough from being peculiar to it or its adherents? Humanity is a far wider term than Christianity, and only blinding and narrowing confusion can arise from any attempt to identify the two. It is no unusual thing for purveyors of new doctrines—especially if they are in precarious official positions—to send forth these doctrines labelled "Christianity Rediscovered;" but this is mere quackery, and should be treated as such. This remark has, of course, no reference to Professor Chiappelli!

What we want is neither Christian, economic, nor "sportive" (Bellamystic) socialism, but that simple, large, human socialism, which the best modern nations, and especially the United States, are doing their best, in all ways, to further,—a socialism which, while cultivating the social spirit, uses its best efforts to safeguard and develop individual freedom and to encourage individual initiative. If Professor Chiappelli were as well acquainted with

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modern America as he is with half-mediæval Italy, where moral autonomy is still a rare phenomenon, he would doubtless agree to this—so honest a thinker is he.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

FORECASTS OF THE COMING CENTURY. By a Decade of Writers (A. R. Wallace, Tom Mann, H. Russell Smart, William Morris, H. S. Salt, Enid Stacy, Margaret McMillan, Grant Allen, Bernard Shaw, Edward Carpenter). London: Labor Press, 1897.

This series of essays might serve as an example of the truth on which one of the essayists has insisted with much effectiveness and humor, that the names Socialism and Collectivism cover many very different opinions and social ideals. The ten writers, though all more or less Socialistic in sympathies, appear to represent almost the same number of shades of Socialist opinion, and, perhaps one may add, of degrees of ability to fulfil the somewhat ambitious functions of prophets. The future foretold varies from the Utopia of Anarchism discussed by the editor, Mr. E. Carpenter, to the "miserably prosaic 'bourgeois' development and extension of the middle class respectability of to-day," which Mr. Bernard Shaw describes with delightful impartiality as the more modest goal of Fabian effort. The editor, indeed, maintains that all Socialists are agreed that a stage of Collectivism is to be followed by a stage of Anarchism, and that they only differ as to the importance of the stages. No doubt he is right; but we should imagine that the period to which the authors of the very practical and moderate essays on "Trades-Unionism and Co-operation" and on "The Illusions of Socialism" relegated the stage of Anarchism would probably be about the millennium.

Mr. Tom Mann, indeed, ends the former essay with a prophecy which, if intended to be taken seriously, it would be inadequate to call rash, to the effect that the next ten years will see a legal six hours' day, the nationalization of mines and railways, and other equally sweeping changes; but most of his argument is in a much more moderate vein. He points out that the value of Trades-Unionism and Co-operation consists alike in what they have actually effected,—the one in improving the condition of the working classes, the other in replacing capitalist by democratic ownership, and in the stimulus they give to self-reliance and class loyalty.

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In neither of these ways, he thinks, are their services used up, and a long time must elapse before they can be superseded by Collectivism.

Mr. Bernard Shaw, with equal caution, warns the enthusiastic against supposing that Socialism as an accomplished fact will differ less from their visions of it than the realization generally does from a social ideal. Mr. Grant Allen, in a vigorous and effective essay, marred by occasional lapses into bad taste, inveighs against the popular superstition that Socialism involves a "dead level," and argues that its real aim is to substitute a natural for an artificial inequality.

The remaining essays are in a more conventional Socialistic vein. Mr. Alfred Russell Wallace advocates Labor Colonies as the solution of the problem of the unemployed. Mr. Russell Smart's "Programme for a Socialist Parliament" includes all the usual items of an advanced bill of fare. Their space, of course, makes a full discussion of these large questions impossible, but both essays seem to us to bristle with impracticable or dangerous suggestions, and to ignore the most obvious objections and difficulties. Mr. William Morris discusses the future of Art, and Mr. Henry Salt of Literature under a Socialist *régime*. The ideal community of the author of "News from Nowhere" is always an attractive place, but it may be doubted whether Mr. Salt's essay is likely to win many converts to Socialism among lovers of literature. Miss Enid Stacy reviews the Women's Rights movement of the last fifty years, and shows how it may be brought into line with Socialism. The only thing about Miss McMillan's essay on Education which seems to connect it with the rest of the book and with Socialistic theory is the tendency which it shows to exaggerate enormously the power of circumstances as compared with character, and the importance of making everything as comfortable and easy-going and free from disagreeableness for children and everybody else as possible. This tendency, though, of course, in no way logically implied in Socialism, is as manifest in this volume of essays as in most popular Socialistic literature.

The essays are all written in a popular vein, and, though necessarily slight, seem likely to be useful in spreading popular knowledge of Socialist opinions and aims of various types.

ELEANOR RATHBONE.

LIVERPOOL.

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LECTURES IN THE LYCEUM; OR, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. Edited by St. George Stock. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co.

One is at a loss how to take Mr. Stock's book. It is not a translation, nor yet a commentary; it professes to be lectures, but drops at frequent intervals into dialogue; it is the *Ethics* for English readers, but contains only half of it. It is, perhaps, best to take it frankly for what it seems to have been,—the *jeu d'esprit* of an Oxford lecturer in his summer holidays (Mr. Stock tells us it was written in the long vacation of 1893). Taking it in this way, we may say at once that, unlike many things that come under this classification, it is *jeu* and has *esprit*. For students or for the general public, to whom the text itself and the better commentaries are inaccessible, it is the pleasantest introduction to Aristotle's moral philosophy that we have come across. Needless to say, the "editor" has made use of Mr. Bywater's new text, and borrows largely and judiciously from Professor Stewart's admirable commentary.

It is when he leaves these excellent guides that the disadvantages of the form of exposition he has adopted begin to make themselves felt. In a translation (if it is a good one) we know what an author has said, in a commentary we know what he has not said, but in a paraphrase like the present we are apt not to know where we are. We need not complain of the many good things we find here which, though not in the original text, are quite in its spirit and throw valuable light upon it. Instances of this are the fine comparison of life to the Olympic games, which is not Aristotle's, but, if we remember rightly, is attributed to Pythagoras; the paraphrase of the idea that external goods are merely the "fittings" of life: "Fortune is our Choregus, Virtue is the true author of our life's drama;" the gloss that reason moves us in the sense in which a candle moves us in the dark; and the metaphor used to explain the paradox that virtue, although a means, is also an extreme; "to lodge an arrow in the bull's eye of a target may be said to be hitting the mean, but it is at the same time an extremely good shot." But there are other expressions of the text which are not so happy. Of some of these the worst that can be said is that they are simply not there. Many of the points started by the "Persons in the Dialogue" are of this kind (*e.g.*, p. 100 *fin.*). Others give a false, *i.e.*, un-Aristotelian turn, to the thought. Examples are the remark that to consider a man apart from society is "like considering a fish

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apart from water" (the connection, of course, on Aristotle's view, is much closer than that between organism and environment); "Happiness is the outcome of the combination of all lower goods" (this is just what it is not); "It is the non-existence or undiscoverability of the reason why that makes a thing to be a first principle" (apart from the English this is doubtful [Aristotelian] metaphysics). The whole passage, indeed, from which the last sentence is quoted (pp. 30 and 31) reminds one rather of the metaphysics of Mill than of Aristotle.

These examples illustrate the danger of representing Aristotle as a glorified university extension lecturer, but they do not prove that many university extension and other students will not get a great deal of help from Mr. Stock's kindly attempt to turn out an Ethics without tears.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

MASON COLLEGE, BIRMINGHAM.

A SURVEY OF GREEK CIVILIZATION. By J. P. Mahaffy, D.D., D.C.L. London: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

A HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREEK LITERATURE. By Gilbert Murray, M.A., Professor of Greek in the University of Glasgow. London: William Heinemann, 1897.

Mr. Mahaffy has written his book confessedly from the personal point of view, and the result is an account, in some respects fragmentary and biassed, but always, as we expect from this scholar, original and stimulating in a high degree. Such a survey of such a civilization, so deep and rich, so far-reaching in its influence, cannot but be of great importance for the history of ethics.

The scope of the book is enormous. Mr. Mahaffy passes in review all the phases of the Greek development as conceived by him,—the pre-Homeric age, a society led by a rich aristocracy, headed by powerful kings, civilized and courteous to their own caste, cruel to those outside the pale; the next age, that shaped the Homeric poems, a time of reminiscence and reverence for bygone splendor; the dawn of historic civilization, with its lyric freedom, exuberance and variety; the golden age of Pericles, unrivalled for intellect and genius, lacking in tenderness and sense of duty; the fourth century B.C., less brilliant, less rigorous, but with signs of wider sympathies and humaner thoughts; the inevitable triumphs of Philip and Alexander; the strange complex period called Hellenistic; and the last days under Roman rule, when conquered Greece took her

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conquerors "with beauty," and Greek language and Greek speculation proved channels for the new gospel that had come into the world.

Students of ethics will feel no less interest in Professor Murray's work, an attempt, as Mr. Gosse explains in a preface, to "interpret the most perfect utterance of the ripest thought" of Greece.

The main lines of the book follow the conclusion generally accepted among scholars of the modern school, while the details throughout show the fresh insight of genuine sympathy. Real light is thrown, for instance, on the character of the ancient drama by the recognition that "the power of entering vividly into the feelings of both parties in a conflict is perhaps the most characteristic gift of the Greek genius." Professor Murray himself has a strain of this imaginative many-sidedness; he can analyze with equal penetration the spirit of Herodotus, that writer of enchanting narratives, not teacher nor philosopher, but a man vividly interested in all the events and wonders of the world, a kindly-eyed judge of humanity; and of Thucydides, the tragic-hearted, clear-sighted, unflinching historian; of Euripides, the poet of questioning, the passionate sympathizer with "the two silent classes, women and slaves;" and of Aristophanes, the brilliant, audacious mocker, "using his half-knowledge and partial sympathy to improve his mocking," his one serious sentiment and admiration for the good old times. Considerations of space have restricted the treatment of philosophy. It is, no doubt, owing to this that Professor Murray has not given us his statement of Plato's idealism. Instead, we have a thoughtful study of the man's temperament and a general review of his writings from the early simple dialogues, through the brilliant versatile periods of the Phædo and the Republic down to the last work as shown in the Laws, the Sophist, and the Timæus, more and more confined to the hardest problems of metaphysics and politics. The character and position of Socrates are described with much picturesque force, and the suggestion is striking that "the most fundamental likeness between Plato and Socrates" lay in the capacity of each for intense personal love; but it could be wished that Professor Murray had given a place to the all-important Socratic search for clear conceptions as it stirred the thought of his time and led on to the system of Plato.

F. Melian Stawell.

London.

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THE HISTORY OF MANKIND. By Professor Friedrich Ratzel. Translated from the second German edition by A. J. Butler, M.A. With colored plates, maps, and illustrations. Vol. II., pp. 562. London and New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897.

The first volume of this work was published a year ago, and was at that time noticed in this JOURNAL, when the general aim of the author was explained. It is not a history, but a treatise on ethnography, describing the various stocks and races of mankind, principally with reference to their conditions of culture.

This second volume is devoted to the native American or Red race and the Negro or African stocks. There is also a short chapter on "the Arctic races of the old world," by which is meant that group in Siberia and Northern Europe which some call Turanian and others Ural-altaic.

The native American tribes are divided with reference to their progress in civilization into two groups,—the wild and the civilized peoples. In Africa, the division is made between the light stocks of South and Central Africa, such as the Bushmen, Hottentots, and Dwarfs, and the True Blacks, including the Bantus of South and East Africa, the Black Hamites of the East, and the Sudanese. The last mentioned are not embraced in this volume.

In the introductory remarks to each of these divisions the author reviews the geographical environment of the stocks and describes their general physical appearance. A slight sketch of their history when known is added, and a full account of their arts, government, mode of life, and forms of religious worship. In all these branches he has availed himself of the most recent authorities, and his presentations are clear, full of instruction and free from bias. His chapters on the American Indians are the best which have appeared in a work of the kind since the epochal treatise of Waitz on the *Naturvölker* of the world.

While meriting this high praise, yet a careful reader will be aware of some deficiency in the chapters on the religious ideas and organizations of these rude peoples. The author is too exclusively occupied with the externals of worship, and does not catch, or, at least, fails to present, the psychic attitude of the primitive man towards his conceptions of the supernatural. The similarity which both author and editor point out between the myths of far distant nations is not analyzed in its bearings on the spiritual development of the race. The Totemic bond, which underlies

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both the religious and civil life of so many tribes, is quite imperfectly explained; and the evolution of ethical ideas through the relation of social necessities to the strictly religious ceremonial law is not brought into the prominence its importance merits. In various passages there is still evidence of that habit of underrating the mental capacity of savages which has come down to us from the literature of the eighteenth century,—when Voltaire could assert that the study of the social conditions of barbarous tribes has no greater interest than that of a pack of wolves! Thus (p. 267) he writes that "some fragmentary ideas about the supernatural, some faded and confused traditions exhaust the evidences of mental life," in the Bushmen,—evidently unaware of the voluminous and rich collection of their myths and folk-lore, filling seventy odd manuscript volumes, obtained by the missionary Bleek.

These, however, are not serious blemishes. The work as a whole is the best on its branch in our language, and should be in all our educational and general libraries. It is printed in clear type on good paper, and the illustrations are numerous, accurate, and drawn from the most trustworthy sources.

DANIEL G. BRINTON.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

ESSAYS AND SPEECHES. By William Samuel Lilly, Hon. Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge. London: Chapman & Hall, Ld., 1897.

This is a collection of most interesting essays. No one who wishes to understand the development of the modern English mind should omit their perusal. Not, indeed, that the reader will find in them any contribution to the development of the world's thought. With all their erudition and brilliancy, they force the conviction that their writer is off the main track; but they show the working of certain fundamental ideas on a type of mind which has played, and which will play, an important part in the formation of English religious and ethical thought. That man is not merely "ein geniessendes thier," but that he is "a person endowed with true volition," is Mr. Lilly's profoundest conviction, which it may be said to be the object of this volume to establish. But though the proposition is of such unimpeachable philosophical authority, and though it is expressed (especially in the essay on "Literature and National Life") with much eloquence and power, it is unsupported by convincing argument so far as these essays go.

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The essay on "Professor Green" * is typical both of Mr. Lilly's fairness to opponents and of the limitations and bias of his thought. He gives "the fundamental position of Professor Green's doctrines" for the most part in Green's own words, or in the words of Green's competent and sympathetic biographer, Dr. Nettleship; but in going on to comment upon Green's philosophical doctrines, he shows a "fundamental misconception" of idealism as such, and remarks, with an amusing air of superiority, that "Professor Green was not extensively read in philosophy. I believe I am right in saying that of the Catholic schools there is no mention in the volume before me. Of the great Oriental metaphysicians, . . . he appears to have been absolutely ignorant. His masters were Kant, Hegel, Fichte, and Lotze among the Germans, and Plato and Aristotle among the Greeks. . . . Now, if Professor Green had turned to Aquinas——." It is not easy to anticipate that the philosophers of any future age will adopt Mr. Lilly's classification of their predecessors. We might imagine them addressing to Mr. Lilly a paraphrase of Ranke's rebuke to a "strenuous divine" (quoted with much approval by Mr. Lilly†), "You are in the first place a Catholic. We are in the first place philosophers. There is a great gulf between us."

In spite, however, of the great gulf fixed between the intellectual position of Mr. Lilly and that of the great philosophers, there is that in these essays which is common to the greatest thinkers of all ages, and which marks the element of permanent value in the book. It is the "fundamental conviction" above alluded to; the conviction expressing itself finely, in the essay on "The New Spirit in History," as the belief that "the elements of civilization are chiefly moral. The main progress of mankind . . . lies in the development of the ethical idea which, existing in our nature in the form of mind, an element of human personality, has ever more and more unfolded itself in history as the vivifying principle of those ordinances and institutions whereby we live as civilized men."

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

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* The late Professor T. H. Green, Balliol College, Oxford.

† "You," he said, "are in the first place a Christian, I am in the first place a historian. There is a great gulf between us." Page 207.

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ESSAYS. By George John Romanes, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., Hon. Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Edited by C. Lloyd Morgan, Principal of University College, Bristol. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. 1897.

Of the ten essays which together form this book, eight are popular expositions of natural science. Two alone ("What is the Object of Life?" and "Recreation") concern this JOURNAL. There is so often occasion of regret when teachers of natural science make excursions into the domain of ethics, that it is pleasant to be able to say what common sense and sound moral instinct characterize these two essays. The moral philosophy of Mr. Romanes (so far as he can be said to have had one) is utilitarian, but nothing could be much better or less distinctive of any school than his conclusion in the essay, "What is the Object of Life?" "But if it is thus true," he says, "that love and thought, conscience and wonder, are the faculties most distinctive of man, it appears to me that we have an objective verification of the conclusion previously reached by subjective analysis—viz., that the object of our human life must be that of exercising these our distinctively human faculties; and that the better each one of us can succeed in doing this, the more fully is he living the life which is most distinctively the life of a man." The essay on "Recreation" is not only full of an enlightened common sense, but presents a noble ideal both of work and of play. "By recreation I mean only that which with the least expenditure of time renders the exhausted energies most fitted to resume their work; . . . recreation is necessary not only for maintaining our powers of work so far as these are dependent on our vitality, but also for maintaining our happiness so far as this is dependent on our health."

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

VOICES OF DOUBT AND TRUST. Selected by Volney Streamer. New York: Brentano's, 1897.

The purpose of this little book is one to be highly commended. It aims to give a candid expression of the soul's search for knowledge of its origin and destiny and its relation to the universe or God. It would bring together the voices of doubt and trust, and let each speak for itself. The inclination of the editor's own opinion is suggested by the arrangement of his material. First

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we have denials, doubts, and questionings; next, "Light on the Cloud;" then, "Duty Here and Now;" and finally, "Trust." The selections are in both prose and verse, the latter being more numerous and from a much wider range. Some of these have not the rarest literary merit, the editor being evidently more bent upon the substance of the message than upon its form. Every reader who is well acquainted with this range of thought will miss certain things which he values highly, more highly, possibly, than others that are given. In some cases we imagine that this is because the editor has not wished to trench on other collections of a somewhat similar character. Only in this way can we account for the omission of such a splendid thing as Alfred Lyall's "Theology in Extremis," and Fitz James Stephen's unique expression, in the form of verse, of his most characteristic thought. And why not the crowning part of Browning's "Saul"?

Other omissions might easily be named, but it would be ungracious to name them, the collection is so rich, and one finds so many of the things that have befriended him in hours of brightness or of gloom. If the object of the editor was to woo the mind up from the darkened valleys of denial and doubt to the shining table-lands of hope and trust, his labor may not prove to have been in vain; but, if it should, his book would still have a sufficient justification. For what the doubting often crave is sympathy more than illumination: that their doubts should know that other men have doubted. The majority of these poems and other selections have the accent of reality. One reason why many of us like the expression of doubt more than the expression of faith is because it often has a truer ring. But in these last days there has been quite as much affectation of doubt and denial as of faith and trust, and it is hard to say which is the more deplorable. We have found some of the most encouraging things here among the most distrustful, as, for example, Turgenev's Dialogue of the Jungfrau and the Finsteraarhorn. A world-scheme so irrational as that of this dialogue cannot be real.

JOHN W. CHADWICK.

BROOKLYN.

VOLTAIRE ET LE VOLTAIRIANISME. Par Nourrisson, Membre de l'Institut. Paris, P. Lethielleux, 1896. 8vo. Pp. 670.

Goethe is said to have called Victor Hugo's "Notre Dame de Paris" the most abominable book that ever was written. Had he

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lived to read the present work he would have changed his mind. Indeed, there is no way of characterizing it but by saying that it is a cesspool into which the academic author has collected all the filthy and malodorous stories about Voltaire, his family and friends, that he could find anywhere, far or near. How any man, and especially how any man of reputed scholarship and culture, could—and in his old age, too—spend years of time in scenting out such ordure, it is impossible to conceive. Certain it is that he has made a loathsome spectacle of himself to the world, without in the least injuring the object of his spleen. To be sure, Voltaire was, in very many ways, far enough from being a saint or a hero. All the world knows that. But Voltaire did great, yea, inimitable work, in helping to dispel the thick clouds of cruel, degrading superstition that overhung Europe for centuries; and for this no one who is not in love with superstition and spiritual slavery—as our author, who apparently writes in the interest of Catholicism, seems to be—will fail to be duly grateful to him. *Auf einen groben Klotz gehört ein grober Keil.* Luther and Voltaire are the special *bêtes-noires* of fanatical Catholics, and have their memories kept green by periodical attacks from them. But these do no harm, and so need not be refuted. Indeed, no one who respects his own stomach would dream of burrowing in this pool of filth in order to find out how much of it can fairly be referred to Voltaire and his friends. There is only one encouraging thing about this book. It bears testimony to the impotent rage of superstition in the presence of ever-advancing free thought.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

ON HUMAN NATURE: Essays (partly posthumous) in Ethics and Politics. By Arthur Schopenhauer. Selected and translated by T. Bailey Saunders, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschien & Co. Pp. 132.

This is the seventh of the small volumes of Schopenhauer essays selected and translated by Mr. Saunders, and philosophically the most interesting. It constitutes a brief and popular exposition of the ethical doctrines originally set out in the fourth book of "The World as Will and Idea" and in the two essays on the Fundamental Problems of Ethics. The selections are drawn from the chapters on Ethics and Politics which are to be found in the Parerga and in posthumous writings. Mr. Saunders has divided the chap-

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ters there found into sections of his own, and has omitted a few unimportant passages. The topics which thus come to succeed one another in the translation are as follows: Human Nature, Government, Free-will and Fatalism, Character, Instinct, and some Ethical Reflections. Of these, Human Nature and Free-Will and Fatalism have already been presented to the English reader by Mr. Belfort Bax in a volume of Schopenhauer's selections contributed to Bohn's Library. Both translations read well, but Mr. Saunders, by interpolating the chapter on Politics and adding the three later sections, has furnished a completer scheme of doctrine so far as merely ethics is concerned. Readers will now be able to see how our main ethical conceptions look in the light of Schopenhauer's distinctive ontological principle. The first section gives his formula for virtue, that it begins with sympathy, or a man's recognition of his own true being in another individual objectively presented to him; the second section defines legal right as a mere limit adventitiously set to wrong; the third expels free-will from the empirical world and gives it only a transcendental meaning; the fourth assigns, as the sole function of experience towards human character, its unmasking, not its making or unmaking; the fifth distinguishes moral impulse both from non-moral impulse and from reason. But Schopenhauer himself seems to have sometimes felt the incompleteness of his system of ethical conceptions, and students must not expect clear and consecutive deductions of them. The puzzle how to account for the diversity of human characters, secluded as they are from the play of empirical influences, and springing all from the free act of the same timeless will, is here solved by him in a strangely easy fashion. "Perhaps," he says, "some one will come after me who will throw light into this dark abyss."

J. BROUGH.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, ABERYSTWYTH.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

ETHICS: an Investigation of the Facts and Laws of the Moral Life. By Professor W. Wundt. Translated from the second German edition (1892) by Professors E. B. Titchener, Julia H. Gulliver, and Margaret F. Washburn. Vol. I. Introduction: *The Facts of the Moral Life.* Vol. II., *Ethical Systems.* London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897.

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THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS, AS BASED ON THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. By Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Translated by A. E. Kroeger. Edited by the Hon. Dr. W. T. Harris. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1897.

SOCIAL AND ETHICAL INTERPRETATIONS IN MENTAL DEVELOPMENT: A Study in Social Psychology. By J. Mark Baldwin. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

THEORY OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE. By Borden P. Bowne. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1897.

THE PHILEBUS OF PLATO. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices, by Robert Gregg Bury, M.A. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1897.

THE WISDOM AND RELIGION OF A GERMAN PHILOSOPHER. Being Selections from the Writings of G. W. F. Hegel. Collected and edited by Elizabeth S. Haldane. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1897.

THE HISTORY OF MANKIND. By Professor Friedrich Ratzel. Translated from the second German edition by A. J. Butler, M.A. With Introduction by E. B. Tylor, D.C.L., F.R.S. With colored plates, maps, and illustrations. Volume II. (Containing Book II., D. The Americans; Book III., The Light Stocks of South and Central Africa; Book IV., The Negro Races, A. The South and East Africans.) London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

EPITOME OF THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY OF HERBERT SPENCER. By F. Howard Collins. With a Preface by Herbert Spencer. Fourth edition. London: Williams & Norgate, 1897.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY, being the Sections relating to that subject in *The Best Books* and *The Reader's Guide*. By William Swan Sonnenschein. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897. [Useful, but already somewhat out of date.]

SOCIALISM AND CHARACTER: a Contribution towards a System of Applied Ethics. By James Leatham. London: The Twentieth Century Press, 1897.

AN OUTLINE INTRODUCTORY TO KANT'S "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." By Professor R. M. Wenley. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1897. Pp. 95. [Seems to be more of the nature of an analysis to guide actual students of the "Critique" than of an introduction to it.]

CHILDREN'S WAYS. [An abridged and popularized edition of *Studies of Childhood*.] By Professor James Sully, M.A., LL.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.

RELIGIONS OF PRIMITIVE PEOPLES. By Daniel G. Brinton, A.M., M.D., LL.D., Sc.D., Professor of American Archæology and Linguistics in the University of Pennsylvania. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1897.

OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. Based on Psychology and History. By Auguste Sabatier. Authorized translation, by the Rev. T. A. Seed. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1897.

THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGION: an Essay in English Culture History. By M. W. Wiseman. London: The University Press, 1897.

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TWO LECTURES ON THEISM. By Professor A. Seth, LL.D. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1897.

A MODERN'S RELIGION. By Ignotus. London: Henry & Co., 1897.

LAZY LESSONS AND ESSAYS ON CONDUCT. [For children.] By W. B. Rands. Edited, with a Preface, by R. Brimley Johnson. London: James Bowden, 1897.

OVER-NUTRITION AND ITS SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES. By Professor Simon N. Patten, Ph.D. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1897.

THE EASTERN QUESTION: A Reprint of Letters written 1853–1856, dealing with the Events of the Crimean War. By Karl Marx. Edited by Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling, D.Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897.

SOCIAL SWITZERLAND. Studies of Present-Day Social Movements and Legislation in the Swiss Republic. By William Harbutt Dawson. London: Chapman & Hall, 1897.

PSYCHOLOGY: an Introductory Manual for the Use of Students. By F. Ryland, M.A. Seventh edition. Revised and largely rewritten. London: George Bell & Sons, 1897.

THE MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATRY AND BOOLE: translated from the Language of the Higher Calculus into that of Elementary Geometry. By Mary Everest Boole. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1897.

THE HERBARTIAN PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO EDUCATION. Being a Series of Essays applying the Psychology of Johann Friedrich Herbart. By John Adams, M.A., B.Sc. London: Isbister & Co., 1897. [Well informed and capable, and written with a good deal of energy and vivacity.]

THE GOSPEL OF HUMANENESS. Selections from the Writings of Count Lyof N. Tolstoi. Vol. VI. of the *Vegetarian Jubilee Library*, edited by Charles W. Forward. London: The Ideal Publishing Union, 1897. [Contains "My Confession," "The Spirit of Christ's Teaching," an extract from "The Kreutzer Sonata," "A Visit to a Slaughter-House," and "Alcohol and Tobacco."]

CHILDREN UNDER THE POOR-LAW: their Education, Training, and After-care. Together with a Criticism of the Report of the Departmental Committee on Metropolitan Poor-Law Schools. By W. Chance, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897.

THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D., Bishop of Cloyne. Edited by George Sampson. With a Biographical Introduction by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P. Vol. I. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1897.

[Contains—"Arithmetic Demonstrated without Euclid or Algebra;" "Mathematical Miscellanies;" "An Essay towards a new Theory of Vision;" "A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge;" "Passive Obedience;" "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." The introductory Essay is reprinted from Balfour's *Essays and Addresses*.]

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THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO. Edited, with Critical Notes and an Introduction on the Text, by James Adam, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1897. [Dedicated to Dr. Jackson. The Introduction and Notes deal exclusively with points of textual criticism.]

LA LOGIQUE DE HEGEL. Par Georges Noël, Professeur de Philosophie au lycée Lakanal. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1897.

[An exceedingly clear introduction to the general principles of Hegelianism. Can be very heartily recommended to all who are interested in the subject.]

MODERN RATIONALISM: being a Sketch of the Progress of the Rationalistic Spirit in the Nineteenth Century. By Joseph McCabe. London: Watts & Co., 1897.

CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS. By Alexander V. G. Allen. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897.

THE COMING PEOPLE. By Charles F. Dole. New York and Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co.

CRIME AND CRIMINALS. By J. Sanderson Christison. Chicago: W. T. Keener Company, 1897.

INEQUALITY AND PROGRESS. By George Harris. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1897.

THE GROWTH OF CHRISTIANITY. By Joseph Henry Crooker. Chicago: Western Unitarian Sunday-School Society, 1897.

VOICES OF DOUBT AND TRUST. By Volney Streamer. New York; Brentano's, 1897.

IDEALS OF LIFE; OR, THE SOUL'S WAY TO GOD. As taught in the Sacred Scriptures of Antiquity. Compiled and arranged by Alfred W. Martin. Tacoma, Washington: City Printing Co., 1897.

SONGS OF HAPPY LIFE. Compiled by Sarah J. Eddy. Providence, R. I.: Art and Nature Study Publishing Co., 1897.

EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF THE CHILDREN'S PLAYGROUNDS. A Novel Plan of Character Building. By Stoyan Vasil Tsanoff. Published for the author. Philadelphia: 1897.

METAFISICA SCIENZA E MORALITA. Studi di Filosofia Morale. Di Francesco de Sarlo. Roma: Tipografia di Giovanni Balbi, 1898. (Davidson.)

KRITISCHE GRUNDLEGUNG DER ETHIK ALS POSITIVER WISSENSCHAFT. Von Dr. med. Wilhelm Stern. Berlin: Ferd Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1897.

PSYCHOLOGIE ALS ERFAHRUNGSWISSENSCHAFT. Von Hans Cornelius. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1897.

DER ÄLTERE PYTHAGOREISMUS. Eine kritische Studie von Dr. Wilhelm Bauer. Bern: Steiger & Cie., 1897.

DIE ERKENNTNISTHEORIE MAIMONS IN IHREM VERHÄLTNIS ZU CARTESIUS, LEIBNITZ, HUME UND KANT. Von Dr. S. Rubin. Bern: Steiger & Cie., 1897.

DIE RECHTLICHKEIT ODER EIN POLITISCH-RECHTLICHER TRAKTAT. Von Dr. Abr. Eleutheropulos. Zurich: Verlag von Cæsar Schmidt, 1897.

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DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI. By Rev. Alan G. Hawkesworth. Albany: Riggs Printing and Publishing Company, 1897.

ESSAI PHILOSOPHIQUE: Quel est le point de vue le plus complet du Monde? et Quels sont les principes de la Raison universelle? Par Henry Lagrésille. Paris et Nancy: Berger-Levrault & Cie., 1897.

THE AGNOSTIC ANNUAL, 1898. Edited by Charles A. Watts. London: Watts & Co., 1897. [Contains—"The Will to Believe," by Leslie Stephen; "The Progress of Liberal Thought," by C. E. Plumptre; "Liberal Orthodoxy," by Professor Goldwin Smith; "The Sources of Modern Doubt," by Joseph McCabe; "The Illusion of Progress," by Mortimer Cecil; "Is Progress an Illusion?—A Reply," by F. J. Gould," etc.]

MIND. October, 1897. London: Williams & Norgate. The October number of *Mind* contains an article by Mr. J. D. Logan on "Fixity of Character: its Ethical Interpretation" (largely with reference to the views of Professor J. Seth on "Freedom"). There is also a Discussion (in reply to Mr. Fairbrother) on "Aristotle's Explanation of ΑΚΡΑΣΙΑ," by Professor Ritchie (who also contributes a review of the new translation of Zeller's *Aristotle*. Mr. E. H. Donkin's "Suggestions on Æsthetics" may be read in connection with Professor Titchener's review of two æsthetical works. There is also an interesting review of Professor James's *Will to Believe*, by Mr. F. C. S. Schiller. Professor Muirhead's article on "The Goal of Knowledge" is partly in criticism of Mr. Bradley and Mr. McTaggart. The most striking article, however, in this number of *Mind* is that by F. Carstanjen (translated by Mrs. Bosanquet) on "Richard Avenarius and his General Theory of Knowledge, Empirio-Criticism," the first connected account we have had of the fundamental point of view of that remarkable writer, who is just beginning to attract attention in England.

THE ECONOMIC REVIEW. Published quarterly for the Oxford University Branch of the Christian Social Union. Vol. VII., No. 4. October, 1897. London: Rivington's.

[Contains a very interesting article by Mr. Sidney Ball on "Socialism and Individualism: a Challenge and an Eirenikon," being a reply to the recent criticisms of the Master of Balliol and the authors of "Essays on Liberalism." Mr. Ball urges that Socialism ought not to be understood as the antithesis of Individualism, but rather in the sense of Social Democracy. Certainly, if the word is to continue to be used at all, it seems very desirable that we should have a clear definition of it; but it appears doubtful whether this has yet been secured. Apart from this, much of the doctrine advanced by Mr. Ball will probably meet with general assent. There are also articles on "The Workmen's Compensation Act," "Is Co-operation a Failure?" "The Agricultural Laborer: a Rejoinder," and "The Value of an Ideal."]

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:

Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.

Prof. Fr. Jodl, 45 Porzellangasse, Vienna, Austria.

Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Merchiston, near Cardiff, Wales.

Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1898.

ETHICAL SURVIVALS IN MUNICIPAL CORRUPTION.

In submitting this paper on Ethical Survivals in Municipal Corruption, the writer is giving her own experience from an eight years' residence in a ward of Chicago which has, during all of that time, returned to the city council a notoriously corrupt politician. To say that all the men who vote for him are also corrupt, or that they approve of his dealings, is manifestly unfair; but to find the motives from which the votes are cast is not an easy matter.

The status of the ethics attained by a given community is difficult to determine, and a newly-arrived resident is almost sure to make mistakes. He often fatuously attempts to correct public morals and change civic ideals without knowing the processes by which the present corrupt standards were obtained, and sometimes quite ignorant of the motives and temptations of those who naïvely hold those standards.

Living together as we do, within the narrow boundary of a Chicago ward, fifty thousand people of a score of different tongues and nationalities, the writer is much impressed with the fact that all that holds us together—Latin, Celt, Teuton, Jew, and Slav, as we are—is our intrinsic human nature,—the few basic experiences which we hold in common. Our social ethics have been determined much more by example

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than by precept, just as our religious life is largely determined by the biographies of the saints. As Stanley points out, "the 'Acta Sanctorum' have been, after all, the main guide of the stumbling feet of thousands of Christians, the solace of darkened understandings, to whom the Credo has been but mysterious words." Or, in the scientific phrasing of Wundt, "the conclusion is inevitable that the idea of morality is at first intimately connected with the person and personal conduct, and that its severance from this substrata is a very slow and gradual process." Granting, then, that morality develops far earlier in the form of moral fact than in the higher form of moral ideas, it becomes obvious that ideas only operate upon the popular mind through will and character, and that goodness has to be dramatized before it reaches the mass of men. Ethics as well as political opinions may be discussed and disseminated among the sophisticated by lectures and printed pages, but to the common people they can only come through example,—through a personality which seizes the popular imagination. The advantage of an unsophisticated neighborhood is, that the inhabitants do not keep their ideas as treasures; they are untouched by the notion of accumulating them, as one does knowledge or money, and frankly act upon those they have. The personal example promptly rouses to emulation. In a neighborhood where political standards are plastic and undeveloped, and where there has been little previous experiences in self-government, the office-holder himself sets the standard, and the ideas that cluster around him exercise a specific and permanent influence upon the political morality of his constituents. If his standard is low, it may be urged in his defence that he came into office with morals as plastic as those of his humbler neighbors, and that this plasticity has been seized upon and impressed by the cynical stamp of the corporations; but moral debauchery is nevertheless the result, and it will take years to change the impression if the stamp is once fairly set. No greater mistake could be made than to assume that politics is something off by itself which does not affect the common lot.

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We must also take into consideration what his various neighbors have brought with them from their own countries, and remember that custom has a greater power of persistence than law or morality, and also that outward forms of conduct are apt to outlast the thought and feelings from which they sprang. Many Bohemians, for instance, have emigrated to this country, largely from the hope of getting away from Austrian oppression, both of the church and state. Their attitude towards the government under which they were born is one of distinct hostility. Some of the journalists and political leaders are so reactionary that to state that they are atheists and anarchists is in their minds to bid for popularity. Such men continually declare that both church and state pretend to protect in order that they may oppress, although they are living in a country in which both church and state are free institutions. Most of the Italians and even some of the Germans, in spite of all their love for the fatherland, have emigrated in order to escape service in the army. The Polish and Russian Jews, of course, have fled from persecution either active or threatened. The Irish bring with them the notion that the men who govern are rack-rent landlords; for centuries the substance of their forefathers was seized by rapacious landlords, who represented the governing class. It has long been regarded as legitimate for Irishmen to get as much as possible out of the English government, because they have been so grievously oppressed by it. Many a politician has come from Ireland, not only with the desire to feed at the public crib, but with a conviction that it is perfectly legitimate to do so, and it is the Irishmen who largely teach political methods to the others living in their vicinity, and who dramatize for them the aims and objects of civic government. It would be interesting to trace the effects of this old wrong of England against Ireland in the government of our American cities. The first Tammany ring, for instance, showed in itself the stubbornness and power of a deep-rooted growth that certainly did not spring solely from New York soil. When we recall the heroic devotion and generous self-sacrifice of which the Irish race has always been capable, is it not clear

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that this sordidness and self-interest in regard to public affairs spring from their governmental experiences?

While the American-born people of the same community are putting forth a claim for a well-ordered democratic government, they at the same time shirk the responsibilities of self-governing citizens. The early enthusiasm for self-government was engendered by men who lived out their democratic principles. The impulse they gave was so energetic that it has outlived two generations of jobbery and office-vending, but the old impulse cannot always last, and we find little left of that old town meeting endeavor but patriotic phrases and a cloak of public spirit, under which American-born politicians too often hide office-seeking.

Nothing is more certain than that the quality which a heterogeneous population, living in one of the less sophisticated wards, most admires is the quality of simple goodness; that the man who attracts them is the one whom they believe to be a good man. We all know that children long "to be good" with an intensity which they give to no other ambition. We can all remember that the earliest strivings of our childhood were in this direction, and we venerated grown people because they had attained perfection.

Primitive people, such as the south Italian peasants who live in the Nineteenth Ward, are still in this stage. They want to be good, and deep down in their hearts they admire nothing so much as the good man. Abstract virtues are too difficult for their untrained minds to apprehend, and many of them are still simple enough to believe that power and wealth come only to good people.

The successful candidate, then, must be a good man according to the standards of his constituents. He must not attempt to hold up a morality beyond them, nor must he attempt to reform or change the standard. His safety lies in doing on a large scale the good deeds which his constituents are able to do only on a small scale. If he believes what they believe, and does what they are all cherishing a secret ambition to do, he will dazzle them by his success and win their confidence. There is a certain wisdom in this course. There is a common

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sense in the mass of men which cannot be neglected with impunity, just as there is sure to be an eccentricity in the differing and reforming individual which it is perhaps well to challenge. Any one who has lived among poorer people, cannot fail to be impressed with their constant kindness to each other; that unfailing response to the needs and distresses of their neighbors, even when in danger of bankruptcy themselves. This is their reward for living in the midst of poverty. They have constant opportunities for self-sacrifice and generosity, to which, as a rule, they respond. The human kindness which a poor man shows to his distressed neighbor is doubtless heightened by the consciousness that he himself may be in distress next week. The gruff and hearty good fellowship is not altogether unlike that of a frontier town. A man stands by his friend when he gets too drunk to take care of himself, when he loses his wife or child, when he is evicted for non-payment of rent, when he is arrested for a petty crime. It seems to such a man entirely fitting that his alderman should do the same thing on a larger scale,— that he should help a constituent out of trouble just because he is in trouble, irrespective of the justice involved.

The alderman, therefore, bails out his constituents when they are arrested, or says a good word to the police justice when they appear before him for trial; uses his "pull" with the magistrate when they are likely to be fined for a civil misdemeanor, or sees what he can do to "fix up matters" with the State's attorney, when the charge is really a serious one.

A gray-faced woman visited Hull House one morning and asked that her son be helped out of the city prison, because he was her last support. The alderman had always done it for her, but the boy had been arrested so often that even his patience, the most colossal she had ever known, had given way. One of her boys was in the penitentiary, and one of them in the reform school for a term of years, and if this one, her Benjamin, were sent up she would have no wages forthcoming. The alderman had bailed them out and spoken to the judges many times since they were little fellows. He had begun when her husband was still living, but he had kept on

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long after she was a widow, and when the boys were still too young to vote, which the neighbors all said was "mighty good of him." The mother had no notion of the indifference for law which this course had fostered in her sons; she was only in despair that her long-suffering and powerful friend had at last come to the position when he could no longer serve her and could only give his sympathy. It did not occur to any of those concerned that the sense of justice was thus slowly undermined and law-breaking encouraged.

Of a like blighting effect upon public morals was the alderman's action in standing by an Italian padrone of the ward when he was indicted for violating the Civil Service law. The Commissioners had sent out notices to certain Italian day-laborers who were upon the eligible list that they were to report for work at a given day and hour. One of the padrones intercepted these notifications and sold them to the men for five dollars apiece, making also the usual bargain for a share of the wages. The padrone's entire arrangement followed the custom which had prevailed for years before the enactment of the Civil Service law. Ten of the laborers swore out warrants against the padrone, who was convicted and fined seventy-five dollars. This sum was promptly paid by the alderman; and the padrone, assured that he would be protected from any further trouble, returned triumphant to the colony. The simple Italians were much bewildered by this show of a power stronger than that of the Civil Service law which they had trusted as they did that of Italy. This was one of the first violations of its authority, and various sinister acts have followed, until no Nineteenth Ward Italian feels quite secure in holding his job unless he is backed by the friendship of the alderman. According to the Civil Service law, a laborer has no right to a trial; many are discharged by the foreman, and find that they can be reinstated only upon the aldermanic recommendation. The alderman thus practically holds his old power over the laborers working for the city, and the popular mind is convinced that an honest administration of the Civil Service is impossible, and that it is but one more instrument in the hands of the powerful. It will be

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difficult to establish genuine Civil Service among these men who learn only by experience, to their minds it is "no good."

Because of simple friendliness, the alderman is expected to pay rent for the hard-pressed tenant when no rent is forthcoming, to find jobs when work is hard to get, to procure and divide among his constituents all the places which he can seize from the city hall. The alderman of the Nineteenth Ward at one time made the proud boast that he had two thousand six hundred people in his ward upon the public pay-roll. This, of course, included day-laborers, but each one felt under distinct obligations to him for getting the job. When we reflect that this is one-third of the entire vote of the ward, we realize that it is very important to vote for the right man, since there is, at the least, one chance out of three for a job.

If we recollect, further, that the franchise-seeking companies pay respectful heed to the applicants backed by the alderman, the question of voting for the successful man becomes as much an industrial as a political one. An Italian laborer wants a job more than anything else, and quite simply votes for the man who promises him one. It is not so different from his relation to the padrone, and, indeed, the two strengthen each other.

The alderman may himself be quite sincere in his acts of kindness. In certain stages of moral evolution, a man is incapable of unselfish action, the results of which will not benefit some one of his acquaintances; still more, of conduct that does not aim to assist any individual whatsoever; and it is a long step in moral progress to appreciate the work done by the individual for the community. An office-seeker may begin with the simple desire to alleviate suffering, and this may gradually change into the desire to put his constituents under obligations to him; but the action of such an individual becomes a demoralizing element in the community when a noble purpose is made the cloak for the satisfaction of lower impulses, and when the plastic morals of his constituents are thus formed to his own undeveloped standards.

While our political system has grown more and more com-

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plicated upon the basic assumption that the individual merges his interest in those of the community, and attains his own ends in terms of the common weal, such men living in the community are seeking solely their own advantage, and striving to obtain personal ends at the expense of the state. As the political system cannot change its direction, it brings the incongruity to the extreme limit of contradiction; a man holding office is known to the community to be there for the sake of "what there is in it;" or a candidate openly announces that his business affairs have gone badly; that he wants his chance at public office; that his opponent is now rich enough.

The alderman gives presents at weddings and christenings. He seizes these days of family festivities for making friends. It is easiest to reach people in the holiday mood of expansive good-will, but on their side it seems natural and kindly that he should do it. The alderman procures passes from the railroads when his constituents wish to visit friends or to attend the funerals of distant relatives; he buys tickets galore for benefit entertainments given for a widow or a consumptive in peculiar distress; he contributes to prizes which are awarded to the handsomest lady or the most popular man. At a church bazaar, for instance, the alderman finds the stage all set for his dramatic performance. When others are spending pennies he is spending dollars. Where anxious relatives are canvassing to secure votes for the two most beautiful children who are being voted upon, he recklessly buys votes from both sides, and laughingly declines to say which one he likes the best, buying off the young lady who is persistently determined to find out, with five dollars for the flower bazaar, the posies, of course, to be sent to the sick of the parish. The moral atmosphere of a bazaar suits him exactly. He murmurs many times, "Never mind; the money all goes to the poor," or "It is all straight enough if the church gets it," or "The poor won't ask too many questions." The oftener he can put sentiments of that sort into the minds of his constituents, the better he is pleased. Nothing so rapidly prepares them to take his view of money-getting and money-spending.

There is something archaic in a community of simple people

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in their attitude towards death and burial. Nothing so easy to collect money for as a funeral, and one involuntarily remembers that the early religious tithes were paid to ward off death and ghosts. At times one encounters almost the Greek feeling in regard to burial. If the alderman seizes upon festivities for expressions of his good-will, much more does he seize upon periods of sorrow. At a funeral he has the double advantage of ministering to a genuine craving for comfort and solace, and at the same time of assisting at an important social function. That curious feeling of remorse, which is an accompaniment of quick sorrow, that desire to "make up" for past delinquencies, to show the world how much, after all, we loved the person who has just died, is as natural as it is universal.

In addition to this, there is among the poor, who have few social occasions, a great desire for a well-arranged funeral, the grade of which almost determines their social standing in the neighborhood. The alderman saves the very poorest of his constituents from that awful horror of burial by the county; he provides carriages for the poor, who otherwise could not have them; for the more prosperous he sends extra carriages, so that they may invite more friends and have a longer procession; for the most prosperous of all there will be probably only a large "flower-piece." It may be too much to say that all the relatives and friends who ride in the carriages provided by the alderman's bounty vote for him, but they are certainly influenced by his kindness, and talk of his virtues during the long hours of the ride back and forth from the suburban cemetery. A man who would ask at such a time where all this money comes from would be considered sinister. They certainly do not discuss the alderman's corruption during the long ride. You cannot very well run a man down when you are sitting in a carriage provided by his generosity. The tendency to speak lightly of the faults of the dead and to judge them gently is transferred to the living, and many a man at such a time has formulated a lenient judgment of political corruption and has heard kindly speeches which he has remembered on election day. "Ah, well, he has a big

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Irish heart. He is good to the widow and the fatherless." "He knows the poor better than the big guns who are always about talking civil service and reform."

Indeed, what headway can the notion of civic purity, of honesty of administration, make against this big manifestation of human friendliness, this stalking survival of village kindness? The notions of the civic reformer are negative and impotent before it. The reformers give themselves over largely to criticisms of the present state of affairs, to writing and talking of what the future must be; but their goodness is not dramatic; it is not even concrete and human.

Such an alderman will keep a standing account with an undertaker, and telephone every week, and sometimes more than once, the kind of outfit he wishes provided for a bereaved constituent, until the sum may roll up into hundreds a year. Such a man understands what the people want, and ministers just as truly to a great human need as the musician or the artist does. I recall an attempt to substitute what we might call a later standard.

A delicate little child was deserted in the Hull House nursery. An investigation showed that it had been born ten days previously in the Cook County hospital, but no trace could be found of the unfortunate mother. The little thing lived for several weeks, and then, in spite of every care, died. We decided to have it buried by the county, and the wagon was to arrive by eleven o'clock. About nine o'clock in the morning the rumor of this awful deed reached the neighbors. A half dozen of them came, in a very excited state of mind, to protest. They took up a collection out of their poverty with which to defray a funeral. We were then comparatively new in the neighborhood. We did not realize that we were really shocking a genuine moral sentiment of the community. In our crudeness, we instanced the care and tenderness which had been expended upon the little creature while it was alive; that it had had every attention from a skilled physician and trained nurse; we even intimated that the excited members of the group had not taken part in this, and that it now lay with us to decide that the child should be buried, as it had

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been born, at the county's expense. It is doubtful whether Hull House has ever done anything which injured it so deeply in the minds of some of its neighbors. We were only forgiven by the most indulgent on the ground that we were spinsters and could not know a mother's heart. No one born and reared in the community could possibly have made a mistake like that. No one who had studied the ethical standards with any care could have bungled so completely.

The amount of sentiment among simple people is constantly underestimated. The songs which are most popular among them are those of reminiscent old age, in which the ripened soul calmly recounts and regrets the sins of his youth, —songs in which the wayward daughter is forgiven by her loving parents, in which the lovers are magnanimous and faithful through all vicissitudes. The tendency is to condone and forgive, and not to hold too rigidly to a standard. In the theatres it is the magnanimous man, the kindly reckless villain who is always applauded. So shrewd an observer as Samuel Johnson once remarked that it was surprising to find how much more kindness than justice society contained.

The alderman of the Nineteenth Ward owns several saloons, one down town within easy access of the city hall, where he can catch the more important of his friends. Here again he has seized upon an old tradition and primitive custom,—the good-fellowship which has long been best expressed when men drink together. The saloons offer a common meeting-ground, with stimulants enough to free the wits and tongues of the men who meet there.

Last Christmas, our alderman distributed six tons of turkeys, and four or more tons of ducks and geese; but each luckless biped was handed out either by himself or one of his friends with a "Merry Christmas." Inevitably, some families got three or four apiece, but what of that? He had none of the nagging rules of the charitable societies, nor was he ready to declare that, because a man wanted two turkeys for Christmas, he was a scoundrel, who should never be allowed to eat turkey again.

Of course, there are those who see through the schemes.

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Some constituents merely suspect, others connive, and still others glory in the fact that they can thus "soak the alderman." The young man who fills his pockets with handfuls of cigars, giving a sly wink at his companions, takes a step downward to the position where he is willing to sell his vote to both parties, and then scratch his ticket as he pleases. Less than a year ago a man in ordinary conversation with the writer complained quite openly, and with no sense of shame, that he had sold his vote for only two dollars this year, and that he was awfully disappointed. The writer happened to know that his income during the nine months previous had been but twenty-eight dollars; that he was in debt thirty-two dollars; and she could well imagine the eagerness with which he had counted upon this source of revenue. The situation revealed once more the difficulty of attaining virtue by those hardest pressed in the industrial struggle; and in the revelation the writer felt the familiar grip that silences us all in the presence of temptations which have never been ours.

There is an old story which the writer has many times heard to the effect that a respectable candidate once tried to run against this popular alderman of ours, and was somewhat embarrassed by receiving an offer of help from the president of a large temperance society. He knew it would make him unpopular to be thus befriended, but he did not quite dare to refuse so moral a backing. The president and several of the members made a vigorous campaign, speaking in his behalf almost every night at the various meetings, and impressively asserting that, if the reform candidate were elected, he would soon have all the saloons of the ward closed at ten o'clock at night. The candidate ventured to protest once or twice that he had not thought of going to that extreme, but this protest so shocked the temperance orators that he at last gave it up. Such a campaign naturally made him very unpopular, and he lost heavily. On the day of the election he was surprised to see the president of the temperance society at the polls, openly working for his rival. He was quite nettled enough by that time to challenge him fiercely, only to receive the spirited reply, "I hope you weren't fool enough

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to think that I made those temperance speeches to help you along. I made them for the other man, and he is going in, too." Of what use to protest? The president was quite willing to retire, both from the society and from temperance, for he had received an office in the city hall.

The alderman's wisdom was again displayed in procuring from down town friends the sum of three thousand dollars wherewith to uniform and equip a boy's temperance brigade which had been formed in the ward a few months before his campaign. Is it strange that the good leader, whose heart was filled with innocent pride as he looked upon these promising young scions of virtue, should decline to enter into a reform campaign? Of what use to suggest that uniforms and bayonets for the purpose of promoting temperance, bought with money contributed by a man who was the proprietor of a saloon and a gambling house, might perhaps confuse the ethics of the young soldiers? Why take the pains to urge that it was vain to lecture and march abstract virtues into them, so long as the champion boodler of the town was the man whom the boys recognized as the loyal and kind-hearted friend, the public-spirited citizen, whom their fathers enthusiastically voted for, and their mothers called the friend of the poor? So long as the actual and tangible success is thus embodied, marching, whether in kindergartens or brigades, does little to change this family ideal of goodness.

The question does, of course, occur to many minds, Where does the money come from with which to dramatize so successfully? The more primitive people accept the truthful statement of its sources without any shock to their moral sense. To their simple minds he gets it "from the rich," and so long as he again gives it out to the poor, as a true Robin Hood, with open hand, they have no objections to offer. Their ethics are quite honestly those of the merry-making foresters. The next less primitive people of the vicinage are quite willing to admit that he leads "the gang" in the city council, and sells out the city franchises; that he makes deals with the franchise-seeking companies; that he guarantees to steer dubious measures through the council, for which he de-

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mands liberal pay; that he is, in short, a successful boodler. But when there is intellect enough to get this point of view, there is also enough to make the contention that this is universally done; that all the aldermen do it more or less successfully, but that the alderman of the Nineteenth Ward is unique in being so generous; that such a state of affairs is to be deplored, of course, but that that is the way business is run, and we are fortunate when a kind-hearted man who is close to the people gets a large share of the boodle; that he serves these franchised companies who employ men in the building and construction of their enterprises, and that they are bound in return to give jobs to his constituency. It is again the justification of stealing from the rich to give to the poor. Even when they are intelligent enough to complete the circle, and to see that the money comes, not from the pockets of the companies' agents, but from the street-car fares of people like themselves, it almost seems as if they would rather pay two cents more each time they ride than give up the consciousness that they have a big, warm-hearted friend at court who will stand by them in an emergency. The sense of just dealing comes apparently much later than the desire for protection and kindness. On the whole, the gifts and favors are taken quite simply, as an evidence of good and loving kindness, or are accepted as inevitable political measures.

The alderman is really elected because he is a good friend and neighbor. He is corrupt, of course, but he is not elected because he is corrupt, but rather in spite of it. His standard suits his constituents. He exemplifies and exaggerates the popular type of a good man. He has attained what his constituents secretly long for.

At one end of the ward there is a street of good houses, familiarly called "Con Row." The term is perhaps quite unjustly used, but it is nevertheless universally applied because some of these houses are occupied by professional office-holders. This row is supposed to form a happy hunting ground of the successful politician, where he can live in prosperity, and still maintain his vote and influence in the ward.

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It would be difficult, I imagine, justly to estimate the influence which the successful and prominent alderman who lives here, has upon the ideals of the youth of the vicinity, to whose minds the path which leads to riches and success, to civic prominence and honor, is the path of the corrupt politician.

The writer remembers that when she was ten years old, the village school-master told his little flock, without any mitigating clauses, that Jay Gould laid the foundation of his colossal fortune by always saving bits of string; and that, as a result, every child in the village assiduously collected parti-colored balls of twine. It is needless to tell any Chicago boy who reads the newspapers that the most prominent alderman in Chicago is the keeper of a gambling house, and obtains large sums of money for services rendered in the council to the corporations; in short, that his success is founded upon law-breaking. One day the papers announce that he has been indicted for gambling, the next that he has been elected president of a great political organization. Even my village mind at the tender age of ten would, I think, have seen a connection which is certainly quite as close as Jay Gould's millions and bits of twine. A bright Chicago boy—not necessarily a Nineteenth Ward boy, but any boy in town—might well draw the inference that the path of the corrupt politician not only leads to civic honor, but to the glories of benevolence and philanthropy. This confusion was fortunately spared my infant mind in regard to Jay Gould, for we were never told that he was philanthropic.

We must also remember that the imitative impulse plays an important part in life, and that the loss of social estimation, keenly felt by all of us, is perhaps most dreaded by the humblest. It is doubtless true that freedom for individual conduct, the power to give only due weight to the opinions of one's neighbors, is one of the latest developments of civilization. A form of constraint, gentle but powerful, is afforded by the simple desire to do what others do, in order to share with them the approval of the community. Of course, the larger the number of people among whom an habitual mode

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of conduct obtains, the greater the constraint it puts upon the individual will. Thus it is that the great corruption of the city presses most heavily where it can least be resisted and is most likely to be imitated.

According to the same law, the positive evils of corrupt government are bound to fall heaviest upon the poorest and least capable. When the water of Chicago is foul, the prosperous buy water bottled at distant springs; the poor have no alternative but the typhoid fever which comes from using the city's supply. When the garbage contracts are not enforced, the well-to-do pay for private service; the poor suffer the discomfort and illness which are inevitable from a foul atmosphere. The prosperous business man has a certain choice as to whether he will treat with the boss politician or preserve his independence on a smaller income; but to an Italian day-laborer it is a choice between obeying the commands of a political boss or practical starvation. Again, a more intelligent man may philosophize a little upon the present state of corruption, and reflect that it is but a phase of our commercialism, from which we are bound to emerge; at any rate, he may solace himself with the ideals of literature and history; but the more ignorant man who lives only in the narrow present has no such resource, and slowly the conviction enters his mind that politics is a matter of favors and positions, that self-government means pleasing the boss and standing in with the gang. This slowly acquired knowledge he hands on to his family. During the month of February his boy may come home from school with rather incoherent tales about Washington and Lincoln, and the father may for the moment be fired to tell of Garibaldi, but such talk is only periodic, and the long year round the fortunes of the entire family, even to the opportunity to earn food and shelter, depend upon the boss.

This lowering of standards, this setting of an ideal, is perhaps the worst of the situation, for daily by our actions and decisions we not only determine ideals for ourselves, but largely for each other. We are all involved in this political corruption, and as members of the community stand indicted. This is the penalty of a democracy,—that we are bound to

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move forward or retrograde together. None of us can stand aside, for our feet are mired in the same soil, and our lungs breathe the same air.

During a campaign a year and a half ago, when a reform league put up a candidate against our corrupt alderman, and when Hull House worked hard to rally the moral sentiment of the ward in favor of the new man, we encountered another and unexpected difficulty. Finding that it was hard to secure enough local speakers of the moral tone which we desired, we imported orators from other parts of the town, from the "better element," so to speak. Suddenly we heard it rumored on all sides that, while the money and speakers for the reform candidate were coming from the swells, the money which was backing our corrupt alderman also came from a swell source; it was rumored that the president of a street-car combination, for whom he performed constant offices in the city council, was ready to back him to the extent of fifty thousand dollars; that he, too, was a good man, and sat in high places; that he had recently given a large sum of money to an educational institution, and was therefore as philanthropic, not to say good and upright, as any man in town; that our alderman had the sanction of the highest authorities, and that the lecturers who were talking against corruption, and the selling and buying of franchises, were only the cranks, and not the solid business men who had developed and built up Chicago.

All parts of the community are bound together in ethical development. If the so-called more enlightened members of the community accept public gifts from the man who buys up the council, and the so-called less enlightened members accept individual gifts from the man who sells out the council, we surely must take our punishment together. There is the difference, of course, that in the first case we act collectively, and in the second case individually; but is the punishment of cynicism which follows the first any lighter or less far reaching in its consequences than the arousing of this imitative impulse which follows the second?

Another curious experience during that campaign was the difference of standards between the imported speakers and

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the audience. One man high in the council of the "better element," one evening, used as an example of the philanthropic politician an alderman of the vicinity recently dead, who was devotedly loved and mourned by his constituents. When the audience caught the familiar name in the midst of the platitudes, they brightened up wonderfully. But, as the speaker went on, they first looked puzzled, then astounded, and gradually their astonishment turned to indignation. The speaker, all unconscious of the situation, went on, imagining, perhaps, that he was addressing his usual audience, and totally unaware that he was perpetrating an outrage upon the finest feelings of the people who were sitting before him. He certainly succeeded in irrevocably injuring the chances of the candidate for whom he was speaking. The speaker's standard of ethics was upright dealing in positions of public trust. The standard of ethics held by his audience was, being good to the poor and speaking gently of the dead. If he considered them corrupt and illiterate voters, they quite honestly held him a blackguard.

If we would hold to our political democracy, some pains must be taken to keep on common ground in our human experiences, and to some solidarity in our ethical conceptions. Just because, in America, we have a wide difference in our traditions, customs, religion, and language, must we cherish our moral awakenings, our mutual compunctions, and strivings for better things. A strenuous moral appeal meets with a much surer response than one based upon prejudice or patriotism. Kinship of a common moral nature is the last and most comprehensive of all bases of union. The meaning of life is, after all, to search out and then to conform our activities to our new knowledge. And if we discover that men of low ideals and corrupt practice are forming popular political standards simply because such men stand by and for and with the people, then nothing remains but to obtain a like sense of identification before we can hope to modify ethical standards.

A neighborhood of less sophisticated people has one advantage that when a dramatized truth does reach them, it excites at the same time their hero worship, and their disposition to

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follow. They thus balance their opinions by their living, and if we could but dramatize "public spirit," it is conceivable that their big emotional ethics, just because it constantly results in activity, has in it a possibility for a higher and wider life than the ethics of those of us who are content to hold it merely as a possession. We may learn to trust our huge and uncouth democracy in its ethics, as we are coming to trust it in other directions, for by slow degrees the law emerges. "That conduct which opposes the ends of the common weal must finally give way to conduct which furthers those ends."

JANE ADDAMS.

HULL HOUSE, CHICAGO.

THEORY AND PRACTICE.

CAREFUL consideration of the ways in which the nature and relations of Theory and Practice are viewed in ordinary life will lead to the discovery that hardly any statement is made on the subject to which a counter-statement is not directly opposed. It will be found that one view maintains that theory occupies one sphere of a man's life and practice another with no needful relation between them, that therefore a man may hold what opinions he chooses, he can and must keep his practice far from their influence, because his conduct must bear the scrutiny of the moral judgments. Another view is that there must be and is a direct relation between opinion and practice; that a man cannot and ought not to hold one opinion or set of opinions and allow his conduct to proceed according to principles opposed to and different from the opinions he holds. Some, again, will allow a relation between theory and practice, but these will divide themselves into two parties, one side maintaining that practice should decide the value of opinion, that all opinions not "applicable" are visionary or false; the other side holding that opinion as the expression of truth is self-subsistent, that practice is secondary though necessary as the concrete manifestation of opinion, that the final value of opinion can be determined by

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its consistency. Further, if we take actual experience as it unconsciously reveals itself we will find an incessant flux of theory in the history of thought itself, and in the history of the individual. Nothing is more apparent than the modification or annihilation of one theory by another; what claimed the intellectual assent of one epoch will not be sanctioned by those who share the spirit of a later; different views are held at one and the same time by different thinkers dealing with the same object; unity and uniformity seem nowhere realized. An individual, again, is observed to hold different and opposed positions at different periods in his life, and even to hold contradictory or conflicting opinions at the same time, and to maintain his sincerity and conviction regarding all his opinions. And in what is usually called practical life we find men whose action reveals a principle of conduct directly opposed to their admitted opinions. Further, men can apparently breathe the atmosphere of an epoch and yet, ostensibly at least, not be affected by the general ideas and principles, still less by the "theories" which are current in it, while clearly if we are to give any meaning to the "spirit of the age," such indifference should not at all be expected. The numerous theories offered on subjects of direct interest to man's life are almost entirely neglected by the ordinary man of action, either through inability to decide which of the opposed views is true or through lack of time to examine them. Conduct seems to proceed along one line and the intellectual life of the world, let it be never so claimant regarding the importance of its discovered truths, to pursue its own course; and yet it is evident that conduct with its principles must be affected somehow by the influence of current theories. All this applies not merely to particular spheres of practical life, as, for example, the moral and religious life, strictly so called, and the influence exerted upon them by ideas and "theories" specially relevant in those spheres, but also to the general trend of the active life of an age and to the influence exerted on this by all the various conclusions of the different sciences. Now, the *practical* question which arises out of such a complex state of affairs is, what are the nature and limits of the compromise

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which each individual must make between the actual and practical demands of his life and the claims of truth? the *theoretical* question, which is at bottom the final question, is, what, as a matter of fact, is the relation between practice and theory? Does the one stand in an inner and necessary connection with the other; and if so, what is the form of that relation? And especially what is the relation between theory and practice in the spheres of morality and religion? It is this second (the theoretical) question which we seek to answer in this paper. Needless to say the first (the practical) method of meeting the difficulty suggested is most common, while again it is equally clear that even to carry out the compromise effectually the second question must, to some extent at least, have been answered. The imperative necessity for such an inquiry and some solution of it any acquaintance with life will make sufficiently evident. . . . We must first of all determine the general characteristics which theory is considered to possess when it is brought into relation to practice. As a controlling principle or guide in action theory is found opposed, *e.g.*, to "instinct," to habit, to emotion, to "natural inclinations or tendencies," to "common sense," to established principle, to the "dictates of experience." With hardly any exception theory is contrasted adversely with these others; they are regarded as more trustworthy guides to action than theory. An element of arbitrariness, subjectivity, is supposed to belong inevitably to theory, which therefore carries a suggestion of insecurity and untruthfulness with it. These other supports of action are considered to hold more directly of reality, to be in closer contact with the "facts of the case," to be less derived from our own minds, in a word, to be more objective in every sense. But be it noted both theory and these non-theoretical forms are *primâ facie* on the same level, they are all sources of direction in conduct; theory is not *as such* false or even doubtful, nor are those other forms *always* infallibly trustworthy. For example, in the carrying out of some new theory, in the application of some purely scientific principle to practical affairs, no other direction is possible but that of the formal theory, and, indeed, none other is

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believed in by those engaged in the work. On the other hand, it is well known that "instinct" or again "common sense" is of very doubtful value or of no value whatever in those circumstances where action depends on foresight and reflective circumspection. And so of the other non-theoretical modes of determining action. These same considerations hold good in the direction of moral action proper as well as in regard to practical activity of other kinds. Theoretical and non-theoretical guides in action may both be secure and insecure according to circumstances. So far the ordinary view would agree with us. When we ask, however, what, the above being granted, constitutes the ground of difference between theory and non-theoretical forms, what is the source of general distrust in the one and trust in the other, an answer somewhat of this description is given: that "theory is entirely in our own minds, it arises there, and you can never be certain that it actually will agree with facts, and unless it do so of course it cannot be trustworthy; while instinct, etc., are actually built into our experience, they are part of our constitution, we dare not distrust them without grave risk to the security of life." These last, in short, are on the face of them self-evident, while *self*-evidence is precisely what the former lacks, the evidence for its worth depends not on itself but on what is outside itself, on the "facts" with which it is to "agree." Such is fairly the general view, a view which we see insisted on in all phases of practical life, in all spheres of conduct, from the practical scientist to the practical man with the rule of thumb, in religion and morality as well as in the business of the world. Yet it does not seem on consideration to be at all admissible, nor will the interpretation usually given in any wise reconcile the facts of the case. We do not question the truth of the principles by which conduct is guided in all its departments, we do not doubt the sincerity of the belief in the principle in all cases; our point is that the interpretation put upon its principles and the reasons given for the maintenance of the abrupt distinction and, indeed, separation between the theoretical and the non-theoretical guides in conduct seem unsound and untenable. For, in the first place, the above offered ground of difference is

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not valid. Granted, as every one does, that common sense, instinct, etc., sometimes fail us, and that theory is often the only guide we can have, and surely the proffered reason for trust in the one and distrust in the other falls to the ground.

It is plain that the fact that a theory emanates from our minds cannot be in itself a reason for distrusting it, for, since all knowledge arises from our minds, on such a view all knowledge would be doubtful by virtue of that very condition by which alone it can exist at all. And it is likewise plain that the deliverances of instinct, etc., cannot as such be self-evident if circumstances arise where instinct is of no value; all that we dare mean by such a contention on behalf of instinct is that in those circumstances where as a matter-of-fact instinct can guide us completely the deliverances of instinct will be self-evidently trustworthy. But these circumstances will be found to be such that no other guide in them is either possible or necessary; and again, circumstances will similarly be found where theory alone can guide us, and which therefore must be accepted to be in its own sphere quite as self-evidently trustworthy. In short, the only valid reason for trustworthiness, or the reverse, whether in regard to theory or "common sense," is the confirmation by experience of the final result. It is by experience that the security of a theory is assured, or the belief in "common sense" maintained, and it is likewise through experience that the insecurity of both is revealed. Ordinary life can offer no more valid ground for its faith in its principles than that. It is not over-nice about their self-evidence or even about their truth. All are good enough for its purpose, all are tenable if they will only work properly. Experience in general is a kind of sum in the simpler processes of arithmetic; the answer may involve a considerable fraction, but it is not careful for the fraction provided it can retain the round numbers. There is a rough equilibrium which it persists in maintaining, and it can retain this equilibrium in a very indefinite number of ways. It will not avail to assert that the ground of distinction between the theoretical and non-theoretical above given is "in general" true, that in general instinct, etc., are more trustworthy and valid than theory·

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For in the last resort this will be found to mean simply that the non-theoretical are more generally appealed to, and required for practical life; but this is due to the conditions of that life, and is no proof of the superior value of instinct or common sense. Nor, again, is it to the purpose to insist that theory after all is indeed "subjective" without a doubt, for clearly so is instinct, so is common sense, and so all the others. Every one emanates from our mind, and is ours in the same sense and to the same extent as theory. "But we construct a theory, we make it, and we do not make an instinct or the principles of common sense," it may be said. True, but if we are in earnest we construct it because we believe it true, and in order to express the truth. Is a principle, then, less true and trustworthy *because we* construct it than *because* we do *not* construct it? . . . If, then, experience and that alone settles the trustworthiness and truth of a guide to action in ordinary life, we see in this not only the refutation of the ordinary views above stated, but an indication of the solution of the difficulty of discovering what is the fundamental form of the principles of action. All are equally necessary to experience, and seem necessary for one reason: they all seek to impart a definite unity to the details of action, details which are always at once presupposed for and essential to the realization of our aims. For action is only possible by and through the details which appear in the process of carrying out our ideas, and those various guides to action furnish or express a unifying principle which determines the details. This fact of a general unity is the common feature of theory, of instinct, and of all the others named. For, not to mention theory itself, instinct, for instance, is neither blind nor self-contradictory; it is the consistent realization of certain ends, according to some definite, though, by the nature of the case, undefined and undetermined plan, order, or unity. "Common sense," again, furnishes ideas or principles which express the general point of view taken up by those who would determine action in view of the needs of the moment on the one side and the balance of life as a whole on the other. And so of the others. Now, our contention is that this unity of aim necessary to all

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determining guides of action finds its supreme and final form in theory, and that those other so-called non-theoretical forms get their significance from the fact that they embody a theory, that they are, indeed, theory at a lower level of manifestation, that while theory is a principle completely determinate and explicit they represent principles in an implicit undefined form. In no other way can we unite all those various ways of determining action. This view is made quite clear when we note that the determination of the principles operative in any habit of action always takes the form of a *systematic* expression of their contents, and such a systematic expression (which is all that theory means) is not taken as something in our heads, but is refunded again into reality; it is the reality; and the further development of a habit lies along the line of an *explicit* determination of its contents. Habits, as it has been said, are "deposits of reason;" they are embodied theoretical principles of action which have been found to work. Habits are made possible because circumstances in which our action is to appear, and the principles by which that action is to be realized, can continually recur. A new theory or scheme for action is the principle of new habits, if the action to be realized should be repeatedly demanded. Theory is the consummation of man's knowledge of his principles of conduct; all his principles of action are theoretical expressions for the conditions under which his actions can be realized; all his actions are simply the realization of these principles. This holds of every sphere of practice. We will see this if we consider practical activity as it presents itself in ordinary life. We must, however, confine ourselves to a general discussion of a few of its appearances.

To begin with, we may take practice for our purpose to be identical with action in general. Now, if we take this in its most ordinary sense we shall find that when we speak of action we have in mind primarily action which appears in the external world, action as it appears in Space. We may therefore take this to be the characteristic feature of it, and discuss practice accordingly. All action when analyzed will be found in its last resort to be the medium by which ends particular or universal are translated into concrete form. Now, ends are not

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external to and apart from the means by which they come into being. On the contrary, from the point of view of the means the end is simply the summing up and completed expression of all the details which constitute the means and make them organic elements in the whole. From the point of view of the end, again, the means are simply the embryonic form, the gradual development of the end as such. Further, it is fairly evident that the ends which action may have in view may be derived from two broadly distinguishable sources. We may seek to fulfil an end which we determine simply by ideas which are ours as reason constituted beings; such, *e.g.*, are æsthetic, imaginary, and moral ideas. On the other hand, our end may be determined by a consideration of the nature and conditions of the external world in which our end is to be realized; such, *e.g.*, is the case when we seek to build a house or engage in an enterprise. True, this distinction is not very abrupt in many cases; and in all cases the knowledge implied in the constitution of both these ends as so distinguished is necessary to a greater or less extent for the performance of any action whatsoever; that is to say, every end must be to a certain extent ours, and the conditions under which it is to be carried out must be known. Nevertheless the terminus *a quo* of those ends is clearly distinct.

Let us, then, take action as it results from the second form of end and ask how does practice in this case relate itself to theory? When action proceeds from and is the expression of a prior knowledge of the nature of that sphere in which the action is to have effect, it seems impossible to find where theory ends and practice begins. For, in the first place, we require to be acquainted not merely with the end as such but with all that lies between the first step and final completion. From first to last, therefore, the action is knowledge-constituted, is thought-determined. Take, *e.g.*, the construction of a machine (even a bad one!), and what do we find but that our machine is simply the carrying out in definitely determined ways what we know of the nature of the material, the conditions of motion, and so forth. Every element in the machine, every step in the process of constructing it, is nothing at all if it is not

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just the expression of what we know of the specific sphere of reality in which this product of ours is to appear. And the same holds good not only of such substantial material objects as a machine, but also, *e.g.*, of the media and *modi operandi* of commerce, with all its compactly organized agencies for the realization of the needs of man. The opposition between theory and practice in the case under consideration usually appears in the assertion that theories may be held and yet not applied, and may, in fact, be unable to be applied, the application, (*i.e.*, the practice) being assumed to be entirely distinct from the theory. And it is true that the theory in our heads is not in all and every sense the same as the complete result which appears after action. Yet the asserted opposition must either mean that a given theory is inadequate for the reality in which it is to be manifested, or it may mean that the theory is too finely developed to admit of "practical" application. But in the first case the separation insisted on is not at all an ultimate separation; for the inadequate theory is not *in itself* inadequate to that reality where it actually does appear, but only in reference to the whole of that reality which, indeed, it did not pretend to represent. If we deny that it had any adequacy, then we confess that the theory proposed is entirely a piece of imagination and has no reference to reality,—a position which easily refutes itself. And again, when the theory is too finely drawn, what we mean is that the reality in which we wish the theory realized is such that the completer truth which that theory contains cannot in its completeness be made to appear in that limited reality which we wish to realize, and which therefore must have a theory "adequate" to it. But surely this is in the nature of the case and in no way whatever affects the contention here maintained, that in the last resort the "practical" and the "theoretical" cannot be separated at any point.

We may now discuss that kind of action which proceeds from the first kind of ends named, those whose starting-point is the mind itself. Here the question is much more difficult and of much deeper significance. Indeed, it is here that we touch most closely the problem we have had in view all along. After what has already preceded we may in this case,

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instead of working to our conclusion, start from it. Our position briefly is, then, that all conduct in the narrow sense of that term presupposes and expresses a theory of life, morality is the deliberate and responsible working out into details of a certain conception of the import and purport of human existence, and that in that aspect of conduct which concerns religion a certain theory of man and his relation to God is implied and acted upon in the various exercises of the religious life; hence that once again practice and theory are one and inseparable. We are concerned, in the first place, with deliberate as distinct from habitual action, and here the particular form which theory assumes appears under the category of "belief." Perhaps a term as often applied to the conceptions we have here in view is that of "principle;" and this holds good more especially of moral beliefs. We talk of such a one as being a man of "principle," or again as possessing certain "beliefs," the implication being that these form the basis of his conduct in life. For our purpose these and such like forms may be treated as identical. If we examine what "beliefs," "principles," mean, we will find that they imply that the conduct of individuals is determined by the views they maintain regarding the ends and aims of their lives. These ends are principles or laws by which they hold and according to which they act. These laws, again, express the conditions under which their lives in particular and human life in general can continue to exist, can be realized; and these conditions further are not superimposed *ab extra*, but express the nature of man himself. Let us illustrate by an example. A man determines to guide himself by the maxim that truth in utterance must be maintained at all hazards. This means that his conception of man's life and of his relation to the details in and through which his life is manifested, is such as to require the precise expression of the experience man goes through in dealing with the various details of his life; and that therefore anything short of this accuracy would lead to contradiction. Such a principle when maintained is not external to a man's general frame of mind, it is a constituent part of it, and hence must be bound up with the general

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mental attitude which forms the basis of his intellectual life. And this "mental attitude" is a point of view more or less definite and conscious, and when actually and distinctly conscious assumes the form of a general unifying principle or conception. Such a point of view, for instance, is what is meant by "common sense" both in its general significance and also, in a slightly altered form, in the significance given to it by a well-known school of philosophers. The law therefore above mentioned is a necessary element in the attitude of the individual who adopts it, and the infringement of the law must mean contradiction and confusion in his whole mental and moral life. Those who question the interpretation here suggested will have to account somehow for the following facts which are integral and necessary elements in our whole moral life: (1) the fairly definite unity which pervades the moral life of the normal individual, (2) the passionate insistence on principles adopted deliberately as guides in conduct, an insistence so strong that the whole world may be judged in the light of them, (3) the obedient and ready devotion to the fulfilment of the demands placed by the principle on the individual in all, and particularly "test," cases. All these are essential factors in a good life, and must be interpreted. Now, if the principle adopted were merely isolated, were taken in and for itself simply as it can be expressed, there would seem to be little reason to expect and apparently no reason by which to explain how it is that the whole personality should be knit up with this principle and its realization. But if it be granted that it is not isolated, the only alternative seems to be the one above suggested. The principle in question is an organic constituent of a moral attitude, and partakes of the intellectual (theoretical) character possessed by that attitude. Now, this attitude is the construction put upon the life of the individual himself, and by implication upon all human life; it is a view of what life should be on the whole. We are not prepared to argue that this general view is in all cases, or in many cases, at all definite, or has been in each case analyzed and clarified. We are not even prepared to admit that in all or in many cases human life actually would gain in richness

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and beauty by such an analysis or such a clarification of its ground principles. We allow full weight to the significance of the fair and wondrous loveliness of the *schöne Seelen* whose secure serenity and joyous self-forgetfulness seem the result more of unconsciousness of the primal elements in their experience than of a studious and careful elucidation of them. What we would seek to insist on is, that none of these facts in any way affects or infringes the validity of the principle here contended for. It does not at all militate against our interpretation to point out that many or most men are not conscious of their general point of view in morals. We might just as well argue that because most men are unaware of the interpretation put upon certain facts in the world by certain scientists,—*e.g.*, physicists,—that therefore they possess no general intellectual conception of the world in which they exist. Yet it is surely evident that the interpretation put on certain aspects of the world by these scientists is simply the development of a deepened consciousness of the meaning put upon the world by the ordinary uncritical understanding from which as a matter of fact the scientist himself starts and in which he shares. If this be not so, how and in what sense can science have any meaning for the pupil or for the ordinary man? There cannot be any breach between the common and the developed understanding. All education presupposes precisely the reverse; its whole effort, in fact, is the gradual annihilation of any such difference as may exist. There are not kinds of knowledge, there can only be degrees of it, if knowledge is to have any meaning at all as applied to man as man. And the same holds as distinctly of morality. The very fact that some men (and they are by no means few) do face the problems set by their moral experience and win for themselves out of it some general definite point of view, and more especially certain distinctly clear laws regulating particular spheres of it, is itself the indirect proof which establishes the existence of the original half-unconscious conception from which they start. For this developed and explicit morality is only the unfolding into clearness of the prior state of their moral attitude, and therefore cannot be in principle different

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from it; and hence, though unaware of it in its explicitness, men must have such a general point of view as we speak of. And, further, it should be noted that what distinguishes the higher moral types from the lower is not the absence of this development, nor is it merely the explicitness of the content of morality, it is rather the absolute and unquestioning obedience to the principles of which they are conscious.

Nor, again, is our contention affected by the objection that it seems to argue for a universally similar moral attitude in all men, and this is, of course, contradicted by experience. Our view does not require or presuppose such a position. It would not be difficult to argue in a general way for the absolute accuracy of this general consensus; but it could be established by other means than those here seemingly implied. All we maintain is, that in any moral life, no matter what that be, such a moral point of view as we speak of must lie at its basis. Education, heredity, national spirit, etc., all go to shape the distinctness and the content of our moral experience; but surely all these various influences tend directly to the verification and elucidation of our contention. What, for instance, is the "moral conscience" of a nation if it be not the more or less explicit recognition by the nation itself as a whole of those principles on which the conduct of the life of all the members in the nation proceeds,—a conscious moral attitude determining the moral life of all and shared in by each?* Further, in the case of habits, our principle holds quite clearly; for are not habits simply those "deposits of reason" which, once deliberate lines of conduct, have come, by persistent obedience

* We might point out, too, in passing, the part which institutions play in determining the actual form, the general "tendance" of the attitude which shall fashion men's lives in various spheres of activity. Take, for instance, the Church. One of its unquestionable functions, and certainly one of its results on society, is that it supplies men with a general moral or religious point of view (which the majority of men would never arrive at for themselves), and thereby not only gives unity to their religious life, but maintains and nourishes that precision of mental attitude and strength of character which are so essential to human life, and which can only come by gathering and keeping within a definite focus the scattered and isolated impulses of men. Such, too, is the effect, and, indeed, the aim, of other institutions which represent more concrete objects.

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to the laws or ideas determining these lines of conduct, to be finally built into the personality in its concreteness, and hence to return to that state of an unconscious or semi-conscious moral attitude from which all conduct starts? We need hardly pursue the subject further. One objection more, however, we may remove. It may be said and justly that people hold or are controlled by principles which are inconsistent with each other, that life is full of contradictions, and that men who adopt principles often just as readily throw them aside when occasion requires. All this is quite true. But we may reply, in the first place, that men need be at no great pains to demand consistency in the conduct of life. Life is made the richer and the more desirable, the fuller, the greater, even more beautiful, by all the unreconciled disconnectedness of its general features. Not that consistency is not to be sought for or not to be demanded. Our point is, that should the attempt be made to impose an absolute consistency on the movements of life, the result in most cases would assuredly be a sapless rigidity of outline, an undeviating perfectly calculable inflexibility, a monotonous, amiable mediocrity, would, in short, be a finished product of artifice rather than the rounded fulness of a work of art. The consistency which is to be aimed at is that which the "æsthetic necessity" that dominates the world will work out for itself. On the other hand, we will find it very difficult, indeed, hardly possible, to find in normal life that the inconsistence here insisted on is in its essence fundamental. It rather results from an undue insistence on particular principles in certain circumstances to the neglect of other principles which might equally be brought to bear on the case at issue. A man, for instance, may be just and yet carry his justice so severely into the various details of his life that the natural affection for his family or his associates is weakened thereby. But this is not taken to imply a contradiction between justice and affection; it is simply due to a misconception of the sphere within which justice operates. The very existence of a plurality of duties means surely that there are spheres which lie beyond the range of a particular duty, that a duty or a virtue is limited in the range of its

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operation. This may lead to moral or mental conflict in certain situations; but where a borderland exists this is in the nature of the case. The plurality of duties itself does not mean conflict or contradiction, it only means difference. Were there no plurality, were there but one duty, there would be no difference, and, in any case, no conflict: hence, for instance, the moral and religious significance of Love. The inconsistency, therefore, here complained of, so far as there is indeed really such, is not incompatible with the more or less definite unity of a general moral attitude which is characteristic of the ordinary moral life; and when it is remembered that the moral life rarely develops, as a whole, and that men's natures are often lopsided from the beginning, apparent deviations will be readily explicable.

The same line of argument will lead us even more easily to a similar conclusion in the case of religious beliefs and the religious life. Religion is precisely on all fours with the insight and intellectual *Anschauung* possessed by the religious mind. The more comprehensive the conception of the relation of God to man, the more exact the theory, the deeper and truer is the religious life. One of the most, perhaps for the Christian religion *the* most, distinctive feature of religion is its personal character; it is essentially conscious and "living;" it demands an individual acquaintance with the supreme Object of Reverence. This being so, it is almost too obvious to point out that the religious life fulfilled by each will just be the reflex, the counterpart, of the nature and of the distinctness of the conception of the Highest and his own relation thereto. It is impossible to be religious by proxy; according to the often misunderstood saying, all men are equal before God. Experience bears out this interpretation. Those whose religious instincts are truest are the prophets or the saints; and no one would be likely to assert that these are unacquainted with their object. For surely of all people they find themselves most intimately acquainted with that to which they are devoted; their conceptions are more or less accurate and even to themselves consistent, their ideas precise and distinct; this alone it is which makes it so easy for them to sus-

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tain their devotion. Those, again, who have no depth of religious experience are precisely those who know and indeed profess to know least of all about the Object which they nevertheless in an abstract way recognize. And those who profess scepticism or indifference in regard to all religion need only be mentioned as negative instances of the same fact of the connection between theory and practice in religion. There are two classes still to be noted which may seem instances of or objections to our contention according as we look at it. These are those whose religious lives are better than their religious beliefs and those whose lives are worse than their beliefs. Here already there is an apparently decided opposition between the theory held and the practice maintained, and nothing is commoner than to find the statement in regard to religion that it does not much matter what you believe provided your conduct is irreproachable, and that many who "profess" religious beliefs are not illustrations of the beliefs they hold, nor indeed of any worthy conception of life. The assumption in such statements always seems to be either that it is impossible to fulfil the ideal set by the beliefs in question or else that the life cannot be conformed to them, the beliefs being out of agreement with life. Hence the two classes above mentioned. Suppose we take the first class; what is meant by a person's religious life being better than his beliefs? In its last resort it means that the actions of his life cannot find their source in the convictions by which he outwardly and explicitly professes to be guided; his actions as known are inconsistent with the ideas he accepts as principles of action, the former do not reflect the latter in his realized experience. Does this imply (1) that his conduct therefore proceeds from no religious beliefs whatever, and (2) that those beliefs he professes to hold as his have in fact no influence on his life? These are the questions at issue. Now, in regard to the first the answer comes easily to hand. The person's life is better than his belief, but it is not the less maintained that that life has its principles by which it is guided and which determine its action. For instance, a person may believe that the sufferings consequent on evil-doing, whether deliberate or

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unintentioned, are the planned and inevitable punishments meted out by God to the children of men in this world, and yet may not refrain from, yea, may zealously seek to alleviate and if possible prevent entirely those sufferings from having effect. Are we to say that in such a case the person is not actuated by any other religious principle? Surely the moving principle is that of an all-embracing charity; and this is a religious principle. For is it not in its essence the expression of the nothingness of distinction and the assertion of the all-pervading unity of men with one another before God? So, too, again, a person may hold that all human beings are "in their natural state" condemned to endless punishment, that they from their birth as human beings are in original sin, and therefore doomed from childhood to the wrath which is endless, and yet may not refrain from sharing in, but rather may eagerly encourage, the joys which gather round family affections. Such a person is clearly holding a belief, which has doubtless truth in it, but, for him who ordinarily holds it, assumes the form simply of abnormal cruelty, and is at the same time in direct contradiction with the principle which governs his family life. In this case, again, clearly the same contention holds good,—another theory or belief is governing his actions. The answer to the second question, whether the beliefs which a person declares he holds and yet which clearly do not find expression in his life actually have any influence at all on his life, hardly seems quite so easy to answer. Yet consideration seems to show that as the degree of effect which a belief has on the life (in the widest sense of that term) is determined by the intensity of conviction with which that belief is held, the less vigorously a belief is held the less prominent will it be in the life. But no belief which the mind can hold can fail to modify in some degree the general mental attitude of the individual. The mind is an organic unity, its content, such as it is, is the expression by itself of its own nature. To hold otherwise is not only to commit the old error which regards ideas as atoms of intelligence which roam about in the mind, but to each of which the mind is as such indifferent, it means also that *all* belief is quite con-

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tingent and accidental, a position we need not wait to criticise. The principle, by which in fact science seems to be governed, that every phase of reality, every manifestation of it is necessary to it, and that all its appearances are bound together by the inner necessity which controls and expresses the nature of the whole,—this principle (which indeed is the objective aspect of the law of sufficient reason) when applied to mental facts makes it impossible to hold that any belief can be maintained and yet have no effect on the life. How otherwise, for instance, would we explain the fact of *holding* a belief as ours? Hence we conclude that, when beliefs, which we hold, do not completely govern our lives as it would be expected they should, either these beliefs still have a relatively small, general influence on our lives, or else the circumstances in which these beliefs would be expected to manifest themselves do not play the same part in our lives as they used to do. When neither of these alternatives is true in the case of any belief, then we ourselves hold that the belief has passed into our history, and that actually we hold it no longer. What such a state means we cannot stop to inquire. That the cases here discussed imply the possession of many and opposed beliefs with different effects and spheres of activity in the life is evident. This, however, does not effect either our general contention or our insistence on the fundamental unity of all these beliefs in a general religious attitude which is more or less distinctly before us. For we find as a matter of fact that the more dominant a particular belief is the more is this the central belief of the individual, and the absence of any such central dominant belief reveals itself in the absence of any pronouncedly characteristic religious life. Instances of this can easily be found.

Finally, we may add one word on the distinctive form of the other case suggested, where the beliefs of the individual are better than his life. It is the old moral situation in the sphere of religion, *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.* The explanation is fairly simple. On the one hand, it may mean that habits of following less noble and ignoble lines of conduct have been formed while the corresponding habits of good

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doing have not been formed. Or it may mean that the conception of the evil line of conduct has been as a whole more definitely fixed and realized (by imagination and so on) than the corresponding good; the latter therefore, being more abstract and without content, has less influence. Any instance in the sphere of religious life will make this clear. . . . We conclude, therefore, that in no sphere of life whatever, where practice is of primary importance, is practice found to be other than the manifestation in belief of a theory; theory is from first to last on all fours with practice; the two are through and through identified, inseparable. In the sphere of action theory is to practice as form is to content; but content is simply non-existent apart from form; the two are completely interpenetrated; it is not possible in reality to say where one begins and the other ends. This can only be done by a further metaphysical inquiry, on which we do not here enter. Our whole argument, both as concerns theory as such and as concerns practice as such, may be stated quite shortly from another point of view. We take it that the interpretation when made explicit is the expression of the content, the reality of the world.

All forms of explanation, all laws and principles, are the forms which interpretation assumes. The laws, etc., appear in the so-called scientific world and in the so-called practical world. Their character is precisely the same in both. They are not superimposed on experience, they are immanent in it. Our argument has merely gone to show that if these laws are taken in their (to us) conscious expression to be the inner nature of the world, and we saw that they are always assumed to be so, then they have been so from the start, and being obviously thought constituted for *knowledge* they are actually thought constituted in experience, in *reality* taken by itself. The facts and forms of reality are not transformed by being known, nor are the laws transformed by being refunded, so to say, into reality. Reality in all its forms proceeds by and through its thought constituted elements.

We would now seek to point out as distinctly as possible certain much neglected consequences of supreme importance

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which are implied in the foregoing argument. And first of all from the side of practice. Those who insist on the significance of practice for its own sake, its permanent value, its unchanging importance, and who contrast it adversely with the manifold forms of theory, the instability and uncertainty of theory and the futility of trust in theory at all,—these, we do not hesitate to say, if taken at their own word, are the unintentional atheists and materialists of the world. If the history of thought reveals anything, it is not that practice is the touchstone of reality, not that action in the already determined sphere of life, has been the mainstay, the secure support of the conduct of men or the agent for enlarging and purifying his manifold almost endlessly varied existence. Such an appeal to practice seems inevitably to lead to a helpless repetition of the established order, and leads, therefore, to that monotony and ennui of spirit which ushers in decay. It is essentially conservatism in the worst sense of that term. That which has guided, strengthened, and deepened the life of man is the insight into the principles which control his life, the clarifying of his purposes, and the unhesitating faith in his consciously conceived aims. There can be no stronger conservatism than the maintenance of the truth, and this is not so much that which can be secured and bound forever as that which must be forever sought for. Not that such a condition implies that we never discover and realize the truth; precisely the reverse; it means that we are continually discovering it, and for that very reason must not, if we would avoid the penalties of stagnation, imagine that when we have merely pitched our tents we have thereby founded a city. For it seems in the end more true to say that it is truth which supports life than that life upholds truth. And only the continual unwearying realization of the principles on which conduct proceeds can rescue action from the faithlessness of mechanical invariableness. . . . Again, we find that at no stage in the life of a nation is its action in all that particularity and concreteness of detail which constitutes its very nature the same as at another. What is generally called the "spirit of an age" is found to impose fairly definite limitations on the conduct of the individuals

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whose lives are spent during a given epoch. Nay, more, not merely the "spirit of the age," which may, indeed, also control various nations at a given time, but the "spirit of a nation" as such likewise imposes its influence on the conduct of men. It need hardly be pointed out that the conduct which appears is the inevitable outcome of that general mental attitude which the individuals of a nation share. At this there can be no complaint; it is impossible for a man to be a man in general, he can only be a man in particular, an individual person namely. Should a man try to strip himself of the garments or trappings, let him call them how he may, which give him definite characteristics as a member of a nation and a sharer in an epoch, that were merely to desubstantialize himself, and thereby transform himself into a homeless abstraction. Let his conduct proceed from and be moved by those general ideas which control the epoch in which his life is cast. As a matter of fact these ideas have already before he is aware determined the current of his being. All he can hope to do is to develop that which without his will has become his own. The attitude of an individual to the forces of his time can only be one of acquiescence and sympathetic realization. Take, for instance, the influence exerted by the idea of development in all departments of human life and activity in this century. The significance of this idea for all who are aware of the tendencies of their time reveals itself in the peculiarly suggestive fact that it is almost a positive pain to oppose the idea in question, that the problem of conduct itself is simplified by the mere acquiescence in this principle, that, in short, it seems impossible to think otherwise at the present day than in the terminology of the principle it employs. These governing ideas, therefore, are at once the conditions and the limitations by which life is controlled at each stage of human history. All these have some influence. And if we come to greater detail we find similar limiting conditions placed on the conduct of individuals as such. It is an obvious fact that the conduct of all men is not and people are prepared to admit cannot be the same either in kind or quality of excellence. Yet we find it so commonly maintained that the

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moral conduct of any man can become as worthy and as good as that of the best. Such a view supposes that because the difference between men as moral beings is simply a difference of *degree* therefore there need be no *difference;* as if a difference in degree might not itself mean a decided degree of difference. Are we to suppose, for instance, that because quantity is an integral element in human reason that every one could therefore become an expert mathematician? And shall we assume that because all men ought to be moral that therefore any one may become a *schöne Seele?* Surely not; and the explanation is quite simple. Men's conduct is determined, as we have seen, by their insight into the nature and meaning of conduct; and their capacity for attaining the good is relative to, is simply the other side of their appreciation of the import of it. The range of a man's vision is the range of his possible experience; a man's hopes are a man's limitations; the ideal which a man has is just the ideal he can attain to. And that ideal which cannot be realized is surely no moral ideal, for morality demands that which should be, and not the impossible which by its nature should *not* be. The like holds also of the religious as distinct from the moral life; and it is in the religious life that the significance of this truth is in reality forgotten. Men suppose so easily that the mere acceptance of certain doctrines is of itself a guarantee of a deep religious life. Such a view overlooks the fact that unless the significance of these doctrines for life is in some measure appreciated any such mere acceptance is entirely a vain thing, and the religious life which is maintained under such conditions is maintained in spite of and not because of these particular doctrines. For doctrines are surely neither more nor less than the expression of the nature and content of various aspects of religious experience, and unless they are guaranteed by experience and realized in it they cannot have any validity for it. . . . Finally, we may point out that the attempt so often made to flee from the claims of theory, and the problems therein arising to the strong realities of facts and practical affairs, is in itself quite futile. It will not only accomplish, it will defeat its own intention. What such an effort will arrive

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at will be a deepening of men's acquaintance with the practical aspect of life, and such a deepening will inevitably raise anew questions similar to those which were at first avoided. This has been curiously illustrated in the history of inquiry in the present century. From the bold quasi-omniscience of the speculative thinking which opened the century men turned to the apparently less ambitious task of examining the facts, the details, for example, of the facts of mind. And what is the result? We have rediscovered the problems which have to be answered and can only be answered by speculative thinking. We have not found our satisfaction in the mere colligation of facts, nor has our method or presuppositions enabled us to answer, still less to avoid, the ultimate metaphysical questions. And the same is true in the more general sphere of spiritual or intellectual life. To try to stifle the cries of the spirit with the husks of sense is little less than to attempt to hoodwink Nemesis by an illusion. The practical affairs to which we flee will themselves be our school-masters to bring us back to the satisfying securities of those principles by which they themselves are controlled.

A sentence will suffice to show the bearing of our discussion on the character and import of theory as such. There is a tendency in certain quarters, as every one knows, to maintain the self-dependence of theory, its independence of practice. Our whole argument has shown that this is a fatal mistake. In moral and spiritual life, for instance (in which we include a large part of intellectual life as such), theory is nothing but the deepening of our consciousness of these aspects of experience. It cannot come into existence except as the fruit of actual activity. Communication on one side without inner participation on the other is impossible. Law, dogma, and doctrine are not dispensable superimpositions or excrescences on experience, they are inevitable interpretative expressions of it. They are not causes but effects of experience. Hence the only legitimate method to enlarge and if need be criticise existing theories, beliefs, or doctrines (call them how we may) is first of all to share with the sincerest intensity the life's-experience out of which they arose. Actual experience, in short,

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must be the source and the means of developing our theories. And those beliefs which cannot bear this test, beliefs, for example, which seek to insure moral and spiritual realities in the present or future by acceptance of particular historical facts bequeathed by tradition, but now no longer discoverable, will inevitably suffer at the hands of experience itself, which is the sincerest critic. Religion does not depend for its reality, its truthfulness, its depth in the present on particular historical facts as such. These facts themselves only get their worth from the *acknowledgment* of a religious experience which preceded and revealed itself in them. And, again, by no amount of belief can we *create* a fact of religion or morality. We cannot, for instance, create the fact of the immortality of the soul by a belief in it as a dogma or doctrine. It has its basis in the reality of life itself or else is a fond illusion. And it is the deeper acquaintance with reality which is imperatively necessary if we would pronounce a judgment on its content. So, again, in purely intellectual life, the person who isolates theory finds himself either out of focus or unduly exercising his imagination in the "pursuit of truth." No department of truth can be considered as in itself absolutely independent, and its own character becomes modified when brought into relation with all the others. Only a false view of truth can induce thinkers to attempt to maintain the self-sufficiency of any one theory or of any one department of theoretical activity. And this unity of all truth itself becomes manifest by a deepened acquaintance with the facts with which any one science deals. . . . Further, the workman in science who attempts to sever his intellectual activity from the other elements of his nature, and presumes to keep the former in vigor while the others are allowed to take care of themselves, will work out his own penalty. Nothing can secure as well the realization of those uncoined resources of the intellect, which only reveal themselves in the course of activity and not before it, as the possession of that rounded completeness of a fully developed spirit. One might, indeed, even suggest with considerable truth that exaggerated specialism is a kind of intellectual protuberance, not so much the sign of health as of

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over-development. Not to ask whether the "pursuit of truth" be even *possible*, if the other elements of our nature be trampled underfoot in the hurry of our search, we would ask what is the significance, what is the purpose, what the end and meaning of all our labor to discover truth? Are we attempting, unconsciously or otherwise, in some way or other, to patronize mankind or the Almighty and glorify ourselves? Or are we trying to fulfil the deepest needs and claims of the human spirit? If the latter, is it not evident that the workman here, as everywhere, is higher than, is greater than, his work; that the latter is a means, himself in all his rich many-sidedness being the supreme end of all his labor? The history of philosophy may be taken as furnishing indirectly a continuous illustration of the accuracy of this position. For it will be found that it is an ethical, or, more truly, a religious impulse, from which philosophy arises, and that it is this which supports the thinker in his wrestle with reality. Indeed, if the unity of truth with itself and with the beautiful and the good has any meaning, its realization in conscious external form, which is the aim of science, can surely be alone possible if that unity has already found in some measure its counterpart in the spirit whose purpose it is to reflect it. And it is this consideration which determines with some definiteness the much-disputed relation between philosophy and life. For if life is that complete round of aspirations and needs which men take it to be, then he who will clearly bring that life into the sunlight of intelligibility must be and can alone be he who has realized in himself all the fulness and wealth of purpose and of meaning which it possesses. Not till then will the many-sounding keyboard of human existence break into unison at the touch of the meditative musician of the destiny of man. It is this incessant attempt to realize concretely and state abstractly and in essence the entire experience possible to man that has always demanded and has always justified the existence of philosophy. The varying needs and different intellectual and emotional characteristics of the thinker account for the difference of *nuance* of each philosophy, while the incomplete realization by all of the full

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complex content of human life is the source of the error in each system and of the ceaseless procession of systems which make up the history of philosophy.

J. B. BAILLIE.

EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY.

THE ETHICAL MOTIVE.

NOT least among the contributions to ethical science which Mr. Herbert Spencer has made in his "Principles of Ethics" is the clear and comprehensive description of conduct, viewed as a natural phenomenon admitting of scientific observation and analysis, which is presented in the opening chapters. We are there shown that conduct is distinguished from actions in general by the exclusion of acts which are aimless or purposeless. Conduct is the activity of a volitional being who perceives that he has the power to modify his own existence, and who sets before himself an end to be attained. His conduct, then, differs from the merely physiological activity of his body in being made up of a series of acts adjusted to the end which he has in view. Good conduct, in turn, may be described as consisting of acts which as means are, on the whole, well adapted to the attainment of an end which a critical judgment pronounces to be in itself worth while, satisfying to a reason that has examined all of those possible ends or goals of action which have thus far appealed to the mind.

If this description of conduct is accepted as being a fairly accurate one, and I think that moralists of all schools admit that, as a general account of conduct, Mr. Spencer's chapters are true, a scientific study of morality necessarily includes a critical examination of the ends which purposive activity attempts to realize, and also a critical examination of the motives by which we are impelled towards the attainment of the end in view.

The study of ethical ends, as all readers of moral systems are painfully aware, has produced many differing hypothetical goals of action. We have theological ethics, which assume that the chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy him for-

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ever. We have utilitarian ethics, which assume that the only practical good is the greatest happiness of the greatest number; and we have idealistic ethics, which assume that the perfection of the rational and spiritual nature of conscious personality itself is the only end which can satisfy the rational mind.

In the study of motives, as it has found objective expression in moral literature, four distinct hypotheses may be discovered. The first of these is, that there is a moral intuition which is at once a revelation of right and an impelling force, driving us onward towards the attainment of our moral goal. The second hypothesis is, that there is a moral instinct, which has either been created in us as a blind but trustworthy guide, or has been developed in us by evolutionary processes through the experiences of countless generations of experimenting creatures who have learned to go right after trying all the possible ways of going wrong. The third hypothesis is, that there are certain classes and groups of feelings more definite than instincts, which move us to moral action; the feelings, namely, which we know as sympathies and affections. The fourth hypothesis is, that our rationally conceived ideas of ethical ends themselves react as motor forces, and draw or impel us to attempt to realize the conceived ends.

These four hypotheses are commonly held to exhaust the possible explanations of ethical motive.

In the present paper I shall attempt to prove that neither any one of the four hypothetical assumptions about the ethical motive, nor any combination of them, gives us an adequate account of the psychological process whereby our voluntary acts are organized into that series which we describe as conduct. There is a phase of this process that has appeared to me to have a very great importance, and which, I think, has hitherto not received a sufficient attention.

Since moral conduct consists of acts adjusted to ends, it is, of course, impossible to discuss motives without first stating one's position in regard to ends. For my present purpose, however, it is not necessary to decide between utilitarianism and idealism. It is sufficient to say that both of these schemes

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of conduct include in their conception of ends the notion of a relatively large and growing mental life, and of a more varied voluntary activity, as distinguished from a diminishing consciousness, and from a reduction of purposive to automatic or mechanical action. The utilitarian does not set before himself a temporary or exhausting pleasure; he pictures rather the happiness which is concomitant of large and varied life. The idealist no less distinctly looks to the enlargement of the rational and spiritual nature as an essential phase of that perfection which he desires.

For the purposes of the present argument, then, it is sufficient to say that the moral motive is one that makes for largeness of conscious life.

If so much is granted, the reader is prepared for a suggestion which I have now to make. It is that, as a result of studies which, in recent years, have been made in quite another part of the psychological field, we are now, for the first time, in a position to make discoveries in regard to the origin and the strength of the moral impulses and in regard to the conditions of their growth.

The studies to which I refer are those that have been made in the psychology of economic activity, and which have undertaken to explain the nature and to formulate the laws of economic motive. Most readers, even those who are not particularly interested in economic discussions, have by this time some notion of the modern psychological theories of utility and value. The names of Cournot, Walras, Menger, and Jevons have crept into current literature, and nearly everybody knows the essential doctrine for which they stand. We no longer think of utility as a quality inherent in objective things or conditions. Objects of our strongest desire afford us more or less satisfaction according to ever varying circumstances. Food itself may please or disgust according as we are still hungry or have over-indulged the appetite. Every commodity offered in the market appeals strongly or in slight degree, or not at all, to the desires of possible purchasers, according as they have been able already to satisfy those desires in some measure through a preceding supply. Psycho-

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logically, then, utility and value are phenomena that diminish as the consumption of the means of satisfying desire increases. Every want admits of satisfaction, and every satisfaction may become satiety.

There are certain implications of this theory that have not yet been duly examined by either economists or psychologists. It is implied that an economic satisfaction is the pleasurable activity of a particular organ or group of organs, at a particular time and in a particular way. For example, to return to the illustration of the consumption of food, it is not maintained, and, of course, no one could maintain, that food has a diminishing subjective utility at all times. Its value to the organism falls as hunger is appeased. But with the return of appetite the subjective value of food again rises. In like manner it could not be maintained that the subjective value of food must follow a descending curve if food articles had the power of ministering in equal degree to every organ of the body. If, for example, a single class of material goods afforded us all the pleasures that we craved, so that by means of commodities fit for food we could satisfy the desires for clothing, for shelter, for amusement, and for instruction, the subjective value of these commodities would remain forever at their maximum point. Subjective values then rise and fall simply because each commodity has the power of satisfying only the cravings of some particular organ or group of organs, and usually under some particular combination of conditions existing at a given time.

Of course, it is unnecessary to prove that within certain limits these particular satisfactions indirectly minister to other organs than those immediately active, and, indeed, to the whole organism. Food not only satisfies the immediate cravings of the stomach, but it affords the pleasures which spring from the organic sensations of vigor. Nevertheless, it is perfectly obvious that there are limits beyond which the satisfaction of a particular organ or group of organs may deprive other organs of those means of satisfaction which they crave, inhibit various activities, and deplete the entire organism. The man who should spend all his substance upon his

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table would for that reason be compelled to do without other material gratifications; he undoubtedly would starve his intellectual nature, and, sooner or later, he would reduce a large part of his physical system also to a condition of atrophy.

This implication of the modern theory of subjective utility is so obvious that further insistence upon it would seem to be quite unnecessary. A second implication, if not quite so obvious, is not less certain. If the cravings of a particular organ or group of organs are being liberally met with appropriate satisfactions, while other organs suffer deprivation, the neglected organs set up a protest, which usually is sufficiently importunate to compel us to attempt their appeasing. The hunger of the neglected parts of our nature normally takes possession of consciousness, and diverts our attention and our effort from the organ which is receiving more than its due share of indulgence. Now this hunger of the entire organism for a varied satisfaction, and this protest of the entire organism against the over-indulgence of any one appetite, is obviously a phenomenon quite distinct from those particularistic desires for specific satisfactions which in recent years have been recognized as the specific economic motives.

Thus distinct and general, the craving of the organism for integral satisfaction, and the organic protest against any excess of particularistic indulgence, constitute, I think, the ethical motive in its original, physiological form.

There is thus a real and fundamental difference between the economic motive and the ethical motive. The economic motive is the desire for a particular satisfaction of a particular organ in a particular way at a particular time. The ethical motive is the desire for the varied satisfaction of the entire organism through continuing time.

This account of the subject is, of course, merely physiological; and I suppose that no modern psychologist will object to discovering that even ethical phenomena have their origin in physiological processes. Let us, however, turn to the psychological aspect. A sharp organic craving for a particular satisfaction always receives a preferential attention in consciousness. It is this preferential attention which is liable

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to be unduly continued, and therefore to cause excessive indulgence. A mere organic craving would diminish as the point of satiety was approached. The least intelligent animals are less likely than man to carry any particular form of consumption or activity to excess. It is therefore even more true of man than of the lower animals that the hunger and protest of neglected organs must take possession of consciousness before the course of consumption or activity can be diverted into new channels. In other words, the ethical motive plays psychologically a larger part in beings having the greater power of attention, and especially of attention colored by imagination.

In more technical terms, then, the economic motive is the sum of those normal desires to which, at any given moment, we are giving a preferential attention. The ethical motive is the sum of those normal desires to which, at the same given moment, we are denying attention or forcing out of consciousness by neglect, but which will presently assert themselves strongly enough to divert attention.

Strong confirmation of the truth of this analysis is afforded by the popular view of that class of economic activities which is most remotely and indirectly related to the immediate satisfaction of particular wants. If the foregoing reasoning is sound, the prudent and enterprising man, in laying by a portion of his income, converting savings into working capital, energetically improving new conditions, and organizing industrial methods, is acting from mixed motives. He is moved partly by economic, but partly, also, by powerful ethical desires. It is therefore interesting to remember that these forms of industrial activity have always been regarded as no less ethical than economic. Saving, frugality, thrift, have, from immemorial time, been inculcated as duties. In other words, when economy broadens out into a provision for the expansion and the future development of life, economic activity merges into ethical conduct.

In this broad distinction between economic and ethical motives, I think we may discern the ground of a persistent dissatisfaction with utilitarian ethics. The common mind does not to any great extent think of pleasure in general

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terms. The average man thinks of pleasure concretely and specifically, in terms of particular satisfactions. Duty or right, on the contrary, the average man thinks of vaguely, as something indefinable imposed upon him by a mass of feelings which he cannot analyze and does not understand, but which constrain him to inhibit specific desires and to deny himself particular enjoyments. The common mind therefore associates self-denial rather than pleasure with organic well-being and with a continuous development of either the bodily or the mental nature. The end to which the acts of the ordinary individual are adjusted is a vaguely conceived "welfare" or "salvation." It is only the cultivated mind that can distinctly picture to itself a greater pleasure, a deeper happiness, as the concomitant of a larger and sounder life. Consequently, the common mind always shows a strong antipathy to systems of ethics which make pleasure the end of moral action. Yet objectors have seldom been able to meet the utilitarian argument. In other words, it has been felt, rather than clearly seen, that between economics and ethics there is a distinction which should be discovered; and that there must be something wrong about an ethical theory that calls both motives by the same name.

Another and vastly more important phase of popular thinking is similarly explained by the foregoing account of the ethical motive. When we have discovered that the ethical motive arises as a reaction of the organism upon the organ, of vague feelings *en masse* upon specific feeling, we have discerned the real source of moral authority and the origin of that half-superstitious conception of authority which still holds the common mind in dumb distrust of reason. The mass of mankind thinks of authority as something so absolutely different from reason that it may oppose reason. The mass of mankind also thinks of moral conduct as a course of action which is prescribed by authority; while it thinks of economic activity as being indicated and guided by reason. The explanation is not difficult to find if there is a real and great difference between the economic and the ethical motive. By authority the average man means a power which con-

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strains his will without his knowing or being able to find out why. By reason he means a knowing why. Now it is perfectly clear that, in pursuing economic ends, the average man thinks that he knows why he does this or that. He acts in a particular way because specific, clearly apprehended wants clamor for satisfaction. It is not less clear that, in obeying what he regards as an ethical mandate, the average man acts without knowing why. A mass of vague feelings and ideas arise within his consciousness in protest against certain indulgences, or constraining him to something which he feels to be a duty, although he cannot possibly explain to himself why he feels or calls it duty. That is to say, the average man can clearly apprehend the economic motive; he knows, or thinks he knows, the whys and the wherefores of his economic life; and therefore he thinks that the economic life lies within the domain of reason. The average man cannot clearly apprehend the ethical motive, analyze it into its elements, or discover its origins. He does not know why he is moral; yet he feels himself constrained to try to be moral. Therefore he believes that morality is imposed upon him by authority; in other words, by a power that constrains his will without revealing to him how or why; and he regards with distrust any intrusion of reason into the ethical domain. So conceiving of reason and authority, and having within his own consciousness an experimental acquaintance with authority, the average man easily passes from a deference to the moral authority that is internally known, to a reverence for any external authority that is impressively asserted, and allows himself to regard the external authority as, like the moral authority within himself, superior to reason.

Has this discrimination of the ethical from the economic motive a practical value, or is it of merely theoretical interest?

It has, I think, a twofold practical value.

First, if a truthful account has been given of the relations which the common notion of authority bears to the ethical motive, the importance of cultivating rationalistic habits of thought is strongly emphasized. Moral authority is real, and, in a sense, it is independent of reason. It is deeper, more

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fundamental, more nearly primitive as a part of human consciousness than reason is; but it is not independent of organic conditions, and therefore is not apart from or in any way independent of the complex processes of natural causation. Reason alone can enable man to perceive the true nature and origin of moral authority, and thereby to avoid the dangers to human well-being that still linger in the popular confusion of moral with external or supposedly supernatural authority. Only through the rationalistic habit of mind can men come to understand how important it is, on the one hand, to assert the rightful supremacy of moral authority, and, on the other hand, to deny the rightfulness of any external authority other than a common or social consciousness of the reality and rightfulness of the moral authority in each individual. It is therefore of supreme importance to continue without quarter to fight that obscurantism which is still endeavoring to keep the control of thought and conduct within the hands of those who assume to rule the spiritual domain by right of divine anointment.

The discrimination of the ethical from the economic motive has, I think, secondly, a practical value because it enables us to reaffirm with renewed assurance certain rules for the strengthening of ethical impulses which have long been recognized, but which have never been regarded as authoritative. If they follow legitimately as deductions from the principle which has here been laid down, their authority is clear.

Ethical motives, as all recognize, may be strengthened both by teaching and by activity. If I have rightly described the ethical motive, it is possible to see with much clearness what teaching and what activity are necessary for ethical culture, and to see, also, the order in which principles are to be emphasized and activities are to be encouraged.

Ethical motives, then, are to be strengthened first by reaffirming the doctrine, older even than any teaching of the Greeks, that the efficient cause of morality is manly and womanly power, is that vitality which, by its own insistence, creates a demand for expansion and variation of life. The ethical motive, as we have seen, springs from physiological

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conditions; and, as power, it is derived from vitality. To neglect bodily development, therefore, is not merely to do wrong in a sense which all intelligent persons now recognize, by impairing the health that is in itself a good, but in the much deeper sense of impairing the very springs of moral conduct.

The ethical motive may be strengthened, secondly, by recognizing and teaching that varied experiences of pleasure within limits of moderation are essential to the existence of a consciously moral motive and a moral life. The organism which has had repeated experiences of many different kinds of enjoyment, associated with the normal activity of every organ, is the one that reacts most promptly and vigorously against any sort of excess or any over-indulgence in a particular pleasure. The Hedonists are absolutely right in their fundamental contention. Morality without pleasure of some kind or composition is unthinkable. As certainly as specific pleasures are the springs of economic action, so certainly are varied, measured, and combined pleasures the springs of moral action. The task of moral philosophy is not to condemn pleasure; it is rather to show how differently pleasures are combined and presented in consciousness, when they enter into the moral motive, than when they incite economic effort. We must frankly admit the essential goodness of pleasure, and deny that asceticism is in any sense ethical.

The ethical motive may be strengthened, thirdly, by reaffirming that excess is the fundamental wrong. By permitting attention to dwell too long or too exclusively upon any one subject of desire, we in some measure destroy the power of other desires, and not only dwarf our lives, but impair the moral motive. And this is just as true when our excesses are on the side of those things that are conventionally called "virtues," as when they are on the side of pleasures that public opinion condemns. In other words, the over-zealous Puritan, the moral or religious fanatic, the uncompromising political radical, when they refuse to recognize any interest in life other than the ones to which they are devoted, are, in the light of the physiological and psychological analysis which

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has been presented, as immoral as the drunkard and the libertine. If this analysis is true, the middle way, which Aristotle described as the only true road of virtue, is indeed such; and no one can wander from it to the right hand any more than to the left hand, without falling into wrong.

The ethical motive is to be strengthened, fourthly, by teaching that next to moderation is the importance of cultivating a varied outlook and sympathy, and of cherishing ideals as an intellectual duty.

This is an age of specialization and of commercial standards. Men judge one another by their business success, and business brings a fearful pressure upon every man to devote his entire energy to some one line of activity in which he can hope to attain pre-eminence. This is in itself a plain violation of moral law, and there is nothing mysterious in the undermining of personal and public integrity through the insidious action of an excessive commercialism. That the business man who devotes his entire energy and thought to business matters should look without horror upon the control of politics and law by an unscrupulous use of money is no occasion for surprise. It is a normal and necessary consequence of the conditions supposed. Unhappily, our educational policy, which should be the great corrective of such tendencies, has been corrupted and made to encourage the very evils that education should prevent. We have encouraged specialization, which is a proper thing to do just to the extent that by specialization we mean thoroughness, minute and exact knowledge within a certain limited field. But specialization in this sense need not and should not be at the expense of a broad outlook upon the world and a correlative strengthening of varied sympathies. Education should make the average man see that business interests are but one small part of life, and that citizenship is a word of larger import than trade. It should make him feel a strong sympathy with every spontaneous popular movement. He should care about the well-being of other classes than the one to which he belongs. He should be interested in the progressive civilization of other nations than his own. Above all, he should be interested in

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the history and development of thought, in the broadening of the mental horizon of the race, and in the expression of its struggles and aspirations in the enduring forms of literature and art. If the ethical motive is what I have here described it as being, then it is the duty of all teachers of morality to insist that any man who knowingly neglects to cultivate throughout his business or professional life some interest or interests that have no direct relation to his business or profession, who intentionally or by negligence permits his sympathies with all mankind, and with the progress of science and art to die, is an immoral man, as much to be condemned by a sound public opinion as one who transgresses the conventional code of right doing.

Moreover, the expansion of thought and sympathy must ideally extend into future time. The evolution of social relations is not ended, and the development of the human mind is not complete. The ethical motive does not merely constrain us to act with reference to the many-sidedness of life; it constrains us to act also with reference to the further development of life. It is therefore our duty to form and to cherish ideals. We must believe that many things can be made better than they are at present, and that life in many ways can be made more desirable. But these ideals must not be narrow, exclusive, or grotesquely disproportioned to one another, or to the world of fact. They must be brought into harmony, order, and measure. In fine, the ethical motive must be both strengthened and directed by reaffirming the Platonic doctrine of correlation, subordination, and proportion in all that we think and in all that we do.

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

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SELF-REALIZATION AS A WORKING MORAL PRINCIPLE.

In spite of the mournful utterance of the desponding students of society, who tell us that while the world is more and more, the individual is withering, it is very doubtful if the individual has ever had a better chance than at the end of this nineteenth century. In numberless ways life is free and richer for us than it was for our forefathers. And this is seen to be for our good. People are growing convinced, and justly convinced, that education, culture, and rational amusement are all helpful to a virtuous life; while ignorance, coarseness, and general poverty of mind and body are its greatest hinderances. It is inevitable that a conviction so wide-spread, and in many ways so salutary, should be represented in contemporary philosophy, which justly prides itself on being closely in touch with life. In moral philosophy it appears as the theory of self-realization. The obvious fact that modern culture has promoted virtue has suggested that virtue itself may be a sort of self-culture. In all ages speculation has asked, What is moral good? Not a few of our ablest thinkers now answer, It is self-realization. And self-realization may be best defined as the cultivation of character, as the formation of a rich, noble, and harmonious personality. Or again, speaking in terms of function, it means a life full of rich, noble, and harmonious activities. The fulfilment of such activities, or, in other words, the cultivation of such a character, is, the self-realizer would argue, what we mean by virtue or moral goodness.

This interpretation of virtue is, we venture to think, quite mistaken, for reasons which cannot be adequately set forth in a short article. It is possible in brief limits to state a fundamental truth, but scarcely possible to controvert a fundamental mistake, since that involves a full statement of the truth as well. Our present scope is narrower, to show that this self-realization principle does not work well in practice. This, of

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course, amounts indirectly to a criticism of its truth; since, as Aristotle remarked, "all experience harmonizes with a true principle, but a false one is soon found to be incompatible with the facts."

The thesis which we will try to establish is that self-realization is useful as a rough indication of the right moral direction, but that when examined narrowly, it turns out to be no more than a secondary principle of conduct.

First, for the former half of the thesis. Self-realization is in harmony with the tendencies of the age. It is a counsel of growth and expansion, and growth and expansion have been characteristic of the England of our generation. The causes of this are largely political and economic. Among them are the increase in the food-supply and other kinds of wealth, the creation of new industries, the participation of the masses in political power, colonization, the emancipation of women, and the weakening of class prejudices in social life. Now, just as in a decaying and straitened society, the virtues of resignation and self-denial must rightly gain in favor, so in a free and thriving society must the virtues of self-expansion and healthy enjoyment.

These material and political causes of the expansion of modern English life may be left to the political economist and social historian. They are the conditions of self-expansion, rather than elements in it. We are concerned rather with the higher sides of life, with the sphere of knowledge, religion, and art.

We need not say much of knowledge. For some hundred years the English nation has professed to believe in education, but only in recent years have we, as a nation, acted up to the profession. No side of our national life has expanded more than this.

Religion is another sphere where the principle of expansion has supplanted the principle of repression. The essence of our Protestantism is to lay more stress upon the individual Christian than upon the Church, more stress upon the personal relation of the worshipper to his Maker than upon the community of the worshippers, combined into an organization

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and acknowledging common formulæ of belief. But this personal relation has a double side. We may think more of our inferiority and dependence, or more of our aspiration. We may reflect that, contrasted with God, man is as dust and his life brief as an eddy of the dust; that his wisdom is foolishness and his strength naught; that his righteousness is as filthy rags, his good intentions most weak and transitory. If, in addition, we believe in the dogmas of Original Sin and Eternal Punishment, we are forced to admit that life should be nothing but a preparation for death, and everything which hinders the work of salvation a stumbling-block to be cast aside from the path. To the condemned wretch daily expecting the executioner mirth is but a mockery, and every earthly interest but a lure from the task of reconciling himself with an offended Maker.

It may be that few have believed with logical thoroughness in this death's-head theology; but it is certain that not long ago it gave a tinge to the lives of most religious Englishmen. The grudging or prohibition of amusement, such as novels or theatres, the distrust of science, the depreciation of art and all the realm of the beautiful was, and in some circles is still, a mark of a well-principled mind. But for these old prejudices serious middle-class life, particularly in non-conformist circles, would not be so bare and tasteless as it generally is.

But now the tide is setting the other way. We are all coming to think more of the possibilities than of the imperfections of our life, more of the promises than of the prohibitions of the Law, more of aspiration than of self-abasement. Our teachers tell us to advance towards the Divine Perfection, not to grovel before it.

It is impossible not to connect this change in religious thought with that revival of English art so closely associated with the teaching of Ruskin. In great part it has been a reaction against the deformities of industrialism; but many of its phenomena carry us back in thought to the great Revival of Learning. We know the story of the St. Bernard journeying along the Lake of Leman and so lost in theological meditation that he never raised his eyes to the noble landscape before

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him. We know, too, how four centuries later Europe shook off this load of theology and claimed once more the right to live and enjoy. Something of the same sort has happened to us in England on a much smaller scale. As the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries revolted against the Romish asceticism, so we have revolted against the self-negating side of Protestantism; and in our case, too, with those misguided decadents who would sever art from morals, a certain amount of lawlessness has found place in the tumult of reconquered freedom.

But in the main our art revival has been a power for goodness. Ruskin, its protagonist, is a preacher of morality as much as of art; nor is there any intention of selfishness in his self-expansion. But though few lives have shown more self-sacrifice than his, it is self-expansion which appeals to him primarily as a good. In a notable passage he questions the claim of self-sacrifice to a place among the virtues; so loath is he to waste the riches of the human spirit.

If the foregoing estimate of the general expansive tendency of our society is right, then self-realization is in a measure justified. For no one can doubt that the widening and enrichment of English life makes for good. The times favor self-expansion, and the self-realization theory teaches us to seek it. It is therefore justified as a principle of conduct. We shall question, however, its claim to be the main principle of conduct.

A word may be said in passing on the relation of self-realization to hedonism, which has many points in common with it. The more modern hedonists maintain that pleasures are diverse in value, and that we ought to seek the highest. The best life would be one full of pleasures, various, persistent, and refined. Now, as pleasure is nothing but the feeling of activity, this high hedonistic life is much the same as a self-realizing life of excellent activities. The difference is that the self-realizer thinks more of the permanent character which underlies the activities. His aim is the good character rather than the functional expressions of it.

It is characteristic that in modern days we have had an ethical rehabilitation of pleasure. The mistake of older times

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was to confound pleasure with excess, and bring both into the same condemnation. A more thorough criticism has led us to a milder judgment. Pleasure is seen to be nothing more than the feeling of the performance of function, of the free discharge of vital energy. In itself it can neither be harmful nor blameworthy. Rather it is a mark of health and adaptation to environment; while pain is the mark of disease and failure and a spirit at odds with life and one's fellow-men.

Now, it has become an ethical truism that for the normal man a good life must be a life of congenial work and sympathetic co-operation with his fellow-citizens. It is obvious, therefore, that a good life must be on the whole a pleasant one. But not only is it right to make a pleasure of one's duty, it is right also to take advantage of all those innocent enjoyments which put us into a harmonious state of mind, increase our vigor, and make us feel kindly towards our fellow-men. This is a truth which has penetrated far beyond philosophical circles and contributed to form public opinion on the value of enjoyment. A wise liberality towards innocent pleasures has in the best of our contemporaries replaced the puritanism of our forefathers.

The foregoing remarks have, it may be hoped, given some color to the first part of our thesis, that the maxim of self-realization is valuable as a guide for the general direction of conduct. Before we go on to the second part we will, as self-realization is not an exact term, attempt to gain a clear view of its meaning. We have defined it in a general way as the cultivation of character. This may be understood in more than one sense. When we are told to realize the self, does this mean the entire self? If so, we must form a conception of human excellence somewhat akin to that of Aristotle, who says that the chief good for man must be the actuality of his powers according to their own proper law of excellence. The good man then will be one who has developed his nature in every direction, or, to use a phrase of Goethe's, one who has reared the pyramid of his being as high as he possibly can. But surely to live for self-realization in this sense is a very pagan sort of virtue. The entire self includes a great many

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elements which are entirely selfish. A fully developed man, according to the Greek idea, is one who is not only rich in habits of virtue and sympathy, but also in bodily vigor, and the various accomplishments of intellect and emotion. Now, to be all this, one needs not only good intentions, but also the "furniture of fortune,"—wealth, social position, and general prosperity. So to make entire self-realization one's supreme aim implies the pursuit of these things as well as the pursuit of virtue. But it is hardly necessary to point out that, according to the current standard of morality, at least, one must be constantly prepared to give up or hazard these external goods, and accept with resignation the prospect of a maimed and stunted life, if duty so requires it.

The difficulties in the way of all-round self-realization are obvious; but some thinkers have sought to evade them by distinguishing in man the true self from the false, the rational from the irrational, the animal from the spiritual. Self-realization, they maintain, lies in developing the higher and suppressing the lower. But this distinction is not a sound one. We cannot break a man's personality into two. We cannot say that his bodily part has, so to speak, no business to be there, and that his intellect and will alone form his true self. If feeling were a false element in the man, it would be separable from him at least in thought. We could imagine him without it, and he would seem to us as then relieved from an encumbrance and disfigurement. But psychology tells us otherwise. Man is a creature of feeling in every fibre of his nature. We cannot even conceive him without his body, or his consciousness without the element that comes from sensation. Even if we achieved the impossible and formed a character all intellect and will to the exclusion of feeling, we should not be realizing the true self, but only a part of the self.

To this criticism an opponent might urge that partial self-realization is the truest form of it; that we may not be able to annihilate the lower self, but we are most ourselves when we indulge it as little as possible. We reply that this is asceticism, and asceticism may or may not be a true theory of life, but it is something quite different from self-realization. The

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principle of self-realization has, in fact, transformed itself into a principle of self-sacrifice. It is true that from one point of view every act of denial is also an act of affirmation. The austerity of the hermit, the obstinacy of the martyr, are acts of self-realization in so far as they affirm one element of the self. But the affirmation of the one element is made at the expense of the rest, and this kind of self-realization lies outside the scope of our present argument.

A very popular and valuable form of the self-realization doctrine is that which bids us realize what is called the social self. One often hears people make a sharp opposition between egoism and altruism; in fact, treat them as contradictories and mutually exclusive. But it does not need a very profound study to see that they are to a very large extent two aspects of the same thing; that the growth of the self implies an increased devotion to the interests of one's fellow-men. The sympathies are, indeed, a great part of the content of the ego; a man can only live a full life for himself if he lives in the lives of others also. This is a point of view which T. H. Green did so much to impose upon our generation. A life of social devotion, of service in the spheres of the family, the parish or city, and the state, is really a life of self-realization of the truest and highest kind. Such a moral ideal, he would have argued, combines the truth in the ethical systems of Aristotle and Hegel. While Aristotle tells us to pursue the *summum bonum*, eudaimonia, Hegel insists on the moral value of "my station and its duties." The fact is, says Green, that happiness is realized by devotion to the duties of one's station. This only requires a little supplementing to make it the best form of self-realization which our moral experience has so far disclosed to us. Green hardly took enough account of the self-regarding virtues and of the pursuit of art and science for their own sakes. But if a man, without neglecting the claims of prudence and self-preservation and the claims of intellectual and artistic culture, can live a widely sympathetic life as a religious man and an active citizen, he has surely formed a character as rich as any that we know.

The foregoing, it may be hoped, is a statement of the self-

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realization principle as a thinker might express it. But every one has heard this question discussed in places far outside the philosophic sphere. It has escaped out of the lecture-room into the circulating library. Not a little of the literature of the day preaches vaguely but forcibly a gospel of self-realization. "Be free," "Strip off conventions," "Live your own life," is the burden of many a problem novel and problem play. On the ears of men of settled character and station such phrases fall unheeded. But to the young and untrained they have a delusive ring of hope and emancipation.

One can imagine a veteran exponent of this higher individualism giving counsel to a young friend entering life. "My son," he will say, "cultivate character. It is the only object in the world of permanent value in itself. Shun everything that narrows your life; cast out everything that deforms it. Breadth, sweetness, equipose, these are the qualities of the virtuous man, the man who truly succeeds."

We have now tried to show what the maxim of self-realization means in its various forms, and to prove that it is in harmony with the tendencies of the age and, therefore, valuable as a general indication of the kind of life one ought to lead. But we hold that its utility ends here. If a man attempted to regulate his conduct strictly by it, his life would be a moral failure. There is, in fact, a maxim which is higher than "Realize yourself," and that is, "Work." Let the work be the highest within your reach, but let it be low and inferior work rather than none at all. It may be objected that Green's theory of conduct combines these two principles of work and self-realization, since it is by working in one's station that self-realization is achieved. This is not strictly true. Devotion to the duties of one's station implies commonly a certain self-realization, the acquirement of a certain excellence of character; but not always. It may lead to a partial or total self-suppression. Whereas if a man makes it his chief aim to form an excellent character, to enjoy a life rich in noble and various activities, he must reject as unworthy most of those forms of work with which men have to be content. Green's theory is plausible because it is not strictly logical. Work

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is one thing and character another. They are closely connected but not the same. A man will look at life in a different way according as he makes the one or the other his primary aim.

We will now see how this works out at the various ages of man. Take first the young man to whom the self-realization principle appeals so powerfully. We argue that when he is entering on the serious business of life he should accept eagerly and gratefully such opportunities of self-realization as present themselves, but must not make this his primary aim. He must not resolve to "be free" or to "live his own life." He must resolve to live in the eye of the task-master. The maxim of work, the spirit of service and subordination, not the desire of personal achievement, must be his prevalent mood if he would succeed. In support of this we have but to consider the constitution of society. It is a truth which only needs recalling that man is a social creature; apart from society he is nothing. Now, the dominating, one might almost say overwhelming, fact about society is its organization. In order that society may exist certain work must be performed; certain daily provision made for the sustenance of body and mind. In a civilized society the mass of this work is enormous, and can only be accomplished by an immensely elaborate industrial organization held together by stringent discipline. On the successful working of this the welfare of every citizen depends; and every citizen, if he would not be a useless drone, must bear his part in it. As it is the foremost of all human interests that society should flourish, so our co-operation in it is the foremost of all our duties. Till that claim is satisfied we must not think of individual self-realization.

For the young man entering life these conditions must hold good with special stringency. To many of us the universal yoke of social duty may become easy through custom; he is just learning to wear it. In serving the apprenticeship to life a man cannot afford to think of forming a character, except in a secondary way. He has to acquire the mechanical skill of his profession, the knack of handling the tools, so to speak; and this is an engrossing task, even for the aptest learner.

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Moreover, he must get some notion of the composition of his society, of the way the social mechanism does its work, and of the function which his own employment performs in it. He must study human nature and, in particular, those varieties of it which he will have to work with. Above all he must get to know himself, his faculties and their limitations, so that he may lay out his talent to the best advantage. All this time he must, apprentice-like, be subject to authority. He must, in some measure, surrender his personality to be moulded by his master and by the spirit of his professional environment.

It is possible that the out-and-out believer in character may remark that this apprenticeship is the apprenticeship of a Philistine, or, as Dickens would have said, of Podsnappery, and that our docile young man will end as a soulless creature of routine. The case is not quite so bad as that, and yet we must admit that in thus becoming useful members of society men, for one thing, lose much of the charm of irresponsibility. A Harold Skimpole who utterly refuses the social harness and shifts all his burdens on to his more business-like friends is a much more entertaining creature than Podsnap who has gone to the City at ten A.M. regularly for the last thirty-five years, and whose ideas, never very extensive, have become too narrow for intelligent conversation. And, fiction apart, it is unfortunately true that many excellent men grow duller as they grow older. One notes in them with regret the withering of youthful enthusiasms, the abandonment of youthful studies, a general policy of mental retrenchment. The change may not be enough to dissolve friendship, but one is forced to admit that though they remain good fellows they are no longer good company.

This fact is all the sadder because so many scamps grown gray in mischief remain entertaining to the last. The life of a ne'er-do-well is one of adventure, of escapes and devices, of frequent change of scene and occupation. He does not fossilize in the routine of business and the rearing of an unintelligent family. It is certain that, in many ways, Alfred Jingle, that prince of sharpers, was more of a self-realizer than the exemplary Podsnap. His character, though less solid,

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had more wealth of experience, more variety and intricacy, more light and shade, and all the charm of the out-at-elbows picturesque. The life, then, of the average useful citizen does not tend to develop and display the lighter graces of character. This no doubt is due to the still imperfect development of society. When this imperfection is removed, when scientific invention has superseded drudgery, when every man's life-task is so varied, so interesting, and so congenial that his mind grows brighter and suppler as he grows older, then self-realization and duty will coincide. But this is obviously in the distant future. So much for the question how far the lighter excellencies of character are realized by devotion to the duties of one's station.

Now let us turn to the solid virtues. Do we realize that side of character by the life of civic subordination? To this our answer must be twofold. We realize them in a sense; but not in the sense meant by one who maintains the ethical theory of self-realization. It cannot be too strongly insisted that active work in society, the business-like pursuit of some useful calling, is the only moral training that rests upon a solid base. No academic or cloistered virtue can pretend to the same reality. The moralist defines virtue; the preacher inspires us with ardor to pursue it; practical experience alone can show that it is the necessary condition of all that gives life its value and its dignity. But we cannot argue from this that doing one's duty in one's station and resolving to realize oneself are the same thing, or two ways of describing the same moral attitude. From our humble human standpoint there is all the difference between them. Life is a struggle, nay, a sort of fight, and a resolution to do one's best in the fight is very different from thinking foremost of the type of character produced by victory. A few considerations will make this plain. In the first place, there is the chance of perishing or getting maimed in the struggle. This chance is very considerable in some professions, as those of the soldier, the sailor, and even the physician. But it exists, too, in the most peaceful walks of life; in the way of business or in the management of one's family. No one can be sure that he may not

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any day be required to hazard life or fortune at the call of duty. Now, surely, this obvious contingency is not provided for when self-realization is made the rule of life. Consider the profession of the soldier and imagine the recruit enlisting with the aim that he may realize the character of the veteran. How absurd this sounds! and yet, if character is really the supreme thing, it is what he ought to do. If any recruit did talk in this strain, the man of common-sense would remind him that a bullet might ruin his plans at the outset. So, more or less, with the other walks of life, from chimney-sweeps to emperors. To the man of duty death is an incident; to the self-realizer it is a frustration.

A further consideration will show the impracticability of the scheme of life we are criticising. The young man who sets out to realize character must have some more or less definite type before his mind. No one can think of rivalling such diverse kinds of excellence as Shakespeare, Napoleon, and Sir Isaac Newton all in one lifetime. Generally, some favorite hero strikes his fancy and shapes his ideal. Now, granting that he has health and long life, what are his chances of becoming what he wants to be? Surely, very slight. In the first place, very few men are in a position to choose their own career. Circumstances are generally such that only two or three places in the social organization are open to them. They must either take these or starve. Secondly, even if a young man is free to choose his career, it is impossible to be certain what will be its effect on his character. He can only guess how the matter will work out; for both factors in the problem, his own nature and his future circumstances, are at best imperfectly known. It may be that his chosen career will turn out very different from what he anticipates, and demand a type of excellence very different from what he admires. A youth may enter the army desiring to realize the virtues of the Homeric warrior, and find, when in it, that he can serve his country best as a statistician.

The advocate of self-realization may consider the two foregoing objections to be of minor importance. It may be true that when we set forth to form a noble character we cannot

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be sure either that an accident will not frustrate us or that we shall achieve exactly that type which we admire. And yet, he might urge, under average circumstances, some sort of excellence will undoubtedly be achieved if we go the right way to gain it,—*i.e.*, by working in the social organization. Now, in one sense this is true; but it is not true exactly in the sense the self-realizer means it. Undoubtedly the best way to form a character is by doing the duties of one's station. But we must, when we throw ourselves into those duties, be moderate in our anticipations of the character we shall achieve. It may possess a good deal of solid worth, but it is very likely to be battered and flawed by rough contact with the world. This is not the kind of character which attracts enthusiastic youth. The better kind of young man shows but scant respect for what he calls the respectable Philistine. Occasionally one meets with seniors who have borne an active part in life and yet delight us with the fulness and beauty of their natures. They have somehow kept themselves unspotted from the world. But this is rare. The average man who works in the world must expect to be more or less spotted thereby.

Of this any one may convince himself who has had experience of life. Let him think of the business men he knows and weigh their virtues with an even hand. Take a man in full contact with the hard realities of the world, a solicitor or stock broker, for example. Respectable members of these professions are honest in the main. We habitually trust our fortunes and our dearest interests in their hands. But would their general practice, and therefore their characters, be approved by any youth enamoured of abstract virtue? Would it bear to be put forward as the goal of a self-realizing life? No one has written a detailed and authentic treatise on the morality of the stock-exchange or the solicitor's office, though on the latter subject there are many valuable hints in a recent paper on legal ethics in America.* It is to be hoped that some candid and philosophic member of these professions

* International Journal of Ethics for April, 1897.

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will brave idle scandal and record an interesting phase of moral practice before it passes away. It is doubtful, however, if such a treatise will ever be written, but if it is, we may be quite certain that the system of practice which it will disclose, though perhaps not unsuited to the needs of the profession, will not square with any moral code promulgated by philosopher or religious teacher, from Confucius and Buddha down to the present day.

It is needless to enlarge further on the moral imperfections of the worldly. The judicious student of human nature knows them only too well. The subject is one which readily lends itself to cheap sarcasm. It is very easy to dwell on the failings of respectable modern society and then turn and ask how we dare call ourselves Christians, or claim to be superior to savages, who are too simple to cheat and too gentle to kill their fellow-men. This is ethical clap-trap. It is better to record with equanimity these two instructive facts: we cannot be solidly virtuous if we do not work in the world, and we are not likely to be perfectly virtuous if we do.

Of this second fact the reason is not far to seek; it lies in the imperfection of society. Dirty work and drudgery, the same causes which depress our elasticity and make us dull and formal, also tend to make us morally imperfect. The system in which we work is imperfect, so are the people we work with, and the imperfections of all react upon us. Consider the lawyer. Under the most favorable circumstances he sees men in an unamiable light, disputing mostly over money; while as an agent of justice he is a sort of social scavenger. He has a great deal of dirty work to do and must come into contact with many dubious and even vile characters. All this does not improve a man; it is difficult to touch pitch and not be defiled. Again, the system of law which he has to administer is very faulty, and the individual can do but little to improve it. Let him be as scrupulous as he will, he must do many hard things; he must often be the instrument of injustice; he must make many compromises between professional advancement and the dictates of honesty.

These considerations lead us on to what is the really fatal

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defect of the self-realizing principle: it prevents a man from throwing himself with all his heart into the duties of his station. At the outset of every enterprise it calls on him to pause and ask himself, Shall I be the better man for this? Will not that work involve a deterioration of my character? Will not this drudgery narrow the full round of my activities? It bids us replace duty by a sort of higher selfishness and subordinate the interest of the community to a sort of higher individualism.

Now, this is a fatal mood if one would accomplish anything in the world. The self-realizer is like a soldier who puts his personal character above the interests of the army. He cannot embark on this expedition because it is a wanton aggression; he cannot besiege that city because innocent women and children will be starved; he cannot shoot that prisoner because the man was maltreated and goaded into mutiny. Obviously, soldiers must go through the horrors and brutalities of war as best they can. Not theirs to reason why or make reply when orders come. And yet we honor the profession of arms. So with other walks of life, more or less. We all know the story of Cavour, who, in the midst of his diplomatic labors for Italian freedom, paused one day and asked himself, "Am I not fast becoming a scoundrel?" Some professions are less trying than others, and in every one we can, within limits, reject the evil without losing the good. But in all it is a condition of success that we think of work before character.

It is possible that the reader may agree to some extent with the foregoing views and yet be sorry to hear them spoken. The ethical theory you attack, he may say, is visionary, but it is elevating. It stimulates aspiration, and in any case can have no bad effects. We doubt this. It is of real importance to a young man to have a theory of virtue which squares with experience, and this is where the self-realization theory is particularly weak. Just now this questionable theory tends to predominate in ethical teaching. The result is that the cultured young man leaves the university with mistaken notions about the conduct of life; and, unless he is one of those prac-

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tical sceptics who keep their academic theories in one pocket and their working maxims in the other, he soon finds himself at odds with his profession. Thus it is that a hopeful career often begins in failure. A man of vigorous mind, of course, soon pulls himself together; for the logic of life is pretty sure to overpower the logic of the lecture-room. He learns to smile at ideals whose merit lies in their inaccessibility, at moral precepts which are totally unworkable, at counsels of perfection which, if one took them seriously, would lead society straight to destruction. This is no great misfortune. The misfortune is that he grows sceptical of moral philosophy altogether. He concludes that it is quite incompetent to grasp the facts. He may even assert that a consistent theory of moral experience is beyond the reach of the human mind.

These facts probably account for the neglect of moral philosophy among practical men. Of such men very few, whether in politics or trade or the professions, would admit that any text-book of ethics could help them much in the questions with which they have to deal. The same spirit appears in modern literature. There is a touch of it in Charles Kingsley and more than a touch in Mr. Kipling. The latter, indeed, in his anxiety to insist on the stern realities of duty would have it that ideals are superfluous, except to professors, and that the first step in real wisdom is to fling them away. This is absurd, taken literally. The working ideal in every man is nothing but his system of preferences and antipathies, and we find this equally in the roughest Tommy Atkins and in the most cultured professor. The fallacy to shun is that in the ideal a purpose of self-realization, rather than of active service, should be the dominating principle.

In estimating the validity and the workableness of the self-realization principle we have taken first and foremost that epoch when a man is embarking on the serious business of life; for then especially does one come into contact with solid realities and need the guidance of a solid maxim. At such a time, we have tried to show, the principle of work-where-you-can takes precedence of self-realization. For the rest of life also, as it seems to us, this precedence holds good. But

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there are at least two epochs when self-realization, though still secondary, gains in importance. One is the *Lehr- und Wanderjahre* of youth, when we should strive to widen the boundaries of our character; the other, the years of settled middle life, when we should strive to perfect it.

In adolescence, the young man, emancipated from school and not yet harnessed to a profession, has a few precious years to devote to moral and intellectual culture. If men were like the Olympian gods, careless of trouble and the necessity of laboring for their daily bread, culture, no doubt, would be the supreme principle of life. We should have nothing to do but to devote ourselves to the most refined and improving life we know. Now, the young man at the university is actually in an almost Olympian position. He has but little care or drudgery; his business is to improve his mind and body as much as possible. If he does not extend his knowledge and accomplishments at this propitious season, his mind is likely to remain poor and narrow for the rest of his life. It is right, therefore, that self-realization should bulk largely in the young student's ideal, and this is one reason why the ethical theory based thereon is so popular in academic circles. And yet even here the judicious educator will insist that the duty of work is ultimately higher than culture. Hegel was right when he taught that the stern lesson of submission and service must be learned before we can enter into knowledge and freedom. The fear of the Lord, or something like it, is undoubtedly the beginning of wisdom.

The self-realization of maturity is a rather different thing. Youth, like a barbarian conqueror, overruns more territory than it can retain. In our college days we take up a variety of pursuits, which have to be dropped when leisure becomes scarce, and indulge in virtues which afterwards prove too delicate for common use. In middle life we concentrate ourselves on what is practically attainable. A man, let us suppose, is master of his profession. His work, which has the first claim upon him, has become easy by habituation. He then can and ought to try to cultivate virtues and faculties which his daily task does not require. The relation of this conscious self-

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cultivation to the discipline of one's daily work is like that of gymnastics to natural exercise. The latter is the true foundation of a good physique, but it does not bring every muscle into play. A man must train systematically if he would have all parts equally strong. So it is with the active citizen, who, having passed the stress of mastering his profession, finds himself with leisure for self-cultivation. In this matter no man can lack employment. Innate faults of character, faults contracted from the world, abound in every one and usually defy complete eradication. However diligently the field be cleaned, the weeds spring up year after year; while in æsthetic and intellectual culture there is literally no end to what one may do. But even in this quiet autumn of life, one need hardly say, the maxim of self-realization remains secondary. Man, in some sort, continues in harness to the end. He may have retired from business, his family may have grown up and gone out into the world, but at least the duties of citizenship and religion remain. So soon as he ceases to recognize the sway of duty and to serve an ideal which is something higher and wider than his own personal perfection, he ceases to lead a good moral life. If he does not actually work much, he must hold himself ready to work, or, at least, to suffer. Death is the only final manumission from the service of life.

HENRY STURT.

OXFORD, ENGLAND.

THE MORAL VALUE OF SILENCE.*

PYTHAGORAS, among the ancients, united men in voluntary association for the purpose of realizing, through such fellowship, the moral end of life. He made it a condition that every one who desired to join his Order, before he could be admitted, should attest his worthiness by preserving silence during five years. Nay, he allowed no one to see his face who had not successfully passed through this trying novitiate.

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* An address to the Society for Ethical Culture of New York, Sunday, February 6, 1898.

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In the Monastery of La Trappe, France, and in its affiliated Monasteries in this and other countries, there prevails the rule of perpetual silence, broken only by the voice of prayer and of brief and solemn salutation when the brothers meet.

Without going to any such lengths, without attempting to depreciate the kindly offices of human intercourse through the medium of the spoken word, I yet maintain that some of the holiest, loveliest things in life are best preserved when kept in the casket of reticence, when the seal of silence upon them remains unbroken.

If an instrument could be devised to record the words that are spoken on the face of the globe, this instrument would need to be in constant operation. For the stream of human speech is never still. When one half the world is quiet, the other half is talking. But, of all the words that are spoken, how few can be regarded as successful expressions of thought and feeling. How few are remembered after they have been uttered, or deserve to be. The art of using language is one which everybody practises from babyhood upward. And yet it is one in which only an exceedingly small number become proficient. To what precisely is the difficulty due? It is due not merely to our awkwardness in using the tool of language, but to certain defects in the tool itself. The difficulty consists in this,—that there are few words in language that express a particular thing and nothing else, but that words for the most part designate classes of objects, and that it is only by combining these class terms, by partly blocking the meaning of each by the help of the others, that we can indicate more or less satisfactorily the particular thing we wish to say. The trick of speaking is like a trick sometimes practised in the hunting of wild animals. The wood or thicket in which the animal is concealed is surrounded, a cordon of hunters is drawn closer and closer, the circle becomes smaller and smaller, until at last the quarry is brought to bay and transfixed with the spear. So, in endeavoring to find a suitable expression for our thought, we are engaged in a kind of mental chase, and the words we use are a series of concentric circles, growing narrower as we proceed, until at last the sense is trapped,

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brought to bay, as it were, where it can no longer escape us, and transfixed on the keen point of speech. It is difficult enough to produce this specification of meaning, even where visible and tangible objects are concerned. If you read the account of a botanist about some species of plant that you have never seen, you will at once realize how hard it is to form a picture of what is described merely from the descriptive terms used. But the difficulty is immeasurably increased when an attempt is made to express, by means of language, something that is not tangible, not visible, a purely inward occurrence, an idea, a state of feeling. The vocabulary at our service for such purposes is limited indeed.

Here, then, we have one reason why silence is often better than speech, because certain things—and these the greatest, the highest, and the most inward—are actually inexpressible, incommunicable, ineffable in their very nature, and because the attempt to clothe them, nevertheless, in words belittles them. I mention, as a first instance of the unspeakable, gratitude. Of course, we can express our thanks for the lesser benefactions which we receive at the hands of our fellows; to one who has helped us by a timely loan, for instance, when we happened temporarily to be in need of financial assistance; to one who testifies, honestly and truthfully, in our favor, without, however, incurring any great sacrifice himself by so doing; to one who lends us his influence in procuring employment, to which, by our talents and attainments, we are entitled. To these and such as these we can express our thanks, and we can, occasion offering, return their favors by similar services on our part. But the moment the benefactions, of which we are the recipients, involve self-sacrifice on the part of our benefactors—especially great self-sacrifice—we are speechless, utterly unable to find words in which to express our thankfulness. That is to say, when infinite thanks are called for, we find ourselves to be poor in thanks, not because we do not feel the gratitude, but because the instrument of human language cannot convey what we feel. And at such times to use the current phrases in which thanks are apt to be expressed seems to us like a profanation of our feeling, so far

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short do they fall of what we should like to say; so paltry and pitifully inadequate do they seem. We are reduced to the necessity of falling back on the language of gesture, and of indicating by signs and tokens, by the pressure of the hand, by the eloquence of the eye, what the tongue is incompetent to frame into words. Can you thank the physician who, by constant attendance, by unremitting watchfulness and solicitude, by the exercise of his highest skill, by self-forgetting patience and care, has saved the imperilled life of your child? You can indicate your gratitude by signs. For the acts in which you try to express it are only valuable as signs of what you feel. But you can never express it in any set form of language. All the forms of speech that suggest themselves for the purpose are at once rejected as cold, trivial, worthless. Neither can a child ever thank its parents in words for all that they have done for it. Nor can lovers thank one another for the infinite tendernesses, delicacies, and ministries of love. Gratitude of the deep sort, then, is one instance of a content too volatile to be confined within the forms of words; or, better, of a freight too heavy for the vehicles of language to transport without their giving way beneath it. Our richest spiritual joys and our profoundest sorrow are other examples. Indeed, all our deepest feelings have about them this characteristic,—of being incommunicable. We try, in stammering utterance, by tokens and symbols, to give a hint of what we feel; but when the feeling has become so profound as to take complete possession of us, even that resource fails us, and then the realm of utter silence is our only refuge. We think with contempt of the chatterer who can talk glibly of his gratitude or his love; we judge that his nature is shallow, that his emotional life is superficial. The very fact that he talks so freely about what he feels is proof of that. We say of the grief that vents itself in sighs and groans, in cries and lamentations, that though it may shake the soul like a tempest, like a tempest it will pass away. Those who mourn their friends loudly and violently, as a rule mourn briefly. A year, perhaps, will pass, and we shall find that they have formed new friendships, new affec-

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tions. On the other hand, we stand in awe of speechless sorrow, for we know that it has taken hold of the roots of the soul, and that a long time must pass before its poignant pangs can be mitigated. Silence, then, is forced upon us by the defects of language as an instrument of expression. It is forced upon us because there are certain inward experiences that simply cannot be put into words.

In the next place, silence is the right attitude in the case of those things which might, indeed, be spoken, but ought not to be. Of these, I mention the following examples. First, charity. The violet of charity blooms in hidden nooks, and its charm is inseparable from its secretiveness. "Charity," it is said, "vaunteth not itself." And why not? Because its value is altogether dependent on the motive by which it is inspired,—the motive of pure, unselfish love for another being like ourselves. The publication of one's charities to the world is so unpleasing and repellent because it gives color to the suspicion that the actuating motive was the vainglorious desire for admiration and praise. A frankly selfish act is revolting indeed, but is by no means so obnoxious as selfishness parading under the mask of unselfishness self-love, that pretends to feed another's need, but in reality aims only at pampering its own conceit. "Charity vaunteth not itself;" for the moment it vaunteth itself it ceases to be charity. Charity executes its mission of mercy under the ægis of silence, in such a manner that its own right hand shall not know what its left hand doeth. Secrecy is the bloom of charity. If you brush that away from it, you have despoiled it of its richest beauty. The silence that marks true charity is required to guard the purity of the motive. Any act is capable of manifold interpretations. A seemingly kind act may be prompted by an evil motive; and a seemingly unkind act may be prompted by a lofty motive. It is only the spirit that inhabits the act that makes it fine. But how shall we judge of the spirit? In the case of charity we have a sufficient mark to go by. If the act is obtruded upon the attention, the spirit is not fine. If the act is withdrawn from view, performed almost shamefacedly, the spirit *is* fine.

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I have used the word "shamefacedly;" and this leads me to suggest another reason why charity deserves to be called the Daughter of Silence. There is really a distinct feeling of shame mingled with our charitable deeds. Shame is a complex attribute. It by no means always implies the sense of guilt. It is often the sensitive protest against the unveiling of sanctities, the sign of innocence and not of evil. And so, we often feel ashamed when we bestow our help upon a worthy object of charity, not on our own account, but on his account; we are vicariously ashamed for his sake. For we cannot help regarding it as something pitiful, something to be covered up, that a being invested with the dignity of humanity, a being so great in destiny, so worthy of reverence as every human being ought to be, should have fallen to so low an estate as to be deprived of food or shelter, or other necessaries of life, and dependent for these upon the aid of his fellow-beings. It is this pathetic sense of the contrast between what the man's condition ought to be, and the actual condition in which we find him, that awakens in us the desire to shield him as far as possible from the exposure of his needs to the world's eye, and leads us to throw the mantle of silence—in this case the mantle of true charity—over his nakedness. He who is not silent as to his charities is deficient in a fine moral sense. His charity is of a questionable sort.

There are these two reasons for reticence in the case of charity: the one relating to the purity of our own motives, the other to the protection of the self-respect of those whom we assist. I wish to add that what I have said applies to private charity. There are, however, certain forms of collective effort in charity, in which publicity of action is not open to the same objections. A body of people acting in concert for the support of philanthropic institutions have a right to make known to the public what they are doing, or propose to do, for the sake of obtaining the public support. And, for the same reason, it is often best that those who contribute should do so openly, for the sake of influencing others to follow their example. The distinction between collective and private charity appears to me to be a valid one, inasmuch

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as the former is rather an act of public spirit than of charity proper, and is directed to the public well-being rather than to that of particular individuals, while the latter is, or should be, the outgrowth of a relation between individual and individual, a ray of sunshine, falling from one human face upon another.

The silence of gratitude and the silence of charity have been mentioned. Let us consider next the silence of privacy; the law of silence that protects whatever specifically concerns ourselves from the prying curiosity of others. There are certain intimate thoughts which we express only to our intimate friends; nay, certain thoughts which perhaps we do not divulge even to these, which even our nearest ones must content themselves to guess at, to divine. There is, or ought to be, for every one, a certain territory which he may properly fence in against all comers. The right to be uncommunicative, with regard to certain matters, has been slowly acquired, and the extent to which it is conceded may be regarded as a measure of civilization. Children, among themselves, do not tolerate incommunicativeness at all. To keep anything secret they consider an offence. Among primitive races there seems to be the same lack of seclusion, the same denial of the right to be incommunicative. As property is often held in common, as many families often live under the same roof, so the inner life of each member of the tribe is the common property of all. Under the existing law in the State of New York it is provided that, on Sundays, in the liquor-shops, the shades shall be raised and the windows shall be free from obstruction, so that the police-officer may, at any time, look in and see what is going on. So, among uncultivated people, the windows of the mind are required to be kept free from intervening curtains or obstructions of any kind, in order that the public, if it choose, may look in at any moment and see what is going on within. Slowly, gradually, with much difficulty, the right to curtain off our inner world has been won in civilized communities. And even in these communities the subjects to which the benefits of the rule of privacy apply require to be further extended. This precious privilege of keeping one's

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own counsel as to matters which others have no right to know, simply because they cannot comprehend, because they cannot be expected to have the insight, the intellectual sympathy, necessary to enter understandingly into the niceties of our feelings and our way of thinking,—this precious privilege, I say, requires to be further extended. That it would be an impertinence to ask a man how large his income is, or to touch on other private subjects of like nature, is conceded by everybody. But, in regard to one subject, the right to remain incommunicative has not yet been established, particularly in the United States. Persons otherwise fairly well-bred have no scruples in asking a comparative stranger to what church he belongs; that is to say, what opinions he may hold on the very highest questions of life; opinions which he may find it extremely difficult to express to others in such a way that they shall comprehend, and which he ought, therefore, to be particularly privileged in withholding. The reason why a question which is so intimately related to the very core of personality can be thus abruptly put, why there is such want of delicacy in regard to religious opinion, is probably to be found in the circumstance that certain cut-and-dried doctrines have hitherto formed the basis of religious fellowship, and that the right of individual difference in matters of religion has not been recognized as it ought to be. The more Ethical truths are recognized as the foundation of the spiritual life, the more religious opinions are relegated to the sphere of individual intuition and insight, the more, we may hope, will a reverent reticence in regard to religious convictions come to be regarded as a mark of genuine culture.

The rule of silence applies to the things that cannot be communicated, to the things that might be said but ought not to be. It applies also to those things which may be ripe for communication after a time, but are not yet ripe. Under this head are included our intentions, our plans for the future. The dignity of a rational being is compromised by the premature announcement of what he intends to do. And the reason is that what he proposes or resolves to do he may never be able actually to carry out, and that he will then appear

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in the unenviable light of a maker of vain speeches which he has not had the ability to convert into corresponding facts. But, just as we are bound to speak the truth,—that is, to make our words correspond to facts,—so also are we bound, as far as is at all possible, to make the facts correspond to our words, and to say nothing, to make no announcement of which we have not a reasonable expectation that we shall be able to translate it into reality. For the world we live in is a real world, and our mission is to be real factors in it, and the worth of life is proportionate to the amount of reality which we import into it.

The wisdom of mute lips furthermore appears in those situations when right, justice, and reason are assailed by passion, by prejudice, by fanatical hate that is too deaf to hear, too blind to see. The rule I have tried to indicate is that reticence should be observed when the likelihood is wanting that what is said will have its due effect. And from this point of view we can understand the silence of Jesus in the presence of his enemies. We read in the Gospel that when he was accused of the chief priests and elders he answered nothing. "And Pilate said unto him: Hearest thou not how many things they say against thee? And he answered him never a word, insomuch that the Governor marvelled greatly." He wrapped himself round with silence. He could not doubt, indeed, that the power of truth would assert itself in the long run, even over the hostile forces then arrayed against him. But he knew that at the time when the tempest of the passions is raging in men's breasts they cannot, if they would, understand the truth. Truth reflects itself upon the mind only, then, when the surface of the inner waters is smooth: in the stillness of the soul we see it.

But the principal thought I have wished to place before you remains to be stated. The highest moral value belongs to those ellipses, or intervals, during which is being revolved and matured in the mind the right utterance that is to come afterwards. The enemy of morality is impulse. Only to a very limited extent do we ever succeed in rationalizing our impulses, —that is, in training them to move along the grooves which

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reason prescribes. Even when we applaud impulse, we do so only when, by consummate training, it has ceased to be wayward. The really moral person is one who keeps perpetually before his eyes the outspread world of the moral relationships,—that is to say, who sees what his relations ought to be as in an ideal landscape; who sees especially the striking differences that distinguish the duties which he owes to different persons; sees how differently he ought to act towards a superior and towards an equal, towards a person of the same sex and a person of the other sex; towards a person of the same age and a person of tender age; towards members of the same social class and members of a different social class. The moral man, I say, is one who sees before his eyes the chart of his relationship to others, and especially the differences of the duties which he owes to others, and who tries to conform his speech and his action to the directions of this chart. And it is evident that a man who tries to do this often must allow intervals of silence to elapse before he acts or speaks, during which he considers the actual situation in the light of his ideal chart. So that it is not too much to say that the morality of a person can be gauged by his reflectiveness, by the degree to which he has acquired the habit of seeing the invisible moral entities, and deriving thence his bearings.

And the moral importance of letting silence intervene before speaking or acting—silence that is not vacancy, but crowded with thought—becomes particularly plain on certain occasions. For instance, when a child or a friend, or any one close to us, has done or said anything which we are disposed to resent, how infinitely precious, at such moments, is the habit of preserving silence. The mere fact that the impulse to speak is repressed allows the wave of wrathful feeling that threatens to sweep away self-control to subside. And then reflection steps in. We revolve inwardly what the cause of this offence may have been; whether we ourselves have, in any way, given provocation; where the fault of the offender lies; and thus we gain time to shape our words in such a way that they shall have a medicinal effect. Perhaps

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the words we decide to speak may be stern. Sternness may be called for. But, if we do speak sternly, it is because on careful reflection we have decided that stern language will have a curative effect, we do not merely vent our passion, as a geyser vents its scalding flood. And at other times, the answer will be gentle, if, on reflection, we find that it is the genial influence that is needed. There is one feature especially that characterizes the reflective type of morality, for which I claim that it is the only true type,—namely, that the medicinal acts or words often, at first sight, seem to have no connection with the occasion that calls them forth. There appears to be a gap between the occasion and the consequent behavior; and we can only establish the connection if we succeed in supplying the intervening train of silent reflection. For instance, a child has told a falsehood; and the parent, instead of venting his feelings by vehement denunciation, after a brief reprimand, arranges that the child shall receive instruction in natural history. The parent, having come to the conclusion that the falsehood was due to redundant imagination, seeks to overcome this tendency by engaging the child's interest in the real objects which surround him, and by training his mind in accurate observation. A young criminal is brought to the Reformatory and, instead of merely being locked up in a prison-cell, is subjected to systematic physical culture, in the belief that his degenerate physique has much to do with his evil habits, and receives a thorough course of manual training, on the ground that the growth of the criminal instincts is often due to a lack of the power of consecutive thinking, and that manual training, for a certain type of mind, is the best means of developing that power. And so in other ways.

There is a decisive change that separates those who may be called "spiritually minded" from those who are not. Among Christians this is known as the "change of heart." I believe that in the moral field, too, leaving entirely out of account theological ideas, there is such a change. Those may be called "spiritually minded," in the moral sense, who do not suffer themselves merely to rebound from the occasions

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of speech and action, as a ball rebounds from a wall, but who, under the blessed ministry of silence and of the meditation that accompanies it, consider the scheme of moral relationship; consider what their place in it is; consider what the place in it is of the person to whom they are to speak, or towards whom they are to act; and consider the choice of means by which they can restore the right relation between themselves and others. Any one who has undergone that change, from reacting impulsively to acting and speaking *medicinally*, has experienced the decisive change of heart, has become, in the moral sense, regenerate.

A few years ago, during a visit to the Gallery of the Brera, in Milan, I found myself in the Hall of Sculpture. The works of art surrounding me were all the products of the modern school, and bore upon them the impress of strain, vehemence, intensity, which are characteristic of that school. They seemed to me all like a glorification in marble of the merely passionate nature of man, of that side of human nature which I have just characterized as intrinsically unmoral. Not far from the Hall of Sculpture, in the Hall of Paintings, I paused before a picture of the Cinque Cento. It was by Bartolommeo Montagna, the famous Master of the School of Vicenza, and represented the enthronement of the Madonna. What peace, what beauty seemed poured out over this canvas! What a relief, after the nightmare of excited fancy, which I had just left behind me! It was not, indeed, the Madonna herself, nor the angels that seemed to play their viols so melodiously at her feet, but one of the attendant saints, St. Ursula, that particularly arrested my attention. Her face was slightly upraised. It was a face perfectly lovely to look upon. The light shone upon it from above, and another light transfigured it from within. What utter calmness and serenity had settled upon those features! You could not help noticing that, with her wide-open eyes, she saw things fair, and great, and holy, and tranquillizing to the spirit. So may those look who see spread out before them the world of the moral ideal that rises, in its purity and beauty, above this nether sphere of dust and tumult, and whose life is hallowed

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by the task they set themselves,—the task of copying, under the conditions of space and time, to some slight degree, the glory of that divine original.

I have reached the limits of this address. And yet, the thought is capable of being extended and enlarged upon in many ways. Out of the silence have we come, and into the silence shall we pass. A silence not empty, but, like the star-sown canopy of night, replete with light, and power, and law. Vainly, as I think, do men seek to frame the meaning of the Universe into a word. Let us desist from such useless efforts. Let us deepen in ourselves the sense of the infinitude and the majesty of it all, and revere the radiant mystery in a silence like its own!

FELIX ADLER.

NEW YORK.

DISCUSSION.

THE SOCIAL QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF PHILOSOPHY.*

"THE battle for a new meaning of life has broken out, the point in question is the striving for a new social philosophy." These words of the preface best characterize the purport and contents of this thorough, comprehensive work. Ludwig Stein finished it last year, after having already dwelt upon its subject-matter in lectures given since 1890, whilst he was instructor at Zurich, and again as Professor at Berne.

The tone of the lecturer has been preserved throughout the book. Its freshness and vivacity have thereby been enhanced to such an extent that one readily overlooks the drawback of repetitions which are often needless.

This origin will explain why Stein allots relatively so much space (pp. 175–510) to his "Outlines of a History of Social Philosophy," in spite of the fact that he can naturally offer us little that is new on the subject. The chapter on "Original Forms of Communal and Social Life" (56–174) is also historical to a great extent,

* "Die sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie." Vorlesungen über Socialphilosophie und ihre Geschichte, von Dr. Ludwig Stein, ord. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Bern. (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1897. Pp. 792.)

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although he here presents us with some original theories. The scholar who is already acquainted with the social problem will find the chief value of this voluminous work in the introductory lectures (1–55), which prove the right of philosophy to consider the social question, and in the third part, "Principles of a System of Social Philosophy" (511–777). In the other parts, students will find a wealth of information and numerous references to original authors. This is in accord with the intention of the author to address a wide public.

He at the same time very earnestly warns us against a popularization of results, before science has definitely pronounced itself in favor of them (27).

Stein starts from the point of view of the aristocracy of intellect: "The crass, witless crowd" can, perhaps, be temporarily satisfied with a Socialism which merely considers material questions. But not so "the intellectual upper ten thousand" (12). In order that the social question may not be considered a mere "beef and pudding" question, it is not merely the right, but the duty of philosophy to speak upon the matter. If Socialism is to mean progress, it must be "permeated with pure religious (not ecclesiastical-dogmatic) elements and be nourished on moral ideas." The chief social problem is this: "Under what conditions must individual and social groups, economical and socially advanced, work and live together, so that the social organization to be formed shall be adjusted to the greatest satisfaction of all the members?" (14.)

The author's answer to this question is that "in the first place there must be a biological advance,—*i.e.*, an elevation of the physical man through social selection, then an ethico-social perfection to be realized through the socialization of church and state, of art, and science, and education, the improvement of the type of man and development of future generations through education into social beings" (766, 767).

To rightly grasp this solution, one must closely observe that by "Socialism" Stein does not mean the same thing that most people do. For he says (331, 332), "In order to bridge the seemingly bottomless abyss which separates individualism from collectivism, and to abolish the inner antagonism existing between freedom and equality, one must seek a compromise between the two. This compromise is Socialism, which opposes both the abolition of private property and the continued usury of capitalistic individualism while making concessions to each of these apparently irreconcilable attitudes."

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The elementary principle of religious and ethical imperatives, which Stein, purposely leaning on Kant, enunciates, must hold this goal in view (690, 697, 705). "So act that all your doings may be not merely an expression of your own life, but also of that of your fellow-men, and thus insure and elevate the life of generations to come."

The evolutionary and socialistic character of the work before us has thus been shown, provided, of course, that one may term opinions "socialistic" which always emphasize the importance and meaning of private property, and assume, as an established fact, "that private property, presupposing a *do ut des*, is a far better school for the awakening of altruistic sentiments than is common property" (104).

Stein knows that specialists are unanimous in saying that property was originally communistic (92), and that private property subsequently developed therefrom. Basing himself upon A. H. Post, he opines (94) that the varying height and strength of the tribesmen first produced the individualization of property in implements (nets, bows, arrows). But I consider these physiological causes of the origin of private property improbable. In all armies, wherever marked physical differences were taken into account in the distribution of arms and other equipments, a man did not obtain a lasting proprietary right to his weapon, sword, or horse, even in the states where military service lasted half a man's life. The distribution of implements must have been similarly conducted among the primitive communistic hordes. The mere fact that a man is not of the same strength throughout his life, but gradually weakens without becoming immediately unfit for work, would tend to necessitate a change of weapons, and would thus greatly impede the growth of the idea of the right of individual property.

As a rule, the same implements would be suitable for nearly all the members of such a tribe, as yet but little differentiated. Even if in single cases private property had arisen in the way mentioned by Stein, these would always be of less importance as compared with the radical changes in the forms of ownership, caused by the taming of animals, and tillage,—*i.e.*, by changes in the form of production. On this matter, Stein relevantly remarks that, "the rise of slavery is an event running parallel with the taming of animals; the slave is nothing more than a tamed man" (95). The progress is due to the fact that from selfish, rational motives the foe is no longer treated as a predatory animal, but as a domestic

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one. At first, cattle and slaves are the common property of the tribe, but the election of the first chief is the social fall (99). Private property first arose with the chief (100), to whose descendants it was transmitted. Differences of rank arise, social differentiation begins. After the transition to husbandry, the *ager privatus* crumbles away from the *ager publicus*. Whereas in prehistoric times communal property prevails, private property is more and more noticeable in historic times. This happens because "the idea of property always takes the shape which is most adapted to the social requirements of the time" (102). To-day, "the desire for a modification of the idea of property is appearing, strong and inevitable, like a law of nature" (103). Stein, too, admits that property is merely an historical category, and in the course of time may disappear, just as it arose. But he considers that the time has not yet arrived for such a sweeping revolution. In fact, one must assume that he believes the time will never arrive, for, in the chapter entitled, "Logical Inconsistencies in Our Present Conceptions of Property," while placing "expediency in the foreground," he admits the necessity of retaining private property (565). Nevertheless, Stein agrees that in the course of centuries, and in case all palliative measures have failed to bear fruit, a future generation should, as an *ultima ratio*, be permitted to abolish that right of inheritance, which he now warmly defends (573).

This is a concession which, even academically considered, is of small worth. For, presumably, this distant future will not allow itself to be in any way restricted in the execution of that which it may think expedient.

As special evidence in favor of Stein's statement that "private property exerts a highly altruistic and therefore moral influence" (105), he alleges that "adherents of Socialism are often found even among the most wealthy, who, impelled by pity for the widespread misery of the proletariat, or by a feeling of justice, seek a new order of society, the costs of which would in the first instance have to be borne by themselves. This is an evident victory of altruism, born naturally of private property, over a narrow egoism." In this matter the present writer may be said to speak with some special knowledge, for he is one of those well-to-do adherents of Socialism whose convictions are due to scientific study and not to a desire for the improvement of their own personal condition. In the first place, it must with regret be said that the number of those whose attitude towards Socialism means disadvantages to themselves

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is very small. But the more Socialists one finds among those favored by the present order of society, the more sharply will this order be condemned. What can a society be worth whose condition causes those who suffer by it to hate and curse it, and in which, even among its beneficiaries, more and more voices are heard proclaiming it to be a horrible evil and a disgrace to mankind? Can private property be justified when not only the poor believe that therein lies the source of all their woe, but also the rich may be found (according to Stein, even "often") seeking its abolition because they think it economically and morally bad? Can an institution which, on account of its fruits, is increasingly condemned even by its beneficiaries, be such "an excellent school for the elevation of morality" that a conscious reorganization of society could not dispense with "this happy factor in the evolution of moral ideas" (105)? I must confess that only the converse of this would have appeared to me conclusive,—namely, if Stein had shown that private property had proved such a blessing that not only the smallest property owners, but the most miserable paupers, being convinced of its equity in spite of the injury to themselves, favored the ideals of capitalistic individualism, and therefore objected to the new order of society. Then, indeed, the altruistic influences of those conceptions of property, which in their main outlines have been the same for thousands of years, would have been proved. Stein's method of demonstration seems to me, however, to prove the greatness of the misery which has been produced by the school he considers indispensable to the future. With the same logic, one could declare that slavery, or, at any rate, serfdom, was a prominent and indispensable factor in furthering morality, for even in this case some of the lords desired the abolition of an institution by which they benefited: as witness the celebrated evening of August, 1789.

Still more surprising is Stein's conception of the manner in which private property "naturally" awakens altruism. Apart from a reference to Spencer's "Data of Ethics," Stein adduces only one argument in support of his opinion. He maintains that under primitive conditions one could produce what he needed, and be "thus independent of his fellow-men, and consequently inaccessible to altruistic motives" (104). But with civilization "the mutual interdependence of man increases. . . . This everlasting transformation of the *do ut des* must finally increase the consciousness of human solidarity (Zusammengehörigkeit), and thus naturally

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produce the moral sense of altruism in the highest degree" (104). If the premises were not so radically wrong, the conclusion would be right. Primeval man (with the exception of a few who led solitary lives) is an undifferentiated member of his horde, his tribe, his clan, upon which he and all his economic religious and other interests are dependent. Far from being "independent of his fellow-men," he is closely bound to them, and goes through an altruistic schooling which expresses itself quite differently (and in the self-sacrifice for the tribe often of much higher moral value) from the cunning, selfish calculation of the *do ut des* policy which Stein so much approves. This is a policy which in actual life and among highly civilized men has led as often to the most wicked attempts to exploit and overreach, as to a rational, voluntary consideration for others. True, this altruism is only exercised in favor of the members of his own tribe, and becomes egoism in his relations with other tribes. International morality is the product of a later epoch. According to Stein's argument, mutual consideration and a higher morality ought to develop more quickly in a state without hereditary property in which individuals are far more dependent upon each other than is the case to-day.

If one holds up the catch-phrase "decentralization of labor, but centralization of interests" as the true formula for modern society, he will find that both conditions would best be realized under a collective ownership,—*i.e.*, a state ownership of the means of production. Separate economic interests hinder the collective intellectual interests. Even to-day the independent manufacturer cannot decentralize labor to anything like the same extent that the State does in its undertakings.

Even if Stein were right in saying that private property is an excellent school in which to elevate moral ideas, which the present writer emphatically denies, he is wrong in saying that this school will always exist. If private property is an eminent pedagogic medium, it must be remembered that the final aim of all education is to make itself superfluous. As the child outgrows the school, so should humanity finally outgrow that stage in which, according to Stein, private property is serviceable, and according to Marx simply necessary. Whether this moment has already come is, of course, another question. One can believe with Stein that the time has not yet come, and even that it will not come in the twentieth century, without advocating the retention of private property for all time under certain restrictions. His formula for the future

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amounts to this: the social ideal, philosophically expressed, is individualism mollified by the communistic character of national institutions (106). He calls this the "*aurea mediocritas* of compromise." Fully as I agree with him that "the salvation of mankind does not lie in extreme measures," I can discover in his attempt at compromise only the *mediocritas* without the golden glitter of the ideal. This is at once evident when he asserts that "science, art, and technical industries have developed historically on the basis of private property," whence it may rightly be deduced that so far it "has been continually associated with the civilization of Western Europe and America" (why not include the Japanese? the limitation is not quite explicable). For Stein hesitatingly declares that private property has accompanied, "even if it has not been an unconditional presupposition" of this type of civilization. Communistic experiments would endanger the results and the very existence of our present civilization, "the extermination or mere endangering of which nothing but sheer madness will bring about." The opponents of innovations have at all times fought with such high sounding phrases. As we know, no Roman or Greek could picture a civilization that was not based on the slavery of the majority, and yet our civilization, without this basis, is in all respects much higher and richer than Rome's, and superior in most respects to that of Athens. In an age which brings forth surprising discoveries every year (X-rays) and inventions (telegraphy without wires), the fact that a thing has not been is no "sure proof" that it will never be.

It would be rash to leap straightway into communism when the preliminary steps in favor of it in all branches are unknown, and cannot be known in the present state of development of even the most advanced nations. Thus, the opinion that danger to civilization arises from communism, has yet to be proved. Such an argument is of the timorous, shallow, but "effective" sort, which finds so much favor in the low regions of politics, but which in the higher walks of science ought to be avoided as much as possible, or used, if at all, with great caution. During a certain period of human development, private property was indispensable; that it does today, however, and that in all the future it will "doubtless exercise a civilizing and moralizing influence" (106), is a private opinion of Stein's as bold as it is incapable of proof.

The present writer must confess that he receives just the reverse impression: with the continuance of private property he thinks that egoism will flourish, and the treating of others as a means and

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never as an end in themselves, giving them as little as possible while taking the utmost for one's self. The *do ut des* principle appears to me strongly egoistic. It is difficult to realize how Stein can call this maxim a motto of altruism, for it is not a utopian, but a realistic egoism reckoning with the attainable. Altruism consists in giving without expecting to receive a reward in return. A universal application of the formula *do ut des* would simply be an unthinkable retrogression in morality. An institution basing itself upon this principle is thereby already stigmatized as a stage of development which the progress of civilization must surpass, and is ethically condemned.

Stein's fundamental principle of morality, already quoted, may be more readily applied to a member of a socialized community than to the owner of private property. The latter, while maintaining his own life and that of his descendants, naturally diminishes the possibilities of life of his competitors in the economic struggle for existence, and often to such an extent as to make their life and that of their descendants impossible.

"The strength of Socialism lies in the weakness of its opponents" (290). This opinion of Stein's is confirmed by his own example. Like so many others, his dislike for a complete abolition of hereditary property is engendered by the conviction that "despotism is the bosom friend of communism" (300). "Without a severe despotism communism is unthinkable" (327). He says, "Communism doling out its provisions in equal shares is unacceptable; firstly, because equality is incompatible with the human inequality established by nature, and, secondly, because the inevitable despotic suppression of individual freedom, which is a feature of all communism, is not desirable. For this purpose, too, the modern individual is far too greatly differentiated" (331). In terms not less severe, Stein, however, rejects "capitalistic individualism," which, in a one-sided way, favors income without work, that is, capitalists living at the expense of those who do the intellectual and physical work.

Profit, Stein considers entirely justified as a reward for the management of production. He, however, forgets that this function, like everything else, is only worth its just reward; this reward, however, as compared with the pay of public and private officials and of workingmen, is much too high. If one rejects income without work as unjustifiable, it is necessary to find for all sorts of work useful to society, incomes more correctly graduated than is

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the case to-day. He who seeks this solution will be able and willing to seek to preserve the necessary (but by no means extensive) freedom of the individual under collectivism. The opposite of Stein's opinion might be expressed thus: the social ideal is that form of collectivism in state organizations which is modified by individualism, which always sets the interests of the community in the foreground, and which on this account carefully takes into consideration the differences of individuality, to the advantage of the living and coming generations. On the basis of common property, unequal reward for unequal tasks can be executed with as much equity and justice as under a continuation of private property.

That a limitation of the absolute liberty of the individual is under such circumstances unavoidable is true; but, as Stein knows (599), it is the same with every form of government. "There never has been, and never will be, an absolute liberty of the individual, for personal liberty without a correlative personal security is a chimera," and an atom of assured liberty is worth far more than any amount of liberty which is every moment threatened. Such phantom-liberty, however, is what not only man in a state of nature, but man under to-day's civilization, often possesses. Stein puts the following words into the mouth of the politically deluded proletarian: "It was formerly my duty, it is now my right, to starve" (612). The solidarity of the human race, however, on which a rational collectivism will be erected is no delusion, no phantom, "but an incontrovertible scientific fact, statistically proved" (665); aye, human solidarity is "the most profound thought of social evolution" (701). In these elementary conceptions I find myself agreeing with the author. Wherein I differ is based upon this fact: although Stein often condemns the evils arising from capitalistic individualism, although he often approaches the new view which says that in the preservation of one's kind race is of all importance, whereas the individual is but a point of transition, he yet is not free from the antiquated notion which ascribes to the individual, as compared with the group, an importance and independence which he never possessed. Stein theoretically assumes the interaction of individuals and groups of men (522) and their surroundings as against Gumplowicz and Marx, who, respectively, in the theory of racial struggles, and in the all-directing power of economic influences, treat the influence of the individual as if he were entirely irrelevant. Stein thus believes that he represents a view intermediate between the old spec-

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ulative doctrine which makes the individual everything, and the new exact method which makes him nothing. (Nietzsche, the pupil of the Sophists, is also to be reckoned a representative of the old doctrine, as Stein himself proved in his book entitled "Beyond Good and Evil.") It seems to the present writer as though Stein repeatedly inclines to a Carlylean hero worship, involving an exaggerated notion of the part played by individuals in the history of mankind. Thus, when he defends the despotic (*harten*) rulers (Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon) because "such grand human butchers have, with one bold stroke, done the work of centuries in furthering civilization" (115), he makes a statement which, if applied to Alexander, is very doubtful, and in the case of Cæsar and of Napoleon is evidently not apposite. Pompey might have defeated Cæsar at Pharsalus without altering the course of history, save in so far that the first Roman emperors would have borne other names. In so far as the civilization of the last century has been dependent upon political factors, it was not determined by Napoleon, but by the French Revolution. The declaration of the independence of the United States, perhaps the act of all acts in modern history which involved great consequences, was due, as fittingly becomes the beginning of democracy, to no one person, but was the impersonal act of a whole people.

Stein expresses the view of many other investigators, and, to a certain extent, of the present writer, when he states (358) that "governmental socialism" has the best chances for the future. One can also agree with him when, instancing Rodbertus, he asserts that Socialism is as compatible with national and monarchical as with international and democratic convictions (424). He strongly approves of a social monarchy; in fact, the idea of a general socialization under the domination of a ruler possessing great authority justly finds supporters among the educated classes of Central and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, one factor is momentarily lacking,—viz., the monarch who is thoroughly educated in social politics, and who will give his whole force and power to the service of equalizing social justice. Even if he were found (and sooner or later by force of circumstances he will be, but too late, I fear), he would not be capable of all the heroic deeds with which Stein credits him: "Who knows but that a Napoleon of socialism or an Alexander of politics could with one sharp blow sever the Gordian knot of social politics more easily than that wild parliamentary conglomeration of glib-tongued lawyers, who to their mutual satisfac-

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tion demonstrate that they are only blockheads" (428). (By the way, Stein sees only the picture of *bourgeois* parties, for there is not a single lawyer among the prominent Social-Democrats of Germany, France, or Austria.) The great dissatisfaction induced by the evils of parliamentarism may be justifiable, but it does not make it more probable that the social question could be solved with a single sharp blow, even by an absolute monarch. Such a fearfully exaggerated piece of rhetoric could only be excused in one of the parliamentary blockheads. A man of pure science ought to beware of it. This boundless utopianism appears much weaker in the sentence immediately following: "If the chief acquisitions of humanity are due to genius, there is no reason why time should not also give birth to a social genius, who could hasten social evolution and the realization of the ethical ideals of socialism more quickly than will probably happen in the regular way of immanent teleology." Here, too, the conclusion would be correct were not the premises false. All modern methods of thought rebel against the naïve conception which would account for the marked progress of mankind in any other way than by the added results of small causes. Even a new religion does not suddenly and unexpectedly descend from heaven, but gradually develops for one or more centuries, and then does not always develop according to the intention of its eminent founder, although it may have been named after him. Before Christ came John the Baptist, after him Paul, and little as we can imagine Christ without his predecessors, yet his apostles, and especially Paul, considerably modified his teaching, to say nothing of the interpretations which Greek wisdom introduced. St. Simonism is a striking example of a similar appearance in our century. It is well known in this case, on which the clear light of a critical time has fallen, that after his death the first apostles created the teaching which bears his name and will make it immortal. It is continually being proved that the individual does little, and that the community does most. Strangely enough, Stein believes he refutes this, when, by pointing (523) to the Czar, who could grant a constitution or cause all heterodox religionists to leave his empire within three months, he concludes that great political personalities can change the character of society by a violent blow or a decisive word. He somewhat naïvely considers such proofs of power the result of "a disturbed night." He has momentarily forgotten that the thoughts of an individual do not arise by pure chance, but are the last link in a long chain

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made up of everything which has ever acted upon him. If a Czar were to grant a constitution to-day, this would not be his own free act, but more or less the result of events in and out of Russia. The same can be said of the religious example above given, whereby the character of society can be changed by a despot's word (523). The might of even a despot is minimized by his surroundings. Looked at *sub specie æternitatis* (a point of view adopted by Stein), the question whether a state receives a constitution ten years sooner or later is of no importance. A social monarchy, too, cannot of itself change the world; it can only hasten or hinder in a moderate degree the pace of development; however important its acts may be in detail, they are small *sub specie æterni*. What Stein, who constantly emphasizes his antagonism to Social-Democracy, wants is not "the abolition of the modern state," but "continuance of private management in socialized guise, a mixture of state and private management, which, while not quite abolishing wage labor, would gradually abolish all its loathsome evils" (648). This would be considered by other investigators, who do not agree with the Marxian Social-Democracy, and who criticise socialism more sharply and severely than Stein, as not the aim but the beginning of the end of the private capitalistic method of production. They, however, would agree with Stein that the socialization of law must take place within a social body before the social state becomes a ripe fruit. Hence, in spite of theoretical divergencies, there will be agreement on the immediate practical measures; this Stein admits. He points to Laurence Gronlund (602); he could have adduced many more who, while entertaining socialistic views, do not believe in the abolition of marriage or in all being paid alike. We can fully agree with his definition: "under socialization of the law we understand the protection of the economically weak, the conscious subordination of individual interests to a greater common whole, to the state, and, finally, to the whole human race" (607). Stein justifies the right to existence somewhat forcibly but brilliantly by saying that the modern state in "prohibiting abortions and the starvation of children" (Kinderaussetzung) has placed on the "individual resting in his mother's womb a legal compulsion to be born," even in the case of weaklings or cripples, which the Greeks deserted or killed. Therefore, the moral duty is incumbent upon the state of making "the right to live" a corollary of the "legal compulsion to be born" (616). This must take place through the "state guarantee of a minimum standard of life" (639).

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The following social reforms are to provide the means: "nationalization of all mining industries, of water-power, of insurance, of inventions, and of all intellectual property, say, one generation after the death of the testator" (639). True, the author admits (640) that as a corollary to the minimum, which should be made to vary with the quality of the soil, the climate, the state of civilization, and the wealth of a country, there should be a maximum standard of life. This modest proposition is not very boldly made, and Stein is satisfied with a progressive income and inheritance tax.

The socialization of law is to be followed by a complimentary socialization of art, of morals, of science, and of education. In connection therewith, certain demands are made which the present writer can all the more endorse, as he himself has repeatedly urged them in various publications. Stein says (653), "whether human society is to be socialized from above downward, or from below upward, is more a question of time (*tempos*) than of principles." Although he is right here, he straightway falls into the worst form of utopianism when he dreams of the social emperor who with one blow, or with a single majestic word, can bring about the socialization of society more quickly and more thoroughly than it can be by the mole-like work of gradual democratization. If this be not mere rhetoric, he who would prefer socialization from above ought to point out all the more emphatically the childishness of the notion of bringing about a transformation through a theatre-king or by the wave of a magic wand. It would be necessary that several of the largest states should have at the same time successive generations of devoted monarchs, conscious of their goal, sacrificing themselves without individual vanity in order to further—by comparatively small degrees—the socialization, not of humanity, but of the continent of Europe alone. Stein has no faith in the endurance of a single imperial individual. Here again he judges by present casual events rather than *sub specie æterni*. I also believe with Stein that the individual in society is like a prism through whom the light of his *milieu* shines, and is seen in its component parts (533), and "each social act of an individual is the product of the interaction of the individual and his surroundings." This is also applicable to the question of the probability of there being a social ruler. The more a dynasty leans on a landed military nobility, the less likely is it to produce the social genius so ardently desired by Stein. The more a monarch is looked upon as the chief civil servant, and the more the civil servants—possessing nothing but their

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pay—are regarded as the supporters of a policy of social reform, the easier it will be to govern society. A certain democratization of society as a counterpoise to the feudal state is the necessary presupposition to this. Any one who keeps out of the ruts must believe that the national differences, so strongly insisted upon by Stein, will exert their influence and cause a democratic development as the sole course historically possible for Western Europe and America, with the possibility that a social monarchy may arise in Central and Eastern Europe. This will apply all the more "if an ethical-social movement, broad and intense, carried on through all branches of polite literature, of science and art, awakens, sharpens, in other words, socializes, the conscience of the educated" (447).

We Socialists of the chair have a task next in importance to that of the press. For from our lecture rooms go forth (in Europe) the future officials impregnated with a social spirit, the precursors of a new social kingdom. It is for its propaganda among the educated that, in spite of several points of difference and many objections, we welcome this book of Stein's. Its bright *aperçus* will also serve as a recommendation to those who with much cause often fight shy of such ponderous tomes. Though occasionally the desire to shine by a play on words leads to an unfortunate metaphor, yet he has many pretty figures of speech, such as: "Utopianism is the mystic shadow cast before it by the coming social philosophy" (286); "Utopians are the poetical storm-birds which herald the tempestuous approach of a new era."

Stein, in speaking of the "Nova Atlantis," says with a certain pride, in reference to the Bacon-Shakespeare controversy, that Shakespeare criticises in "The Tempest" (Act ii, Sc. 7) the utopian fancies which Bacon approves (301). That this is not so, I already showed in 1892 in my book, "Die bürgerliche Kunst und die besitzlosen Volksklassen." I also am convinced that Shakespeare was the author of the works attributed to him and not Bacon. But I am equally convinced that all who quote the above-mentioned scene against socialism—and in this respect Stein is merely the last of a long series—entirely overlook the fact that the ridicule comes from Sebastian and Antonio, the rogues and traitors, whereas good-hearted Gonzalo, the portrayer of the ideal state, behaves throughout the play in accordance with the naïve description of him in the cast, "an honest old counsellor." It is, therefore, highly improbable that Shakespeare expressed his own views

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through the treacherous politicians, Sebastian and Antonio, men who do not even hesitate at fratricide. One could with more justification draw the conclusion that the bard of Avon had expressed the melancholy truth that a peacefully anarchic state of nature, such as Gonzalo desires (his dreams have but little in common with socialism), is impracticable, because some men have the evil dispositions of an Antonio or a Sebastian. Stein introduces here (302) and often elsewhere (390, 407) a somewhat irrelevant glorification of Judaism, oppressed for centuries, and even to-day suffering; an exaggeration which affects one not quite pleasantly. He should rather have remembered the remarkable words which Shakespeare, otherwise so often anti-democratic, places in the mouth of Shylock in the celebrated trial scene:

> "You have among you many a purchas'd slave,
> Which, like your asses, and your dogs, and mules,
> You use in abject and in slavish parts,
> Because you bought them:—shall I say to you,
> Let them be free, marry them to your heirs?
> Why sweat they under burdens? Let their beds
> Be made as soft as yours, and let their palates
> Be season'd with such viands. You will answer,
> The slaves are ours:—So do I answer you:
> The pound of flesh, which I demand of him,
> Is dearly bought, is mine, and I will have it."

Do not these words contain a biting satire on the strict definition of property? As a matter of fact, the proud doge and the noble senators do not know what answer to make, and in their confusion wish to adjourn the sitting until Bellario's arrival. So clear is the unanswerable accusation which comes from the despised usurer, that secretly they had to admit that his conduct was scarcely less heartless than theirs, that their pretended right of exploitation was not more excusable than his.

Stein does not deny the great evils of existing conditions. He even reproaches the physiocrats with "not possessing sufficient intelligence to see that, from the wild play of industrial forces, the competition between husbandry and industry, there would spring up an industrial *bellum omnium contra omnes*, which would not subside, but be accentuated by the boundless individualization of moral and social egoism" (315). Unfortunately, the same complaint might be made concerning Stein and his defence of private property. It is an echo of Hegel's oft unjustly ridiculed trichot-

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omy, especially of his doctrine of reversion to the antithesis, when Stein says that "under the lasting sway of untrammelled capitalism, individualism would deny (*negiren*) itself to the utmost!" (331). For it is just the play of free competition which at last crushes the small concern and permits the few to absorb the many. Presumably he is thinking of trusts and corners among the surviving capitalists when he pens the damning sentence, "individualism is philosophically bankrupt when great capitalists form partnerships!" (331). In spite of this, he disapproves of genuine, outspoken socialism, and leans upon doubtful authorities whom scientific criticism has "destroyed," as Stein himself admits, although with some irony,—men such as Julius Wolf and Otto Ammon whom he upholds. It is depressing to hear Stein quite cheerfully remark that in the present order of society most men of talent, as Ammon recently tried to show, can rise (340), a proof of which, in the opinion of many experts, was not given by Ammon. Stein, as well as Ammon, forgets that we hear of nearly all the hundred who succeed, seldom, however, of the thousands who, possessed of similar abilities, are wrecked on the reef of capitalism and either sink entirely or see their powers disgracefully wasted. Stein, as is not unusual with him, changes his opinion later on when he remembers these sacrifices (748), and speaks of the talents lost to mankind as a reason for social reform. But he firmly believes (629), as "Ammon has so well shown," that the modern individualistic state "gives great intellectual efforts their due reward." He, however, grants to the socialistic state the advantage of "not only finding room for all the intellects we already have, but of allowing the greatest number of intellects to be developed." Similarly he vacillates when he accuses Louis Blanc, as a member of the new government, of not knowing how to utilize to the full the intoxicating success of February 1848; otherwise, "the world might have seen how a socialistic state must be created and whether it could exist in the middle of Europe" (355). He maintains that Blanc's yielding to his colleagues resulted in destroying himself and the socialistic state. "And thus the first Socialist through his vacillation missed the first opportunity offered by history of building up a socialist state of importance, and brought ruin to the cause he had called into life" (356). One is surprised to find such a lack of insight into these important events of history. Such passages can only be explained on the score of a rigorously individualistic, not to say small conception, which credits all deeds either to heroes or

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pygmies. It is not, therefore, astonishing to find that the history of the *ateliers nationaux* (which, contrary to Louis Blanc's intentions, were purposely mismanaged by his fellow-rulers) is told with the customary inaccuracy. A few hundred pages later (623), Stein has changed his mind, and admits, what entirely invalidates his pathetic attack on Blanc, that "the Ministry of Works under Blanc sank to a stupid harlequinade because the social condition of France in the forties was far from having reached that stage when such a decisive social-political step could be taken with any chance of success."

But he is again lacking in insight when he says of Lassalle (413) that he only wished that "which was practicable and historically possible." Consequently, he was thoroughly practical when he asked the Prussian State in 1863 to advance one hundred million thalers in order to found working-men's associations. As a matter of fact, the social and economic condition of Prussia was then, as compared with that of France, so retrograde, that it made a scheme of that kind as impossible as it had been in France fifteen years before. This may be asserted without in any way belittling Lassalle's importance. For the great agitator knew well that the fulfilment of his ideas was at the time unthinkable, but he made use of this easily grasped catch-word in order to stir up a social movement among the masses. His correspondence with Rodbertus plainly shows that his social plans were much more extensive than appears from Stein's description (407–416). Taking this into account, in comparing the social reformer Lassalle with the international social revolutionary Marx, I cannot, like Stein, place myself entirely on the side of Lassalle, but I doubt whether he would follow the real Lassalle to the end, any more than he would Marx. For the final aim of Lassalle, as of Louis Blanc, was the complete nationalization of private property. This is identical with Marx's nationalization of the means of production.

In discussing Marx, Stein makes a striking biographical mistake in saying that Marx, Engels, and Lassalle did not have to take part in the struggle for existence as did St. Simon, Fourier, Proudhon, and Louis Blanc: "they were not obliged to earn their bread by their pens, but had the means and consequently the time and leisure to devote themselves without anxiety to their studies" (389). This is true absolutely only of Lassalle, to a certain extent of Engels, who had to spend much of his life in an office, and not at all of Marx. Strangely enough, among the authorities he mentions for

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his biographical notes on Marx is Liebknecht's pamphlet. Now, it is this pamphlet which has made it known that for years, especially during the fifties, Marx had to earn his living and support his family by the arduous work of a London correspondent for American and other papers, and often endured bitter want. This is especially striking in Liebknecht's description of the early death of a child of Marx's. I admit that since I learned this I feel less like reproaching Marx for not having more fully enunciated "the materialistic conception of history" of which he is the father. The author of "Das Kapital," who also had to leave this standard work unfinished, had actually not the physical time necessary for the further exposition of his "materialistic" conception of history (more correctly termed "economic" by me and recently by D. Pasmanik in the Vienna weekly, *Die Zeit*, June 12 and 26, and July 3, 1897). Stein's account of Marx's leisure is thus calculated to give an inaccurate picture of the life of this great master of Social Democracy. It is difficult to understand how our author—who, by the way, treats Marx in his private capacity as kindly as he does Lassalle—could make such a grave error. I uphold what I have said against Marx elsewhere (especially in a lecture before the Vienna "Philosophic Society," May 15, 1896, printed in the *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, XX., 441–470), and coincide in the main with Stein's expositions. I also share with Stein the opinion that Marx obtained his conception of history, "his sociological point of view," intuitively not empirically (399). When comparing Marx with Copernicus, Kant, and Darwin, Stein rightly reproaches him with an insufficient expenditure of time and labor in developing his materialistic conception of history: empiric evidence was not sufficiently collected by him, and when he introduced it, it only "served to verify the stand-point which he had *a priori* adopted." But this is partly to be excused by the circumstances surrounding Marx's life, which Stein inaccurately describes. Important, and as I think apposite, is Stein's objection that Marx bound up his whole social philosophy with the fate of materialism as a philosophic system, and thus built on a quicksand; for "metaphysical materialism is one of those errors of mankind that has been thoroughly refuted" (400). For the rest, Stein finds, as I do, that the philosophic error lies less "in the materialistic conception of history itself, than in the exclusiveness" which is ascribed to it, not so much by Marx as by Engels and his paraphrasing followers. He does not deny the value of Marx's ser-

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vices as an explorer in the region of Sociology (401). He emphasizes the fact that although "social being has always preceded social consciousness in point of time, the temporal priority is not dependent upon logical causality and ethical superiority" (401). Least of all may the economic conditions of production be regarded as "the sole (final) cause of all forms of social development." He lays stress on the fact (402) that, so far, the attempts to explain the phenomena of life through a single cause have suffered shipwreck. As others have already pointed out, the law of interaction must be taken into account. Although Stein's polemic against extreme Marxism is often penetrating, he is sadly astray on the subject of Marx's teaching when he abruptly remarks (438) "where would be the Social-Democratic party, to-day so imposing, had not ideological factors (Marx's 'Kapital') co-operated with the economic ones!" This is an incredibly clumsy misunderstanding of the materialistic conception of history, which does not deny the influence of ideological factors, but merely maintains (to my mind erroneously) that these ideologies are solely the reflection of economic factors in the minds of men, hence strictly dependent upon the stage reached at any time by the methods of production. Consequently, as a final cause, the method of production of material life shapes the social, political, and spiritual life-processes.

Against the Marxian theory of value, Stein says, Why do all commodities contain only one mystic common property,—labor? Could not two or more elements of value be assumed?

"It is an inadmissible generalization to call the most important of the value-producing factors—labor—the sole one" (403). "The subjective, psychological factors of value (scarcity, usefulness, æsthetic and moral worth, piety, etc.) were overlooked by Marx to the detriment of his own theory of value" (404). Stein further recalls the appreciation-value of the Austrian school (Karl Menger, von Wieser, von Böhm-Bawerk) on whose shoulders he leans. Stein, who is himself inclined to overestimate intellectual work, raises the objection that "intellectual work in Marx's calculations is far from obtaining its due reward" (405). When he comes to sum up his opinion of Marxism, one can agree with him that "its chief sociological error is its one-sided mechanism and fatalistic determinism, borrowed from materialism" (405). Marx (and Engels) came off badly in social prognostication, for the predicted revolutions did not happen, and the dominion of capital asserts itself much more slowly than it should according to the "manifesto of the commu-

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nists" and "Das Kapital." But Stein goes too far, when, relying on J. Wolf, he asserts (406 and 437) that the statistics of income tax prove that the middle class is not decreasing, but increasing. The question is not how many people there are with average incomes, but how many small businesses can exist alongside the big ones. Now the last German census of occupations shows that between 1882 and 1895 the number of independent small concerns has diminished very considerably, whereas that of the large ones has increased. Even if this development do not take place as quickly as Marx and his school assumed (as was recently admitted by Edward Bernstein in the *Neue Zeit*), it takes place in the direction indicated by him. The growth of the middle class is an optical illusion in so far as the statistics are based upon the number of private and public officials, officers, etc.; whereas, the actually economically independent middle class is everywhere on the decrease, and especially so in the towns. Like so much of the Marxian doctrine, the catch-word of the few owning all and the many owning nothing is a high-sounding phrase; even under the boundless sway of capitalism there would exist a middle class, but it would include fewer and fewer of the economically independent.

As a whole, the polemic against extreme Marxism forms one of the most interesting features of the work under discussion. After proving the relative justification of the materialistic conception of history (177–179), Stein very cleverly points out that, "under barbarism, economic conditions produce the class war, and thus further social development, whereas, under civilization, the human mind in its reflecting consciousness becomes a social power which, together with the economic conditions produces a marked influence on society and on the evolution of the State" (187).

Relevant, but perhaps too severe, is his opinion (774) that the one-sided insistance on the economic factor might result "in the exclusion of all socialism from socialism, that is, that those ethical considerations which originally led to socialism might be crowded out, and instead of *ethos*, which has so far been supreme, economics, solely and exclusively, would be introduced. Thus a one-sided historical materialism easily degenerates into a disconsolate historical pessimism!" Economic and ideological factors are in a state of constant interaction; therefore, one can undertake at the same time the solution of the economic and of the moral problem (775). Even followers of Marx must join in the criticism (407)

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that, "every æsthetic charm and all ethic consecration have been entirely omitted" from his sociological determinism.

It is especially to those factors which Marx neglects that Stein, like so many others, turns in order to create a social revolution which would at once bring a renascence of humanity and hasten the production of that higher type of man which has been the dream of all philosophers who believe in evolution. Stein gives expression to thoughts that are in men everywhere (559) when he energetically demands, as others have done before him, that instead of trying to prepare the soul for a world beyond our control, we should set about perfecting mankind on the earth which is subject to our social control (680), and where he considers the following to be the stages of this development: "through the medium of ideological factors, capitalism will give birth to the socialization of the law, and this will have to regulate the economic constitution and economic maxims of the future. Everything which contradicts the spirit of the socialized sense of law would be but codified wrong and be irrevocably abolished" (658). Here, certainly, is the parting of the ways, and to us earnest Socialists much will appear wrong which to the author—more individualist than Socialist—appears to be an inseparable condition of a progressing civilization. Development lies in "the form the world's events take, not in their contents" (37). The evolutionary principle common to us both does not prevent our striving to reach different goals; and my goal lies in the same direction, though several stations farther than Stein's. The journey, can, therefore, be begun together. I agree with him that the development of humanity is not plainly teleological, but only that it takes place in an immanently teleological way (49).

With Stein I believe (and have maintained this in the *Vierteljahrsschrift für Philosophie*, xx, 465, 466) that in "a socialistic civilized state the institution of monogamy must remain untouched, not only because it is an inevitable postulate of the opinions in law, morals, and religion of the more developed nations, but chiefly because the law of nature has shown that this is the highest development of human cohabitation" (77).

Stein says that "the development of marriage and of property proceed in general on the same lines,—transition from irregularity to incipient social imperatives, from community to society, from communism to individualism, from the chaotic mass to a finely-worked-out individualism" (91). Now this applies only in part to

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property. In the communistic hordes there are already social imperatives, and the present free competition involves more lawlessness than seems to have existed under those primitive historical conditions. As the features of marriage and property have been only in part identical in the past, so they will be different in the future. From communism by way of individualism to collectivistic socialism seem to me the chief stages of development. In order to characterize my difference from Stein's, I call the philosophic ideal of the future collectivistic socialism. In the first stage, there exists indistinguishable equality of the members of the horde; gradually individual property develops which is favorable to selfishness; and, finally, after its dark side has been seen under capitalism, it will disappear, not as a retrogression to primitive communism, but as a progression to a form of state in which the means of production are the property of all, inequalities of work and disposition being considered.

Such a state will perhaps admit of the soil being cultivated in separate small plots which will possibly be made a "hereditary lease." In the socialized undertakings and management of manufacture and trade, the formula of social justice "to every one according to his value to the whole" (as I have elsewhere expressed it) can be so applied that by favoring the most deserving, the just claims of individuality may be made to accord with the more important claims of the community. The testimony in favor of original communism in marriage is not so strong as it is for original communism in property. The institution of monogamy thus far has been asserted only in favor of the man; and the establishment of equal conjugal rights in the relations of the sexes, would constitute the socialistic change: that form of marriage in which woman is considered to be the private property of man, beginning to develop into that kind of marriage in which man and woman not only live together, but with each other and with equal rights, and with a mutually severe observance of intellectual and sexual fidelity. The neglect of the woman question is one of the drawbacks of Stein's book. It is remarkable that the consideration of how stoic pantheism naturally led to a social conscience (222) did not awaken the thought that the monistic-pantheistic philosophy of life now current must assist socialism. In other instances Stein overestimates the value of analogies drawn from antiquity. He sees (216) in the small *bourgeois* suggestion of Aristotle that the state should increase the number of economically independent small proprie-

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tors, a state-socialistic remedy such as was subsequently suggested by Louis Blanc and Lassalle,—an opinion which would have surprised the two great Socialist opponents of the small *bourgeoisie*. In the tendency towards a universal language, a universal religion, a universal code of morals and law (150), I see with Stein the evolution of modern man, but I think the last two have more chances in the future, and more scope in the present than the first two. Stein's religious ideas especially will meet with considerable opposition. Siegfried Mekler (in the *Mittheilungen der ethischen Gesellschaft* of Vienna, May, 1897) raised notable objections to his history of the origin of religion. Stein asserts that the "ascetic (*weltflüchtig*) pessimistic character" of Christianity arouses from the first a feeling "which is unfavorable to the consideration of philosophic problems, and to the presupposition of a confidence in human power" (244). But he hopes (679) that the clergy will see that "other-world" motives are daily losing their power, because an ardent desire to attend to "this world" has seized the whole body of educated men." As secularized clergy they must join this movement or be "irrevocably doomed to failure."

The new social form of religion must gradually surmount the life-denying elements of the historic religions and "positively produce the conscious and rational subordination of the individual to the eternal interests of the race" (689). In the future, insults to humanity must take the place of blasphemy (an insult to God), which to former generations represented the height of ecclesiastical transgression. They are guilty of this crime, who by their behavior disgrace the type of manhood and mutilate it for generations to come.

Propagation by such as suffer from contagious diseases or hereditary complaints is in a social religion the sin of sins. For in this case "the individual, with devilish wickedness, places his momentary individual desire above the racial interests of mankind" (689). In this connection it should be mentioned that Stein sees in the long dispute between Spencer and Weissmann only "a difference in the matter of time, but not in the principle of variability" (715). With this view the present writer fully agrees. Although I may somewhat undervalue the worth and importance of religious belief, yet I cannot believe with Stein in the recruiting power of atheism for social ideals; and I fear that the positive religions, in so far as they are still strong and united, will not fulfil Stein's hopes, and that, at any rate, in non-Protestant countries, the unhappy

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conflict between science and belief will last, because the clerical organizations will be able to play off the ignorant against the educated. It would be preferable, in my opinion, to undertake the great social reform work in conjunction with the representatives of all religions. Should they refuse to work in the way pointed out by Stein, there remains nothing to do but to seek to prove that "the moral and social feelings are the evolutionary product of a more highly developed social organism," and with Ferdinand Tönnies to place one's hopes in a "secular clergy" of teachers, among whom zealous conviction and strength would certainly not be less than among the present ecclesiastical teachers.

We certainly do not agree with Stein that a secular clergy will approve of standing armies composed of all capable of bearing arms, and serving for at least a year, in order that "young men may acquire the military virtues of discipline, *esprit de corps*, and bravery which are just as valuable to the psychical man as suppleness of limb and the hardening against all temperatures produced by field-work are to the physical man" (740). According to Stein, in the United States of America, as in Russia, corruption celebrates "the wildest orgies," and he reproaches the United States with having "sacrificed the military type to the business type," whence arises the danger of the white race "being thrust back and oppressed by races greater in numbers and smaller in requirements" (740). Standing armies must continue as a "powerful bulwark against the external foe and as an impregnable fortress against the internal one." Stein does not seem to have heard of the drawbacks of militarism, of the cultivation of a blind obedience, of brutalities, and of the harm to morals pointed out even by clergymen. He cheerfully dismisses the question of expenditure in this wise: "Good deportment, abnegation, tough endurance, sturdy manliness, unconditional discipline, self-sacrifice, and the spirit of comradeship are national psychological qualities bred by the soldierly spirit not too dearly bought with billions" (741). This spirited panegyric is an involuntary reminder of the noted words, "the army is nothing but a picnic," spoken some years ago by a Prussian minister of war. Stein believes that even if war gradually disappears, as is probable, a nation in arms remains "an indispensable safeguard against despotism from above or anarchy from below." The majority of psychologists and historians would consider an army subject to unconditional service and serving at least a year, rather as a strengthening than a weakening of despotism.

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The present writer is also inclined to believe that the good physical results of military service and the protection against anarchism from below may be obtained from a militia serving four to six months, inasmuch as physical degeneration can be much better combated through the rational training of the young by means of games, gymnastics, and sports of all kinds, than by military service.

Stein is very unfortunate in an argument he brings forward with much assurance: "American conditions cannot charm us so long as the power of the state is weakened whenever agitations of the 'rag-tag and bobtail' assume a serious aspect" (740). What he considers so impossible is nevertheless a fact, especially in Germany, where, in spite of the reduced time of military service (two years), the number of those who find North American conditions attractive and who much prefer the so-called power of the "rag-tag" to the "blessings" of militarism, is constantly increasing. And when Stein asserts that "without the social pedagogic power which lies latent in church institutions, in national education, and in the national system of law, we shall never attain a thorough socialization of human nature" (770, 771), we fear that his optimism may turn into pessimism. For the Church will be found to favor social reforms, but not those radical inner changes which he expects from it. Those from whom he might otherwise expect sympathy do not consider militarism as one of the national means of developing pedagogic power, especially as the United States, Great Britain, Norway, and Switzerland, countries which have all left this means unemployed, seem to have achieved much better results than the military states. Some of us evolutionists have certainly happier hopes, and expect to reach our goal more surely, if less quickly, through a continual state socialization of law (770), and at the same time a socialization of science, a secularizing of the clergy, and the blessed influence of a socialization of art, as was suggested at the first international Congress of Ethics at Eisenach in 1893. Too many compromises are bad and weaken one's convictions. Like Stein, we too hope for a social reformation. As he truly says, its success "inevitably depends upon its being carried out by a formal idea, a social ideal. This new ideal of civilization cannot possibly spring from fatalistic and atheistic materialism, but from evolutionism and the optimism springing therefrom" (775). But we believe that other means than those he suggests must be to some extent introduced in order to bring about a conscious, rational im-

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provement of the type "man." In many respects, therefore, we are opponents.

In this discussion, many views expressed in Stein's thoughtful book, which has some defects, have had to go unconsidered, and points of difference have naturally been given more prominence than points of agreement. This does not preclude us from expressing the opinion that, in the bare attempt to bring out such a powerful book, Stein has earned the thanks of science. It has many really fine passages. Though one may not agree with him, his book will be read with great interest, and the reader will end it richer in new thoughts, and feel spurred on to action. "Social movements and philosophic social ideas further and advance each other" (247). This maxim is exemplified in Stein's work, which strongly emphasizes the idea of interaction. The present writer has not hesitated to take the position of an opponent when necessary, just because he assumes that the book will exert an influence.

Finally, in closing this discussion, let us express a harmony with the author, which has too often been interrupted, in our common belief that "the motto of the development of civilization is *per aspera ad astra*" (776).

EMIL REICH.

UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE FACTS OF THE MORAL LIFE. By Wilhelm Wundt, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Leipzig. Translated by Julia Gulliver, Professor of Philosophy in Rockford College, and Edward Bradford Titchener, Sage Professor of Psychology in the Cornell University.

ETHICAL SYSTEMS. By the same. Translated by Margaret Floy Washburn, Professor of Psychology and Ethics in Wells College.

These volumes contain translations of the first two parts of Wundt's "System der Ethik," as published in revised form in 1892; these two parts being the historical portion of the work, as distinguished from the constructive. It was doubtless wise to publish these two divisions of the historical section in two separate volumes; for, while their connection with each other and with the

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rest of the "System" is very loose, each of them has an independent interest and value of its own.

Their value is by no means equal. The second part forms a text-book of the history of Ethics; the first forms a concise and very useful treatise on the general course of religious and social evolution. The translators speak of "the boldness of their attempt to English a book so difficult, and moreover so German in its difficulty, as is this first part of Professor Wundt's 'Ethik;' . . . they hope that the result of their labor is a readable literalness, which may open what has hitherto been a sealed book to many English-speaking students of philosophy." The name of Professor Titchener by itself would be a sufficient guarantee for the success of the "attempt." Not all obscurities are removed; but this was perhaps scarcely possible in the case of a writer who has been said to be, in some respects, "the Spencer of Germany." We note that the paging of the German edition is given, and good indices of subjects and names are provided.

The first volume opens with a somewhat weak statement of the problems and methods of Ethics. Ethics is a "science of norms;" Logic is subordinated to it as in the last resort the only other *Normwissenschaft*, and as borrowing the "idea of the norm" *from Ethics*. This mode of expression enables Wundt to avoid stating the most fundamental problem of Ethics. If he had said that Ethics is the science of degrees of worth, the question, "Worth for what?" would at once show that the real problem of Ethics is this: "What is the ideal of human personality which determines the worth of conduct, thought, feeling,—of every activity of consciousness?" And the constant use of the ambiguous word "norm" tends to obscure the importance of the distinction between the ethical idea of good, or worth for an end, and that of right, or conformity with a rule or law (the distinction is referred to at the end of the volume, p. 333). The discussion of method results in what is now almost a truism,—we must combine the "empirical" and the "speculative" methods; in the practical as in the theoretical sphere, the thought which does not limit itself to thinking out the meaning of experience is empty; and the experience whose meaning is not thus *thought out* is blind.

Wundt thinks that the statement of the "facts of the moral life" must come first: hence he begins with psychology, but not the psychology of the individual consciousness. In his preface he implies that his study of the English "moral philosophers"

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taught him the barrenness of this procedure: it is ethnic psychology on which supreme stress is laid. This may be taken as a recognition of the need of a genetic psychology of the general or collective mind. In carrying out this plan of exposition, Wundt begins with what is really a penetrating survey of anthropology and ethnology so far as they bear upon Ethics. He presents sound and suggestive conclusions grounded upon laborious and thoroughly adequate research; but his readers have remarked that much of this first part is of more interest for the student of comparative mythology and prehistoric origins generally than for the student of Ethics.

Of its four chapters, the first deals with the light thrown by language on the development of morality. The treatment here is slighter than the subject deserves. In Germany, where so much has been done for the psychological investigation of language in its relation to thought, one may justly expect something more than a general indication of how language confirms the view that moral ideas differentiate themselves from a sensuous basis and gradually grow in depth and inwardness. We notice with pleasure the very reasonable observations with which the chapter ends:

"Man has always had the same kind of moral endowment. [For], first, the sensible qualities which the savage finds admirable are related both in emotional character and in causal connections to certain moral attributes approved by civilized man. Bodily health and physical strength have always constituted the normal sensible basis of spirit and courage and skill; . . . from the very first, the prizing of physical strength has been accompanied by a prizing of the moral qualities associated with it. Again: from this similarity in the sensible endowment of the human consciousness there has finally arisen, as a matter of history, a similarity of moral conceptions. Those who assert the contrary either draw an exaggerated picture of the primitive sensible stages of the moral consciousness, or over-emphasize the specific toning and shading of the moral life that follow from the varying conditions of civilization and national character. . . . In the last resort, the differences here are no greater than they are in the intellectual realm, where, in spite of all the multiplicity of views and schools, the universal validity of the laws of thought remains unquestioned" (p. 46).

Chapter II. deals with the influence of religion on the development of morality. "All ideas and feelings are religious which refer to an ideal existence, an existence which fully corresponds to the wishes and needs of the human mind" (p. 59). Hence there

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can have been no race or tribe without religion, unless they were also without speech, imagination, and feeling; though, of course, "the lower the stage of development at which we can observe the ethnic consciousness, the more complete is the confusion of the religious elements in the mental life with all its other constituents." The *myth* arises before the differentiation of religion has proceeded far; hence it is the *world-theory* of the primitive mind. Wundt argues with force that "all attempts to trace mythological phenomena to a *single* source come into conflict with experience, which refuses to be bound by the requirements of a system" (pp. 71 ff.). As the religious ideal develops, two constituents appear in it: "one, in which the gods are regarded as ideal exemplars of human conduct; and another, in which they are looked upon as the representatives of an ideal world-order" (p. 70). The first of these constituents has two roots: (1) any relation of man to man, in which on one side there is a recognized superiority of some kind or degree, becomes gradually transformed into a relation of man to God; (2) the "personifying apperception," giving rise to nature-myths. Wundt seems to regard the "personifying apperception" as an original mark of the human mind. "Its essential characteristic is the objectification of one's own consciousness; where primitive man perceives a movement, he sees a *will*, whether residing in the moving object or lying behind it as a distinct being" (pp. 76, 85).* The terrifying features derived from the effects of mere power in nature, as a rule, prevent the nature-gods from attaining the rank of moral ideals (cf. especially the Semitic religions). "Under such circumstances, man's instinctive effort to shape in thought an ideal of what he considers virtuous and desirable seeks compensation in the worship of ancestors. And so we are able to understand the remarkable contrast of gloomy fear and loving service which runs through the religious conceptions and natural traditions of the Semitic peoples after these different elements have become commingled" (p. 86). Gradually the union of the nature-gods with the natural phenomena, which are originally considered to be their outward embodiment, comes to be dissolved; this renders possible their *humanization* (with the hero-legend taking the place of the nature-myth) and ultimately their *moralization*. In the religions of civilization, the place of the more or less barbarous and

* The origin and grounds of this supposed original quality of consciousness is a complex problem whose very existence is apparently ignored by Wundt.

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mythological hero is taken by an *historical* personality of exceptional moral greatness; but even then "the new ideal cannot altogether escape mythical transformation." "As hero-worship is a necessary development from a polytheistic nature-mythology, so is this moral ideal of humanity, realized for thought in the unity of a powerful personality, the correlate of an ethically purified monotheism. Christianity, in designating Christ as the *mediator* between God and man, has defined this position in terms that can be plainly read even through the obscurities of an intruding mythology" (p. 100).

Parallel with the evolution of the idea of the gods as moral ideals goes the evolution of the idea of their moral guardianship of the world; with the humanization of the nature-gods comes their guardianship. At first, this has no connection with the idea of a future life; but afterwards the idea of a continued existence of the soul after death—an idea which had a purely non-moral origin—"came to have a close connection with Ethics as reinforcing one of the most essential constituents in the notion of a moral world-order, the ideas of reward and punishment" (p. 100). The history of this conception and its progressive moralization is briefly but admirably sketched.

This whole chapter is of real interest and importance, notwithstanding its brevity; because it clearly and concisely enforces a general view of the history of religion which can hardly be enforced too much at the present time,—in view of that tendency which finds an extreme and (I think) absurd expression in Grant Allen's "Evolution of the Idea of God." The more reasonable view is that religion grows with the ascent of man, with the growth of his nature in richness and power, in goodness and truth. To argue that morality has originated from religion would be as unjustifiable as to argue conversely that religion has originated from morality. The development of morality acts on that of religion; for, whatever qualities man thinks to be of highest worth in himself, these he considers to be divine, and to be realized in the divine powers more fully than on earth among men; and this conception reacts on the development of morality, because it leads to the creation of ideal exemplars, and to the idea of future rewards and punishments (cf. p. 125).

Chapters III. and IV. deal with the *social* factors in morality which manifest themselves in custom (*Sitte*). Wundt expounds the evolution of the different forms of social custom. He considers

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that they were originally due to religious observances before all else; the perception of their *social utility* could not arise until a late and retrospective period, though this perception is a condition of their modification and subsequent development. The many current theories, which regard the conscious perception of the social utility of a custom as the main factor determining its growth, err in assigning to a primitive stage an amount of conscious reflection which is possible only at a later stage (cf. pp. 133 to 135, 330, etc.). There is force in this contention of Wundt's; but surely the *conscious* pursuit of social ends cannot be altogether excluded from the primitive mind; and if so, then perception of the social consequences of conduct must have been from the beginning a factor in the specification of moral customs and rules. This is the sociological factor, which co-operates with and is inseparable from the psychological factor (the experience of the *individual* as such) and the biological (the experienced effects of conduct on merely physical welfare).

Wundt's view—though it does not find explicit expression in this volume—seems to be that the most fundamental dynamic source of social and moral evolution consists in the constant striving of consciousness after a fuller realization of its life: this is a psychical, and not merely a biological law, and it invites comparison with Schopenhauer's *Wille* and Spinoza's *Conatus*. Wundt's tendency is to carry to excess this thoroughly sound fundamental principle, and hence to ignore the necessity of the co-operating principles which have just been mentioned. His bias is directly opposite to that of such an empiricist writer as Spencer, who ignores the law of growing psychical energy, and lays supreme stress on the principles which Wundt practically leaves out of account. To have recognized the operation of this law is a great merit, at a time when the prevalent theories deny or at least ignore its existence; but it is a serious error to explain social development on the assumption that this law is the only factor in it which is worth considering. The assumption does not vitiate Wundt's statement of the outward facts of social evolution; but it makes him write *as if* he did not see the need of assigning any real causal conditions of the evolution.

I think that another erroneous bias can be detected in Wundt's implicit use of this fundamental law. Not only in feeling and will can its operation be recognized, but in the sphere of reason also. Failure to see this will lead to the conception of this attribute of our nature as a mere push or impulse onwards,—a blind *Wille zum*

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Leben. But if the law operates equally in thought, feeling, and will, then there is less difficulty in understanding how (from the dawn of conscious social life) the specification of authoritative moral customs can be in part moulded by the conscious experience of their social and other effects, through reflection on these consequences. Wundt, of course, does not deny that man's nature is social from the beginning (cf. p. 328); but he underestimates the part played by reason (in its various stages of growth) in the expansion of social life.

After the conclusion of the treatise on ethnic psychology, Wundt passes abruptly to the review of ethical theories (Vol. II.). The best part of this review is the account of the Continental schools. In this respect, as the translators remind us, the book will serve to supplement Professor Sidgwick's manual. Wundt also justly estimates modern utilitarianism; but he seriously weakens his brief account of English Ethics from Bacon to Hume by expounding the writers on the basis of some too rigid scheme, to which he seems to suppose that the "evolution" of their thought conforms itself. If the work were used as a text-book, it would be very necessary to supplement this part of it by Professor Sidgwick's exposition, or by Professor Bain's careful summaries of the particular ethical writings in his "Moral Science."

It is impossible to dwell on the numerous passages which might be made the subject of critical remark. With a brief reference, therefore, to the author's general treatment of Kant and Hegel, we pass on to his "critical classification" of ethical systems. The account of Kant brings out the view which Kant probably took of his own work; but mention should have been made of the suggestions which Kant himself puts forward towards a less abstract view,—in particular, the pregnant conception of a kingdom of ends which is constituted by all moral beings as such. With regard to Wundt's account of Hegel, we must protest against the assumption, made by him, and constantly made by others, that a system so many-sided can be brought under and expressed by a single formula. Wundt observes that for Hegel the question at issue does not concern the perfection of the "single moral personality;" the development of morality coincides with "the objective historical development of the Absolute," and the source of morality lies in the absolute or universal world-reason which is shared in and actualized by individuals, but develops by an inner necessity. Hegel disregards "the individual aspects of morality" (pp. 124 to 126). This is true;

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but it is also true that for Hegel the individual aspects of morality are the essential aspects. In other words, there is no Hegelian *system*, or rigid scheme; there are only Hegelian *ideas*, by which every constructive thinker of the present day is deeply influenced, either consciously or unconsciously, of his own free will or in spite of himself.*

Wundt classifies ethical theories according to "motives," by which he seems to mean conceptions of the *source* (in feeling, understanding, or reason) of moral judgment; and also according to their conceptions of the moral end. *Heteronomous* moral theories derive morality from political or religious "authority," thereby making the products of the moral consciousness into its causes. Intermediate theories illustrate the transition to the *autonomous* ethical systems, which derive their conceptions of the end from a consideration of human consciousness and its constituent factors. Of these systems the author indicates two main divisions: Hedonism, in its individualistic, universalistic, and evolutionary forms, all of which he rejects, after vigorous criticism; and metaphysical evolutionism, in its individualistic and universalistic forms. Wundt implicitly denies that Spencer, Stephen, and their followers are justified in arrogating to themselves the sole right to name the name of Evolution. The watchword of the theory of individualistic evolutionism (as in Leibnitz, Fichte, Schleiermacher) is "self-perfection." Wundt considers that most theories of this type fail to give a positive content to the idea of perfection, and therefore run out into "egoism or utilitarianism." Of universalistic evolutionism, Hegel's theory is the typical example; against this he brings the criticism already mentioned. This antithesis of "individual and universal evolutionism" is unnatural, and is virtually withdrawn by Wundt himself. Thus, Schleiermacher and Krause are "moderate adherents" of the universalistic view (p. 189); and Herbart's theory of social ethics invites comparison with that of Hegel (p. 138). The real question involved in the supposed antithesis is indicated when Wundt proceeds to remark: "these thinkers [*e.g.*, Schleiermacher] are inferior to the extreme supporters of the universalistic theory, because while they postulate a relation between

* It is symptomatic of the present state of thought in Germany that Wundt should almost apologize to his readers for having "some fundamental thoughts in common with the ethics of the speculative idealism which came after Kant." (Vol. I., pref., p. viii.)

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the individual and the social will in which the latter maintains its independent significance, they do not show what the relation is, at least in such a manner as to satisfy our modern scientific requirements" (p. 189). An attempt at such a demonstration, the author informs us, is the subject of the constructive portions of his work.

S. H. MELLONE.

EDINBURGH, SCOTLAND.

PRACTICAL ETHICS. A Collection of Addresses and Essays. By Henry Sidgwick, Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. London: Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan, 1898. Pp. vi., 260.

Professor Sidgwick would, perhaps, not object to be described as a teacher of ethics according to general principles. Neither those who heard some of the addresses contained in the present volume, nor those who will read it, can fail to be impressed by the courage and loftiness of mind with which the claims of rational principle and the need for justification by reasonable argument are maintained by the author in every sphere which he touches. The address, for example, on the Morality of Strife will convey to the reader, as it did to those who heard it, a just conception of what is too commonly disregarded,—the ethical value of sheer intelligence, of the mere understanding by the parties to any dispute of the true point and bearing of the controversy, and of the real nature of the claims put forward on either side. We hear so much of the duty of sympathy and kindliness that it is both pleasant and wholesome to be reminded that especially under the conditions of modern democracy perhaps the first duty of all is to make the effort to understand. The reader will learn from this volume how to uphold the supremacy of reason, and to argue upon problems of practical ethics acutely, fully, and dispassionately, according to general ideas and principles. The spirit is the spirit of Mill and Bentham, as Professor Sidgwick would probably admit; but it is transformed by a range of philosophical knowledge very different from theirs and by an experience of criticism which transcends their horizon. If I proceed to make the observations which occur to me from the point of view with which I am familiar, it is merely because I presume that this is the best service which I in particular can render to the readers of this JOURNAL.

What do I mean, it will naturally be asked, by the reservation

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implied in the phrase, "a teacher of ethics upon general principles"? Is not this the right way of teaching ethics, and can there be any other? Well, what I wished to indicate was this, that Professor Sidgwick, with all his lucidity and breadth of thought, seems to me not sufficiently intent upon connecting particular sets of ethical arguments with the relations and conditions which constitute the individualities concerned. This contrast between his views and mine is obviously and naturally connected with a difference in the ethical stand-points which our training has brought us to adopt. The content of the moral life is derived, as I understand the matter, from relations which constitute and express our individuality. There are general principles in it, but it could not—so I have been led to think—be deduced from general principles; and therefore the argument from general principles of morality, though it demands to be treated with respect, continually fails, to my mind, to reach the root and essence of the matter. It fails, in my view, because it does not sufficiently consider in what way the individuals whose conduct is being discussed are likely, or are not likely, to make the most of their lives, and do the best with the complex of relations which form their ethical being.

This difficulty presents itself to me even in the first two addresses, which deal with the aims and work of Ethical Societies. I feel as if the life of a society was regarded too much as if it consisted of ethical discussion. I am aware, of course, that a society may formally intend its life to be of this nature; but even so, I cannot help thinking that a common experience, a common interest and work, must somehow arise, and must affect the members in a more real way than abstract ethical discussion. I do not think that the general probabilities as to the range of usefulness of ethical societies with a very various membership could have been better stated than the author states them, if stress is to be chiefly laid upon that part of their programme which he was considering. But it seems to me—the complaint may make Professor Sidgwick smile—as if he took the documents issued by the societies too seriously, and the societies themselves not seriously enough. It is interesting, I think, that one such association has been led by its experience to desert the ground of middle axioms, and to transform its work into that of a school of philosophy.

The very suggestive account—exceedingly interesting, too, *per se*—of the famous Metaphysical Society in London should be men-

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tioned in passing as likely to attract the reader of the first address.

From saying that Professor Sidgwick takes documents too seriously, I may pass at once to the fifth and sixth papers in the volume, "The Ethics of Religious Conformity" and "Clerical Veracity." Here, again, I cannot but feel that the importance attached to documents upsets the balance of the discussion. I do not, indeed, agree with Mr. Rashdall, so far as I gather his argument from Professor Sidgwick's representation of it. He appears to me to take too narrow a ground, and in this to follow Professor Sidgwick. But he means, I suspect, something which is well worth considering. At any rate, I do not believe that the problem of remaining or not remaining a minister of a certain church ought to be represented primarily by the question of believing or not believing in some of the documents in which it requires belief to be professed. I do not think that this is the primary question even for the most critically minded, nor does Professor Sidgwick appear to me to state the primary question. It is, in my view, whether, reading *together* the various formularies and accepted expressions of the church's doctrine, and considering its history and present work and aims, its cause seems one desirable to promote, and one in promoting which the individual could find his best life work. In reviewing this question, any one would give weight to such a fact as that formularies, to him obsolete, have to be recited by him in the ritual with an expression of belief. But to any one who has been able to decide the main question in the affirmative, the question of veracity would be so greatly modified as to present little difficulty. I am only discussing speculatively the proportionate importance of the two questions, and I think that the true principle of this is that the society is the first thing, and its documents are secondary; while any one document apart from the others is tertiary or lower. The author only just touches the analogy on which the whole matter seems to me to rest. Is a man bound to cease to be an officer of any association among whose official utterances, by which he is technically bound, are some which he does not agree with? And if so, could any one be an officer of any association which has a long history and has done much work? Is a man to resign if he is beaten in committee on a draft statement of policy? Surely this would make all co-operation impossible. So long as he approves of the actual work and its leading principles, he is entitled to regard many disagreements, even in the representation of facts, as matters

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of detail. How far the solemn profession of belief alters the matter is a further question.*

I feel a similar difficulty about the treatment of Public Morality in Essay III. Within his own lines the author contends, I think with success, that those who direct the policy of a state are bound to have a regard for the interests of humanity. But the real question, as Hegel, for example, treats it, he does not seem to recognize in its true import, though he approaches it in dealing with Hobbes; that is to say, he does not really consider the differences between the position and relations of a state among other states, and the positions and relations of an individual within a state. He veils this difference both by treating the conduct of states almost as if it was one with the conduct of public men,—the title of the essay would obviously suggest to most readers a subject very different from that of which it treats,—and by speaking of humanity as a community, so as to approximate the relations of a state with other states to those of an individual with individuals in a state. But humanity is not a community, nor, on the other hand, is the state a mere group of human beings; there is no family, class, or citizenship within humanity to supply the content of morality to states as its members, and no law court to safeguard their rights and their existence. Any question may therefore be taken by a state as a question of existence; as to what *is* a question of existence the state affected is ultimate judge, and on such a question it must take its own line, and there is nothing to guide it. Here I think Essay III. is partly corrected by Essay IV., which powerfully points out that no state will go to arbitration on a question of existence. And honor is for states a question of existence.

No doubt a state has an obligation to humanity, but what does humanity mean? A multitude, or a quality? What the state is sure of is that it is the guardian of some one type of humanity, and that by letting that suffer suppression it is so far doing wrong. How to estimate the value of other types, and its consequent duty towards them in the interests of humanity, which it must practically

* To avoid any appearance of countenancing unveracity, I should add that my main contention in these remarks is positive, not negative. I believe that the failure to apply a high standard to the work of religious communities is more common and more serious than undue acceptance of their formulæ; and I think that the former failing is encouraged by any criticism which gives documents independent value.

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take to mean the best life it knows, it has not the experience and intimacy which would enable it to judge. Again, the whole question is begged if the relations of states are assumed to be *in pari materia* with the private morality of the men who control them. A treaty is not a private promise; influence over another nation is not an opportunity by which, say, the influential statesman's religious views may rightly be propagated. The introduction of the private conscience as such on the scene of public relations may promise a high degree of purity in politics, but is just as likely to kindle religious war, or to inflict horrible injustice by the refusal to tear up obsolete agreements. It is, of course, not indifferent what a man does in acting for a state, but he must act with reference to its functions and relations, and not to his own.

The essays on Luxury and the pursuit of Culture seem to suffer from a similar lack of essential insight. I think that the final paper on Unreasonable Action is a very valuable piece of ethical psychology, though its concessions are to my mind of more importance than its main contention. Is not the contradiction which Professor Sidgwick finds between a passage in Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," sect. 177, and the remainder of the work, sufficiently explained by Green in sect. 179? Professor Sidgwick's volume will certainly be exceedingly provocative of thought, and it is hardly necessary to commend it to readers of this JOURNAL.

B. BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

THE TEACHING OF MORALITY in the Family and in the School. By Sophie Bryant, D.Sc. Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

Can morality be taught? To this much debated question Mrs. Bryant returns an unhesitating answer in the affirmative. She pursues the wise course of not staying to argue with "those who doubt the efficiency of any definite instruction in the principles of the good life, simply as such . . . holding that it is only by example or as a sequel to religion that morality can be taught," but suggesting to such the "test of plain experience." And it is just this that appears to us to constitute the chief value of the book, that it is not merely the product of a theoretical moralist, but of one who is giving us the results of her own varied teaching experience, an experience which has led her to believe that definite lessons on the subject-matter of morality prove both interesting to those taught and productive of the best practical results.

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Moral education in general is first considered and the concept of morality shown to contain the ideas of conscience, virtuous disposition, and moral wisdom. The importance of affording sufficient opportunity for the formation, through practice, of right moral habits (obedience, kindness, courage, etc.) is insisted upon, as also the no less great necessity of helping the children to form right ideas as to the "good life." It is to this latter necessity—of direct moral instruction—"to the function of education in supplying . . . the content of the ideas which govern life when well governed," that the rest of the book is devoted.

Some account is given of the intellectual processes involved in the study of morality. The ethical value of imagination is effectively dwelt upon, and we heartily agree with Mrs. Bryant when she points out that although, of course, imagination needs to be supplemented by reflection and judgment, yet, on the whole, "English children are probably more likely to imagine too little than to imagine too much; the undramatic Teuton predominates over the dramatic Celt."

It would perhaps be over-critical to quarrel with the use of the term "instinct" in the chapter entitled "The Moralizing Instincts developed by the Study of Morality." We quite appreciate the difficulty of finding a more exact term, but fear that its use may prove somewhat misleading.

The application of the principles of good teaching (securing attention, doctrine of apperception, stimulating self-activity) to the teaching of morality is carefully worked out. Perhaps, however, the most interesting of all the chapters are the last two, which deal with the "subject-matter" of lessons in morality. The first of these, entitled "Virtuous Character," is delightful reading. The necessity of building up an *ideal* of life and character is insisted upon, and the value of fairy tales and fables in this connection is clearly shown.

The chapter which treats of "Social Membership" is suggestive, but more vague than the former. We should have been glad to have had some account of the way in which Mrs. Bryant herself has carried on this part of the teaching. It is obvious that a good deal could be done in connection with the teaching of history, but it is not quite so clear how "the course of lessons on the theory of social membership" could be introduced into the school curriculum; perhaps we may hope for some fuller treatment of this important part of the subject on a future occasion. Parents and teachers, and, indeed, all who are interested in

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education, can hardly fail to find abundant suggestion and stimulus in Mrs. Bryant's latest contribution to our pedagogical literature.

H. MILLICENT HUGHES.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS. By Th. Ribot, Professor at the College of France. London: Walter Scott, 1897. Pp. xix., 455.

All students of psychology will be glad that so distinguished a thinker as Professor Ribot has undertaken to give a systematic account of the emotions in the light of our present knowledge. He confesses that he has been hampered in his task by the relatively slight amount of attention which has been given to this branch of psychological study. His own lucid and stimulating exposition will perhaps be the means of attracting more workers to this field.

The first part of the book is devoted to "the more general manifestations of feeling: pleasure and pain, the characteristic signs of this form of psychic life; then, the nature of emotion, a complex state which, in the order of feelings, corresponds to perception in the order of knowledge." The second part consists mainly of a series of short studies upon the chief special emotions.

According to the author (p. viii.), the whole work is devoted to justifying what he describes as the physiological theory of emotion that, namely, which considers the feelings as "the direct and immediate expression of the vegetative life," p. vii. This statement requires to be interpreted by another, p. 2, that "the deep element" (of the life of feeling) "consists in tendencies, appetites, needs, desires translated into movements." The relation of the physiological condition and the corresponding psychical state is referred to "the Aristotelian formula of matter and form." P. 112.

I am not sure that there is not a certain confusion here. It is possible to accept most (though not all) of the hints which clinical observations furnish the author as to the dependence of feeling upon specific physiological conditions, without being committed to the view which reduces feeling to a derivative kind of action. Does Professor Ribot intend to suggest by the second statement quoted above that we are to return to the old division of psychic life into intellect and will? Is there nothing in feeling which is to be regarded as primordial from the stand-point of analytic psychology?

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Professor Ribot deals with the classification of the emotions in a masterly way, taking it up at the point where Descartes and Spinoza left it. In the chapter upon "the transition from the simple to the complex emotions," he states as the aim of classification, not to determine the genus and species of a composite emotion, but "to know from what primary emotion and in what manner it is derived." He arranges the natural methods of transition under three heads, (I.) *evolution*, homogeneous and heterogeneous; (II.) *arrest of development;* (III.) *composition* (mixture and combination). The primitive forms of feeling are enumerated as "the instinct of conservation in its primitive form," fear, anger, sympathy, "the ego and its emotional manifestation," the sexual instinct. The order is determined by their successive appearance in the life of the individual. From these beginnings there arise the social and moral feelings, and the sentiments religious, æsthetic, and intellectual.

The hypothetical construction of the sentiments can be brought to a test if we refer to the results upon which the various historical methods are converging. The Homeric poems, for instance, can no longer be regarded as the productions of a primitive age (cf. pp. 63, 316, 342). It would be nearer the mark to regard them as the last voice of an expiring civilization (Sittl, "Archäologie der Kunst," 520)! Again, so far is it from being true that, "at the beginning, the religious feeling is in conflict with morality," p. 315, that there never is a time when the two are so inextricably mingled. As Dr. Brinton says, "religion absorbs nearly the whole life of man under primitive conditions," (Religion of Primitive Peoples, p. 38). The comparative study of primitive man discloses, almost without exception, an articulate customary law so thorough as to govern nearly every action: one and the same body of usages is at once the vehicle and object of religious feeling, and the acting guarantee of tribal existence. Impartial observers now concede an unusually high ethical value even to religions of an apparently cruel character.

The wide survey which Professor Ribot has taken involves the need of occasional corrections, such as those which I venture to suggest. They do not, however, affect the general soundness of his method, and I lay the book down with feelings of sincere gratitude to its author.

FRANK GRANGER.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, NOTTINGHAM.

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AMERICAN LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS. Second Series, 1896–1897. RELIGIONS OF PRIMITIVE PEOPLES, by Daniel G. Brinton, A.M., M.D., LL.D., Sc.D. New York, 1897. Pp. xvi., 264.

"It is safe to say that there is no other subject of modern research which concerns all classes as nearly as the study of religion" (p. x). Whether or not the reader accept this broad statement of the American Committee for Lectures on the History of Religions, he cannot fail to be grateful to them for the lectures which they are providing for the American public. Dr. Brinton was listened to with great interest, and the volume containing his lectures in printed form deserves a wide reading. Specialists have long been familiar with Dr. Brinton's investigations, and at least one of his books, "The Myths of the New World," has been repeatedly printed to meet popular demand. Those who become acquainted with the author for the first time through the present volume will be impressed with the breadth and accuracy of his information and with the clear, vigorous style which he uses.

The first two lectures perform a very necessary task in clearing the ground for the discussion of the subject. What is religion? and what is primitive religion? and how can we learn about it? Such are the questions rapidly passed in review. Religion is taken to be a development of an effort for the ideal on the part of the human soul, a process which is realized but slowly and with the evolution of society. This universal function of social life is to be studied among primitive races,—*i.e.*, races who are on the lower and therefore earlier stages of civilization. In this way we learn not the beginning of religion, but some of the stages out of which our higher religions have developed.

In the following three chapters the author discusses primitive religious expression in the *word*, the *object*, and the *rite*; and he appears at his best in the great mass of material here forcefully presented in orderly form. The convenient arrangement involves some difficulties, especially in Chapter III. The word to the god and the word from the god are not very closely allied; and the institution of the tabu is thrown somewhat out of its proper setting. So in Chapter IV. sacred places are brought under the category of sacred objects, though the places are not themselves worshipped; and while "genesiac" cults are treated under the same heading, the author rightly dwells not on the objects, but on the character

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and meaning of the cults. These disadvantages are compensated by the usefulness of such general headings in grouping material for a lecture. The sixth lecture has a somewhat misleading title ("Lines of Development in Primitive Religion"). In reality it discusses savage religion as a power for good in the development of savage society, and only the last four or five pages treat the stadia in the development of religion. The main theme of the chapter is, however, a very fitting conclusion to a study of primitive religion.

It is not to be expected that when so large a theme is treated in a few lectures, all the positions will win acceptance by any other one student who is working in the same lines. The discussion of sacred stones, p. 147, of trees as sacred, p. 150, of savage "baptism," p. 195, the explanation of burial rites by belief in resurrection, p. 211, are a few of the topics on which views different from those of the author might be maintained. Dr. Brinton is especially severe on W. Robertson Smith for his statement that myth is derived from ritual (pp. 113, 117, 173). But on p. 173 he admits that later myths are coined to explain rite, and at least in the study of Semitic and Indo-European religions it is difficult to find any definite myth which can be confidently regarded as older than ritual. Moreover the comparative persistence of rite as compared with myth does not seem to be duly emphasized by Dr. Brinton.

It is hardly worth while to note unimportant statements which might be questioned,—as *e.g.*, the statement as to Greek religion, p. 165, or the interpretation of the fish in old Chaldean and in Christian symbolism as the emblem of life, p. 161. On p. 162 I suppose a slip of the pen is responsible for *deus* where *homo* should be read.

ARTHUR FAIRBANKS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE RATIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC IDEAL OF MORALITY, containing a Theory of Cognition, a Metaphysic of Religion, and an "Apologia pro amore." By P. T. Fitzgerald, author of "The Philosophy of Self-Consciousness;" "The Principle of Sufficient Reason;" "A Protest against Agnosticism," etc. Pp. xvi., 357.

Mrs. Fitzgerald appears to have been writing a series of philosophical treatises, and is anxious to secure the publication of the ethical epilogue without waiting for some intermediate publications; and this book, in fact, includes a summary of projected books on Truth and Harmony or Loveliness which are intermediate.

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All Mrs. Fitzgerald's books show very wide reading on her part, and their pages are studded with quotations from varied kinds of literature and several schools of speculation, even Biblical passages and phrases being introduced with a lavish hand. She seems to have saturated her intellect with philosophical literature and to have absorbed with special enthusiasm and adapted to her own intellectual needs several philosophical doctrines congenial to a romantic and religious disposition. And having sketched these doctrines in earlier books, she now expounds them again with new contexts, and especially in side-lights from the ideas of evolution and development. The main ethical doctrines are such as, that the moral good is something that appeals to the affective, the intellectual, and the volitional sides of human nature equally; that this good can be delineated only by means of idealizing the actual play and interplay of these faculties; that it is, nevertheless, objective, and not a mere concept of psychology; that it includes as one chief item or condition the romance of love and happy marriage; and that so much of it as is actually realized in our lives is a pledge of our perfect good in store at the hands of our Creator. She claims as among her own discoveries the part which true love plays in moral development; and certainly the elaborate and kaleidoscopic, literary, and metaphysical contexts in which this "principle" appears are a novelty. But though there is plenty of interest and of suggestion, there is not enough system. The reader will find it hard to disentangle any methodical sequence in the topics discussed, and if he does not already believe the doctrines, he will not do so until he meets with some exposition of them more mindful of the conditions of progressive argument and proof in philosophical matters than this is.

J. Brough.

University College, Aberystwyth.

Lazy Lessons and Essays on Conduct. By W. B. Rands. Pp. 341. London: James Bowden.

We really fail to see what useful purpose is served by the reissue of this book. The "Lazy Lessons," which occupy about two-thirds of the volume, are apparently founded on the educational heresy that a useful purpose is served by telling children a number of disconnected facts and technical terms. Nor is the information always trustworthy. This is how Mr. Rands makes the geometrical proposition that the sum of the three interior angles of a triangle

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is equal to two right angles "as clear as daylight"—"You may turn the cord by which you hang up a picture as many ways as you like—you may make different shaped triangles all day long with it; but it is quite plain that you cover no *more* space and no *less* space than you cover when you so stretch the string in hanging up the picture as to make two right angles" (pp. 46, 47). The history is equally wonderful. For instance, "It is quite clear, then, that where there were Christian churches, and Christian teachers, and baptism, and marriage, and burial of the Christian sort, there could be no such slaves as there were in ancient times" (p. 159).

In the "Essays on Conduct" which occupy the last third of the book we have a disconnected set of sermonettes of the usual Sunday-school type, in which no distinction in importance is drawn between such points as care in crossing a road and telling the truth. Much of the "morality" here is of the calculating sort,—the reward of being "good" and the direful consequences of being "naughty" being generally to the fore, though higher motives are brought in incidentally. But even at the best, such books as this are a mistake. The simple moral teaching suitable for quite young children—and this book is intended for those so young that they need teaching how to read the face of a clock—should always take the form of comments by the parents on the actual conduct of the child, or of the child himself, guided by parent or teacher, on the actions of the heroes of his stories, and generally should be as brief and concrete as possible. Such "Essays" as these, if read, would tend to make the readers nearly as priggish as the author describes himself (pp. 260–262) as having been. We don't wish to see such boys multiplied.

J. Welton.

Yorkshire College, Leeds.

The Kindergarten System. Its Origin and Development as seen in the Life of Friedrich Froebel. Translated and adapted from the work of Alexander Bruno Hanschmann for the use of English kindergarten students. By Fanny Franks. Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

In this book Miss Franks has given us not an actual translation of Hanschmann's work, but "rather an account of the contents of the book with such omissions, curtailings, and transpositions as seem to me necessary to render the material practically useful to

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kindergarten students and others interested in the newer and better ways of training young children." Although primarily intended for kindergarten students, it will prove interesting, also, to a wider circle of readers.

We are inclined to think, however, that the general reader may find the title of the book at first glance somewhat misleading, and be likely to expect a practical guide to the kindergarten system, and a complete exposition of its means and methods. This, however, is not the purpose of the book, and in estimating its value we must not regard it as a practical hand-book of kindergarten teaching, but rather as an attempt "to show what kind of man Froebel was, and how he came to elaborate his system."

Judged from this point of view the book is quite successful; indeed, it is the most sympathetic presentation of the personality and work of Froebel which we have hitherto met with in English.

Froebel's relation to other educators of his time, and especially to Pestalozzi, is well brought out, as also the value of his work in connection with the training of women teachers. Appendices on "The Education of Man" and the work of "Madame de Portugall" complete the volume.

H. MILLICENT HUGHES.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

CHILDREN UNDER THE POOR-LAW. By W. Chance, M.A. London: Sonnenschein & Co., 1897.

Mr. Chance writes with authority and from fulness of knowledge. In this book he presents us with a history of poor-law education since the poor-law amendment act of 1834, and with a complete survey of the different systems of training and educating poor-law children in force at the present time. The writer endeavors to weigh the merits and demerits of each system dispassionately and impartially; and we know it is a subject upon which there is violent difference of opinion. His conclusion is eclectic: he does not advocate one system rather than another. "One system suits one locality better than another, while a combination of systems is also useful." In short, he seems to favor experiment and elasticity: what he wants is a fair field for genuine interest and conscientious administration. He has no sympathy with "revolutionary" proposals, such as the transference of pauper children from the control of the poor-law authorities to that of the educational authorities; but he is certainly convinced of the urgent need of certain reforms in

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details of treatment and administration, and his chapter on "Suggested Reforms," if not heroic, is eminently sympathetic and temperate. Throughout the book, Mr. Chance keeps up a running fire upon the recent report of the departmental committee on Metropolitan poor-law schools, and he devotes an appendix to a detailed and determined criticism of its attack upon the schools. Without attempting to pronounce a judgment on the merits of the controversy raised by this report, I have no hesitation in saying that for any one who wishes to obtain "a fair general account of the work of poor-law guardians" in the field of training and education, Mr. Chance's book is indispensable for the most part. If he is disinclined to accept all of his conclusions, the author supplies the data by which they may be tested: not, however, that he is any more free from "bias" than his opponents; the particular forms which it takes with Mr. Chance is what one may call the "expert" and the "institutional" bias, of both of which it would not be difficult to find instances.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

SOCIALISM AND CHARACTER. A Contribution towards a System of Applied Ethics. By James Leatham. London: Twentieth Century Press, Limited, 37A, Clerkenwell Green, E. C. 1897.

This little book is a pathetic attempt to meet the need of those who have lost belief in the moral and religious authority of the churches, and who have neither education nor culture to take the place of the weekly sermon and the moral atmosphere of the chapel. The book is of no interest to students of ethics,—it is guileless of moral philosophy,—but it is of interest to the student of morals and to the student of sociology, for it shows an interesting development in a popular movement, and voices a popular demand which deserves to be answered by writers better equipped than Mr. Leatham. Not by "applied Ethics," as Mr. Leatham understands the term (*i.e.*, by the discovery of some general maxim which, like a new kind of philosopher's stone, shall transmute all moral problems), but by the patient analysis of current morals and contemporary institutions in the light of the deepest and widest culture can that need be met.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

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RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA. Consiglio Direttivo, A. Bosco, S. Cognetti de Martiis, V. Tangorra, G. Cavaglieri, G. Sergi, E. E. Tedeschi. Anno I., fascc. i–iii, Luglio—Novembre, 1897. Roma: Fratelli Bocca. Pp. 408.

The Italians have always distinguished themselves in Physical Science, Medicine, Law, and Sociology. The very handsome periodical, of which three numbers are before us, does credit both to its editors and to Italy. Every number will contain "1, original articles, selected according to subjects, and brief notes and communications on burning themes and questions; 2, a 'large' review of Italian and foreign publications—books, reviews, and reports of academies—relating to sociology and kindred subjects; 3, a chronicle, with accounts of sociological studies." The following are among the aims of the Rivista: (1) to keep sociology within its proper limits, and not allow it to invade the sphere of biology; (2) to trace the history and growth of social institutions and phenomena among primitive peoples; (3) to develop the sociological side of the different social sciences, and especially of those doctrines which contribute directly or indirectly to explain the formative and evolutionary process of society; (4) to co-ordinate the results thus far obtained from sociological research, so as to reach a scientific synthesis which shall explain the laws of social evolution. To attain such aims the Rivista will contain articles on sociology proper, on ethnology, philology, history, laws, and customs, as well as on racial psychology, economy, social ethics, history of culture, and demography. It will be independent of all parties and all schools; and will allow each contributor to speak for himself, with the sole proviso that he adhere rigorously to the positive method, avoiding all *a priori* assertions and empty formulas. It will keep its readers informed regarding all scientific advances at home and abroad.

If we may judge from the numbers before us, the programme thus sketched will be faithfully carried out. The articles, reviews, and chronicles are alike excellent. The list of contributors contains many names of high scientific repute from many lands, including even two from the United States. Among the more notable articles in the numbers before as are these: "The Old and the New Phase in the Theory of Population" (Loria); "The Sociological Aspect of Suicide" (Durkheim); "The Political and Economic Ideas of Ancient China" (Puini); "The Place of Sociology among the

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Social Sciences" (Pareto); "The Origins of Human Societies" (Gumplowicz); "The Future of Democracy" (Tosti); "The Legal Status of Negro Slaves in the American States" (Westermark); "Ideal and Positive Science in Sociology" (Tangorra); "Sensibility and Social Condition" (Ottolenghi); "The Ultimate Law of Social Evolution" (Vaccaro); "The Fundamental Laws of Anthropo-Sociology" (De Laponge); "Criminal Sociology" (Sergi). Many of these articles are admirable, both in matter and in form.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE SECRET OF HEGEL: Being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter. By James Hutchison Stirling, LL.D. New edition carefully revised. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1897. [In these days, when Hegel is beginning to be known among us, a reprint of the earliest exposition of his doctrine can hardly fail to be welcome,—the earliest and still one of the most painstaking, brilliant, and suggestive. It is a work of real genius, and has been far too little appreciated. The changes in substance are slight, chiefly the addition of a few foot-notes. There is a new preface, short but very characteristic. One of Dr. Stirling's great merits is his accuracy of translation. Attention may be called, for instance, to his account of the meaning of Schlecht-Unendlich (p. 553). But probably the part of the book which is of most interest to readers of this JOURNAL is the conclusion, in which the relations of Hegel's Philosophy to Religion, Political Economy, etc., are vigorously discussed.]

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM AND CONSTRUCTION. By Sydney Herbert Mellone, M.A., D.Sc. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1897. [Hegelian in general tendency, but modified by the criticisms of Bradley and Professor A. Seth.]

PRACTICAL IDEALISM. By William De Witt Hyde, President of Bowdoin College. New York: The Macmillan Co.; London: Macmillan & Co., 1897. [Based on Hegel and his recent exponents,—Caird, Bosanquet, Dewey, etc.]

VARIOUS FRAGMENTS. By Herbert Spencer. London: Williams & Norgate, 1897.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY. By J. Holland Rose, M.A. London, Glasgow, and Dublin: Blackie & Son, 1897. [Chapters on "The Origin of English Radicalism," "Radicals and the Reform Bill of 1832," "The Revolt against the New Poor-Laws," "The Fight for a Free Press," "Crown, Parliament,

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and People (1837)," "The Rise of Chartism (1838, 1839)," "The Physical-Force Chartists," "The Complete Suffrage Movement," "Revolution or Evolution?" "Phases of Political Thought," "The Reform Bills of 1866, 1867," "The Ebb and Flow of Public Opinion," "The Third Reform Act," "Democracy and Labor," "Democracy and Foreign Policy."]

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Professor J. Shield Nicholson, M.A., Sc.D. Vol. II., Book III., *Exchange*. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1897. [Contains chapters on Exchange-Value and Price, Demand and Supply, Cost of Production in Relation to Value, The Quantity Theory of Money, Bimetallism, Commercial Crises, The Theory of Foreign Trade, etc. It will be seen that the volume is occupied largely with those parts of the subject in which Professor Nicholson has already a well-established reputation.]

A GENEALOGY OF MORALS. By Friedrich Nietzsche. Translated by William A. Hausemann. POEMS. Translated by John Gray. New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1897.

OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY. By Lester F. Ward. New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1898.

A PRIMER OF PSYCHOLOGY. By Edward Bradford Titchener. New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1898.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. By Boris Sidis. With an Introduction by William James. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1898.

THE SOCIAL MIND AND EDUCATION. By George Edgar Vincent. New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1897.

THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF JESUS: An Essay in Christian Sociology. By Shailer Mathews, A.M. New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1897.

CITIZENSHIP AND SALVATION; OR, GREEK AND JEW: A Study in the Philosophy of History. By Alfred H. Lloyd, Ph.D. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1897.

FRANCIS PLACE (1771–1854). With two portraits. By Graham Wallas, M.A. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1898.

COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE TIME OF THE REFORMATION. By Karl Kautsky, Editor of *Die Neue Zeit*, etc. Translated by J. L. and E. G. Mulliken. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1897.

SYSTEM DER WERTTHEORIE. I. Band. *Allgemeine Werttheorie*, Psychologie des Begehrens. Von Dr. Christian V. Ehrenfels, Prag. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1897. [Probably the most complete and systematic treatise on Value that has yet been written. The point of view, which must be already familiar to many readers of this JOURNAL, is to a large extent indicated by the use of the phrases, "General Theory of Value" and "Psychology of Desire," a questionable identification.]

MODERN THOUGHTS ON LIFE AND CONDUCT. Selected and compiled by H. W. Smith. London: Williams & Norgate, 1898.

MODERN THOUGHTS ON RELIGION AND CULTURE. Selected and compiled by H. W. Smith. London: Williams & Norgate, 1898.

[These two volumes contain well chosen extracts from the writings of many of the most representative men of the present and other times on some of the most fundamental problems of life.]

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THE LABOR ANNUAL, 1898. Fourth Year of Issue of the Year-Book for Social and Political Reformers. Edited by Joseph Edwards. Liverpool: Joseph Edwards, 1898. [Contains a good deal of interesting information about social reform, and some portraits and short biographies of reformers.]

THE MORALITY OF MARRIAGE, and other Essays on the Status and Destiny of Woman. By Mona Caird. London: George Redway, 1898.

LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. By Edward Jenks, M.A. London: John Murray, 1898.

THE APPLICATION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION. By Johann Friedrich Herbart. Translated and edited, with notes and an introduction to the study of Herbart, by Beatrice C. Mulliner, B. A., Lond. With a preface by Dorothea Beale. With five plates. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SECULARISM; showing that where Free Thought commonly ends Secularism begins. By G. J. Holyoake. London: Watts & Co., 1896. [A small book of 132 pages. The only parts that specially concern this JOURNAL are short chapters on "Morality Independent of Theology," "Ethical Certitude," and "The Ethical Method of Controversy." But the treatment is too slight to have much value.]

THE ETHICS OF BROWNING'S POEMS. By Mrs. Percy Leake. With Introduction by the Bishop of Winchester. London: Grant Richards, 1897.

[A series of short Essays on "Humanity," "The Lore of Life," "Happiness," "Failure," "Limitations," "Truth," "Marriage," "Motives," "Love," "Knowledge."]

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES. By Thomas Fitz-Hugh. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1897.

MY QUEST FOR GOD. By John Trevor. London: "Labour Prophet" Office, 1897. [The spiritual autobiography of the founder of the Labor Church.]

AFFIRMATIONS. By Havelock Ellis. London: Walter Scott, 1898. [Essays on Nietzsche, Casanova, Zola, Huysmans, St. Francis, and others. The account of Nietzsche is particularly interesting.]

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC. By Wincenty Lutoslawski. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.

IN TUNE WITH THE INFINITE, or Fulness of Peace, Power, and Plenty. By Ralph Waldo Trine. New York and Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company.

TO TEACH THE NEGRO HISTORY: A Suggestion. By John Stephens Durham, B.S., C.E. Philadelphia: David McKay, Publisher.

IL PRIMATO DEL PONTEFICE ROMANO; INSTITUZIONE DIVINA? Memoria letta alla R. Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche della Società Reale di Napoli. Dal Socio Residente Raffaele Mariano. Napoli: Tipografia Della R. Università, 1898.

ROSMINI E LA SUA CONDANNA. Di Raffaele Mariano. Napoli: Tipografia Della R. Università, 1898.

LEÇON D'OUVERTURE DU COURS DE SCIENCE DE L'ÉDUCATION. Par Ferdinand Buisson. Paris: Armand Colin et Cie, 1896.

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MIND. January, 1898. [Contains an extremely able article by Mr. Bosanquet on Hegel's "Theory of the Political Organism," with special reference to Mr. McTaggart's criticisms in this JOURNAL (July, 1897). There is also a review of Mr. McKechnie's book on "The State and the Individual," by Mr. W. D. Morrison.]

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL. December, 1897. [Contains, among other things, an article on "Recent Progress in the Housing of the Poor," by C. H. Denyer, and one on "The Lines of Industrial Conflict," by Mrs. Bosanquet; also Professor Nicholson's brilliant "Inaugural Address to the Scottish Society of Economists," in which there is some reference to the relations between Political Economy and Ethics. His defence of political economists against the attacks of moralists, however, seems to betray some ignorance of the meaning of these attacks. "Some of the moralists of to-day," he says, "in their treatment of labor questions, would do well to look back to the mediæval ideal. They would discover that many of the oldest and most sympathetic of men —men who showed their sympathy not in writing, but in life-long action—looked upon labor as an element of duty and spiritual well-being; they did not regard it as degrading in itself or subversive of the higher morality, but rather as a healthy foundation of the spiritual life." But what moralists have denied this? Surely this is exactly what most recent moralists have insisted on, and is one of the things they have charged some economists with forgetting.]

THE ECONOMIC REVIEW. January, 1898. [Contains "The Quantitative Theory of Money," by W. W. Carlile; "An Italian Sociologist in Northern Countries," by B. W. Henderson; "The International Co-operative Congress of Delft," by Henry W. Wolff; "Social Reform and the Education of the Clergy," by the Rev. H. Rashdall; "Emigration: a Plea for State Aid," by R. E. Macnaghten; "Poor-Law Reform," by Geoffrey Drage, M.P.; "Notes and Memoranda;" "Legislation, Parliamentary Inquiries, and Official Returns," by Edwin Cannan; "Reviews and Short Notices."]

THE ETHICAL WORLD. [A weekly paper, edited by Dr. Stanton Coit, and published in London. The first number, which appeared in January, 1898, contains an interesting article by Mr. Leslie Stephen "On a Passage in Newman's Writings." There is also a criticism of Mr. Rashdall's recent paper on religious conformity in this JOURNAL, and articles by Mr. W. M. Salter and others. Other numbers that have since appeared are not less interesting. The paper may be cordially recommended to readers of this JOURNAL. It contains, among other things, much interesting information with respect to the proceedings of the various Ethical societies in England.]

ERRATA.

The article on "Deterrent Punishment," in the January number, pp. 157–168, should have been signed W. A. Watt instead of W. A. Wall.

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:

Prof. E. Boirac, 51 Rue Jeannin, Dijon, France.

Prof. Fr. Jodl, 45 Porzellangasse, Vienna, Austria.

Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Merchiston, Llanishen, near Cardiff, Wales.

Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1898.

THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW.

THE act of Congress recently passed providing a system of arbitration in disputes between masters and employees in the railway industry is perhaps the most important legislation yet had in the United States, or any of them, upon the labor question. It was drawn by the Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, and Hon. John D. Kernan, an associate with him on the Chicago Strike Commission, and had the further advantage of the advice and amendment of Secretary Olney, and the criticisms of the officers of various railway brotherhoods, the Federation of Labor, and other similar bodies. The law was evidently drawn after careful study of the various State laws providing for arbitration in general labor callings, but is distinctly more ambitious in scope, particularly as it makes an essay in the direction of meeting the abuses of equity process in labor disputes, *vulgò* "government by injunction." As a necessary consequence of all ambitious legislation, it will provoke criticism from the classes concerned, perhaps even from the courts, while it will probably meet with unqualified praise from the general public, who are interested, as citizens, in having the national government thus recognize the principles of conciliation and arbitration in labor disputes, and, as members of the travelling public, in having railway service orderly and uninterrupted by strikes.

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Public criticism of the measure will probably be directed mainly to two points: first, that the arbitration proposed does not go far enough, in that it requires the initial consent of both parties to the dispute; second, that it goes too far in that the trade-union associations, though unincorporated, are recognized and erected into the position of the party controlling the dispute on behalf of the laborers, thus putting great power into their hands and almost forcing non-union employees, unless absolutely in the majority in any particular corporation, to join the union or association. Then the law will have to run the gauntlet, in at least one particular and possibly in two, of the Supreme Court. The weight of the first class of doubts cannot be determined until the law has gone into actual operation and arbitrations have been attempted under it with and without the consent of all the parties concerned, and the award or finding made, and the effect and value of such award fully tested; and it would be presumptuous to predict the decision of the Federal courts upon the constitutional doubts which the law will arouse. Nevertheless, it may be proper in explaining a measure to point out both how far it goes and where it falls short, and the reasons upon which those who do not like the law may resist its application in the courts.

In the first place, it is to be noted that the very existence of this act of Congress rests upon its power to regulate interstate commerce. It is not, and could not constitutionally be, an act providing generally for arbitration in labor disputes; and it applies to that branch of interstate commerce which is transacted by steam railways, not to the shipping interest nor to street railroads. It is, therefore, in a sense, class legislation, justified in spirit by the importance to the public of the proper management of railways, and in fact by that article of the Federal Constitution which gives Congress power to regulate commerce among the several States, which regulation, as the Federal courts have held, includes the instruments and instrumentalities of such commerce, among which are the persons employed as well as the articles and conveyances of transportation. We have, therefore, no constitutional objec-

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tion on this point. If it is class legislation, it is class legislation of a kind made necessary, or at least made possible, by Section 8, Article I., of the Federal Constitution; and it must always be remembered that there is no express provision against class legislation in the Federal Constitution, except so far as may be read between the lines of the Fourteenth Amendment, though many of the State constitutions touch upon it.

Section 2 of the statute provides merely for conciliation: That whenever a controversy concerning wages, hours of labor, or conditions of employment shall arise between a carrier subject to this act and the employees of such carrier, the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor shall, upon the request of either party to the controversy, put themselves in communication with the parties to such controversy, and use their best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to amicably settle the same, and, failing such settlement, shall endeavor to bring about an arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this act. This section contains nothing new, but is substantially copied from the usual State labor arbitration laws; but the next section provides that when the controversy is not so settled it may be submitted to the arbitration of a board of three persons, one to be named by the employer, the other *by the labor organization to which the employees directly interested belong, or, if they belong to more than one, by that one of them which specially represents employees of the same grade and class and engaged in services of the same nature; and in all cases where the majority of such employees are not members of any labor organization said employees may, by a majority vote, select a committee of their own number, which committee shall have the right to select the arbitrator on behalf of the employees.* And the two thus chosen shall select the third commissioner of arbitration; but, in the event of their failure to name him within five days, the third arbitrator is named by the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor. The submission (to such arbitration) shall be in writing, signed by the employer and by the labor organization representing the

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employees, and shall stipulate that the board of arbitration commence its hearing within ten days, and file an award within thirty days from the date of appointment of the third arbitrator, and that pending the arbitration the status existing immediately prior to the dispute shall not be changed: *Provided, that no employee shall be compelled to render personal service without his consent.*

Most of the criticism in the debates in Congress was directed to this section. In the first place, the obvious comment was made that the law would never go into operation unless both parties to the dispute agreed to arbitrate; which they would not be likely to do if the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor had previously failed in their efforts at conciliation; secondly, that to place the rights of the individual laborer in the hands of a labor "organization" in which he might possibly take no interest, was an unfair denial of his equal rights as a citizen; and, thirdly, that the last provision, that pending the arbitration the status existing immediately prior to the dispute should remain unchanged, was rendered nugatory by the provision immediately following that no employee should be compelled to render personal service without his consent. It will be seen that these criticisms are mutually destructive to some extent; but, to take them up in turn, we may note, as to the principal objection, that a compulsory arbitration is a contradiction in terms; and, more than that, no one, certainly not the labor classes themselves, has any desire for the same; but, on the contrary, they have a great dread of it. The point that parties who have failed to agree will not arbitrate, has been shown by the past history of such laws not to be the fact. The provision that the status previously existing should remain the same is enforceable by the very machinery of arbitration as against the trade organization, and through it against its members; and the point that the individual workman might at any point leave, or refuse to be bound by the same, is a most necessary provision for personal liberty, and goes somewhat to meet the other objection that his individual rights are taken from him by the act and placed in the hands of the trade-union.

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The last abuse of "government by injunction," and one which would really justify the name, would be to place in the hands of any court of equity or board of arbitration the power to enforce the contract of personal service. Senator Rawlins, in opposing this bill in the Senate, used these words, "Those provisions which, without consulting the employee of the railroad company, undertake to clothe the leaders of the labor organization—so called in this act—which has no recognition in law, to bind him where the employee has not authorized that organization to submit any question with respect to his wages to arbitration, are an attempt by legislation to deprive the employee of his liberty or his property without due process of law." But it seems there is nothing in this objection. As the award cannot be enforced, nor the employee even compelled to go on with his contract of employment pending the arbitration, he has not been deprived of his liberty or property; on the contrary, his personal liberty is expressly safe-guarded. Senator Rawlins's other objection appears more serious: "We have a board of arbitration composed of one person named by the railroad company, the employer, another person not named by the opposite party to the contract, but by some person constituted, or attempted to be constituted, solely by an act of legislation, where there may be no actual authorization by the party concerned. Then the third is to be selected by these two, or, in default of such selection within five days, by a tribunal which we have created without any consultation with the parties concerned.

"Mr. President, it is said that this is an arbitration. It does not bear any features of an arbitration. It is an attempt, by an act of legislation, to create a tribunal independent of the consent and will of the parties, by which tribunal the employees of the railroad are to have settled for them their rates of wages, their hours of labor, and their conditions of employment." And Mr. Rawlins adds that there is no provision by which any employee whose wages may be reduced by the award which may be made by this arbitration, selected without any authorization or consent of his, may be given an opportunity to be heard before that tribunal; but the labor

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leaders of an organization, created for an entirely distinct purpose, are given authority, without his consent, to go and present his case.

There is a good deal in this objection. In fact, if the act itself were entitled "a bill for the encouragement of labor organizations and to force all railroad employees to become members thereof," it would not be a misnomer. Moreover, these labor organizations are not necessarily chartered even by a State incorporation, still less by an incorporation under the United States trade-union statute. The law might perhaps have made it necessary, in order to take a hand in such an arbitration, for the labor organization to take out a charter under the Federal law; but it has not done so. The only protection the individual workman has under this bill is that if he is actually in a majority, he may take the arbitration out of the hands of the labor organization and conduct it directly by representatives of a majority of the employees; but we all know how difficult is individual action in such cases against any organization, however small and however unpopular. It has been a principal desire of students of the labor problem to get trade-unions to organize themselves in a responsible way so that they may make abiding settlements of labor disputes; but, in this country at least, they have hitherto preferred the freedom from responsibility and liability for their own contracts that an unchartered organization gives them. Then, again, why should Congress recognize a body having no legal existence, which has refused to come under its own laws? We cannot but think that the act is fairly open to criticism on this point. Certainly the effect of it would be to force all railroad men to come into a labor association, however unsatisfactory its methods and motives, and that without taking out a charter in the proper and legal way. Our laws have probably been unwise on the whole in recognizing by their machinery political parties, and the recognition of any body of persons styling themselves a labor organization may be attended with more unfair consequences still. Then again, if this "tribunal created independent of the consent and will of the parties" is really a court, individuals should have their

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rights in it; and if not a court, what is it, and by what right does it issue what is substantially court process? But this point must be discussed later. "I can well understand," said Mr. Rawlins, "how certain labor leaders would desire to put this act through. They, like every other person, will arrogate to themselves as much power as they can. They desire to extend their influence and power over men who may compose those organizations, just as the railroad companies, so far as they think their interests will be advanced by it, desire to extend their influence and power over the organizations by means of the men who may be put in control of them. These labor leaders come here not in the interest of the men—the individuals whose rights are to be affected—but they come here asking Congress to vest in them the power to submit the rights of persons and the right of property of the membership of their organization to arbitration without their direction or authorization or consent. . . . The Supreme Court has decided that a business firm cannot submit to arbitration the rights of the members of the firm. . . . Favoring, as I do, individual liberty and the principle that no man ought to be deprived of any right unless he consents to it, and ought never to have any judgment affecting his right passed where he has no opportunity to be heard, . . . I shall be compelled to vote against the bill." We think one might fairly conclude that it would have been better to require the labor organizations to be incorporated and thereby also gain the advantage of being able, through the organizations, to control the members, and, to a certain extent at least, thereby carry out an award.

This brings up the next point of criticism. Section 3 goes on to say that the award, certified under the hands of the arbitrators, shall have the force and effect of a bill of exceptions, and shall be filed in the clerk's office of the circuit court of the United States, where it shall be final and conclusive upon both parties unless set aside for error of law. That shall be part of the stipulation for arbitration; and also "that the respective parties to the award will each faithfully execute the same, and that the same may be specifically enforced in equity

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so far as the powers of a court of equity permit: *Provided*, that no injunction or other legal process shall be issued which shall compel the performance by any laborer against his will of the contract for personal labor or service." This last provision is the most novel and important of the whole bill. The courts have usually interfered in labor disputes, in England at least, under the common law doctrine of conspiracy to injure the property rights or the liberty of another, though in this country the convenience and certainty of equity process, and the fact that nearly all our courts, even to the minor courts, have in many States been clothed with full equity power, has made it a more powerful remedy to proceed directly by injunction and contempt process rather than by fining individuals for combining to control their employers' business in an unlawful manner. Nevertheless, this section is directly aimed at "government by injunction," and provides just how far it shall be legal,—that is, implicitly, it provides that an injunction may be issued in accordance with the award of these arbitrators to any extent that does not actually enforce the performance by a laborer of his contract for personal service. Indirectly, of course, it has a tendency to deter the courts from issuing such injunctions until such an arbitration has been had; but that arbitration, once had, practically fixes the status of employment and allows the courts to award injunctions against disturbing it thereafter. Perhaps a simpler, certainly a more logical, method of arriving at the same result would have been to pass a simple statute declaring that a conspiracy to strike or persuade others to strike or to in any way control the employer in his business shall not be considered unlawful when the employer refuses to abide by the finding of the arbitrators created by this act. This, however, is a criticism rather of the machinery employed than of the substance and object of the statute.

Now what must the stipulation for arbitration contain on behalf of the employees? First, that employees dissatisfied with the award shall not, by reason of such dissatisfaction, quit the service of the employer before the expiration of three months after the making of such award without giving thirty days' notice in writing of their intention so to quit. As, how-

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ever, the enforcement of the contract of personal service is expressly forbidden, this clause is a mere *brutum fulmen* except in so far as it may justify the employer in withholding wages from the person thus quitting. Secondly, that said award shall continue in force as between the parties thereto for the period of one year, and no new arbitration on the same subject between the same employer and the same class of employees shall be had until the expiration of one year from the award, if not set aside upon appeal to the court; and that, as to individual employees not belonging to the labor organization, the award shall not be binding unless they have personally given their assent in writing to become parties to the arbitration.

We do not think it can be argued that the award will entirely fail of effect. The great and important thing is, of course, public sentiment; and this undoubtedly will be fixed by it; but beyond this, the labor organization itself is bound in so far as it can control its members, and the individual employees may be bound if they have signed the agreement for arbitration. And, finally, it seems, though the statute is perhaps purposely cloudy on this point, that the effort to strike against the award, or for reasons not found substantial by the arbitration, may be enjoined by equity courts in the usual way, and the individual employee prevented from any further combination or refusal to abide by it except by actually and finally leaving the service. This, we think, amounts to a great deal, and we do not apprehend that the act will prove ineffectual on this point. It is much more probable that, as the award works perfectly against the railway corporation and at best only imperfectly as against the employees, the railway may refuse to go into it unless pretty certain of a favorable decision. But undoubtedly the law will have a great effect in preventing strikes pending determination of the question by the arbitrators, which, after all, is one of the main things to be desired.

Section 4 only provides for the filing of the award in the clerk's office of the circuit court, and for taking exceptions to the same upon which it may be set aside, but this only for

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matter of law apparent upon the record, which can probably seldom happen. Section 5 is much more important. Copying the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act itself, it provides that "the arbitrators, or either of them, shall have power to administer oaths or affirmations, sign subpœnas, require the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of such books and papers material to the matters under investigation, and may invoke the aid of the United States courts to compel witnesses . . . to testify," etc. This section raises a great constitutional question; as Justice Field said, in his great decision in the Pacific Railway Commission Case,* "The Pacific Railway Commission . . . is not a judicial body; it possesses no judicial powers; it can determine no rights of the government, or of the companies whose affairs it investigates. . . . Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all other rights would lose half their value. . . . The provision of the act authorizing the courts to aid in the investigation in the manner indicated must, therefore, be adjudged void. The Federal courts, under the Constitution, cannot be made the aids to any investigation by a commission or a committee into the affairs of any one. If rights are to be protected or wrongs redressed by any investigation, it must be conducted by regular proceedings in the courts of justice in cases authorized by the Constitution."

This clause in the act undoubtedly relies upon the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to a similar provision in the Interstate Commerce Act in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission *v.* Brimson,† but even that case only goes to the length of holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission has a right to advise Congress, and for that purpose to gain the necessary information as one of the agencies of

* 32 Federal Reporter, 241.

† 154 United States, 447.

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government. The arbitrators proposed in this act can hardly be said to be an agency of government. And even if the Brimson case covers it, it is worthy of note that in that case three judges dissented, and Justice Field himself took no part in the decision. A strong dissenting opinion was rendered by Mr. Justice Brewer,* in which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Jackson concurred; and it would seem very probable that Mr. Justice Field's reasoning would have led him to dissent also, which would have made four dissenting judges out of nine. Unless the cases are exactly identical, therefore, the authority of the Brimson case can hardly be considered conclusive, and the question in this act will have to be decided *de novo* by the Supreme Court before we can be sure that the provisions of Section 5 will be enforced, should either side object to an examination of what they may deem their private affairs.

Section 6 provides for arbitrations to which the employees are individual parties instead of being represented by a labor organization; but in such case a majority of all employees in the service of the same employer and of the same grade and class must consent to the arbitration before the machinery is put in motion.

Section 7 provides that during the pendency of arbitration under this act, it shall not be lawful for the employer to discharge the employees except for inefficiency, violation of law, or neglect of duty; nor for the labor organization to order, nor for the employees to unite in, aid, or abet strikes against said employer; nor during a period of three months after an award under such an arbitration, for such an employer to discharge any such employees, except for the causes aforesaid, without thirty days' written notice; nor for any such employees, during a like period, to leave the employer's service without just cause, without giving similar notice; nor for the labor organization to order, counsel, or advise otherwise: *Provided*, That nothing herein shall prevent any employer from reducing the number of its employees whenever its business necessities require it.

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* 155 United States, 1.

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It hardly needs saying that this section is full of loopholes. In the first place, no remedy is given the employer but a suit for damages, which is usually valueless as against the individual employee; while, on the employer's side, who is to determine whether he discharges an employee for "inefficiency or neglect of duty"? And as for the prohibition against uniting or aiding in strikes, the act expressly says that each individual may leave his employment at any time, and it would be impossible to prove that a simultaneous leaving by all the employees amounted to the uniting in a strike; while, on the employer's side, again, if all other loopholes fail, he can always reduce the number of his employees, because, in his judgment, business necessities require it.

The next section, though much criticised in the Senate, would seem to be a wise one. It provides that in every future incorporation of a trades-union under the national law, it must be provided that a member shall lose his membership by participating in or by instigating force or violence during strikes, etc., or by seeking to prevent others from working through violence or threats. One might wish that the law had gone even further, and provided that an organization should lose its charter, if incorporated, when it failed to abide by an award, or failed to expel any of its members for not abiding by any award made under this act. This would not be going so far as to prohibit any labor organization from controlling an arbitration under the act unless incorporated under the Federal law, while it would have secured some of the benefits of such a provision.

Section 9 provides, and properly, that employees upon railroads in the hands of a receiver shall have the right to be heard in the court appointing the receiver upon all questions concerning the terms and conditions of their employment, and that no reduction of wages shall be made by the receivers without the authority of the court after due notice. But Section 10, although it copies the provisions of the statutes of several States is, if not of doubtful constitutionality in a Federal statute, at least of doubtful propriety. One State supreme court already has declared such a law unconstitutional. It

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provides that no employer subject to the provisions of this act shall require any employee not to join any labor corporation, association, or organization, or shall discriminate against him because of his membership in such an association, or shall require as a condition of employment that he shall stay out of any such association, or that he shall agree to contribute to any fund for charitable, social, or beneficial purposes; with other provisions against releasing the employer from legal liability for personal injuries, which are more reasonable than the above, as well as a prohibition of blacklisting. This section opens altogether too large a subject to discuss in this article. The question of restricting an employer from engaging whom he likes and discharging whom he does not like, is a very large one, and goes very near the necessary liberty of the citizen, be he person or corporation. There will doubtless be much litigation upon such statutes in the next few years.

Enough has been said to justify the position with which this article started, that this act of Congress is a most important one; that it goes further, and is more comprehensive than any previous act on similar subjects; and that its actual working will be watched with the greatest interest by all thoughtful citizens. It has not been sought by these criticisms to question the propriety or policy of the act, but it is a statute which will require the active sympathy and agreement of both sides to bring about the good that may result from the same if taken fairly by both parties and applied in sympathy with its objects, and with a hearty desire to carry them out. The very word "arbitration" imports a mutual consent to the submission, and that consent should go not only to the initial submission to arbitration, but must accompany the proceeding through all its phases with willingness to give full testimony and information to the arbitrators in making the award, and with an honest and permanent intention to abide by the same when rendered. If taken in a litigant spirit, the whole matter becomes an ordinary legal controversy, and might well be conducted by an ordinary court, which method would indeed have removed many of the constitutional objections. The

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future of the law, therefore, depends entirely on the spirit in which it is taken. The previous statute, which this supersedes, the act of October 1, 1888, does not seem to have been a success in the working, at least we can find no evidence that such has been the case. It is true that this act merely provided for the filing of the award with the Commissioner of Labor, and made no effort to affect the powers of equity courts even indirectly, nor to control the action of the parties to the arbitration either pending the award or after it. The last word of the whole subject must be that arbitrations are in their nature voluntary, and derive their full powers from the consent of the parties submitting, and that the only constitutional machinery for *enforcing* a judgment or decree must still be that of a *court*, into which either or both parties may be dragged against their will. Whenever a trade dispute does not embody a legal injury, there is nothing cognizable by a court, and the only remedy must come from the reason of the parties themselves after a full discussion re-enforced by the public sentiment which a public discussion necessarily creates. It is to the fairness of the parties to railway disputes, and the interest of the public in the fair treatment of a large class of its members, that we must look for a successful operation of this law. The statute will succeed with its friends and fail among its enemies.

F. J. Stimson.

Boston, Mass.

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THE BEARINGS OF PHILOSOPHY ON EDUCATION.*

If Political Economy is (or was) the Dismal Science, Education as a theoretical study has perhaps some claim to be called the Dreary Science. It is a subject on which it is so easy to say something and so difficult to say just the right thing, that it has produced a body of literature which is probably on the whole unsurpassed for tediousness. The things said about it are so indefinite that it is almost a relief to find that any of them is even definitely wrong, so impalpable that one rejoices to find something that is at least a palpable absurdity. Yet it is relieved by splendid flashes. It has the glory of counting on its lists one of the greatest books of all time,—the "Republic" of Plato; and in more modern times it has been enriched by the pregnant humor of Rabelais, the grave eloquence of Milton, the good sense of Locke, the fire of Rousseau, the wisdom of Goethe, the playful depth of Jean Paul Richter, the scientific thoroughness of Herbart, and many others of hardly inferior note. If only the gold could be separated out from the dross, it might well be transformed from the Dreary Science into a treasure-house of wisdom. Now there seems some hope in our own time that this transformation may be gradually accomplished. At any rate, there is a growing interest in its study. No doubt, if I were sitting in the seat of the scorner, instead of standing on the platform of an important educational institution, I might suggest reasons for this growing interest which would be more gratifying to the cynic than to the friends of human progress. Why have the Germans become so intent upon it? Perhaps because it gives them another "Fach" and new themes for doctors' dissertations. What has roused the French? They want a new topic for conversation. Why do even the English show signs of awaking? Because they begin to suspect that, after all, the subject may have some bearing on the purse. As

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for the Welsh, they were always enthusiasts, and don't count. But perhaps there are deeper reasons for the increasing prominence of educational questions, both in theory and in practice. As the game of politics becomes more serious, as we pass more and more from dynastical questions to constitutional questions, and from constitutional questions to social questions, it becomes perhaps by degrees more apparent to us that, in the words of Seeley, "Culture is the larger half of politics;" that the first necessity of a state is to have good citizens, and that education, in the largest sense of the word, is the art by which good citizens are created.

Now, there are various methods of dealing with the subject of education, and there are many sciences that throw light on it; but an interest that goes so deeply into human life, that concerns the unfolding of the highest faculties and the preparation for the most important ends of mankind, must belong mainly to the province of philosophy. Accordingly, it is not by accident that the most suggestive treatise on education is still—as I suppose it is—that of Plato; and that the best of our recent writings on the subject (the essay by Nettleship in the "Hellenica") is a commentary on Plato. Again, from the more purely psychological side, we have such names as those of Locke and Herbart. It is not, however, my object in this paper to put forward any far-reaching claims on behalf either of psychology or of philosophy as a guide to the student of education. I think one may get light from Goethe as well as from Plato, from Milton as well as from Locke, from Rousseau as well as from Herbart; and, where so much that is said is only darkness visible, I think that light from any quarter should be welcome. The claims that I wish to put forward on behalf of philosophy are comparatively modest; and, indeed, my purpose is not so much that of pressing any claims in particular as that of defining the exact nature of the light that those who are interested in education may hope to derive from psychology and from philosophy, and so attempting to guard against the double danger of extravagant hope and complacent neglect. And, perhaps, it may be most convenient at the very outset to sound a note of warning to those

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who may expect more from the study of such subjects than they are ever likely to yield.

It may be thought, no doubt, by some, that, before proceeding to any such note of warning, it would be more becoming to offer some apology for saying anything about such a subject as philosophy at all. I had occasion once to deliver a course of popular lectures on philosophy to an audience composed partly of working-men; and having had the curiosity to ask one of them what he thought of the attempt to popularize such a subject, he answered that certainly his first feeling had been one of sheer astonishment; for his impression, as he said, was that philosophers were a peculiar race of beings who existed upwards of a thousand years ago and lived in tubs. But this was not said in Wales, or even in Monmouthshire; and perhaps I may venture to assume here that the word philosophy is sufficiently known and honored, that you are prepared to regard it as the name of a study which is of the greatest interest and profit, not merely as a historical curiosity, but as the means of discovering some of the most valuable truths; and, consequently, that it is my first business not to stimulate you to pursue it, but to warn you not to expect too much from it.

Now it is, I suppose, our British habit—which we do not easily abandon—to ask first of all, with respect to every subject that comes before us, What is its use? If we are convinced that no answer can be returned in any particular instance, we are apt to set that subject aside with contempt; but if we are persuaded that the subject has some utility, we straightway set ourselves to study, not the subject, but its supposed uses. It was thus that we turned the physical sciences and political economy to minister to our comforts and to our prejudices; and one sometimes fears, that if ever we really interest ourselves in psychology and philosophy, it will only be to further our trade or to defend our superstitions. To guard against such possible misapplications, it is sometimes worth while to protest that in a certain sense such a subject as philosophy, and even such a subject as psychology cannot possibly be of any use at all. And, indeed, it is not only the

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narrowness of the British intellect that is sometimes in need of warning on this score. We may find instances enough in Greece and in France, as well as among ourselves, of the dangerous strength of ideas when men, instead of taking them into their systems to be chewed and digested, turn them at once into hands and feet.

Even the "Republic" of Plato is not without its warning on this side. Interpreted (as we no doubt ought to interpret it) as an ideal sketch, bringing out the significance of certain aspects of human life by throwing them into relief, its suggestiveness of great truths is almost beyond praise. But if we take it, as we are too apt to do, as a hard and fast doctrine, a statement of what life ought to be, what the state should be like, how poetry should be reformed, and how education should be conducted, it becomes almost grotesque. Now, though Plato seems to have been to a large extent aware that his "Republic" was of the former character rather than of the latter, yet he does seem to have been partly under the illusion that it was possible, by a purely intellectual construction, to show what the world should be. And some of his followers have been still more manifestly misled, whether what they sought to reform was education or the social state in general. That such a view is illusory can hardly be doubted. Philosophy cannot construct the world for us *in vacuo*, or any part of the world. It can only interpret our experience, and so criticise it. It is one of the great merits of Aristotle that he saw this clearly; and accordingly his educational proposals are put forward in a much more tentative way than those of Plato, and with a much more direct reference to the teaching of experience. Of course, it is not possible here to discuss the value of the educational ideas either of Plato or of Aristotle; but I have thought it well to disclaim at the outset the idea that philosophy can ever directly teach us how we are to educate ourselves, or how we are to do anything else; and something of this sort is, I am afraid, what people are apt to expect philosophy to do for them, when they believe in philosophy at all.

If we limit ourselves to psychology, as distinguished from

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speculative philosophy,—*i.e.*, if we limit ourselves to the discussion of the processes and the development of the human mind,—the case is no doubt somewhat different. Here we are dealing with a limited province of experience, and our study of its nature may help us to introduce valuable modifications into the methods of education. But even here I cannot but believe that those who expect any sudden illumination from the introduction of the new lights of psychology are doomed to a good deal of disappointment. Reforms in education have generally come from practical experience and sympathetic insight, rather than from theorizing; and I believe that it is likely to continue so in the future. Psychology cannot tell us what are the ends at which it is most desirable to aim; and even with regard to the means it can enlighten us only in a quite general way. The details have still to be discovered by practical experience and by that miscellaneous body of knowledge and insight which we commonly call good sense.

I have thought it well to preface what I am about to say with these somewhat discouraging remarks, because, when one speaks of applying philosophy to education or to any other thing, I am afraid people are apt to think that we mean to apply it as we might apply a poultice or a pill,—what Carlyle used to call a Morrison's Pill. Hegel tells us that there was a book once published in English called "The Art of Preserving the Hair, on Philosophical Principles, neatly printed in post 8vo, price seven shillings." I have also seen in a catalogue of old books the following title, "J. Rudolph Glauber's Description of New Philosophical Furnaces, or a New Art of Distilling; . . . set forth in English by J. F., *with wood-cuts*, thick small 4to, sheep, neatly rebacked, *the Errata a little imperfect*, 15s." Now an art of training the mind on philosophical principles would be almost as absurd as an art of distilling or of preserving the hair; and a philosophical school is almost as little to be thought of as a philosophical furnace. And if we are to understand the true nature of the light that philosophy may reasonably be expected to cast on educational aims and methods, we must clear our minds from the very start of any such misconceptions.

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What is it, then, that philosophy can do for us? In order to answer this question satisfactorily, it is necessary, I think, to bear in mind the distinction, to which I have already referred, between the bearing of philosophy in general upon education and the more special bearing of psychology upon it. On the one hand, philosophy may be expected to throw some light on the general aims of human life, and so on the results that it is the business of education to realize. On the other hand, psychology may be expected to throw some light on the general nature of mental development, and so on the methods of education that are likely to prove most fruitful. In each case the assistance may be expected to be rather general than specific; but this fact ought not to make us regard it as of little value. It is my aim in what follows to bring out as definitely as possible the nature of the light which is thus thrown by philosophy in general and by psychology in particular.

Philosophy in general may be defined most simply as the discussion of what is ultimately real or true. Now this may be said, I think, to bear on education in two different ways. It bears on education as a criticism of the subject-matter that it seeks to impart, and again as a criticism of the type of life which it seeks to develop. Now on the former of these aspects it is not possible for us here to do more than touch incidentally. An educator would naturally wish to communicate what is true rather than what is false to the minds of his pupils; and if philosophy can help us to discriminate between these, it ought to be of some interest to the educator; but to consider this aspect of the subject at any length would lead us too far into the intricacies of philosophical principles. And, after all, this bearing of philosophy on education is somewhat indirect; for most educators have to take their subject-matter to a large extent at second-hand, and have not time to inquire how far it is true, in any ultimate sense of the word. Still, there is a lesson to be derived from this aspect of philosophy, to which I shall shortly allude. But, in the meantime, it is the more ethical aspect of general philosophy to which I wish to refer, —*i.e.*, philosophy as the discussion of what is real or true in

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human aims and efforts. It is this aspect of philosophy that bears most directly on educational ends; and we may understand its bearing most readily if we consider the divergent ends that educators may have before their minds.

There are many respects in which the aims of educators may diverge; but the most striking divergence is that which is briefly expressed by the two terms "Culture" and "Utility." In themselves, no doubt there is no necessary opposition between these two terms, any more than there is between some other famous opposites,—such as Socialism and Individualism, or regard for ourselves and regard for others. But there is a constant tendency in practice to lay emphasis on such antitheses. The truly cultured man will hardly fail to be a useful member of society, and to be, in the highest sense of the word, successful; and the man who pursues what is really useful, either to himself or to others, can hardly fail to be truly cultured. But it is easy to understand the terms in a narrow sense, in which they stand in opposition to one another. Culture may be taken to mean devotion to certain intellectual aims, regarded as ends in themselves, apart from their bearing on human life; and Utility may be taken to imply that which is serviceable for a merely external and material form of success. The former is represented by the scholar in the old sense of the word, of whom we may take Browning's Grammarian as an attractive type,—one who "determined not to live, but know." The latter is represented by more modern tendencies, of which Mr. Herbert Spencer is a chief apostle. When these two types are presented to us in extreme forms, it is not difficult to see that neither of them is satisfactory. If the Grammarian were only "dead from the waist down," we might continue to admire him; but when we find that he is deadened also in heart and head, we inevitably scorn him as a pedant. The other type is perhaps nearer to our own hearts; and we must not lightly blaspheme against it. But at least we may say of it that it would not be so easy to make an inspiring poem about it as it was about the Grammarian. If the latter, in his search for a too remote good, is apt to miss his unit, the quick returns and little profit of the former are in the end still more despicable.

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Now, philosophical reflection on the aims of human life may, I think, lead us to see why it is that neither of these educational ideals can be regarded as satisfactory, and may help to suggest a more complete ideal. For, when we speak of learning what is useful, philosophy will naturally inquire, Useful for what? Useful may mean merely useful for one's own advancement in life; or, again, it may mean useful for the advancement of one's country, or for the general development of the human species. But whichever of these we may mean, we can hardly decide whether it is really useful until we understand wherein the true welfare of city or country or species consists; and, from a philosophical point of view, it would scarcely be possible to recognize the true welfare of any of these as capable of existing without the culture of the highest powers of the individual. Hence utility, from a philosophical point of view, would probably be to a large extent identical with culture. But, again, if culture is put forward as the end of education, philosophy must again ask, Culture of what, and with a view to what? And if it is answered that knowledge is an end in itself, there would still be the question, What kind of knowledge? Not, at least, the knowledge how many sands there are on the sea-shore, or of the latest scandal or the newest magazine article. The knowledge that can be regarded as valuable for its own sake can only be the knowledge of that which is real and significant; and if we inquire why such knowledge is valuable, we shall find that it is valuable not merely because it is knowledge, but because of its relations to the great ends of human life,—*i.e.*, because of its utility in the highest sense of the word. I should say, therefore, that the light which philosophical reflection throws upon educational ends, from this point of view, lies in its enabling us to see the futility of the antithesis between culture and utility, as these are commonly considered.

It may be said, however, that ordinary common sense, without much philosophical reflection, might suffice to convince us of the emptiness of such phrases. But there is a more subtle form in which the same antithesis is apt to present itself, and in which somewhat more reflection is required to solve the

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difficulty that arises. It connects itself, namely, with the opposition between the good of the individual and the good of society. The ideal of culture may be taken as consisting, in the end, of the development of all the faculties of the individual; while the ideal of utility resolves itself into the aim at such a cultivation as tends to fit a man for his place in the social whole. Now it is easy to see that these two ideals may be to some extent opposed. The man who aims at an all-inclusive culture may easily become so good that he is good for nothing; and, on the other hand, the man who seeks to fit himself for some special function may easily render himself decidedly narrow in his range of attainments. Can philosophical reflection throw any light on this difficulty?

Now it is certainly in such a case as this that we must admit that it cannot be the task of philosophy to provide a complete way of escape from such a practical difficulty; but at the same time philosophy may fairly be expected to throw some light upon it. And, in the first place, I think it may be shown at least that the antithesis cannot be quite so complete as it is apt at first to appear. The cultivation of all our faculties is no doubt very different from the development of some particular aptitude; but is the cultivation of all our faculties a strictly possible ideal? What are our faculties, and what do we mean by the cultivation of them all? A man can hardly live at all without in some degree exercising every power that he possesses; and on the other hand it would probably be impossible for any one to develop every power to the highest possible extent; and if we mean merely that they should all be developed equally, then we may naturally ask why any one should aim at this? If a man is a good teacher, he may also reasonably enough aim at being a good singer, a good cyclist, and a good citizen; but is it reasonable that he should also desire to be a good preacher, a good dramatist, a good ventriloquist, and a good card-sharper? Probably, when people speak of a general cultivation of all their faculties, they mean only a harmonious development of some of their most important powers. Then we may ask again, Important for what? And I think we shall find in the end that there can be no

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reasonable estimate of the most important human powers without reference to their serviceableness in society. Again, we may fairly ask whether any one can be in any high degree serviceable to society if he has not developed his powers in a more or less harmonious way. Perhaps there are some physical dexterities that can in this way be acquired, but in modern societies at least these tend to become less and less important. Even technical instructors begin to realize that general intelligence is more important than mechanical aptitudes. Hence, while we may admit that there is some difference between general culture and specialized attainments, the absolute antithesis between them appears to be hardly tenable.

Now the philosophical conception which seems to me specially valuable at this point is that of the vital relation of the individual to the social whole. It was Plato's grasp of this essential idea, more perhaps than anything else, that made his treatment of the educational ideal in his "Republic" so suggestive and inspiring. Soon after his time it began to be lost. Even in Aristotle we see the beginning of the decay of it; and with the Stoics we find the idea of the wise man, with a self-centred life of his own. In modern times it has been one of the main aims of ethical writers to reinstate the conception of the essential relation of the individual to the social whole,—a conception which is sometimes expressed by the inadequate and misleading metaphor of a social organism. It would be impossible for me here to make any attempt to develop what is involved in this conception;* but the more we realize what it means the more shall we see the futility of a culture which is not socially useful and of a social utility which does not involve culture. No doubt there may still be some practical difficulty in effecting a harmonious adjustment between the various elements required, just as there is also the practical difficulty on the part of each individual in finding the exact

* I may perhaps be allowed to take this opportunity of saying that I partly agree with some of the criticisms recently passed by Mr. McTaggart in this JOURNAL on my own use of the conception of Organism; but I hope to be able, at some future time, to restate the main points in a way less open to objection.

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place in the social system into which he fits. But these are difficulties of detail, not oppositions in principle.

This point connects itself closely with another form of opposition between educational ideals,—that which may be expressed as the opposition between the extensive and the intensive cultivation of the mind. Should we seek to know a great number of different things, or rather to specialize in some one direction? This is a question that is often of great practical moment; and here again, though philosophical reflection cannot be expected to yield us a categorical answer, it does, I think, give us a good deal of help. It helps us this time from the more metaphysical side, by pointing out that real knowledge can never be the knowledge of one thing or of a number of things, but only of a systematic whole. The ideal of knowledge which seeks to advance itself by adding one thing to another is pursuing what Hegel calls the simply endless (*das schlect-unendliche*). The man who knows this and that is not much farther on. What we want to see is rather that this and that belong to the same whole. If we can discover this, we transcend the simple finitude of things, and reach what Hegel calls the true infinite. This was brought out by Goethe as well as by Hegel, when he said that the only way to reach the infinite is to view the finite on every side,—

> "Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten,
> Geh nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten."

The ideal which is thus suggested is that expressed in the saying, *Multum non multa*,—thoroughness rather than multiplicity. But this does not mean simple specialization. It means studying a thing so deeply as to apprehend its living relations to other things, and so involves the breaking down of the opposition between the many and the one.

Thus, I should say generally that the lesson that we may derive from philosophy with respect to the educational ideal is that it is to be found in a certain wholeness, which is the essence of truth and reality. It is an error to think that one can serve the world by losing one's soul; it is equally an

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error to think that one can cultivate one's soul in a corner. It is an error to think that one grows wise by knowing a lot; it is equally an error to think that one can know any one thing without discovering its relation to others. Life and knowledge are living wholes, and must be so treated in education.

This leads us to notice the other aspect in which philosophy may be expected to throw light on education,—viz., the psychological aspect. Besides helping to provide us with a view of the end or ideal involved in education, philosophy may throw some light on the means or process by which the end is to be reached. This is perhaps the aspect that has in recent times attracted most attention; and it is possible that some have exaggerated the help that education is likely to derive in this way. But I think there are two points that are of considerable importance,—the points that are commonly expressed by the terms Apperception and Suggestion. The writers who have made most use of these conceptions are different from those who have most emphasized the organic unity and concreteness of life and knowledge; and, indeed, there is even a certain opposition between the types of philosophy that are connected with these various ideas. Yet, as it happens, there is a real relation and even unity of principle involved in the various points of view. Let us take first Apperception.

This is a long word, but what it means is comparatively simple. It means that our intellectual life is to be regarded as a whole, and that the significance of what enters into it cannot be properly understood without considering it in relation to the whole within which it is brought. "The eye sees only what it brings with it the power of seeing." What anything is for us depends not simply on what it is in itself, but on the way in which we grasp it. Now this point is of the utmost importance for education. It brings out the futility of heaping up the material of knowledge instead of providing ourselves with a point of view that can master it. We speak of the treasures of knowledge; but what we most want is not treasures, but the philosopher's stone that turns lead to gold.

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What has to be provided, above all things, is not knowledge, but a way of looking at the world.

One thing that may be brought home to us in this way is the supreme importance of the great literatures of the world as instruments of education; for in these is summed up the quintessence of wisdom. But in truth all subjects may be made instruments of such education, if skilfully handled. It is somewhat futile to contend as to the best kind of subject to begin with in education. There is still a large element of truth in the saying of Dr. Johnson,—more forcible, no doubt, than it is refined: "Sir," he said, "it is no matter what you teach them first, any more than what leg you should put into your breeches first. Sir, you may stand disputing which is best to put in first, but in the meantime your breech is bare. Sir, while you are considering which of two things you should teach your child first, another boy has learned them both." Anything will serve as suitable matter for education if only we can make it live,—if only we can place it in the atmosphere of reality. But there is no royal road to this. The only way in which it can be done for the pupil is, in the end, by its having been done for the teacher; and the thorough education of the teacher must thus be the foundation of everything else. It is here, perhaps, that we see the true significance of a great saying of Plato. Plato said that his ideal republic would never be realized till philosophers became kings or till kings become philosophers. But his republic was essentially in the main an educational system; and we might almost say that what he really meant was that no great good would be accomplished in human life till philosophers became schoolmasters or till schoolmasters became philosophers. And there is a truth in this, if we do not forget the counter-truth, to which I referred before, that a philosophical school is no more to be thought of than a philosophical furnace. The saying is true only when we understand the term philosopher in its large Greek sense, in the sense in which Rousseau and Goethe were philosophers as well as Plato and Herbart, in the sense in which any one is a philosopher who has a true apprehension of the reality of things, or who approaches things in

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the spirit in which alone reality can be apprehended,—the spirit to which the antithesis is that of pedantry, which catches only the outer form or shell and misses the inner essence and life.

So far, then, I have endeavored to lay before you three closely related ideas,—that the life of society is a living whole, that knowledge is a living whole, that the mind is a living whole. Now I may add, further, that, if the mind is a living whole, it may be expected to grow. And this is another point that the teacher must always bear in mind. If the mind is to grow, it must be receiving material that it can assimilate, and, what is perhaps even more important, it must be looking forwards. There is sometimes a danger of forgetting what a child is, and so of presenting it with a kind of material that is wholly unsuitable to its stage of development; and there is sometimes also an opposite danger of thinking too much of what a child is, and losing sight of what it is about to be. The educator must sternly reject the old logical axiom that "what is, is." He must learn that the essence of things lies not in what they are, but in what they have in them to be,—what Aristotle called the τί ἦν εἶναι,—and that this is most of all true of human life. All through his life man never is essentially what he is, but rather what he aims at being, what he takes as his ideal and guiding principle; and a child, even more than a man, lives almost entirely in the future, "partly is and wholly hopes to be," and must be fed with "forward-looking thoughts." Hence there may even be some danger in being too much interested in children, adapting oneself too closely to their present ways of thinking, and forgetting that a child is not simply a child, but far more truly is "father to the man." For, as Aristotle taught us, what is last in the order of growth is first in the order of reality.

It is here that the idea of suggestion is more particularly in place. What we learn has value for us on the whole only if it is something that lives and carries us forward. It must be a force in our lives; it must, so to speak, hypnotize us and possess us, otherwise it can be no match for the forces that

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tend to drag us away from it. There are suggestions everywhere around us, ideas that are forces. The sea is a constant suggestion to a boy that lives near it. It suggests travel and adventure, a wider world, a larger experience. Unless education can take hold of one as the sea might take hold of him, with a real force of suggestion, there is little hope that it can mean much for him. It is in this force of suggestion, more, perhaps, than in anything else, that a great educator differs from one who is not great. It was here, for instance, that Thomas Arnold had his power. He suggested manliness, high principle, force of character. These were with him living ideas that caught hold of his pupils, as a tendency to drink might have caught hold of them. They were drunk, not with wine, but with that spirit. They were inspired. And no education can be good for much that is not to some extent of this character. A pupil cannot come to much unless he is made to feel that it is as fine a thing to be a student as to be a pirate; that to learn is an adventure; that the swell of the ocean is under him, and that he is being carried on into strange lands.

The remarks that I have now made are perhaps somewhat desultory in their character, and not very enlightening. I have been trying simply to emphasize a single point, which I think is of importance for education,—viz., the necessity of seeing the society in which we exist, the knowledge for which we strive, the mind that we seek to cultivate, in their living relations, so as to view them as wholes, as concrete realities. To do this is, I believe, the only salvation of the teacher. Without this he sinks into a Gradgrind, one who communicates "facts," who piles one thing on the top of another. His pupils grow up believers in the damnable heresy that "what is, is," and are never able to realize that nothing is what it is, but always what it was and what it will be. Such a pupil is doomed to remain in the state of Peter Bell,—

> "A primrose by the river's brim,
> A yellow primrose was to him,
> And it was nothing more."

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How different is the attitude of one who is able to say, with Tennyson, in his often quoted but still quotable lines,—

> "Flower in the crannied wall,
> I pluck you out of the crannies,
> Hold you here, root and all, in my hand.
> Little flower! Yet if I could understand
> What you are, root and all and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is!"

It is this thoroughness of insight that makes the meanest kind of knowledge great; the insight that enables us to see that things are not what they seem, but what they mean; that the reality of things lies not in what we see and perceive, but in what we think and feel and will and are.

There is just one other remark that I may add. We hear a great deal of discussion about religious education in schools. Now I cannot but believe that if teaching could be carried on more thoroughly in the spirit that I have tried to indicate, it would be felt more and more that in essence all education is religious. For what is religion but the constant recognition that life has to be lived in the spirit of the whole, that we are not fragments, that the world is not a collection of fragments, but that our lives and the life of the world form a real whole? To know any one thing truly is to know this; and the consciousness of this gives dignity to all knowledge as it does to all action.

> "A servant, with this clause,
> Makes drudgery divine."

It was thus that Plato thought of education, and so for him all education began and ended in religion. And I believe that, if we could but realize the truth of this, all controversy about the teaching of religion would be well-nigh at an end. All teaching would be religious. But this is, perhaps, to point to a distant ideal, to something that can only be reached when philosophers become teachers or when teachers become philosophers.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF, WALES.

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THE BROTHERS OF SINCERITY.

ISLÂM, the religion of Muhammad, is, at bottom, merely Judaism carried to its logical result. Therein man has transferred all the worth he possesses to God, thus transforming Him into a being of infinite, irresponsible power, while he himself, emptied of all good, writhes and grovels before Him as a worm of the dust,—a mere will-less, helpless automaton. Muhammad's addition to Judaism was, that he claimed to be the representative of God, and to speak and command in his name. *There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Apostle of God:* such is the creed of Islâm.

When Muhammad died, in 632 A.D., Islâm was still confined to Arabia, for whose half-barbarous tribes it was intended. These it united for the first time in history, giving them a common religion, and a sense of national unity which was not slow in making itself felt. Muhammad's earliest revelation had begun, *Read, in the name of thy Lord.* An authoritative book to read and a Lord to obey: these are the whole of Islâm, and it sufficed for the unreflecting sons of Arabia. But when, under the Khalifs, or successors of the prophet, the new religion extended to lands of ancient culture, to Syria (635) and Mesopotamia (637–640), and sought to impose itself upon these, it had to justify itself to peoples schooled in thought and versed in history. If these peoples were conquered politically by force of arms, they necessarily conquered intellectually and æsthetically, by reason of their superior culture, to certain charms of which the Arab chieftains were by no means insensible. Thus, under the Khalifs, while the brute force lay in the hands of the Arabs, the intellectual power was in the heads of the subject peoples. In Syria, the Arabs came in contact with Syrian and Greek Christians, and with Harranian pagans, deeply influenced by Greek, chiefly Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic, thought, and also by Babylonian astronomy and astrology. All these sects contained learned and thoughtful men, who could not accept Islâm without, in

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some way, conforming it to their cultivated reason. In Babylonia, likewise, the Arabs came in contact with Persian Mazdeans, Babylonian polytheists, Manichæans, Jews, Ssabians, and various sects, with more or less eclectic and compound creeds, whose cultured members, in accepting Islâm, interpreted it in terms of their own thought.

Two doctrines there were in the faith of Islâm which especially repelled these cultivated thinkers, and which they, therefore, sought to soften and modify. These were (1) the complete transcendence of God, His perfect simplicity, and consequent unrelatednesss to the world, (2) the complete unfreedom of the human will, and the consequent impossibility of rational, ethical, free life,—both zealously defended by the Arab *Mutakallemuna*, or Schoolmen, who, in imitation of the Jewish scribes, rabbis, and geonim, taking their stand upon their revealed texts, deduced therefrom, by methods more or less capricious and unscientific, the results they desired. Such men, of course, exalted revelation, and did their best to discredit reason, philosophy, and science, thus paving the way for fanaticism and a return to barbarism. In opposition to these, there arose a number of men, chiefly of pagan, Mazdean, and Manichæan faith, who sought to interpret these and other Muslim doctrines in the light of the philosophy then current in the East and common to them all, a philosophy compounded of Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, and thus summing up all the results of Greek thought,—in a somewhat unsystematized form, indeed.

The tendency championed by these men began away back in the century of the Hijrah, but did not take definite form until the following century, when the sect of the Mu'tazila, or Separatists (Pharisees), was founded by Wâsil ibn 'Ata. Though sorely persecuted, this sect maintained itself in secret, and made common cause with the philosophic schools, which, under the fostering care of several liberal-minded Khalifs, began about the middle of the eighth century. Their rise was marked by the translation into Arabic, chiefly by Nestorian Christians, of the works of the Neo-Platonists and of Aristotle. After this there appeared in Bagdad and Basra

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several philosophers of vast learning and profound thought. Chief among these were the Arab Al Kendi (780–865), and the probably Turkish Al Fārābī (880–950), who won over a considerable following to the study of Greek thought.

But philosophy was never popular among the Arabs, and a time soon came when both the Mu'tazila and the philosophers thought it wise to pursue their thought in secret. Even the saintly Al Fārābī withdrew to Aleppo and Damascus. Unwilling to rouse the fanaticism of the Arabs, small knots of earnest thinkers, devoted to free thought, met in private places, to teach, to learn, and to discuss, and thus, probably in the last quarter of the tenth century, when the darkness of Europe was almost at its deepest, there was gradually formed at Basra what may fairly be called a secret society, composed of solid thinkers and high-minded men, whose aim was to combat the worst teachings of Islâm, particularly the two above referred to, and to reduce the new religion to such a form that the arts and sciences of civilized life might flourish under its auspices, and a stop be put to the growing darkness, confusion, and barbarism of the time. Their aim, in fact, was to transform Islâm from a religion into a philosophy, from blind faith in the words of a prophet claiming supernatural inspiration, into a reasoned theory of nature and life, through which man, understanding his origin, place, and destiny, might direct his steps to his true end. To put the matter bluntly, they undertook to render the harsh, crude superstition of the Koran innocuous by transmuting it, through absorption, into the Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism then popular in the East. This system drew its doctrines partly from the genuine works of Aristotle, and partly from certain spurious treatises bearing his name, but really due to the Neo-Platonists, and containing doctrines widely different from his,—in fact, a whole system of evolutionary agathism, governed by spiritual laws. Chief among these treatises was the so-called "Theology of Aristotle," an abstract of the last three "Enneads" of Plotinus, made apparently by Porphyry, in Syriac, for his Syrian countrymen, in the days of Zenobia, that is, towards the end of the third century A.D., and translated into Arabic, first of all philosophic

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works. Its contents largely determined the whole subsequent course of Arabic, and, later, of Jewish and Christian thought.

Of the personal relations and history of the members of the new philosophical society we know very little Five names have been handed down to us on good authority: (1) Abu Suleiman Muhammad ibn Nasr al Busti, surnamed al Maqdisiyy, or, the Pilgrim (to Jerusalem); (2) Abu 'l Hasan Ali ibn Harun az Zanjani; (3) Abu Achmed an Nahrajuri; (4) Al 'Aufi; (5) Zaid ibn Rifa'a. Of these the last seems to have been the most illustrious. The bearer of it is spoken of as a man of surpassing insight and lucid understanding, an elegant writer both in prose and in verse, and an eloquent speaker. He and his four fellows seem to have united their knowledge and efforts in order to write the Cyclopædia, of which we shall speak presently. The members of the society seem to have led a quiet, unobtrusive, almost monkish life, striving after knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, and devoting themselves to that noblest form of charity, the spiritual elevation of all who came in contact with them. They were evidently well acquainted, not only with Islâm, Christianity, and Judaism, but also with the religions of the East. Their sympathies were of the widest sort, extending even to the lower animals, whose place in the hierarchy of evolution—and they were evolutionists of the most pronounced type—they estimated far more correctly than any one ever did before or since. In all respects they produce the impression of being men of the finest culture and most exquisite sympathy. They assumed the name of *Ikhwân us Safâ*, which may mean "Brothers of Sincerity," "Brothers of Purity," or, perhaps, "The True Brotherhood." The society meant by it to imply that its purpose was a pure, simple, sincere, kindly, brotherly, rational human life,—a life in which its members should stand in true, essential relations to each other and to all the world. It seems not improbable that it took for its model the ancient brotherhood of the Pythagoreans, with the existence of which it was certainly acquainted. Like this, it was a closed body, into which admission could be gained only after a careful scrutiny and examination, and of which the members were

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divided into classes according to the degree of their spiritual advancement, while all were bound together by a strong tie of affectionate friendship. Like this, also, it regarded its philosophical system as merely the formal element in a rational social life, in other words, as simply educational. This is the fact which renders the undertaking of this far-off society on the banks of the Tigris, nine hundred years ago, of interest to all persons engaged in the work of education, or caring for its results. Indeed, this undertaking is deserving of special study at the present time, for a special reason.

The most obvious and crying defect of education in our time and country is its want of unity. This is due to its want of definite aim, since aim is what gives unity to everything, whether action or the product of action. There can be no unity in action which is not guided by a single aim; no unity in a product which is not made for a definite purpose. Now, the purpose of education must certainly be to enable its subjects to attain the fullest possible self-realization. About this all men are agreed; but, when we come to ask what such self-realization is, they immediately fall into discord. There is at the present day no general agreement as to the nature of that ideal of human realization which is the aim of education, and hence no principle to unite, in an aimful hierarchy, the elements of education itself, or to determine what these elements shall be. Hence the uncertainty, the hesitation, the continual change of subject and method, that mark, confuse, and retard the education of to-day. Ask the great body of our teachers and professors what is the aim of the education they are giving, and not one in a hundred will be able to give a rational answer. Some will say, "We want to make good citizens;" others, "We want to make good men and women." Yes, to be sure; but the question remains, What is a good citizen, a good man, a good woman? Here opinions will differ widely, because there is no general agreement as to what goodness is, nor can there be, until there is a generally accepted theory of the universe, since goodness expresses a relation to such a universe. Plato, in one of his works, asks the question, What is justice? and finds that he has to write

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his "Republic," with its elaborate scheme of social relations, before he can give an answer that is more than a mere empty form. When the answer, Justice is a giving every one his own, is offered, it appears entirely satisfactory, but, on closer scrutiny, turns out to be entirely useless, until some method is discovered of determining what is every one's own. So, in the present case, to answer the question, What is the aim of education? by saying, To make good men and women, or good citizens, does not help us, unless there can be found some method of determining what is meant by "good" in such connection, and this involves a theory or conception of the universe and of man's place in it.

Now, while we may lament that the absence of any such conception leaves our present education in the chaotic condition in which we find it, we can easily see how such a state of things has come about. The old mediæval conception, based upon supernatural revelation, or what was considered such, is passing away, and losing its hold upon practice, and no new conception, based upon science, as all future conceptions must be, has yet arisen to take its place. We have, no doubt, certain cunningly spun cobweb-theories of an *a priori* sort; but, as they do not correspond to the facts of the world, or even to universal intelligence, they are of no permanent value. What we most need to-day is a co-operative effort on the part of a little group of earnest men, well versed in the different sciences, physical and spiritual, to present such a scheme of the universe as shall form the basis of a rational, saving education, leaving room, of course, for continual additions, modifications, and improvements. While we are anxiously waiting for this, it cannot be but interesting and instructive to consider the system of the "Brothers of Sincerity," put forward with this view, and based on such science as existed in the tenth century in the most cultivated circles.

This system is laid down in a Cyclopædia, which must have been written about the year 1000 A.D., and which was printed in Calcutta, for the first time, in 1812, and again in 1842, in four large volumes of densely crowded, unvocalized Arabic.

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The work is divided into fifty-one tracts or treatises (*rasāīl*), which again are arranged under four heads:

(1) Propædeutic and Logic, thirteen treatises.
(2) Natural Sciences, seventeen treatises.
(3) The Rational World-Soul, ten treatises.
(4) Revealed Law, eleven treatises.

In this arrangement, we have an ascent from the formal and abstract to the real and concrete, from the simple and immediate to the complex and mediate. The introduction of revelation distinguishes it from all Greek classifications. Let us deal with these four heads in their order, and

(I.) PROPÆDEUTIC AND LOGIC, with its thirteen treatises.

No. 1 deals with Number, its essence and multitude, showing that the form of number in the soul corresponds to form in material things, and that the doctrine of number is the spring of all science and wisdom. Its purpose is to exercise beginners in thought in meditating on the true essence of things and inquiring into their primal origin. Here we can discern the effect of the teaching of Pythagoras and his school.

No. 2 treats of Geometry, its essence and kinds, and aims at enabling the soul to rise from the sensible to the spiritual, and to grasp pure forms apart from matter; in other words, to abstract. Here the philosophy of Plato is drawn upon.

No. 3 takes up Astronomy, and shows the composition of the stellar world, its spheres, mansions, movements, etc. Its purpose is to rouse the soul to a longing for its proper home among the spheres. Here we are brought face to face with that theory which we can trace back to Aristotle and Plato (who perhaps derived it from Babylonia), and which identifies spiritual elevation with distance from the centre of the earth, itself regarded as the centre of the universe. This notion pervades the entire middle age, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim, and finds classical expression in the *Comedy* of Dante, which ends with these words: "But already my desire and the will was turning, as a wheel that is evenly moved, through the love that moves the sun and the other stars." It was for attacking this theory, which was far more than astronomical,

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being the form under which intellectual and moral existence was conceived, that Giordano Bruno was burned in 1600.

No. 4 treats of Geography, showing that the earth is a globe, and giving the reasons why the soul descended from its true home into this world. Its purpose is to lead the soul to admire the wonders of heaven and earth, the wonders within and without, to convince it that God is the prime reality, and induce it to prepare for death, which is spiritual birth from the unreal to the real. Here we have the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the lapse or fall of the soul, a doctrine derived directly, perhaps, from later Judaism, but no doubt of Babylonian or Syrian orgin. It is interesting to find the doctrine of the earth's sphericity taught here.

No. 5 deals with Music, showing that the measures of music are so many medicines for the soul, just as the different drugs are for the body, and that the revolving spheres, by rubbing against each other, produce tones and melodies, like those of a lyre or harp. Its purpose is to make the soul eager to ascend through the melodious spheres and meet the spirits of prophets, martyrs, and mystic seers. Dante adopts this notion in his *Paradise.*

No. 6 relates to Geometric Number or Quantity, its kinds and relations, that is, to the theory of symmetry and æsthetics. Its purpose is to initiate the rational soul into the deeper relations of things and actions. These have different properties, which may, or may not, harmonize. The faculty of æsthetic judgment investigates these properties, and so discovers the rules of Art.

No. 7 treats of the different Liberal Arts or Sciences, enumerating and classifying them, so as to show their nature and purpose, and guide the soul in its endeavor after a unitary conception of the world. Here we have an Encyclopædia of the Sciences.

No. 8 deals with the Practical Arts, their number, kinds, and methods. In order to do this, it has to reveal to the soul its own substance, as the author of the arts, and its relation to the body and its members, which are merely instruments of the creative soul. A philosophic Encyclopædia of the Arts !

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No. 9 examines the differences of Temperament and Character, with the view of enabling the soul to attain the proper mood and develop a perfect character. Here we have a system of Ethics.

In these nine tracts is presented a bird's-eye view of the field or matter of science, beginning with the simplest and most abstract conceptions and going on to the most complex and concrete. The next four deal with Logic, or the form of science, and are based on the *Introduction* (εἰσαγωγή) of Porphyry, and the "Organon" of Aristotle.

No. 10 deals with Porphyry's *Introduction*, on the five notions or "words"—Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident,—which proved a fruitful source of dispute through the entire Middle Age, a single sentence giving rise to Christian Scholasticism.

No. 11 discusses Aristotle's ten *Categories*, or classes of existence, and shows that all things may be subsumed under them.

No. 12 is occupied with Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*, which treats of the Proposition, its component parts and different forms.

No. 13 deals with Aristotle's *Analytics*, that is, with the Syllogism and the Method of Scientific Proof.

The purpose of these four tracts is to make the rational soul aware of its own forms and faculties, and the method by which it may reach truth. From these we pass to

(II.) The NATURAL SCIENCES, occupying seventeen tracts. Here, again, we rise from general and abstract notions to things more and more concrete and individual.

No. 14 (1) treats of Matter, Form, Space, Time, and Motion, and is based on Aristotle's *Physics*. It is called the "Torch of Being."

No. 15 (2) is devoted to the General Form of the Physical World,—earth, heaven and its various grades and spheres, the glorious Throne of God. Here, as in I. 3, we have the mediæval theory of the physical universe, according to which the "Throne of God" is in the outermost sphere. (See Dante, *Paradise*, XXX., 38 sqq.). In the famous "throne-verse" of

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the Koran (II. 256), we read: "His throne encompasseth the heavens and the earth, and it wearies him not to keep them; for he is high and glorious." * The aim of this tract is to show that all action in the universe is due to the universal soul acting in obedience to God.

No. 16 (3) treats of *Genesis and Decay*, of the forms of the four elements, as the components of the mineral, vegetable, and animal worlds, and of their transmutation into each other under the influence of the stars and revolving spheres. It draws its materials from the *Περὶ Γενέσεως καὶ Φθορᾶς* and other works of Aristotle, including the spurious *Theology*. In this tract we have the mediæval substitute for Chemistry.

No. 17 (4) treats of *Meteorology*, and is based on Aristotle's work of that name.

No. 18 (5) is devoted to *Mineralogy*, enumerating the different minerals and trying to account for their origin. Its purpose is to show that the first product of the universal soul is the sublunary world, and that in this the partial souls (all individual souls are parts of the universal soul) begin their career. Starting in minerals at the earth's centre, they advance through plants and animals up to man, and thence rise through the superlunary spheres, as angels, up to union with God. Here we have the Arab doctrine of evolution, which hardly differs from the Darwinian, except in not recognizing the "struggle for life" as an agent in the process. Instead of this, the older theory puts the natural desire of all beings to return to their source. In this tract, as well as in the following, the "Theology of Aristotle" is largely drawn upon.†

No. 19 (6) deals with the *Essence of Nature*, and the manner in which it acts upon the four elements, producing the three kingdoms of nature. Its purpose is to show the action of the universal soul, its essence, and its relation to the spheral intelligences. (Cf. Dante, *Convivio*, II.)

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* Cf. Psalm ciii. 19. The notion of God's sitting on a throne goes back to 1 Kings xxii. 19. See D. H. Müller, *Ezechiel-Studien*, p. 9. Cf. Koran, xxxix. 75; xl. 7.

† Cf. Dieterici, *Der Darwinismus im zehnten u. neunzehnten Jahrhundert.* Leipzig, 1878.

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No. 20 (7) is devoted to *Botany*, enumerating and describing the various plants, and showing how they are pervaded by the plant-soul, how they spring up and grow, and what their uses are. Stress is laid upon the fact that there is no break between the mineral, vegetable, and animal worlds. The palm-tree, being male and female, is on the line between plants and animals.

No. 21 (8) treats of *Zoölogy*, following Aristotle mainly. The highest of the animals is man, who forms the link between them and the angels, the bridge between hell and heaven. This tract contains a long and delightful story entitled "The Case of the Animals *vs.* Man before the King of the Genii." The scene is laid on an island in the Indian Ocean. The animals, claimed by men as their slaves, plead their own cause, and present a picture of human injustice and cruelty that is truly appalling. Men are defeated at every point, and the case would go against them, but for the fact of their immortality, On the ground of this, that men are ends in themselves, the king of the genii counsels the animals to serve them, but strongly enjoins on men to treat them kindly, and not over-tax them. The deep human feeling of this story bears testimony to the high culture of the "Brothers of Sincerity." It would be hard to match it to-day.

The next nine tracts deal with various aspects of man, as a physical, sensuous being.

No. 22 (9) investigates the structure of the human body, *Anatomy*, and finds that man is a microcosm, a state, in which the soul is king, the representative of God upon earth, a book written by God's own hand. In knowing himself, man knows God. These notions are about as remote from those of Islâm as can well be conceived, and are derived from the "Theology of Aristotle," in which, as has been said, "self-introversion is represented as an intellectual ascension into heaven." (Cf. Dante, *Paradise*, I., 7 sqq.)*

No. 23 (10) treats of *Sense-Perception* and the perceived,

* Haneberg, quoted in Steinschneider, *Die hebraeischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters*, p. 243.

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and contains a whole physiological theory of cognition. It shows how the senses seize their percepts, and carry them to the faculty of imagination, whose organ is in the front part of the brain, whence they pass on to the faculty of judgment, in the middle part of the brain, where they are again distinguished and seized in their true essence. Hence, again, they pass on to the faculty of retention, in the hinder part of the brain, where they lie ready to be recalled into consciousness by reminiscence. From this they proceed to the faculty of speech, which lies above the tongue, and by which they are translated into words, which, when accompanied by meanings, issuing from the soul, form significant speech. Hence also they proceed to the faculty of action, whose organs are the hands. These record them in books, to be preserved for future generations. Thus the experience of the race is accumulated and preserved in literature.

No. 24 (11) deals with the *Processes of Generation*, conception, and birth, the union of the soul with the embryo, and the influence of the stars upon the temperament and character of the child. The purpose of this tract is to show the condition of the simple soul, before it personifies itself and unites with the partializing body. (Cf. Dante, *Paradise*, I., 73 sqq.). Here we have a whole system of *Astrology*, as affecting human character,—something altogether abhorrent to the spirit of Islâm, and due to Neo-Platonism.

No. 25 (12) treats of Man as a Microcosm, in form similar to the Macrocosm, and having equivalents to the angels, genii, satans, and animal spirits of the latter, and shows that he resumes in himself the corporeal and spiritual worlds, and the meaning of all that exists. All this is purely Neo-Platonic.

No. 26 (13) shows how the partial soul grows in the human body, and how it may thus, before or after death, become an angel.

No. 27 (14) investigates the Limits of Human Knowledge, and shows that man may attain to a knowledge of his creator.

No. 28 (15) treats of Life and Death and the meaning of them, showing why the rational soul is united with the body till death, which is not to be feared, but to be welcomed as a

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spiritual birth. All this is utterly foreign to Islâm, which knows of no souls separate from bodies.

No. 29 (16) considers the Nature of Spiritual and Bodily Pain and Pleasure, and how these are felt by disembodied spirits. It also shows that the wicked associate with devils in hell, the just with angels in heaven. Hell is in the world of becoming, heaven in that of being,—a Platonic doctrine.

No. 30 (17) treats of the Nature and Function of Language, and shows how there come to be different languages.

Having thus obtained a description of sensible nature, we next arise to a consideration of its system, as an expression of reason and a norm of ethical life. It is the distinguishing characteristic of all mediæval thought, from the days of the Neo-Platonists onwards, that, in making the system of the visible world a manifestation of goodness, reason, and soul, it makes it ethical; in other words, that it expresses moral elevation and degradation in terms of distance from the centre of the earth, itself the centre of the universe. This universe is an emanation from God, diminishing in intensity as, by receding from Him, it divides into many. The nearer anything is to the One, the higher it is in the grade of being.* He (1)† is above subsistence, completion, perfection.‡ From Him emanate (2) Reason, subsistent, complete, perfect, (3) through Reason, Soul, subsistent and complete, (4) through both of these, Primal Matter, which is merely subsistent. God is "the One, the Pure," standing to the universe in the same relation as unity to number. Reason, answering to duality, is, because it emanates from God, who is; it subsists, because God continually pours upon it His overflow of good; it is complete, because it accepts this overflow; it is perfect, because it communicates this overflow to the Soul. The Soul subsists, because it emanates from Reason, which subsists; it is complete, because Reason pours upon it the overflow received from God; it is not perfect, because it cannot again communicate this over-

* See Dante, *Paradise*, I. iii.

† This and the following numbers correspond to the grades of being which they mark.

‡ See "Theol. Arist.," p. 137; *Lib. de Causis*, § 21.

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flow to Primal Matter, for the reason that this, not being complete, cannot receive it. The Soul, therefore, finds itself in this position, that, unless it can make matter complete, it can never itself be perfect. Its whole effort, therefore, is to complete matter. In its endeavor to pour out the divine overflow upon it, it creates the physical universe, whose incompleteness is shown by its motion; for the complete moves not. In this way are formed (5) Secondary or Tri-dimensional Matter,—*i.e.*, Body, (6) the Extended Universe, (7) Nature, sublunary and transient, (8) the Four Elements, (9) Things or Products. In these, the Soul having, at last, reached the lowest depth of multiplicity, begins a process of unification, whereby it perfects itself and completes matter. This is called the Return (*Ma'ād*, sometimes rendered Resurrection). It is exactly what we should call Evolution, whose existence is thus accounted for. Under the unifying influence of the Soul, matter becomes, first, minerals, then plants, then animals, and, lastly, man, who gradually ascends above transience, through the various moving spheres, until he reaches the quiet heaven of the Universal Soul, which can now pour upon him the divine overflow. Through this he turns to pure, complete, perfect reason; through it he becomes perfect, and enters into direct union with God. Thus, the whole process of the universe is a going forth from the unity of God to the absolute multiplicity of matter, and back from this again to the unity of God. The world is from God and to God.

With this explanation we can now turn to the ten tracts on

(III.) THE RATIONAL WORLD-SOUL, or ETHICS.

No. 31 (1) discusses the principles of Reason according to Pythagoras, and shows how God, in creating, arranged the world on a basis of number, drawn out of unity. The content of this tract seems to have been partly drawn from certain pseudo-Pythagorean writings, current among the Arabs. One of these seems to have borne the title "The Republic of Reason." *

No. 32 (2) states the principles of Reason, according to the

* See Müller, *Die griech. Philosophen in arab. Ueberlieferung*, p. 5.

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"Brothers of Sincerity," and gives the grounds for the origin of the world, and the mediate causes for all existence.

No. 32 (3) discusses the saying of the philosophers, that the Universe is a great, good man, endowed with intellect and soul, a living world (ζῷον), obedient to its master, a complete whole.

No. 34 (4) deals with Reason and its object (Being), and the true nature of the substance of the soul. The passive Reason is the locus (τόπος) of all known forms (εἴδη).

No. 35 (5) treats of the Revolutions of the Stars and Spheres, and shows that the world came into being, and will again go out of being.

No. 36 (6) treats of the Love of the Soul (ἡ ἱερὰ νόσος), its nature and origin, and shows that the object of this love is God, for whom all creatures long (Cf. Dante, *Paradise*, I., 112 sqq.).

No. 37 (7) relates to the Return or Resurrection (see p. 452), and the nature of the ascension through the spheres and the knowledge gained in it. In this the whole system laid down in the Cyclopædia culminates. Dante's *Paradise* has the same subject.

No. 38 (8) deals with the various kinds of Motion, their beginning, culmination, and end, and shows how the world proceeded from the creator.

No. 39 (9) treats of Causes and Effects, and shows that they form a continuous circle. Here we are shown the origin, rules, and arrangement of the sciences (Cf. Dante, *Convivio*, II.) and taught that the universe is a self-determined whole.

No. 40 (10) treats of Definitions and Determinations, and tries to show the ideal essence of things, simple and compound.

Lastly, we come to that portion of the Cyclopædia which, however much affected by Greek thought, draws its first principle from Semitism, from Islâm:

(IV.) THE DIVINE LAW, or REVELATION, in eleven tracts.

No. 41 (1) treats of Opinions, Doctrines, Dogmas, Religions, Prophecy, and the views of different philosophers regarding them. It shows that all philosophies and all religions seek

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the salvation of the soul, and try to point out the way whereby it ascends from the hell of the lower world to the paradise of the spheres,—the path of mystic vision. Most sects miss the true path.

No. 42 (2) treats of the Way to God, and shows that it leads through the civic and cathartic virtues up to the theoretic virtues, by which death, resurrection, and eternal reward or punishment are contemplated.

No. 43 (3) exhibits the Faith and Teachings of the "Brothers of Sincerity." This faith includes a belief in the immortality of the individual soul, one of the chief dogmas of Islâm.

No. 44 (4) describes the Life of the "Brothers of Sincerity," which, if somewhat formal and monastic, was full of sweet reason, compassion, sympathy, and love. As it is from these two tracts that we derive our knowledge of the life-ideal of the "Brothers," we must stop for a moment to consider it somewhat in detail.

As we have already seen, the "Brothers," in imitation, probably, of the Pythagoreans, had formed themselves into groups, or lodges, for the pursuit of study and a common life of purity, simplicity, and helpfulness. The guide of their life was science, including revelation, which was reduced to the form of science. Like the Pythagoreans, they were hospitable to all knowledge, excluding no branch of study from attention. They professed to draw their doctrines from four kinds of books:

(1) Books dealing generally with the Matter and Form of Knowledge,—Propædeutic and Logic (Aristotle).

(2) Books of Revelation,—the Torah, the Gospel, the Psalms, the Koran, and other prophetic writings.

(3) Books on Physics, and the products of human art.

(4) Books on Mystic Philosophy (Neo-Platonic chiefly) dealing with the ultimate concepts of being. Their social bond was friendship or love, and in this they agreed with the Epicureans and early Christians, both of whom, strange to say, they resembled in many respects. Four degrees of spiritual attainment were recognized, and on the basis of these they were divided into four grades or classes:

(1) The virtues demanded and cultivated in the first were

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purity of soul-substance, quick comprehension, and rapid presentation. Its members were called the *Technics*, and were supposed to perfect themselves in sense-perception, and to recognize the value of sensible things. Their course extended from their fifteenth to their thirtieth year.

(2) The virtues proper to the second class were directive power, generosity, gentleness, sympathy, and compassion, in one word, enlightened judgment in dealing with men. They were called the *Directors*, and their course extended from their thirtieth to their fortieth year.

(3) The virtue characteristic of the third class was power to command and forbid, to overcome and determine, with a view to suppressing, with gentleness, kindness, and loving admonition, any disobedience or rebellion that might arise. They were called *Kings* and *Rulers*, and their course extended from their fortieth to their fiftieth year.

(4) The virtue peculiar to the fourth class was divine insight or inspiration, by which they rose to a vision of the eternal, and of the future life, its nature and conditions, and the way thither. Thus they were able to grasp "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." They were called *Angels*, and had complete authority over all the "Brothers." Their course lasted from their fiftieth year till their death, when they ascended to minister, as angels, by the throne of God.*

It is easy to see that this system contains elements borrowed from Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the later schools of Greek thought; perhaps, also, from the Syrian monks, from whom the Muslims directly derived their knowledge of Greek thought.

No. 45 (4) seeks to show the Philosophic Content of the Muslim Faith, and to explain the meaning of inspiration and obsession. It contains deep wisdom and a dark secret.

No. 46 (6) discusses the Nature of the Revealed Law, the conditions of prophecy, the qualifications of prophets, and the teachings of the servants of God. Its purpose is to show how the sacred writings have to be interpreted, in order to be brought into harmony with philosophy. Here allegory

* Cf. the closing lines of the Pythagorean "Golden Words."

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plays a large part. It also tries to show who the expected Imâm, or temporal and spiritual head of Islâm, is. This was a bitterly disputed point between the different Muslim sects.*

No. 47 (7) treats of the Call to God, to sincerity, and genuine love, and shows that the kingdom of truth and goodness must begin with a small knot of men who unite and agree to lead a certain life, and persistently to propagate a certain doctrine.

No. 48 (8) treats of the Actions of Spiritual Beings, and shows that there exist incorporeal, active essences in the world.

No. 49 (9) deals with the different Forms of Government, the grades of rulers, and the characters of the ruled. It shows that the supreme ruler is God, and that the best earthly ruler is he that stands nearest to Him.

No. 50 (10) shows that the universe is an ordered hierarchy of existences proceeding from God and returning to God. It bases this upon a verse from the Koran: "On the day when we shall roll up the heavens like a scroll, as we produced it at its first creation, we will draw it back again" (Sur. xxi. 104).

No. 51 (11) treats of Witchcraft, philtres, evil eye, forebodings, amulets, talismans, genii, satans, angels, and their relations and acts. Its purpose is to show that, besides men, there are on the earth other beings called spirits. Here we have a whole theory of spiritism, due partly to Arabism, partly to Neo-Platonism.

Such is the Cyclopædia of the "Brothers of Sincerity." I have dealt with it somewhat in detail, because it contains the best articulated statement in existence of that system of the universe, at once religious, ethical, and physical, which governed the thought of the civilized world for over two thousand years, until at last it perished in the flames of Giordano Bruno's funeral-pile, in the year 1600. This system must, as a whole, be abandoned, as incompatible with demonstrated truth; much of it must be rejected as pure superstition. And yet its interest for us is very great, and that for several reasons: (1) It represents the best thought of a long and momentous

* See Syed Ameer Ali, "Spirit of Islâm," pp. 467 sqq.

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period in the history of human culture, a period in which man rose from nature to spirit, and, indeed, it is the very form of that process. (2) It is all-comprehensive, including nature and spirit, and showing that the former is dependent upon the latter. It thus gives us a universe which is completely rational, significant, and, therefore, optimistic. (3) It does its best to harmonize philosophy, or rational science, with revelation, and shows us the dangers with which any such attempt is necessarily beset. Such attempts must always fail, because they start by assuming a dualism which does not exist. A super-rational revelation made to reason is a contradiction in terms. (4) It shows man his place in the universe, his origin, his destiny, and, therefore, his duty. (5) It thus furnishes a complete scheme of education, or of man's true relations to the universe, enabling him who receives it to lead a perfectly rational, aimful, and, therefore, free life.

A system possessing these characteristics surely deserves our most careful attention and study. If we cannot accept it as it stands, we can certainly accept its spirit and its purpose. It did, with imperfect knowledge, marred by superstition, what ought to be again attempted with our ever-widening knowledge, from which superstition is being gradually eliminated. No free or rational life can ever be led except on the basis of a consciousness of a rational world. Such a world the system of the "Brothers of Sincerity" undertook to supply. Let us survey it for a moment. As we have seen, it is divided into four parts, and presupposes an elementary course in reading, writing, arithmetic, grammar, and versification. *First*, we have a Propædeutic, divided into two parts, the former supplying a general notion of the matter of science, from pure abstract number up to the most concrete human character; the latter, a theory of its forms. *Second*, we have a very comprehensive course in *Natural Science*, or the science of the sensible world, from abstract matter and form up to human speech. *Third*, we have a complete course in *Metaphysics* or *Philosophy*, the science of the intelligible world, as a hierarchic unity of manifold life, dependent upon a supreme principle, or world-soul. *Fourth*, we have a well articulated course in

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Theology, or the science of that which, transcending human reason, must be accepted through revelation made to prophets, a science furnishing the ultimate grounds for ethical life, and for the hope of eternal life. The system is complete in every part, and though, as we have seen, it cannot be now accepted as a whole, it is, nevertheless, in the form of rationality, which is the important thing. Like all systems that arose before the days of experimental science, it assumes that everything knowable is known, and, therefore, presents itself as final, an absolute norm for thought and life. Looking away from this unavoidable defect, let us consider how the system affected life. On its intellectual side, it taught men to look upon themselves as having their origin and end in the one supreme principle of the universe, and as being essential parts of the sum of existence. On the emotional side, it made them feel that the entire universe was only their larger self, and that, since the same soul pulsated in all things, in wronging another they were wronging themselves. Thus, universal love and tenderness became the dominant impulses of their lives. On the volitional side, it made them labor with all their might to elevate the living world nearer and nearer to God, to instruct, purify, and discipline the souls of their fellows. It is difficult to imagine a nobler attitude towards life than that occupied by the "Brothers of Sincerity," whose name truly indicates their character and intent. Had they succeeded in disseminating their system, and making the Muslim world accept it, human civilization would have advanced in the eleventh century to a point which it will hardly have reached in the twentieth.

And this suggests the question, why they did not succeed, and why their system remained unknown to the world for many hundred years. The answer is, that they were many generations ahead of their time; that the world was not ready for their gospel. To live by insight and reason implies a degree of culture rare at any time, and one that certainly was not common in Babylonia in the year 1000. Among the men who flattered themselves that they could so live, was a contemporary of the "Brothers," Ibn Sina, one of the greatest of all thinkers; and his life offered an example which did not

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invite imitation. His outspoken rationalism roused the fanaticism of the Arabs, and this found expression in the writings of the sceptical mystic, Al Ghazzali († 1111), whose name closes the list of Eastern Arabic thinkers. After him, a harsh, rigid orthodoxy, set off against a gross material, disingenuous mysticism, triumphed, as it still triumphs, in the East. About the close of the eleventh century, all that remained of Arabic philosophic writings found its way thence to the Far West, to Spain, giving rise to a philosophic movement of much promise, which lasted for a century. Among these writings was the Cyclopædia of the "Brothers of Sincerity," introduced into Spain, about 1020–30, by Muslim ibn Muhammad abu 'l Kasim, called the Peripatetic. Here it influenced, not only the Arab thinkers of the West, such as Ibn Baja († 1138) and Ibn Tufail († 1185), but also, and in a still higher degree, the great Jewish thinkers, Ibn Gabirol, whose work, *Fons Vitæ*, is largely dependent upon it,* and Joseph (ibn) Zaddik, whose *Microcosmus* † may be said to be an enlargement of tract 25. Thus it came to pass that, when, with the death of Ibn Rushd, in 1198, Arab philosophy definitively succumbed to fanaticism, its products, and, among them, the Cyclopædia of the "Brothers of Sincerity," continued to exert an influence upon the Jews, and, partly through them, and partly also directly, upon the Christians. It does not seem that the Cyclopædia was ever translated into either Hebrew or Latin; but, through the works mentioned above, it influenced the Schoolmen, and, later on, Spinoza, whose pantheism is nothing more than a reproduction of it in terms of Cartesian philosophy, just as Hegel's panlogism is merely a reproduction of Plotinus' system, in terms of Kantianism. Thus, the thought of the "Brothers" found its way into the modern world, and still lives on there, though now merely as an intellectual scheme, no longer as a world-view by which man may guide his life to the highest ends. What we need to do, is to take their Cyclopædia and write it over, in terms of

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* See Guttmann, *Die Philos. des Sal. ibn Gabirol*, pp. 35 sqq.

† See Doctor, *Die Philos. des Josef (ibn) Zaddik*, pp. 16 sqq.

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the latest modern philosophy and science, retaining its comprehensiveness, its unity, its earnest spirit, and its educational ideal. When this is done, our education will cease to be chaotic and tentative, and become consistent, comprehensive, and aimful, from the kindergarten to the university, from the cradle to the grave and, further, forever further.*

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE ACTIVITY-EXPERIENCE.

IT requires no very profound acquaintance with the trend of the literature of general and specialized philosophy of the last twenty-five years to detect a decidedly practical turn in the recent speculative tendencies of philosophy and philosophers. The older conception of philosophy or metaphysics as an attempt to state (more or less systematically) the value of the world for thought is being slowly modified, if not altogether disappearing, into the attempt to explain or to grasp the significance of the world from the stand-point of the moral and social activity of man. The philosophical student must be to some extent conscious of the difference in respect both of tone and subject-matter between such books as Stirling's "Secret of Hegel," E. Caird's "Critical Philosophy of Kant" (the first editions of both works), Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," and the most recent essays and books of Professors A. Seth † and James ‡ and Ward § and Sidgwick || and Bald-

* In preparing this article, I have been very largely indebted to the works of Prof. Dieterici, of Berlin, to whom belongs the credit of having made the "Brothers of Sincerity" and their Cyclopædia known to the modern world.

T. D.

† "Man's Place in the Cosmos," a book consisting of essays and reviews, published by the author during the last four or five years. They all advocate "humanism in opposition to naturalism," or "ethicism in opposition to a too narrow intellectualism." The review of this book by Dr. Douglas, in *Mind* (January, 1898), seems to me to emphasize its main characteristic,—the necessity, even for speculative purposes, of a recognition of the practical problems of man's life.

‡ "The Will to Believe," 1897.

§ "Progress in Philosophy," art. *Mind*, 15, p. 213.

|| "Practical Ethics;" Essays.

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win,* and of Mr. Bosanquet† and the late Mr. Nettleship,‡ and between—to turn to Germany—the writings of Erdmann and Kuno Fischer and Zeller and F. A. Lange, and those of Gizycki, Paulsen, Windelband, Evcken, Hartmann, Deussen, Simmel, and—in France—between the writings of Renouvier and Pillon and Ravaisson, the "Neo-Kantianism" of the *Critique Philosophique* (1872–1887), and those of Fouillée, Weber (of Strassbourg), Séailles, Dunan, and others, and of general writers like de Vogüé, Desjardins, and Brunetière, and of social philosophers like Bouglé, Tarde, Izoulet, and so on. The change of *venue* in these writers alone, not to speak of the change of the interest of the educated world from such books as Huxley's "Hume" and Renan's "L'Avenir de la Science" and Du Bois Reymond's "Die Sieben Welträthsel," and Tyndall's "Belfast Address," to the writings of Herbert Spencer (the Sociology and the general essays on social evolution), Kidd, Nordau, Nietzsche, Mr. Crozier (his important "History of Civilization"), and Demolins §, and the predomi-

* "Mental Development—Social and Ethical Interpretations" (a work crowned by the Royal Academy of Denmark). We can see in this book how a psychologist has been led into a far-reaching study of social and ethical development in order to gain an understanding of the growth of even the individual mind. We may indeed say that the individualistic intellectualism of the older psychology is now no more. It was too "abstract" a way of looking at mind. Professor Royce, it is well known, has given, from the stand-point of a professed metaphysician, a cordial welcome to the work of Professor Baldwin. In an important review of Mr. Stout's two admirable volumes on "Analytic Psychology" (*Mind*, July, 1897), Professor Royce has insisted strongly upon the need of supplementing introspection by the "interpretation of the reports and the conduct of other people" if we would know much about "dynamic" psychology. It is this "dynamic" psychology—the "dynamics" of the will and of the "feelings"—that I think constitutes such an important advance upon the traditional "intellectual" and "individualistic" psychology.

† "The Psychology of the Moral Self." Macmillan, 1897. I have tried, in a short notice of this book in the *Philosophical Review* (March, 1898), to indicate the importance of some of its chief contentions.

‡ "Philosophical Lectures and Remains," edited by Professor Bradley.

§ Editor of *La Science Sociale*. His recent work on the "Superiority of the Anglo-Saxons" (*À quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons*)—a chapter in the study of the conditions of race survival—ran through seventeen editions in a few months, and set the whole press of France and Germany (other countries following suit) into commotion, as well as calling forth *pronunciamentos* from

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nance of investigations into general biology and comparative psychology and sociology over merely logical and conceptual philosophy seem to afford us some warrant for trying to think of what might be called a newer or ethical idealism, an idealism of the will, an idealism of life, in contradistinction to the older or intellectual (epistemological, Neo-Kantian) idealism, the idealism of the intellect. Professor A. Seth, in his recent volume on "Man's Place in the Cosmos," suggests that Mr. Bradley's treatise on "Appearance and Reality" has closed the period of the absorption or assimilation of Kanto-Hegelian principles by the English mind. And there is ample evidence in contemporary philosophical literature to show that even the very men who have, with the help of Stirling and Green and Caird and Bradley and Wallace, "absorbed and assimilated" the principles of critical idealism are now bent upon applying these principles to the solution of concrete problems of art and life and conduct. Two things alone would constitute a difference between the philosophy of the last few years and that of the preceding generation: An attempt (strongly * accentuated at the present moment) to include elements of *feeling* and *will* in our final consciousness of reality, and a

most of the prominent editors and critics of France,—men like Jules Lemaître, Paul Bourget, Marcel Prevost, François Coppée, Édouard Rod, G. Valbert, etc.

* In different ways by all of the following English writers: Professor A. Seth ("It is not in knowledge, then, as such, but in feeling and action that reality is given," "Man's Place," etc., p. 122, etc., etc.), by Mr. Bradley (in "Appearance and Reality"), by Mr. Balfour (in his "Foundations of Belief"), and by Professor James. Professor Evcken, of Jena, in his different books, also insists strongly upon the idea that it is not in knowledge as such, but in the totality of our psychical experience that the principles of philosophy must be sought. Paulsen, in his "Einleitung in die Philosophie," and Weber, in his "History of Philosophy" (books in general use to-day), both advocate a kind of philosophy of the will, the idea that the world is to be regarded as a striving on the part of wills after a partly unconscious ideal. Simmel, in an important article in the *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale*, IV., 2, expresses the idea (which it would be well to recognize generally at the present time) that truth is not something objectively apart from us, but rather the name we give to conceptions that have proved to be the guides to useful actions, and so become part of the psychical heritage of human beings. Professor Ribot, of Paris, has written more extensively upon the will and the feelings than upon the intellect,—a fact in keeping with the scientific demands of our day.

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tendency (inevitable since Comte and Hegel's "Philosophy of History") to extend the philosophical synthesis of the merely "external" or physical universe so as to make it include the world of man's action and the world that is now glibly called the "social organism."* A good deal of epistemological and metaphysical philosophy of this century has been merely cosmological, and at best psychological and individualistic. The philosophy of the present is, necessarily, to a large extent, sociological and collectivistic and historical. Renan once prophesied that this would be so. And many other men perceived the same fact and acted upon their perception of it—Goethe and Victor Hugo and Carlyle, for example.

To be sure, any attempt to draw lines of novel and absolute separation between writers of to-day and their immediate predecessors would be absurd and impossible, just as would be the attempt to force men who are still living and thinking and developing, into Procrustean beds of system and nomenclature. The history of the philosophy of the last half of this century constitutes a development as continuous and as logical as the philosophy of any similar period of years wherein men have thought persistently and truly upon the problems of life and mind. There were in the sixties men like Ulrici and Lotze (Renouvier, too, to some extent) who divined the limitations of a merely intellectual philosophy, and who saw clearly that the only way to effect a reconciliation between philosophy and science would be to apply philosophy itself to the problems of the life and thought of the time, just as we find, in 1893, Dr. Edward Caird writing, in his "Essays on Literature and Philosophy," that "philosophy, in face of the increasing com-

* See, *e.g.*, an article by Fouillée in the *Revue Philosophique*, XXI., 5, with the very title "Necessité d'une interpretation psychologique et sociologique du monde." Fouillée finds there, as he does elsewhere, that (*à la* Schopenhauer) will is the principle that enables us to unify the physical with the psychical world, —an illustration of the fact that the two characteristics I am referring to are really one. A present instance of the introduction of the element of will (the will of man, even) is to be seen in the contention of such a book as M. Lucien Arréat's "Les Croyances de Demain" (1898). According to *Mind*, M. Arréat proposes to substitute the idea that man can by his efforts bring about the supremacy of justice for the traditional idea that justice reigns in the universe.

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plexity of modern life, has a harder task laid upon it than ever was laid upon it before. It must emerge from the region of abstract principles and show itself able to deal with the manifold results of empirical science, giving to each of them its proper place and value." Professor Campbell Fraser, while welcoming and sympathetically referring to (in his books upon Berkeley and Locke) the elements of positive value in English and German idealism, has throughout his life contended for the idea (expressed with greatest definiteness in his Gifford Lectures on "The Philosophy of Theism") that "in man, as a self-conscious and self-determining *agent*," is to be found the "best key we possess to the solution of the ultimate problem of the universe;" while Professor Sidgwick, by virtue of his captivating and ingenious pertinacity in confining philosophical speculation to the lines of the traditional English empiricism, and in keeping it free from the ensnaring subtleties of "system" and "methodology," has exercised a healthful and corrective influence against the extremes alike of transcendentalism and naturalism. And it would be rash to maintain that all the younger men in philosophy show an intention to act upon the idea (expressed by Wundt, for instance, in his "Ethik") that a metaphysic should build upon the facts of the moral life of man; although we find a "Neo-Hegelian" like Professor Mackenzie * saying that "even the wealth of our inner life depends rather on the width of our objective interests than on the intensity of our self-contemplation;" and an expounder of the ethics of dialectic evolution like Professor Muirhead quoting † with approval the thought expressed by George Eliot in the words, "The great world-struggle of developing thought is continually foreshadowed in the struggle of the affections seeking a justification for love and hope;" and a careful psychologist like Mr. Stout deliberately penning the words,‡ "Our existence as conscious beings is essentially an activity, and activity is a process which,

* "Manual of Ethics," according to Mr. Stout, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1894. There are many similar sentences and ideas in the book.

† "Elements of Ethics," p. 232.

‡ INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1894, p. 119.

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by its very nature, is directed towards an end, and can neither exist nor be conceived apart from this end." There are, doubtless, many philosophers of to-day who are convinced that philosophy is purely an intellectual matter, and can never be anything else than an attempt to analyze the world for *thought*—an attempt to state its value in the terms of thought. Against all these and many similar considerations it would be idle to set up a hard and fast codification or characterization of the work of the philosophy or philosophers of to-day. Still, the world will accord the name of philosopher to any man—Renan, for example, or Spencer or Huxley or Nordau or Nietzsche—who comes before it with views upon the universe and humanity that may, for any conceivable reason, be regarded as fundamental. And on this showing of things, as well as from many indications in the work of those who are philosophers by profession, it may be said that the predominating note of the newer philosophy is its openness to the facts of the volitional and emotional and moral and social aspects of man's life, as things that take us further along the path of truth than the mere categories of thought and their manipulation by metaphysic and epistemology. It is, however, not so much upon the actual history of the modification, as to form and subject-matter, of the traditional post-Kantian philosophy that I wish to dwell, as upon some of the constituent elements or possible leading conceptions of the newer positive philosophy of to-day, called by whatever name may appear to be most expressive and appropriate.

I have employed in the title of this paper the expression "the activity-experience" out of a desire to speak of a certain *rapprochement* that may be to-day observed between philosophy (conceived of—to put it broadly—in the classical sense as the Theory of the Ideas) and the actual practical effort that characterizes the life of man, that brings him, as we say, his experience or wisdom of life. It may seem somewhat illogical to place together, even by way of antithesis, two such apparently "disparate" notions as "philosophy" and "activity," —a *theory* and a *thing* (or fact). The considerations of the argument to follow may perhaps tend to remove this appear-

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ance of inconsistency or irrelevancy. A more serious initial reflection (one, too, that opens up our very subject) arises in my mind regarding what has been called the *automatism** of the recent psychology, its claim that there is in the mind of man no evidence of self-engendered effort, of spontaneous activity, of activity essentially different from sensation and affection.† I pass over this reflection, however, with two remarks: (1) Human beings themselves and history and literature all seem to speak of a life of effort and creative activity and spontaneity as of the very nature of man. This fact alone is enough for my purpose. (2) It would also be enough for my purpose to speak of the "*alleged* activity-experience" instead of the "activity-experience." The mere *belief* in activity, and the facts and necessities of the practical life, and reflection upon that belief and upon these facts and these necessities, have, in my opinion, modified the traditional metaphysical monism or the critical philosophy of recent years. If a belief in the activity or spontaneity of man's mind or brain has produced, as it most certainly has, results in the world of achievement and conduct and in the world of religion and art, these results are sufficient reason for investigating and guarding and cultivating that belief. The study of evolution, as well as the study of psychology, has made us aware of the fact that it is "function," or adaptation to needs and purposes, that measures reality.

The newer idealism does not dream of questioning the positive work of the Kantian and Neo-Kantian and Neo-Hegelian idealists. It knows only too well that even "scientific" men like Helmholtz and Du Bois Reymond, that "positive" philosophers like Riehl and Laas and Feuerbach and others have, through the influence of the Kantian philosophy, learned and

* Professor Seth, op. cit., p. 64, "The 'New' Psychology and Automatism."

† Professor Titchener, "An Outline of Psychology." It is really to Professor Titchener that I am indebted for the expression, "the activity-experience," although I think I have seen it elsewhere. He distinguishes it from the "activity-inference," implying that our whole theory of "activity" is in itself a matter of inference and supposition. I attempted a criticism of this and other points in his book in a paper read (December, 1897) before the American Psychological Association, published in the *Psychological Review* (1898).

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accepted the fact of there being "ideal" or psychical or "mind-supplied" factors in so-called external reality. There are among the educated men of to-day very few Dr. Johnsons who ridicule the psycho-physical analysis of external reality, who believe in a crass and crude and self-sufficient "matter" utterly devoid of psychical attributes or characteristics. True, Herbert Spencer has written words to the effect that "If the Idealist (Berkeley) is right, then the doctrine of Evolution is a dream;" but then everything in Spencer's philosophy about an "actuality lying behind appearances" and about our being compelled "to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon," is against the possibility of our believing that, according to that philosophy, an unconscious and non-spiritual "matter" could evolve itself into conscious life and moral experience. The philosophers of to-day have indeed rejoiced to see Kant's "lesson" popularized by such various phases and movements of human thought as psycho-physical research, art and æsthetic theory, the interest in Buddhism (with its idealistic theory of the knowledge of the senses), and the speculative biology of Weismann and others. That people generally should see that matter is, for many reasons, something more than mere matter, is to the student of Kant a piece of fulfilled prophecy. By a plea for a return to reality and life and sociability from conceptualism and criticism and speculative individualism no philosophical scholar for one moment contemplates as ever conceivable an overlooking of the idealistic interpretation of the data of the senses supplied by Locke and Berkeley and Hume, or of the idealistic interpretation of the data of science and understanding supplied by Kant's "Copernican" discovery. Any real view of the universe must now presuppose the melting down of crass external reality into the phenomena of sense and experience and the transformation of inorganic and organic nature into so many *planes* or *grades* of being expressive of the different forms (gravitation, cohesion, vital force, psychic force) in which cosmic energy manifests itself.

Equally little does the Newer Idealism question the legiti-

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macy or the actual positive service of the "dialectic" (Hegel's "Logic," to wit, as Archimedean a leverage to humanity as was the "concept" of Socrates or the "causal category" of Kant) that has shown the world to be a *system* in which everything is related to everything else, and shown, too, that all ways of looking at reality that stop short of the truths of personality and moral relationship are untrue and inadequate. To use the words of Professor Howison, of California, in the preface to the first edition of Professor Watson's latest volume (a book that connects the idealism of Glasgow and Oxford with the convictions of the youth of the "Pacific Coast"), the "*dominant tone*" of the militant and representative philosophy of to-day, is "affirmative and idealistic. The decided majority . . . are animated by the conviction that human thought is able to solve the riddle of life positively; to solve it in accord with the ideal hopes and interests of human nature." Only whenever I read such words as *affirmative* and *idealistic*, or their equivalent, in writers like Watson or James or Seth or Fouillée or Desjardins or Nettleship or Paulsen or Simmel or Windelband, or in a host of others, I say to myself (what, I think, is one of the characteristics of the newer philosophy) "it means the *will;* means that the *will* [Schopenhauer] as well as the intellect [Kant] is implied in our construction and interpretation of reality; means that the universe is partly what we make it to be, what we must make it to be, what the best of men endeavor to make it to be, what humanity as a whole may endeavor to make it to be; means that the universe is this, and not merely, as Kant and Hegel have forever taught us, what we must *think* it to be. Nay, rather, it means that we are compelled to think the universe to be what the necessities of our practical nature demand that it shall be [Kant suggested this, although Spinoza thought it a reason for denying a knowledge of *final causes*], that for philosophy as for psychology, reality is simply whatever sustains a verifiable relation (positive or limitative) to our activity." I am aware of a great many things that these statements are apt to suggest, such as "philosophizing with one's heart and inclinations a *l'enfant gaté* or a *la vielle femme*," or "Fichte's short cut to reality up to

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date," or "Schopenhauer *minus* his pessimism," or "the mere truism that reality is and must be thought to be what it proves itself to be, proves itself to be in us." But why should not reality be considered and analyzed by philosophy as "what it *proves* itself to be"? If evolution be rational, reality must be what it proves itself in our experience to be, for man's body must be regarded as an "organism for the storage and voluntary expenditure" of cosmic energy, and man's nature and mind as an agency for bringing nature to its highest development and expression (a realm of goodness and beauty). And, again, if this "practical idealism" be at a glance detected to be merely an obverse of the intellectual idealism of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," or Hegel's "Logic"—nay, merely a rendering according to taste of the teleology of Kant's "Critique of Judgment" and Hegel's "Philosophy of History," it is none the less a new statement of the results of philosophy, for it carries with it an obligation to give a new rendering of the "principles of knowledge," an interpretation of these principles that does not seem merely to idealize away the reality of things, to reduce the world to "appearance" * *and* (reality?), or to leave us with Fichte's conviction (or error) that knowledge somehow must always be an indirect or second-hand way to reality. If knowledge tells us something about reality that we cannot with our "whole heart" believe, if it gives us a version of reality that fails to satisfy the very knowing "power" itself, then, indeed, is Pyrrhonism the only true philosophy and indifferentism or opportunism the only true conduct. But the newer idealism honors and glorifies knowledge as most real and most reliable,

* Some critic recently suggested an alternative name for Mr. Bradley's book on "Appearance and Reality,"—the Disappearance of Reality. And it has always seemed to me that the defenders of a reality higher than that of science and thought (as Professor Seth makes out Mr. Bradley to be, to a certain extent) ought to be very careful about seeming unduly to disparage the reality that is before us and the "life that now is." Reality must always be found in appearance, and not altogether "above" it and "beyond" it. See my "Schopenhauer's System, etc.," pp. 448–450, etc. The principles of knowledge do not (as a superficial study of even Kant might lead us to suppose) apply to a reality "outside" the mind; they are simply a statement of the essential nature of our experience, of our experience reduced to its simplest elements.

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as telling us not what reality is *in itself*—this very idea being nonsensical, as every one now (thanks to Hegel) knows—but what reality is in relation to our activity, as constituting for us an actual grasp or leverage (this is no mere metaphor) on things, whereby we can raise ourselves on to higher planes of vision and conduct. I find this view of knowledge suggested in Professor Ward's *Britannica* articles on psychology (in his exposition of the memory-continuum as a differentiation of the perception-continuum) and in Mr. Stout's two volumes on "Analytic Psychology" and in the philosophy that may be built upon Professor James's "Will to Believe," and upon Professor A. Seth's "Mr. Balfour and his Critics," and in Mr. Bosanquet's recent *opuscule* on the "Psychology of the Moral Self." The reader has but to convince himself, by psychological and psycho-physical investigation, of the truth of the fact that our conceptions or ideas and the conceptions and ideas of humanity represent the history of the differentiation of our practical needs and tendencies; and then to master the meaning of Hegel's criticism of Kant's "Thing-in-Itself," to clear his mind of any and all difficulties connected with the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, doubts that he may have been led to entertain about the reality of our experience, from an acceptance of the so-called doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge. This doctrine does not mean what we used to suppose it did mean when studying Protagoras and Ænesidemus and modern Agnosticism, that the senses and understanding are not reliable guides as to the nature of reality; but rather that the data of knowledge and investigation *are* reliable because they tell us the relation that "things" and the "world" sustain to the movement of our bodies and the evolution of our life, or the relation that our life sustains to the life or evolution of the universe.

When once we grasp the true nature of the self, with which, of course, knowledge or reflection (*Besonnenheit*) is intimately associated, we see clearly that we cannot think of the self without at the same time affirming it. Affirmation—in other words, the affirmation in the simplest judgment—is not merely logical but also volitional. We cannot think of an "ideal

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content" of the mind (goodness, *e.g.*, beauty, sociability), or of a definite relation to the world of men and things, to—

> "This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England;
> This land of such dear souls, this dear, dear land,"

without at the same time affirming it; and by *affirming* I mean *acting*, *living*, *willing*, as if that notion of the mind were real—real somehow in our very consciousness of it. I believe that the newer psychology and sociology (philosophy of society) and philosophy generally, have a better conception of the *organic* nature of the self than the traditional metaphysic since 1781, and with a better conception of the nature of organism as applied to the self, also a better conception of the application of this notion to nature and to humanity.

It has been the vogue among educated people to make merry over the idea of Schopenhauer and Hartmann that humanity may some time rise to such an acute consciousness of the unsatisfactory character of all material life as to actually will to suppress that life in the interest of non-existence, as something preferable to a life of unending illusion. But, fantastical though this notion at first seems to be, there is implied in it at least that perception of the organic continuity of all animal and human existence for which the biology and sociology of to-day may be regarded to stand. Humanity, in virtue of a deepened consciousness of its own essential moral unity and "intellectual solidarity," and, consequently, of its collective control over most of the forces of nature and over the anti-social forces at work in certain of its own members, may *will* to rise above practical materialism and the warring of groups of human beings against groups of their fellows. With this somewhat fanciful indication of the *terrain* that may be won for a philosophy of mind and life, for a philosophy that adopts Comte's idea of arranging all knowledge and all science in view of its bearing on human life, and that takes along with this very arrangement the idealism of Plato and Schelling and Hegel, let us think of some of the many reasons why the reality of man's life as that of a being who acts and who "alone," in his action, can "achieve the impossible," as

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Goethe puts it,—act in advance of the mere conceptions of his reason, should at present be made one of the fundamental data of philosophy.

First, it is almost a truism that a philosophy of volition is necessarily the best possible clue to the systematization of the world from a teleological point of view, the supreme *desideratum* of all philosophy, even of the philosophy that denies its possibility. "Only that metaphysic," says Schopenhauer,* "is really and directly a support to ethics, which is itself ethical in its origin,—constructed, in fact, out of ethical material, the will. For this reason I could have called my metaphysic ethic with much more justification than Spinoza, with whom the word savors of irony,—a sort of *lucus a non lucendo*, in fact, since it is only through sophistry that he foists morality on to a system which has logically no room for it." Human action represents the integration and storage and expenditure for higher purposes of all the diverse forms of energy of the known universe, from gravitation up to vital or biotic force; and—what is still more important and miraculous—it also represents *in operation* the force (for thought is a *force*) of thought as not only directing the subordinate energies just referred to, but as expressing itself and its influence over the life of man. "The course of evolution . . . has been in the direction from the unorganized and inefficacious towards the organized and efficacious through the process of storing energy in appropriate forms. This has taken place by a series of successive steps, each resulting in a more efficient product; that is, one possessing, in addition to the properties of antecedent products, some new property with a special power of its own capable of better work."† The body of man no doubt represents a contrivance or organism for the highest or most highly

* See my "Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance," ch. vii.,—Schopenhauer's Moral Philosophy. I believe, of course, that Schopenhauer sets forth more completely than any other philosopher the reality of a philosophy of the will. The application, too, in his shorter writings and general essays, of such a philosophy to life and conduct and character, is not the least valuable part of the information he gives the world about itself.

† Lester Ward, *The Monist*, Vol. V., p. 257; "Outline of Sociology," p. 146.

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economized expenditure and direction of physical or cosmic energy; and the action of man may be said to turn the forces of nature back upon themselves in an enforced subserviency to the needs of human society and of the moral and spiritual life of man. And in collective human action, in the organized volition of humanity, we have a still higher control and adaptation of the forces of the universe than in the actions of individuals or of mere groups of individuals. Man can to an almost indefinite extent make the world to be very largely what he intelligently desires it to be. It is sometimes claimed —*e.g.*, by the late Mr. Huxley in his "Romanes Lecture"— that nature is indifferent and even hostile to man, and that the whole of civilization consists in fighting and subduing the mere forces of nature; but the "slightest philosophy" (as Hume put it) will dispel altogether from the mind this fiction of any kind of "nature" whatsoever existing anterior to or independent of the intelligence and purpose that man is directly conscious of in himself.

Secondly, if we can see our way to adopt a practical principle as the most logical explanation of reality, we should be more free in our thoughts from that somewhat unfortunate sense (*le tourment de l'infini*, as Zola lately called it in an address to Paris students) of a discrepancy between philosophy and ordinary life, with which most metaphysicians seem to be afflicted, and with which the world half humorously persists in crediting them. Sincere students of philosophy have always experienced a *quasi* minor irritation of spirit on being told by their friends and by great men like Goethe, to bring themselves and their philosophy back to life or closer to life. A true philosophy, as it were, should never feel the need of coming "back to reality," should never find itself in the position of being a mere passive spectator of "cosmic evolution," for the impulse to think is an assertion of the impulse to live, and "conceptions" or "ideas" are an abbreviated statement of the knowledge that humanity has acquired of its environment— matter that we of to-day must use to help us still further onwards in the work of the conquest of the world and of ourselves. No philosopher of to-day has any right to think that

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the world exists for thought, when comparative biology and positive psychology most conclusively show that "thought" exists for the world, for man as a weapon or instrument of conscious effort. And if, to return to our point, the solution of the world is to be found (as is the expressed or implied conviction of an increasing number of students) in the real and historical evolution of the life of man, the best way of "making a beginning" in philosophy is to analyze the *implications* of human action. For human action, in so far as it is a combination or a working together in unison of the force that we call physical and nervous energy and of the force that we call thought, is the most characteristic and expressive fact of the universe, an epitomized expression of its life.

Thirdly, the fact of volition or conduct is the only process in the world that we know "on the inside," from the "inside" outwards. All other processes of the world we know "on the outside," by their manifestations or effects rather than "in themselves," in their internal potency. That we know volition on the inside may, of course, be denied, and is denied even by men who allow themselves to be called psychologists (theorists of the "soul" or *psyche*). But let us reflect. Every philosophical student knows that it is only in the facts of "attention," and "control" and "thinking" that any unique or differentiating characteristic of human volition is to be sought and possibly found. Now it is just because of the traditional Cartesian dualism between "thought" and "extension," between "thought" and "movement" in which most of us in our feelings and associations are still steeped, despite Kantian criticism and Hegelian monism, that we still find it difficult to represent to our minds the undoubted "voluntary * command of the motor processes of fixation" which all "voluntary command of attention" involves. Not until we have studied the physiology and the biology of the sense-organs does this difficulty disappear. When it does disappear, it disappears not because we can *think* any more easily than we could before, the interference of thought with the almost completely differ-

* Stout, "Analytical Psychology," I., 243.

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entiated motor-apparatus of the brain; but because we have ceased to think of "thought" as "outside" movement, vainly endeavoring to influence it, and have come to regard it as itself essentially an effort or conation of which (as of other movements of our bodies, organic and systematic or localized and specialized) we are more or less immediately conscious. It is because we have learned to see, as Mr. Stout expresses it, "that all mental process as such is conation, and that the more complex and systematic it is, the more it asserts itself as independent conation." * We know, then, *on the inside*, the "volition" that is involved in attention or control, because the appercipient or dominating "mental systems" or sets of ideas and associations that determine attention are part of the self or character. There is in developed thinking a principle of self-determination, a psycho-physical process which itself "initiates the changes on which its propagation ultimately depends," a self-preservative *nisus* of our mental life that is "identical with its very existence." This is why men have hitherto thought that the Cartesian "Cogito ergo sum" represents the only piece of "experience" that we know "on the inside." The "cognitive † synthesis is merely the way in which active tendencies define and differentiate themselves," and of the "active tendencies" of our nature we are as surely conscious as we are of breathing or of hunger—when we understand what these last words connote. We thus seem to know "thought" and "knowledge" on the inside, because we "are ourselves necessarily concerned" ‡ in the "origination and continuance" of the very processes of thought and knowledge. "The more complex and systematic that knowledge

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* Cf. Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations," p. 248: "All knowledge tends to lead to action." Also, p. 295: "The growth of the ethical sense is a growth in motor accommodation."

† Stout, loc. cit., II., 103. Cf. Wundt, "Phys. Psychol" (Aufl., 1887), II., 471. "Angeboren ist nur in der Organisation v. s. w.—The only thing that is innate in an animal organism is the tendency to respond with appropriate movements to certain impressions from the outside; the mental representation of these movements is something that comes *after their actual performance*."

‡ Titchener, "Outline of Psychology," p. 5.

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is, the more it asserts itself as independent conation." * Thus, what we do know "on the inside" in knowledge is volition, and volition is the only thing in the world that we really know on the inside, because volition is identical with the self-preservative *nisus* or effort that is the ultimate fact about our life, and not about it alone, but about all organized or animate life.

Fortunately, the fact of our knowing volition on the inside is conceded even by the line of argument that sums itself up in the contention that we are "conscious *automata*," † that in volition consciousness is a kind of epi-phenomenon, a mere knowledge-accompaniment or accompanying presentation (*Begleiterscheinung*) of the adaptation or "least resistance" movement in which and in which alone the said volition consists. We are at least aware of the fact that we are acting beings, and that in our conduct the force that we absorb from the outer world is converted, through the action of our bodily and mental tendencies (as Professor Titchener would have us put it), into energy that produces new effects in the outer world itself, and that creates the institutions and agencies and customs and ideal creations of what is called civilization. In the conduct of man, and especially in the organized and socialized forms of collective human conduct, the merely physical force of the universe has become conscious of itself as modifiable or capable of being modified into psychical energy, that in its turn may react upon nature and upon humanity, for "evolution is essentially a process of storing and economizing and co-ordinating different forms of cosmical energy." Even, that is, if the roots of our actions reach down into the very depths of organic (the cellular constitution of our bodies) and inorganic (in distribution of the matter of the universe) nature, we may still be said to know our actions on the inside (and through them the whole of nature on the inside) in a way in which we know no other objects. Through the activity-experience, then, man may be said to be conscious of the whole world as the evolution of an energy or purpose that he is able in a

* Cf. *supra*.

† See an article by Professor Laurie, "Psycho-Physical Materialism." *Mind*, 19, 56.

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measure to understand, in so far as he is conscious of the utilization (in himself and in humanity) of physical process for "ideal" ends—the conquest of the earth and of the forces that threaten civilization itself. In the language of philosophy, the activity-experience brings us into living relation with the real things and real purposes (the Platonic Ideas) of which the *world as presentation* is significant. This thought of the subserviency of the world of sense and the world of science to the commerce and the united activity of *persons*, lay, partly latent and partly patent, in the writings of Berkeley and Kant, but it required the doctrine of evolution with its "frank recognition of the oneness of all existence" and the conclusion of modern psychology, that the *measure* of *reality* is *belief* in what affects (aids or limits) our activity-experience, along with perhaps the philosophy of Schopenhauer and of Buddhism, to develop it into the possible basis of a philosophical system.

It being, according to psychology, true that knowledge reveals to us only the relations that "phenomena" and "phenomenal happenings" sustain to the movements of our bodies and the activities of our lives (evolution is every day discovering adaptations in nature when they were least of all expected), it, of course, follows that the utility and "purpose" of *all* knowledge is to be found in its "practical character," its value for the further development of our lives. All our "faculties" and susceptibilities must be regarded as biology regards the sense-organs, as means of bringing their possessor into living relation to the different phases and planes of the life of the universe. Even Lotze, many years ago, defined sensations as acts of self-assertion (*Selbsbehauptungen*) on the part of the soul in response to "interferences," a fact that connects his philosophy with that of Herbart and Leibnitz and (in a different way) with that of Schopenhauer. Fouillée in his "Idées-Forces" develops the philosophical consequences of the idea that perception is posterior to appetition, to will. Memory, as every one knows, is a tendency of the mind to retain and to reproduce the different phases or parts of an experience to which it has been subjected. And as for *thought*, we may, of

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course, analyze our experience and the alleged experience of humanity in any way that we "please" (this "please," by the way, will always denote a direction of practical interest that could, with sufficient data, be determined beforehand), but the "conceptions" that we employ in thinking are always abbreviated or tentative "constructions" of material that has in its constituent elements formed part of the actual experience of ourselves and others. Conceptions that are incongruous with the continuity of our own or of the world's experience are rejected by us and are supplanted by others. The real object of knowledge is to store up reality or experience in conceptions that may, in the form of motives, influence or determine conduct, and so aid men in the evolution of their lives. It may be questioned whether there are any conceptions—"God," if you will, the "soul," "free will," "matter," "evolution," "faith," "beauty," anything—that do not represent a more or less simple or more or less complex "construction" (schematic representation, mental picture) of certain phases of reality, or of realities, that have formed part of some experience or other, and that represent an active effort on the part of the mind to use these and all experiences as means to further personal development. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non privis fuerit in sensu et in voluntate.* Socrates, we may remember, could not see how a man could know the better and do the worse, or how virtue could be anything other than (applied) knowledge—a proof that the hardest thinker on questions of conduct that the world has ever seen, had, in his own way, a hold of the fact (patent to every student of biology and psychology) that there is a dynamic aspect of every conception, that it is a "mental system" struggling to establish itself as victorious over other competing "mental systems" that must in their turn subordinate or co-ordinate themselves in relation to it. Indeed, the mind itself is a dynamic thing; it is the consciousness that a human being has of his life, as (*pace* Aristotle), the realization of an inward vital energy or purpose. I am willing to admit that, once "mind" has become conscious of itself, it does become a law unto itself, that it changes for man the whole face of nature,

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making him feel that everything he does must be "conceived" and "born again" of the "spirit;" but my main point is that the whole content of mind is, as is now confessed by classical philosophers, an "operative content," * a content that is nothing if not active and practical and in process of evolution. *Je suis ce que je veux*—I am what I will, to employ the *mot* of Secretan—is true of man in so far as the reality of his being is, in "idea" and in fact, dependent upon what he rationally wills himself to be.

It has been, perhaps, somewhat customary to say that philosophy furnishes us with a *timeless* analysis of reality, an analysis that has a value for thought alone, independently altogether of the fact whether the life and thought of an age or a time is or is not expressive of the complete truth and reality of things. But if both the world and philosophers could only realize that *thought*, in its very attempt to grasp in a few bold and comprehensive conceptions the evolution of the whole world up to a given moment of time, is the most utilitarian and positive and aggressive of all forces, there would be at once far less idol-worship and far less disparagement of knowledge as such than is generally common. Hegel says somewhere in the "Logic" that it will upon reflection be found to be true that all the so-called highest things are also at the same time the most useful. Wisdom is indeed the most useful of all possessions. Philosophy will always be regarded to be what the Kantians and Neo-Kantians of our day have contended that it is,—an analysis of experience; but the philosopher may learn that experience is every day enlarging itself through feeling and through volition (the volition of moral and æsthetic conquest) and through the efforts of mankind after organized achievement. "I cannot help thinking," said the late Mr. Nettleship,† "that it would be much better for many metaphysically-minded people if they would think about the things which they happen to feel and have real ex-

* Bosanquet, *e.g.*, "Psychology of the Moral Self," p. 10.

† "Philosophical Lectures and Remains of Lewis Nettleship." Edited by Bradley and Benson. Macmillan, 1897. I quote from *Literature*, January 8, 1898.

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perience of, instead of taking their subjects and lines of thought from other people's thinking." If philosophers would really do this, they would see somewhat more deeply than they often do into the essential unity of all experience. They would gain a consciousness of the relation of the aims and purposes of thought to the aims and purposes of all evolution and effort, to even the industrial and economic activity of man. And if they acquire this insight, as there is abundant evidence in the philosophical activity of to-day to show that they gradually are acquiring it, then the great public in its turn will see that philosophers, in endeavoring to register and record and understand all experience and to eliminate from it the errors of partial observation and partial judgment, are just as much workers as are men of science and men of affairs. Of course, too, a "clearer conception of the ultimate significance and end of all existence" will give a "clearer direction to all the aims of human exertion."* And in this way will philosophy on its side exercise a controlling influence over the life and activity of men, becoming in practice, as in theory, the Queen of the Sciences and the Arts.

W. CALDWELL.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS.

* Professor Clark Murray, in an interesting article on "Philosophy and Economic Life," in *The Monist*, July, 1894.

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DEFECTIVE CHILDREN: THEIR NEEDS AND THEIR RIGHTS.

THE words of Coleridge,

> "A mother is the holiest thing alive,"

found a fitting illustration in an incident to which my attention was recently drawn. A commissioner of the poor met a sad case of ejectment. A mother with no roof but a tree between her and a stormy sky had gathered around her six helpless children, one of them a profound idiot. His offer to provide for this one in an asylum for defectives met with an indignant refusal. "Part with that child? I will give up all the others first." The most helpless is the dearest,—that is the mother-cry we hear so often in our work.

> "Two thousand years that cry has been repeated,
> And its eternal youth is ever new."

Yet how little has been done since the Great Physician healed the impotent child and the heart of the sorrowing mother,—since His apostle charged the churches to comfort the feeble-minded. Tradition tells of the good bishop of the fourth century, St. Nicholas of Myra,—still regarded as the patron of children,—who recognized the imbecile and idiot and claimed them as his special wards. Twelve hundred years later St. Vincent de Paul and his *confrères de charité* attempted to ameliorate in some degree the condition of these unfortunates; but it remained for the present century to take the initiative; and, indeed, not until the latter half of it has the work taken definite and organized form. Meanwhile the evil has grown tremendously, and it is important, first of all, that its character be made clear.

The ignorance of the general public in regard to this evil is daily brought home to us and constitutes a serious drawback to our work. On occasions of public addresses, I have been approached for information by persons amazed to learn that

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there is any difference between the idiot and imbecile. The idiot is utterly incapable of training except in the simplest matters of self-help; he has no power of speech; in fact, nothing can be done for him save to minister to his physical needs. The imbecile, however,—classified in three grades,—may be trained to become almost self-supporting, and does, under tutelage and direction, fairly creditable work in both industrial and mechanical arts. It is clear, therefore, that the difference between an idiot and an imbecile is even greater than that between an imbecile and a normal child. Indeed, so nearly normal do many of our boys and girls appear that the uninitiated constantly ask why they are in an institution. Why may not this boy, who can make his own coat, draw, paint, play the cornet, make and carve a chair, and perform equally well the office of butler or valet,—why may he not go out into the world and earn a good living? Because, away from the compelling hand, without the constant stimulus of affectionate guardianship, his weak will and indolent nature would at once succumb. Alone, he could never be trusted to compete with normal labor; nor would it be safe to allow his weak moral nature, often absolutely wanting, to contend with the temptations of the world. He would inevitably be pushed to the wall, join the army of tramps, vagrants, and criminals, and help to crowd our almshouses or penitentiaries; and, worse still, he would perpetuate his race.

The world has no place for him. Not understanding him, it will not put up with him or his vagaries. The imbecile, whose training must cover a period four times that of a normal child and who must work under constant supervision, who is childish and wilful, who is often physiologically an old man and psychologically a young child while yet a youth in years, belongs to an abnormal race and must be forever set apart with his own. This is necessary not alone to ensure his only certain success in life, but for the protection of ourselves and our children. Society must be protected, in the first place, from the motiveless acts of the irresponsible which are as pregnant with disaster as premeditated crime and, because unsuspected, far more difficult to evade; and in the second place,

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from the contamination of intermarriage. Marriage, which is sometimes contracted ignorantly (abnormally brilliant qualities concealing serious mental defects) but too often knowingly from lust of wealth, position, or social advantage and entered into reckless of consequencess, is creating a race in our midst more to be dreaded than any foreign immigration.

What are marriage laws worth that guard so little the sacred precincts of the home? Are we not allowing our much vaunted freedom for the individual to run into a tangled web of license? We hear the frequent assertion of the ignorant or foolish, "I will marry whom I please, and it is no one's business but my own." And, insane, imbecile, or diseased, there is no law to "show just cause or impediment" or to interfere with "this right of the individual." A few years later the inheritor of this same liberty repeats, naturally, the same sentiment: "I will do what I choose and no one dare touch me." And no one does. When, finally, the lawlessness of self-will has destroyed all power of self-control, the atavism of the race encloses its helpless victim. "Freedom which comes too soon—before the individual is ready for it—proves his ruin," as Earl Barnes wisely says, and he becomes the unintentional author of some unpremeditated crime. Then the law, which has permitted all this, steps in and, by way of condoning its own lax guardianship, consigns its unfortunate ward to prison or to death. Is this a protection which protects? No other class of defectives transmit ill with such certainty as the feeble-minded. Unstable nerve centres in one parent seem naturally to attract and coalesce with any weakness or ancestral taint, be it patent or latent, in the other. Disappearing for one or several generations, if modified by pure connection, the atavism still clings, sure to reappear, if not as imbecility, still as insanity, epilepsy, or some one of the varied forms of neurosis. A case in evidence is that of two persons, each apparently of sound mind and pure blood, enjoying every advantage that health, wealth, culture, and position can give; yet their only child is a profound idiot.

I have the record of a family through seven generations, numbering one hundred and twenty-four individuals, showing

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forty-two defectives. Another family of eighty individuals, thirty-two of whom are defectives, shows through four generations a continuous stream of idiocy, imbecility, and crime. These are not isolated facts, but types of cases constantly met with in the experience of alienists. Can it be wondered, therefore, that we urge, not only the permanent sequestration, but asexualization of the imbecile as the only reasonable and effectual safeguards against an evil which, in poisoning the springs of society, is attacking the very life-blood of the nation?

There are more imbeciles in our midst than people generally are aware of. They walk our streets and fill our schools. The high-grade imbecile, often abnormally bright, flattered and pushed forward by fond parents and unsuspecting teachers, given a liberty amounting to license for which he is totally unequal, is early placed in a position of trust, from which he quickly passes to a felon's cell or escapes justice and repeats his experience in a foreign land. The low-grade drags his slow length through the primary schools, perhaps, or skulks in by-lanes and alley-ways, and, devoid of purpose or will, he sees no future, nor is he conscious of any law but what the present dictates. Gamin, tramp, a lover of mischief,—the step is easy to unconscious crime; and, without intent, this purposeless being often becomes the chief actor in a tragedy made double when the death penalty is imposed upon such an irresponsible.

I was called upon a short time since to give testimony in a case which enlisted my warmest sympathies,—that of a purely motiveless crime committed by an utterly irresponsible lad with every mark of degeneracy upon him. By the law of Pennsylvania, children over seven years of age found guilty of murder are liable to the death penalty. The public, convinced that there was no insanity and not understanding imbecility, for which, indeed, the law makes no provision, clamored for his conviction. Picture that court-room crowded with curiosity-seekers and horror-mongers. The great doors swing back, and the dwarfed child, with his misshapen head, wiry, unkempt hair, drooping mouth, imbecile leer, and slouching

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gait,—guarded by two big officers,—takes his place in the dock. With what simplicity and directness the brave, heart-broken mother tells the story of her own sufferings before the birth of her boy, on whom a fatal inheritance and almost every disease known to childhood had set an ineffaceable seal. Never shall I forget how her appealing eyes hung upon my words, as being all that stood between her and this last most bitter blow. The mother was spared. But one feels that there is no place for the boy in all the world. The deed bars him from school as it does from society, lest by mere association he bring harm to others. He is adjudged *insanus*, or of unsound mind, to save him from the gallows; yet, not being insane, the close confinement of asylum or prison means for him either insanity or a lapse into idiocy. I look at my own boys, happy in their work and play in the glad, free sunshine, and think how any one of them might be in his place to-day were they not shielded and guarded from the possibility of such an ill.

Before considering the remedy for this evil, it may be well to review the work already accomplished. As I have before remarked, work among mental defectives, building on Itard's experiment upon the wild boy of Aveyron in 1801, and carried forward by his pupil Seguin, assumed definite and organized proportions about the middle of the present century, when a general and almost simultaneous movement took place in England, on the continent, and in our own country. Early efforts were naturally directed towards the idiotic or the lowest grade of imbecile with the aim of arousing dormant faculties sufficiently to induce to habits of cleanliness and self-help. The queer, the erratic, the eccentric, were scarcely recognized as abnormal any more than are those destitute of the moral sense, who are often accounted monsters of wickedness, "possessed of the devil," rather than the moral imbeciles they really are. This neglected class has multiplied like dragons' teeth; but the advance made in psychology and education in revealing their needs has also opened up for them new possibilities, causing modification and adaptation of methods and enlarging in every way the sphere of our work.

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Thus, from the simplest aim of psychological education—that of awakening and inciting sense-impulses—we have passed to training in such habits of consecutive thinking as will secure the results already alluded to. This, in epitome, is the progress made in fifty years.

We are about to enter upon a new century of work showing greater possibilities and demanding a yet greater advance. Statistics show, in the United States alone, nearly one hundred thousand mental defectives, and of these only about eight thousand are provided for in the twenty-four large institutions now in existence. Many of these institutions are already filled to repletion and, unfortunately, with a large proportion of the idiot or untrainable class. In this respect the English are far wiser than we; for, even with the title of "Homes for Idiotic and Mental Defectives," they do not admit the idiots into their training schools, but care for them in asylums apart, the economic and moral value of such an arrangement being self-evident.

Not alone from this stand-point will our work require a similar arrangement in the near future. We not only need more space, with entire concentration of energy upon our legitimate work of training, but a new element not included in the last census will soon be pressing for admission. Results of legislation under the compulsory education act show in the city of Philadelphia alone one thousand and twenty-one truants, "children not to be desired in the regular grades." The committee reports: "There are some children who are mischief-makers in the regular schools, and who are better out than in." Special schools are to be opened for those who are incorrigible or who need special assistance in study. This is but following similar experiences in England and on the continent based upon corresponding pressing needs. Some of these children, doubtless, are backward from mere physical defects which may be overcome; but a large majority of these "mischief-makers" in the schools will soon be proven "mischief-makers" in society; and, recognized as defectives, they will naturally drift into training schools for the feeble-minded. To receive and train them, and also to care for present demands,

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we must be freed from our untrainable population and turn our asylum wards into workshops and school-rooms. The providing of homes for idiots and for epileptics must therefore be the first step in clearing the way for extending the work of training mental defectives; but to this view the public must be educated.

I have said that the training of an abnormal person, especially if not begun early, covers a period four times that of a normal child. Now, with a continuous stream flowing in from the public schools of those who have been tested and proven mental or moral defectives (the necessity of their permanent sequestration having been recognized), our training schools will soon be overcrowded unless there be some outlet for them. And just here we come face to face with the great question of the future and the unsolved problem of the past,—a question asked of us every day, "For what are you training the imbecile? What place can be found for this child who never grows up?"

Society must be protected from pollution and tragedy on the one hand, and on the other the innocent imbecile must be saved from punishment for heedless or reckless transgression for which he is absolutely irresponsible. The interests of both therefore demand permanent sequestration. But where, and how? A way must be prepared for the crisis which even another decade may force upon us. The Spartans recognized this law of self-protection, and, being forced by their circumscribed limits to choose the lesser evil as the greater mercy, they sacrificed the weak for the strong and put to death their defectives in early infancy in order to protect the integrity of the state. We, with our broad territory, are able to meet the same issue in a more humane way; but with us also a national need can be met only by a national provision. The government is caring for the deaf-mute, the Indian, and the negro; then why shall it not care for this race which is at once more helpless and more aggressive, which is incapable of self-preservation and fast becoming a standing peril to the nation? The unoccupied lands of the great West, or the undeveloped portions of the Atlantic seaboard, give free space and oppor-

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tunity for permanent sequestration under happiest conditions. Colonized there under wisely ordered provisions, protected from society and society protected from him, safe from the temptations of a world which does not understand him any more than he understands it, the imbecile would be given his freedom under law, and a true junior republic might be established for these grown-up children of the nation.

The axiom "give a man his work and he need ask nothing else of life" applies even more to the abnormal than to the normal. A dilettante existence for the former means retrogression. The continuous stimulus of quiet, congenial occupation constitutes his only true mental and moral life. For this, as well as for economic reasons, it would be well if all the needs of such a colony were supplied within its own limits, which would be not only a direct but a reflex benefit, as it would give a definite aim to the training in the various state institutions which would then be called upon to supply trained workers for various positions. This is no optimistic view, but one founded upon practical experience. Only a year ago we sent out a colony of one hundred and fifty trained workers to a new institution, and the physician in charge assures me he does not know how he would have managed with only new and untrained children. As it was, our boys and girls went to work with a will, leading even the employees of the institution, and thus clearly and practically demonstrated the greater possibilities of success in enlarged experiment.

Contrast such a community of happy, busy folk, protected from possibility of crime and obloquy, with this picture, described in the *Woman's Tribune*. "The American Siberia has a new chapter added, in the leasing of four hundred and thirty men, women and children prisoners at Albion, Florida, to the four contractors making the highest bids for them. These convicts have been leased for a year, and for that time they are the actual property of the contractors, and may be subleased by them. They will work in the phosphate and turpentine camps and at road-making. The condition of these camps whenever they have been investigated rivals the horrors that

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rend our souls when they are perpetrated by other nations in foreign lands." There can be no doubt that many, if not all, of these men, women, and children are mental and moral degenerates.

Rapid as has been the advance in our work, it has not kept pace with the appalling increase of imbeciles. This is owing in great measure to a misapprehension of the evil, an ignorance of its cause, and a consequent indifference to its tremendous effects. Points, therefore, which should commend themselves to the thoughtful consideration of every humanitarian association and which for the common welfare need to be thoroughly ventilated, are,—

1. Education of the public as to the dominating power of heredity, and the hopelessness, except by heroic means, of escape from atavism.

2. The enactment of laws preventing the marriage of defectives or of their immediate descendants. This should be coupled with such stringent measures for the imbecile as are dictated by science and have already been proven by experience. Such measures, resorted to early in infancy, will not only protect society, but release the unfortunate both from the slavery of his own passions and from the bondage of a keeper, and insure greater happiness with increased freedom of intercourse between associates of the same community, without that strict surveillance now absolutely required in all of our institutions.

3. Early recognition of defective and separation of trainable from untrainable cases with suitable and distinct provision for each.

4. National provision for the permanent sequestration of the imbecile under such conditions, dicated by moral and economic considerations, as shall be best conducive to the happiness of the individual and to the safety of the community.

I have given no mere opinions, but convictions founded upon a living experience. Apart from the demands of family ties, I have consecrated my best energies to this work. For twelve years, in a training school numbering over a thousand,

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I have eaten and drunk, walked and slept with the imbecile, and here and in Europe I have personally examined over five thousand cases. I know what society has to fear from the imbecile. I also know his needs and his rights and the protection he demands at our hands; and I therefore make my appeal in behalf of those whom the French have so touchingly named *Les Enfants du bon Dieu.*

MARTIN W. BARR.

PENNSYLVANIA TRAINING SCHOOL FOR FEEBLE-MINDED CHILDREN.

SIDGWICK AND SCHOPENHAUER ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY.

PROFESSOR HENRY SIDGWICK in his "Methods of Ethics" lays down three abstract moral principles, which he regards as self-evident. The first of these principles is that "if a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not right (or wrong) for some one else, it must be on the ground of some difference between the two cases, other than the fact that he and I are different persons."

Let us take an easy instance of the application of this principle and see how it defends our moral judgments against the perverting influence of passion and self-interest. We have an excellent case in point in the interview between Nathan and David described in the second book of Samuel. David severely condemned the conduct of the imaginary rich man who seized the poor man's only ewe lamb, but, perverted by passion and egoism, he had failed to condemn the heinousness of his own similar conduct. He had thought himself justified in doing an act of a kind that he could not approve when done by another, and the result was an infraction of the moral law. In Kantian language he had acted on a maxim that he could not will to be law universal. Nathan helped him to arrive at a correct judgment in his own case by inducing him to give judgment on an imaginary third person,

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in the estimation of whose conduct he would not be misled by the irrational preference for his own ego and by the tendency that we all have to regard ourselves in certain cases as more important than other human beings. David, having condemned the action of the rich man in Nathan's story, showed his recognition of the truth of the principle enunciated by Sidgwick, when he condemned his own injustice to Uriah and exclaimed "I have sinned against the Lord." The principle exemplified above is found on examination to be the only self-evident element in the idea of Justice.

Professor Sidgwick's next great fundamental principle of morality is not concerned with the conflict between the ego and the non-ego, but with the comparative value of different periods in the existence of the ego. It prescribes "impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life," and warns us that "Hereafter (as such) is to be regarded neither less nor more than Now." A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, and we may of course rationally prefer the certainty of happiness in the immediate future to the mere possibility of the same amount of happiness in the distant future. But we often go a step farther than this. We often sacrifice the future to the present, not from a well-considered recognition of the uncertainty of the future, but because we are impulsively carried away by the prospect of immediate pleasure, and are, from deficiency of imagination, unable to realize the prospects of future happiness. This is the irrationality condemned by Sidgwick's maxim of Self-love or Prudence.

Professor Sidgwick's third great principle is the principle of Rational Benevolence. It prescribes that "one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as one's own, except in so far as we judge it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable." In support of this principle he makes an appeal to Butler's "plain man," who (so he thinks) "if his conscience were fairly brought to consider the hypothetical question, whether it would be morally right for him to seek his own happiness on any occasion, if it involved a certain sacrifice of the greater happiness of some other human being—without

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any counterbalancing gain to any one else—would answer unhesitatingly in the negative." So he probably would. But the full import of the Rational Principle upon which Benevolence is founded, would seem to be wider than this. It is propounded elsewhere as the "self-evident principle that the good of any one individual is of no more importance from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other." This cuts both ways. It makes it not only irrational to sacrifice the greater happiness of another to the less happiness of ourselves, but also equally irrational to sacrifice the greater happiness of ourselves to the less happiness of another. If the plain man of Butler were informed that the principle of Benevolence forbids the latter kind of sacrifice, he would be much astonished. Indeed it is rather a startling paradox to oppose Benevolence to self-sacrifice. Many plain men and a still larger number of plain women are so addicted to extreme acts of self-sacrifice that they think it praiseworthy, benevolent, and presumably rational to sacrifice everything for the good of others, like St. Paul, who was willing to have his name blotted out of the book of salvation for the sake of his brethren. Therefore the appeal to common sense in support of the last of Sidgwick's Principles should rather be to the common sense not of the "plain man," but of those rare persons who are able to take the point of view of the universe and looking down, as from heaven, on the earth can recognize that the good of all men is equally desirable in the sight of God or as an element in the well-being of the universe, and that, from a strictly rational point of view, a man should regard his own good as neither less nor more important than that of any other man.

We may then sum up the result of Professor Sidgwick's three principles by saying that they prescribe on the one hand disregard of difference of persons in our moral judgments and in promoting the good of men generally, and, on the other, disregard of mere difference of time in providing for our own good.

It is strange to find that Schopenhauer, by an entirely different route and following the guidance of Indian philosophers,

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comes to almost exactly the same conclusion, when he investigates the metaphysical basis of morality. The great German pessimist makes pity the foundation of his moral system. The two all-embracing virtues of justice and charity are, according to him, based upon pity. He does not think that an action has any moral virtue except in so far as it springs from this motive. When pity prevents us from harming others, we manifest the virtue of justice; when the same feeling prompts us actively to aid and relieve the sufferings of others, we manifest the virtue of charity. From these two virtues all morality can be deduced, and thus Schopenhauer establishes pity as the foundation of morality.

In the last and most interesting chapter of his moral treatise he undertakes the task of finding a metaphysical justification of his moral theory, and finds it in the essential unity which, according to his philosophy and the philosophy of India, underlies the variety of phenomena. The bad man makes a great difference between himself and others. So he does not hesitate to injure others for his own advantage, and refuses to help them when they are in distress. The good man, on the contrary, more or less identifies himself with others. So great is his sympathy with them that their sorrows are his sorrows and their joys are his joys. In fact, the good man intuitively recognizes the great philosophical truth that, in spite of the misleading influence of appearances, the whole universe, including men and women, is really one and not many. This essential unity of the universe is expressed in the Hindu aphorism "*Tat twam asi* (Thou art that)," which recognizes the unity of all in Brahma. Schopenhauer also quotes from the Baghavad-Gita "He who sees the same highest lord existing in all living creatures and not perishing when they perish, he sees clearly. He who sees everywhere the same lord present, does not injure himself by his own fault, and thence goes to the highest path." The Sanskrit term *maya* is used to express the delusion that the material world with all its phenomenal differences is a real existence. When we escape from this delusion, we may expect to see clearly in moral and other questions. Thus, as regards the

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principles of Justice and Benevolence, Sidgwick, Schopenhauer and perhaps Indian philosophy, may be regarded as substantially in agreement. Sidgwick tells us that the principles of Justice and Benevolence require us in our moral judgments to make no difference between other men and ourselves. Schopenhauer finds at the bottom of morality the fact that there really is no difference between other men and ourselves, and he finds a recognition of the same great truth in Indian philosophy.

But what are we to say about Sidgwick's principle of Prudence? Here we seem to find distinct opposition between the two moralists under consideration, as Schopenhauer places our self-regarding actions entirely beyond the pale of moral philosophy. The difference between the two thinkers will however be found upon examination to be more verbal than real. In his investigation of the metaphysical foundation of morality Schopenhauer deduces the falsity of the wicked man's idea of the wide difference between man and man from the Kantian doctrine of the ideality or non-reality of space and time. When the wicked man says "*Pereat mundus dum salvus sim*," he is justified from an empirical point of view in making a difference between himself and others. In the empirical domain man is distinct from man, but the difference does not belong to the real essence of the universe. It is entirely due to space and time, which he therefore calls the *principium individuationis*. When we accept the doctrine of the ideality of space and time expounded by Kant in his "Transcendental Æsthetic," we see the real identity of man and man and act like moral beings. Thus Schopenhauer's virtues of Justice and Charity are ultimately deducible from Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space and time. If, however, we start from one part of Kant's doctrine, namely, the ideality of time, we must in the same way deduce from it Sidgwick's principle of Prudence, which, as we have seen, prescribes the ignoring of all difference of time in estimating our own present and future good. So that the doctrine of Kant, from which Schopenhauer deduces the virtues that he recognizes, Justice and Charity, must also lead to the rationality of

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Sidgwick's principle of Prudence, and, though Schopenhauer would refuse to call that principle a moral principle, he would at any rate be logically bound to admit that it is rational, and as rational as the moral principles which rest upon the same metaphysical basis.

In conclusion, it remains to consider an objection which at first sight appears to make Schopenhauer's ethical system defeat its own end. Again and again he insists upon the fact that the great end of moral philosophy, and one which none but his system can well effect, is the overthrow of egoism. But we have seen that, while Sidgwick and the utilitarian school agree with the Gospel precept, and teach us to love our neighbor as ourself, Schopenhauer, in accordance with the doctrines of Indian philosophy, declares that our neighbor *is* ourself. If this be true, men who think they are doing good to others are in reality doing good to themselves, and thus, when they have mastered the great doctrine of identity, their pity and their benevolence are merely forms of a new and more extensive form of egoism. Thus we seem to be plunged at once into the cheerless darkness of Hobbism.

The answer to this objection is to distinguish between the two kinds of egoism, namely, on the one hand, the egoism of most men who, looking at the world from the empirical point of view, regard themselves as different from other men, and, on the other hand, the all-embracing egoism of the philosopher who identifies himself with his fellow-men. It is only to the former kind of egoism that the moral philosophy based upon pity is diametrically opposed. To the latter kind of egoism it is not opposed, nor need it be. Egoism is not in any way immoral, when it does not lead to cruelty and injustice. The most tenderly compassionate man who regards his neighbor's suffering as his own and acts accordingly, may be, strictly speaking, an egoist, as he seeks the good of his wider self; but his egoism is blameless and entirely free from all taint of immorality. Such a man is not precluded from attaining to the highest virtue. He is capable of self-sacrifice, for the self-sacrifice praised by moralists is the sacrifice of one's empirical self; and the fact that such self-sacrifice is

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made in a moment of mental exaltation, when the agent pierces through the veil of illusion that generally conceals the identity of man and man, does not detract from the high moral value of such action.

MICHAEL MACMILLAN.

ELPHINSTONE COLLEGE, BOMBAY.

BOOK REVIEWS.

HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT: ON THE LINES OF MODERN EVOLUTION. By John Beattie Crozier, author of "Civilization and Progress," etc. Vol. I.: Greek and Greco-Roman Thought; Hinduism and Buddhism; Judaism; and Christianity down to the closing of the Schools of Athens by Justinian.

This volume is the first of a series in which Mr. Crozier proposes to set forth "the detailed evolution of one great factor in Civilization,—viz., Intellectual Development," under which term he includes "the great departments of Religion, Science, and Philosophy." This first volume deals with Greek and Hindoo thought, Judaism, and Christianity. These vast regions of fact are to be surveyed, and their progress "reduced to definite laws." The author does not tell us, once for all, what he understands by this phrase, which is one of those that may mislead the reader because it slips by so easily; but we may perhaps paraphrase its meaning thus: we trace the evolution of a principle when we are able to show how, the more clearly its earlier forms are *understood*, the more reason there is for anticipating that its subsequent forms would have been what they actually were. This may be granted if we remember what really is involved in "understanding" any stage of a principle in order to explain later stages by it. We must penetrate to the inner meaning of the earlier principle, and trace out its innumerable relations of dependence. We must view any concrete activity of the human spirit not only in relation to the general spiritual and material condition of humanity at the time,—the state of "civilization," as Mr. Crozier would say; if we are to understand the activity in question, we must extend this "environment" until it includes *all time and all existence;* we must see its relations to the entire universe. Our right to speak

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of the past as explaining the present varies directly as our progress towards this ideal of knowledge. History is *in the end* inexplicable save through a metaphysical or philosophical view of what man verily is and what he may become. Indeed, only on the strength of some such presupposition can the author approach his problem; he cannot isolate the development of religion, of science, of philosophy, without some conception of what these activities of the human mind really are or aim to be; and this implies a conception of what the human spirit is or may be.

Of course, such a process of isolation is necessary if investigation is to be possible; but Mr. Crozier constantly uses language which suggests that he has forgotten how the results of an inquiry which begins by abstracting its material must likewise be abstract, and hence at the best can only be of limited and "relative" truth. To me there seems to be scarcely any meaning in such a statement as this: "As in systems of pure philosophy things take their value from a single supreme principle, we ought, if only we can seize what this principle is in any particular world-system, to be able to lay down at the outset the laws of its procession and the curve of its evolution with a large measure of scientific precision; . . . and just as when the past position of a planet or satellite is disputed, the difficulty can be at once resolved by asking where the law of gravitation would necessitate that it *must* have been, so in disputed questions as to the meaning to be attached to certain controverted doctrines . . . we are helped to the right solution by asking which of the disputed interpretations, if any, is the one cut through, as it were, by the evolutionary curve as it passes on its way" (pp. 5, 6). It is hardly necessary to remark that the author's achievement is very far from this ambitious "ideal."

The author remarks that, for such a treatment of history as he has in view, "an exact knowledge of historical sequences is of the very essence of the proof." But there is something even more indispensable than an accurate acquaintance with a sufficiently wide area of facts; and that is, a power of penetrating to the inner meaning of a historical movement and seizing its "net results." The presence of this power atones for a few deficiencies in scholarship, and even for errors in the whole method of inquiry. In saying this, the reader will easily understand that I am thinking chiefly of Hegel. It is to be regretted that there are not more traces of this quality in Mr. Crozier's work. With Hegel, philosophical doctrines are not mere abstract principles; they express moving

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forces determining the thoughts, feelings, and actions of men in each age. But Mr. Crozier's view is expressed in such sentences as these: "It is only with the greatest thinkers that one has to deal, and as it is these who, like the great chess-players, follow most logically the moves necessitated by the complex game of their predecessors, there is no reason why the same human mind which has woven these airy flowing webs of speculation, should not be able to interpret them and even to anticipate them also; provided always, that the starting-point be given, and that the laws of the particular game of thought, as it were, that is being played, whether Greek, Hindoo, or Modern, be fully and clearly seen" (p. 4). In short, Mr. Crozier's whole treatment of philosophy is vitiated by a fundamental error; he regards it as before all else a theory of the "nature of *things*,"—an inquiry into the nature of the world around us. This is true, on the whole, of the pre-Socratic speculation in Greece; but Hindoo philosophy, Greek philosohy from Socrates onward, and modern philosophy are essentially theories of human nature and human destiny. The work of the Sophists (including Socrates) was to shift the centre of gravity from nature to man; and there it has remained and must remain.

Part I. (pp. 19 to 78) deals with the evolution of Greek thought to the rise of Christianity. It is a mere sketch, with some important factors omitted,—*e.g.*, the meaning of the Greek *Aufklärung*, the work of the Sophists, is scarcely mentioned. Its thesis is that in ancient times "philosophical explanation" (through "essences" and abstract ideas) inevitably developed into "religious explanation" (through Personal Wills). To make this "law" fit the views of Plato and Aristotle, we must make the meaning of "personal" include what is impersonal, and the meaning of "will" include what is not a form of will in any ordinary sense of the term. The only reason given for the necessity of the supposed "evolution" is that philosophy seeks for unity and finds it in personality. Hence the "law," after all, is only the familiar fact that "theology and philosophy differ as the uncritical and the critical methods of dealing with the same problem" (T. H. Green). But the misleading statements which Mr. Crozier gives of this relation come to a head in such observations as these: "There are only two kinds of causation that can permanently satisfy the minds of men: either the Wills of Religion, or the uniform antecedents and consequents of Physical Science. Now the essences and abstractions of Philosophy are neither the one nor the other of these, and as in them the mind

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of man cannot rest, it must, in the absence of Physical Science, make in the direction of the Wills and Personalities of Religion" (p. 74). Hence Christianity rose on the ruins of ancient Philosophy. This passage suggests that, in Mr. Crozier's view, the Philosophical demand for unity can find its only ultimate satisfaction in the codification of the laws of coexistence and succession among "phenomena," and a merely provisional satisfaction in the unity which religion offers; but such is not his opinion (see *Appendix*).

Part II. (pp. 81–147), on the Evolution of Hindoo Thought, is better done than is the section on Greek Philosophy. But it is not a continuous account of the development of Hindoo thought. The first of the three chapters sketches three main tendencies in Hinduism, represented by the Vedanta, Vaiseshika, and Sankhya systems. Mr. Crozier points out well the fundamental difference between Hindoo and European thought, arising from the fact that the former starts with a first principle which can only be negatively defined,—"the night in which all cows are black;" while the latter always tends to take as its highest principle, self-consciousness or intelligence. But he might have referred to the frequent tendencies in European thought to run out into the same negative result. The Nyaya, Mimansa, and Yoga philosophies are barely alluded to. But if they are not systems of "world-philosophy," they have still real interest and importance, especially the Yoga, which has recently been introduced to the thoughtful public, here and there in the Western world, by the eloquent Swami Vivekananda. The second chapter deals with the teachings of Buddha; and so far as I can judge, it is a clear and concise summary of the most important points. A fruitful subject for another chapter would have been the *Theistic Evolution of Buddhism*, in which a philosophy which begins as a rigorous system of ethical culture, develops at length into a system of "explanation by means of Personal Wills" in the fullest sense of the words; but this is not mentioned. The comparison of Buddhism (and, indeed, Hinduism in general) with Christianity touches the root of the matter. Christianity "acts, not by repressing the lower, but by stimulating the higher nature; raising it above itself, as it were, by holding up before it for its contemplation a Divine ideal and object of love, in whose presence the lower desires sink into the shade. . . . Although the central precept of Buddhism, as in Christianity, is the doing good to others, that good consists in the cutting away of all desire, and therefore no effective motive is given for improving

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the material welfare of men" (pp. 116, 119). Still, this very bias prevailed in mediæval Christianity; and it is still to be found,—*e.g.*, among those sacerdotal writers and preachers who represent "this world" as a foreign, hostile region into which we are sent for a brief period on probation, and *from which* the Church has to rescue us. On the other hand, Mr. Crozier is right in his view that the merely negative attitude to the world is foreign to the *spirit* of Christianity.

The last of the three chapters on Hindoo thought contains an interesting exposition and criticism of modern "Theosophy" or "Esoteric Buddhism." In these chapters we note traces of the error which affects the author's judgment of every philosophy that he deals with,—*i.e.*, his exaggeration of the importance of what Kant would have called the cosmological side of a philosophy, as compared with its anthropological (or psychological) side. The theory of human nature is always the most fundamental, although what is most fundamental in this theory may not be explicitly stated.

I must here briefly consider a very important result which the author alludes to several times: that we can discern in the events of history a dramatic tendency, by which the activities and designs of individual men, communities, and nations are "used as *means* and *instruments* merely to the one great end of morality and the elevation and expansion of the human spirit" (p. 15). This is not pressed upon the reader; it is only the author's personal impression. But when he speaks of history bearing witness to a dominant purpose which is realized through its events, he seems to forget what this language implies. It implies that we conceive the realization of an object of supreme worth as possible; and that we estimate the degrees of worth of ordinary events according to the degrees in which they contribute to the realization of the "far-off divine event." This conception of the realization of an object which has supreme worth, and the conception that worth has degrees, cannot be merely based upon history; it must be based on a study of man's nature as it is. We must bring it with us to the interpretation of history; all we can do is to test it by its capacity for this interpretation. In this connection, Mr. Crozier observes: "Were the active agents in these great designs *conscious* of what they were doing, the whole achievement would only be an instance of the activity of the human spirit, working after its own proper laws, . . . and so would have no ulterior philosophical or religious significance'

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(p. 14). In this extraordinary assertion Mr. Crozier fatally ignores the function of the Prophet, Leader of men, Revealer,—call him what we will. And the least that can be assigned to him is to *interpret* these dramatic tendencies, and so to supply that element of "consciousness" which Mr. Crozier thinks would deprive the whole achievement of its ulterior philosophical significance. It has been said, on the one hand, that the popular or national upheaval produces the prophet, and, on the other, that the prophet produces the upheaval. No doubt it is as easy to uphold one of these views as the other; for surely both are one-sided, and the truth is that the "prophet" and the "upheaval" co-operate and reciprocally act on one another in producing the overt result. The prophet has the power and insight to discern, among the distracting conflict of tendencies in his time, those that are superficial and transient and those that have the deep strength and reality which mean ultimate victory; and he forces others to see this also. By such means he helps the "upheaval" which these deeper forces are producing. He does not simply produce it; indeed, in the mere statement of this view you presuppose him to stand in a position of abstract separation from the contemporary historical movement, while in reality he never does occupy such a position; and the forces in question do not simply produce him, for without him they would have found an expression quite different from the one which, as a matter of fact, they did find. Mr. Crozier fully recognizes this elsewhere; but in the passage I have quoted he forgets that the prophet always gives voice to or interprets the deepest movements of his own time. The prophet makes Humanity self-conscious in the deeper sense,—conscious of where the roots of its being lie, conscious of the contrast between what it *is* doing and what it is *capable* of doing, and conscious of the results of this contrast. The prophet's teaching is the same in type or essence as the simplest moral judgment passed in daily life (if it is a true one); it is an *anticipation of history*.

The third and fourth parts (dealing respectively with Judaism and Christianity) are much superior to those which we have been examining; and in this portion of the book the author shows more grasp of the significance of philosophy as not merely a theory of the "nature of things," but of the nature of man.

In speaking of the passage from Paganism to Christianity, he restates with freshness and force the conclusions to which the best researches of our time have led. "The genius and essential spirit of Paganism—the moral relationship which runs alike through its

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religion, its polity, its jurisprudence, and its social life—may be accurately represented and summed up by the relation of *master and slave*, as that of Christianity can be by the relation of *parent and child*" (p. 153). On the whole, spiritual isolation or separation was the end of the endeavors of ancient civilization,—*e.g.*, isolation of men from one another, of God from man and from the world, of the highest or Divine life from all desires arising out of the earthly life, and so on. The ancient world had no grasp of the means of overcoming these separations. To point to the existence of a high morality in certain quarters—*e.g.*, under the influences of Stoicism—is irrelevant; the fact of a fundamental and disastrous spiritual disintegration cannot be denied, and the morality in question did not overcome it. The "proof" (pp. 158, 159) that the passage from Paganism to Christianity could not have been effected by any form of philosophy, but only by a religion, is hardly necessary when we remember the author's conceptions of philosophy and religion in this connection: philosophies are "games of thought played by the abstract or merely logical intelligence, under definite conditions;" religions are "games of thought played by the *whole* man,—intellect, conscience, and heart" (p. 151; *cf.* p. 191, etc.). The failure of ancient "philosophy" was simply due to the fact that it *was* "philosophy,"—if we are to use the word in this very limited sense; it exhausted itself in the self-analysis of intelligence in exposition of the laws and structure of thought, and then endeavored to make the results of this logic into an all-sufficient means of human salvation, of realizing the ideal of humanity. So far, Mr. Crozier's contention is certainly true. The gulf between Paganism and Christianity could only be bridged over through "the impregnation of Paganism by some religion outside itself, and that religion not a polytheism."

The analogy from the breeding of animals is suggestive. The new force was not an external "revelation," nor did it merely take the place of the enfeebled ideals and aspirations of Paganism; it was produced by the organic union of a new group of ideals with those of Paganism,—the former being as fresh and vigorous as the latter were weak. The new ideals were those which the first apostles of Christianity built out of the ideas set forth in the Old Testament, read in the light of Christ's life and words. As Mr. Crozier well says, the possibility of some kind of *reciprocal* relation between man and God had to be brought home to the consciousness of humanity; no such conception is possible for any religion lower

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than monotheism; and philosophy had failed to reach it. Christianity provides for it in many ways,—and not least in its doctrine of Grace, according to which the approach of man to God *is* the approach of God to Man.

The accounts of the Evolution of Judaism and the Evolution of Christianity are both admirable summaries. With respect to the former, Mr. Crozier follows Kuenen and Wellhausen in giving what is now the accepted view. With respect to Christianity, to give a summary account of its early history is a matter of great difficulty, owing to the divergent results arrived at by critics of the highest eminence,—particularly Baur and Harnack; but Mr. Crozier adopts a very reasonable position between them. I had selected a number of passages in this part of the book for comment, but want of space forbids anything more than a few general observations on the whole of these two sections. The author shows well how Judaism developed up to the very verge, so to speak, of Christianity; but Judaism had within it certain tendencies to excessive formalism and ethical and spiritual decay, and hence it was unable to take the final step that Jesus took, in realizing the idea of the universal Fatherhood of God,—*i.e.*, that the world-power is *akin* to ourselves and is the *source* of our ideals; and the idea of the Brotherhood of Man,—*i.e.*, that we are heirs of a common destiny and are in the service of a common good.

In discussing the significance of the "Kingdom of Heaven (or of God)," which is, of course, the central idea in the ethical teaching of Jesus, Mr. Crozier shows that it is not *merely* a state of the individual soul, for Jesus and his first followers expected it to be constituted on the earth in a few years. This seems undeniable; but the significance of the idea does not lie in its referring to an *earthly* kingdom, but in its referring to a *kingdom*. In other words, it is not merely a state of the individual soul, because there is no real good which is not a common good. The kingdom of heaven is the realization of a common good. The infinite variety of concrete forms in which this profound idea may be clothed gave, and still gives, to the Christian Ethics all their power.

In conclusion, I must say that the author has by no means produced a memorable contribution to the rational study of history; but he has produced a book of real interest and suggestiveness, and one which may be of practical use to many who wish to have a clear survey of the sphere of study connected with the history of Judaism and early Christianity.

S. H. MELLONE.

EDINBURGH, SCOTLAND.

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SERIOUS ANSWERS TO CHILDREN'S QUESTIONS. Selected Chapters taken from a Hand-book on Practical Pedagogics for the Home. By Rudolph Penzig, Ph.D., Dozent at the Humboldt Academy in Berlin. Ferd. Dümmler, Publisher. 1897. Pp. 248.

This book—a series of chapters on Home Ethics—comes to us from Germany, and should be welcomed as a refreshing sign of reaction against the centralization of education and the scientific method, which entirely leaves out moral instruction in the scheme of school-life.

The author has been a teacher, and is equipped for his task by a careful training in pedagogics, which, together with his insight into children's ways and sympathy with children's problems, combine to make his work a suggestive and helpful one. It must be admitted that the pedagogic style is a little too frequently used, and the temptation of the teacher to pour forth information is occasionally apparent. But the sympathetic disposition evinced, and the evident desire to pluck the heart from out the difficulty, hold our respectful attention, and even when we dissent from his conclusions, and do not agree with his elaborate philosophical theories, we are, nevertheless, stimulated by the spirit and earnestness he displays. Though these subjects have been treated before, there is still much need of enlightenment in regard to topics which are usually shifted from the home to the school, and by the school are relegated back to the home, or else are neglected and slurred over by both. And some of the questions which the author considers are not brought up at all, or left to chance treatment that is, at best, unsatisfactory and vague.

Such, for instance, are the questions relating to sex and marriage, the problem of social distinctions, the ethical value of property, the child's attitude to the lower animals, and the importance of an ethical code for the school,—all of which are treated in separate chapters of this book.

In the department of child study the questions of children have received considerable attention, but the emphasis has been laid upon the questions, and the answers to be given have not been quite so seriously considered. Here now, in this book, the text is given by the child; his questions supply the starting-point, and the author preaches the sermon, which is interesting, thoroughly suggestive, and full of good points, and which the parent can take home with him, to apply and expatiate upon in his own way when his experi-

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ence requires. The importance of the child's questions—how they should be encouraged, not repressed—is the author's first point and a good one, one that innumerable parents have still to learn. The child's first questions reveal its curiosity in regard to the great world which it has but just discovered, and it turns to its parents and to all those that can satisfy this instinct. Most of all is it concerned to know the uses of objects, and what advantages it can derive from them; and, in this connection, the author cautions parents against the danger of fostering selfishness in a child by referring all objects to its own needs. But it seems to us that this danger is only a remote one, for a child that recognizes the universal advantages of objects, and is taught that not he alone, but all can use them, will learn comradeship and brotherhood rather than selfishness. Is not this one of the beautiful lessons of the kindergarten, where the child is taught that the flowers, the birds, the sunshine are for the happiness of all?

Dr. Penzig suggests an ingenious explanation for the troublesome question which puzzles many conscientious parents, "Who made this?" The child, having learned that most of the household articles are produced by persons, is apt to ask the same question in regard to natural phenomena: "Who makes the thunder and lightning?" Now the child wants to know only the immediate logical cause of an effect, not its primary cause. And if we teach it to ask "How has this come to be?" and give him the simplest natural explanation of such phenomena as thunder, lightning, etc., he will ask for no personal cause. Thus undesirable and premature religious instruction is unnecessary, and the child is content to know how phenomena are produced without requiring any supernatural agency. What the child wants is a logical answer, one that will satisfy his intense desire to know how objects are made, how effects are caused. Even a deeply-religious parent when asked by the child "Who makes the watch?" will answer "the watchmaker" and not "God." Why then should we not always seek to answer the child as logically; and instead of answering by offering the child a new puzzle give him the most natural, simple explanation? Very often, indeed, as the author suggests, the convenient answer "God" may be used to conceal the gaps in the parent's knowledge of the cause of natural phenomena, and therefore he would have parents endeavor to instruct themselves so as to be able to answer their children.

These first questions: "What is it?" "How made?" "What

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for?" "Whence?" "Why?" are the passwords which every living being needs to possess in order to enter freely the domain of Nature. And these questions the author endeavors to show us how to answer.

It is self-evident that the child must not be so dealt with, that it cannot distinguish between the serious answer and the joking and chaffing one. Children resent the teasing replies by means of which many ill-advised people amuse themselves; such teasing is generally one-sided and, in many instances, is positively harmful. The child must be able absolutely to rely on the answer. And so we must endeavor to answer truthfully and seriously even the most delicate questions. Such questions as those regarding sex, marriage, and birth, come to all parents. They are answered in a most admirable manner and with more downrightness and common sense than we have been accustomed to expect from the Germans, who have disregarded the advice given them by one or two of their most eminent educators, Jean Paul pre-eminently. The successful disposition of this difficult problem is revealed as a possibility, the complete solution of which will depend on the skill of the parent and the nature of the child's extraneous influences.

No student of children's questions can afford to leave out that ever recurring, most perplexing question, "Why?" Dr. Penzig points out how the question should be answered when it is considered legitimate. He quotes Preyer, who says: "The questions of the child are seldom correctly appreciated as a most valuable means of educating it. The desire to learn causality, which develops with great force as speech is acquired, and the almost insatiable desire to know why, is fully warranted, and should not, as is too often the case, be suppressed, ignored, or wrongly answered."

This question also leads to some very sensible utterances by the author in regard to the attempt to preserve the infallibility of parents. And some very good things are said on the vexed subject of the unquestioning obedience of children. We cannot forbear quoting what is said about breaking the child's will, for there are parents who still dwell in the benighted land where the phrase "breaking the child's will" is heard. "This question always comes too late. When we must break something, it proves that it has become too hard to be bent. And that the question of breaking the child's will can come up at all reveals to us that the early education, the training of the infant, has been neglected. Whoever, for the sake of comfort or good nature, yields to all the baby's

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whims and desires, buys years of uneasiness and care for the sake of a few quiet hours. The will of the child must be trained, not broken. An energetic, strong, and unbroken will, will be developed when parents and educators have understood how to preserve the right measure in bending the young will, without undue severity, and without expecting blind, unreasoning obedience."

The most difficult problem, however, which the educator has to face is to answer the question, Why should I obey? "A satisfactory reply to this would require no less than to find a basis for morality itself, and not merely a theoretical but a practical and pedagogical one. If we realize that there are endless compendiums on the basis of ethics, but not one complete hand-book of ethics treated independently of philosophical, religious, or metaphysical bias, we can judge which is the more difficult. Our task, in one word, is to make clear to an untrained mind the reasons for being under an obligation to act in one way or another, so that the will is intelligently able to acquiesce in such action."

In attempting to solve this, as he realizes, trying and delicate problem, the author seeks to cover ground which is beset with difficulties, and, to our thinking, he has not been so successful as in other parts of the book. The effort to find a basis for the moral law in the child's own consciousness, and to bring that home to the youthful mind, is one that comes dangerously near the line which marks off pedantic theory from practical common sense. To familiarize the child with the abstract results of metaphysical theorizing may be the hobby of a school of modern thinkers. To us it does not seem feasible, the danger being that it is apt to lead to priggish conceit and unclear thinking.

The dialogue with which Chapter III. is concluded, and which the author seems to indicate also must conclude the child's struggle, is a specimen of the impossibility of this task,—that of satisfying by discussion on abstract principles the concrete question mentioned above. Is the child's mind able and prepared to discover the basis for moral actions, to distinguish such actions, and decide that it is willing to subordinate its own desires to the moral axioms developed by metaphysical abstractions? We are not inclined to think so.

We are thankful for the answers given us in Chapter IV., which, of all the chapters of the book, might be termed the most practical and most applicable to the needs of parents of whatever creed or nationality. The position of children in the family, the relations

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of sisters and brothers, of children to servants and inferiors are discussed. Especially the difficult questions of property rights in the nursery, of class distinctions, and how to eradicate or rather prevent class feeling, are dwelt upon. We cannot but be impressed by the fine spirit of the author, who is free from that weak sentimentality which is often exhibited by those who object to social distinctions; for he is not tempted to go to the extreme of assuming the complete equality of men in all respects. It is interesting and significant to note that the spectre of the social revolution, which stalks abroad and will not be exorcised, appears most frequently to our author. It is a spur to his conscience and will not give him peace. We trace its influence in many of his remarks. For instance, "The thought that, at least, two-thirds of the pauper class are the victims of social conditions, approved or at least permitted by us, that the remaining third is but partially to blame for its own troubles; that very often they suffer for the social sins of their and our progenitors; that finally almost nobody can be safe from the danger of himself or his descendants joining the proletariat—all this should induce us to look upon pauperism as a misfortune rather than a retribution."

How to prevent conflicts between children in regard to property, leads to an elaborate investigation into the origin of property in the nursery, and as to the possibility of eliminating the idea of property and making children communists, the conclusion being that this would be impossible. The evil results of property, dissensions among children, the adoption of force as opposed to right, etc., are carefully treated. "Teach the child that never, under any circumstances, can might overcome right," with references to the need of Peace Societies, etc., recalls the German whose children have, indeed, before them those object lessons that demonstrate the very opposite of this teaching. The treatment of class distinctions, the child's relations to the servants, etc., are most interesting, and deserve to be heeded and studied by all parents, not alone those of European children.

The child's question, "Why don't I go to Public School?" leads to the discussion of the shortcomings of the Public Schools of Germany. Many of the remarks on the responsibility of parents for the defects of the schools applies in a remarkable degree to our own condition. "Why complain of the schools," the author says, "when you do not do your share to improve them? Send your own children there; and, if every one will do so, it will

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not be long before you can have better teachers, smaller classes, properly paid masters. If the instruction be not good enough for your own children who are to have higher education, how can it then be sufficiently good for the workman's children whose only opportunity for an education is here given. For the people the schools are good enough! Then those men have lived in vain who worked for popular education and to whom you raise monuments, as for instance Comenius, Pestalozzi, Fichte, von Stein."

Fully as we assent to this criticism of the parents, nevertheless we cannot agree with the author as to the remedy. "We cannot wait until the Public Schools are improved, and are made the very best schools. Whatever I can do must be done, and, above all, my own child must be there to play, to learn to work, and, if need be, suffer with the others. Children are not my toy, not my property. They have a mission. May they learn betimes to fulfil this mission of being comrades of the people!" Beautiful and noble as the spirit is that prompts such an utterance, it must not lead us to forget that the child is also a trust and that the parent dare not use it, if it be to its own detriment, as a social missionary. The interest in social reform must not lead to such extremes. In our own country, however, such a difficulty need not arise. The Public Schools that are defective can be made what they ought to be if men will but organize to crush the power of political control. Then all classes will send their children to the common schools, as is done in every place where they are satisfactory. In Germany, where the control by the autocratic power of the government is so much stronger, to appeal to the democratic spirit of the citizen may not be of much avail; but it is the proper method of stimulating Americans, and therefore we wish that the ringing words of the author on this subject might be widely read on this side of the Atlantic.

The problems of man's relation to Nature, to the mysteries of sickness and death are fully and carefully treated. We can follow the exhaustive study of this subject with interest; but we cannot agree with the author in his deductions, and are obliged to repeat what was said before. The ambitious child may, perchance, listen to his disquisition, and imagine that it can follow him; but is it not true that such moral instruction, based on natural evolution, is apt to be misleading? Indeed, the whole school of modern evolutionists seem to go wrong when they try to show that the course of natural development and that of moral evolution are parallel.

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And, even though the child should be able to pick up some few crumbs of information, how can they be applied and be of any use in solving the problem? The larger application of the facts of natural evolution do not fall within the province of the child's mind. Take, for instance, the fact that the destructive, cruel element in Nature is so wide-spread. That thought troubles the child. Can we remove it, as Dr. Penzig would attempt, by pointing out the evolution of man, and showing that man's nature also has developed from primitive fierceness to present conditions? If the child asks, "Why is the tiger so cruel? why is the cyclone so fearful?" we cannot answer him and satisfy his mind by bringing before him the picture of man's relation to the order of the Universe.

And, when the supreme questions of death and immortality are raised, would parents be willing to carry on such philosophical discussion as Dr. Penzig seems to consider useful? Are they not futile, in view of the child's immaturity and inability to comprehend these problems?

But it seems ungrateful to dwell on a few errors of judgment, when there is so much solid excellence. The book, as a whole, is sure to call forth earnest commendation; and serious parents will find so much to praise, and so many points of agreement with the author, that the objections raised do not in the least invalidate our praise.

Space forbids a detailed criticism of the remaining chapters. Though both interesting and valuable, we must be content with a cursory glance at the rest of the book. The relation of the child to society proves a most interesting subject for discussion, and the convictions of the author are clearly and boldly enough set forth. His preoccupation with the questions of social reform is again unmistakable, and we are impressed by the sincerity and high-mindedness of the student who realizes all the pathos of the unfortunate classes of society, and who will have us teach the child to distinguish between true worth and mere social position. However universal the need of this doctrine, it is most called for at present in Germany, where class distinctions are so patent and so hard to overcome. "To be sure," he says, "every one ultimately finds out that the honest man need not care for class distinctions, that the husk is distinct from the kernel. But why should we wait till the experience of life has taught this truth? Why should not the child learn this early? Why should he be taught the very opposite in his school days?"

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Some of the other questions treated by the author are: the child's understanding of pauperism; how to teach charity to children; true love of country; the child's idea of criminals, of the police and punishment; boys and military service; and, lastly, the relation of the children of free-thinking parents to the church—the child's idea of God. All of these chapters will be found most interesting, notably the one on the Child's relation to Society.

The answers to the remaining questions are consistent, and all indicate an ideal, conscientious nature. Whether we entirely agree with all of them or not, we must respect the author's convictions, and realize that those who will read so earnest and painstaking a writer will reap the advantage of thinking seriously and carefully themselves on many subjects which, in the hurry and aimlessness of modern life, are rarely dwelt upon as they ought to be.

HELEN ADLER.

NEW YORK.

THE PHILEBUS OF PLATO. Edited with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices, by R. G Bury. Cambridge: University Press, 1897. Pp. lxxxvii., 224.

Unlike many editions of classical texts, Mr. Bury's "Philebus" meets a real want. There are few dialogues of Plato that have more interest for the philosopher than the "Philebus," and there is hardly one, with the exception of the "Laws," which presents more problems to the textual critic. It is perhaps in consequence of these linguistic difficulties that, with the exception of the edition of Poste and the two brilliant but erratic recensions of Badham, most of the work that has been done by English scholars on this most important dialogue consists of translations and essays on special points, which, however valuable, scarcely fill the place of a really comprehensive edition of the *Ur-Text* itself. Classical scholars and students of philosophy must, therefore, alike feel grateful to Mr. Bury for giving them in the present work an edition of the "Philebus" which is at once eminently scholarly and eminently philosophical. Of the purely critical side of Mr. Bury's work this is hardly the place to speak at any length, even were the present reviewer more competent to appraise it than he feels himself to be. It may, however, just be mentioned that Mr. Bury's text is avowedly "eclectic," and disagrees in two most important respects from the principles of the Cobetian school of criticism which is mainly represented, where Plato is concerned, by the editions of Schanz.

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Mr. Bury will acquiesce neither in the excessive veneration of the great "Clarkian" codex, nor in the readiness to discover "glosses" in the received text of Plato, which are so characteristic of this school. As far as the present reviewer can judge, Mr. Bury seems to be in the right on the latter point, at any rate as against the extreme gloss-hunting zeal of Badham; but it is possible to doubt whether he has quite done justice to the memory of Cobet.

The main interest of the "Philebus" is, however, not literary, but philosophical. For one reader who is concerned with Plato's later dialogues as symptoms of the transition from a purely Attic to a Hellenistic diction, there must be at least ten who come to them solely or mainly to know what were the Master's final views on the great question of ethics and metaphysics; and for such readers it would be hard to find a better guide through the difficulties of the "Philebus" than Mr. Bury's full and learned *Introduction* and *Appendices*. Not, of course, that the present writer is prepared to endorse all Mr. Bury's conclusions without qualification; in the interpretation of so many-sided a philosopher as Plato there is so much scope for legitimate difference of opinions that it will probably always be true to say *quot lectores tot sententiæ*, but Mr. Bury is always so clear and candid in his statement of the views he rejects as well as of those he accepts, that even where he does not carry our assent with him, we feel that he has provided us with the material for forming conclusions of our own.

The main purpose of the "Philebus" is, as all readers of Plato know, to show by a psychological examination of pleasure and pain that pleasurable emotion as such is not only not "the good" itself, but is the least important and characteristic ingredient in the good life. In fact, in Plato's final estimate of the relative value of various aspects of life and existence, the first place of all is given to "measure" and proportion (*μέτρον*); and, while knowledge comes third on the list, pleasure is degraded to the fifth and last place, and only allowed to appear there on condition that "violent" pleasures are excluded from consideration. With all that part of Mr. Bury's *Introduction* and *Notes* which deals with the ethical and psychological treatment of this problem of pleasure the present reviewer is glad to express himself in entire accord. Particularly striking is Appendix F, which deals with the important question how far Plato is right in admitting that a pleasure may be *false* or *deceptive*. In spite of the captious criticism to which this conception has given rise, Mr. Bury seems to be fully justified

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in defending it. A *false* pleasure, in fact,—such appears to be the upshot of the discussion,—means one which appears to be a solid gain to the psychophysical organism, while it is really nothing of the kind. The pleasure of drinking, for instance, is a *false* pleasure, because, as the man said about claret-drinking, it takes you "no forrarder." You will be just as thirsty to-morrow as though to-day's potations had never been; eating and drinking, like shaving, are things that you do to-day only to find that you have to do them over again to-morrow, and for this very reason the man who "lives to eat" is seldom permanently happy. It is perhaps a pity that, in his learned and exhaustive note on this subject, Mr. Bury has given such prominence to the antithesis between "subjective" and "objective" truth. Though, in one sense of the words, the distinction in question fairly answers to the simpler Greek distinction between τὸ φαινόμενον and τὸ ὄν, the thing as it *looks* and the thing as it really *is*, "subjective" and "objective" have so many and such vague meanings in different philosophies, that it is surely well never to use those unfortunate terms if you can possibly help it. To the metaphysically minded reader the most interesting question connected with the "Philebus" is that of the position ascribed to the "Ideas," in other words, of the bearing of the dialogue upon Plato's general metaphysical principles. As is well known, this problem forms the great puzzle of the book. In the "Philebus," which is, as practically all competent critics are now agreed, one of the very latest of the Platonic compositions, Plato actually at the outset of the discussion invites attention to this very subject; but it is, unfortunately, far from clear how the questions mooted by Socrates are met in the course of the dialogue. Everybody would admit that the answer depends upon the place assigned to the "Ideas" in the fourfold classification of "everything that is said to exist," as (*a*) the indeterminate, (*b*) limit, (*c*) the combination of both these elements, (*d*) the cause of the combination, but, unluckily, almost every writer on the "Philebus" has his own peculiar theory as to the place of the "Ideas" in this fourfold scheme. Among living authorities, Zeller advocates the claims of the "Ideas" to appear in the fourth division, while Dr. Jackson has argued ably for placing them in the third. Mr. Bury's view, which is certainly ingenious, attempts to avoid the difficulties which beset both these explanations. While he recognizes the considerations which appear fatal to Dr. Jackson's theory in its published form, he attempts to preserve its charac-

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teristic advantages in the following way. He argues that, though Plato's scheme applies immediately not to "Ideas," but to concrete things, we may suppose that the contents of the ideal world are so far parallel to those of the sensible world that they admit of being classified under the same heads, with the omission of the category of "cause," which is inapplicable to the realm of self-existent, uncaused verities.

He then agrees with Dr. Jackson that the "Ideas" are a "composite" resulting from the union of "limit" and the "indeterminate," but differs from him in denying that they belong to that particular class of "composites" contemplated in the "Philebus." Thus, Mr. Bury, like Dr. Jackson, is able to maintain the substantial accuracy of the account of Platonism given by Aristotle in "Metaphysics," A. 6, without, like Jackson, laying himself open to the retort that all the instances of "limit" given in the "Philebus" refer to mathematically quantitative determination. If Aristotle's account is to be taken as our starting-point, it must be confessed that Mr. Bury's interpretation seems the most satisfactory that has as yet been given; but when we consider first and foremost the teaching of other Platonic dialogues, I cannot but think Zeller's arrangement, in spite of all objections, the most plausible. If "causation" is to be excluded from the ideal world altogether, it seems impossible to understand what Plato means by the famous comparison of the "good" to the sun in "Republic," VI. It is there asserted (*a*) that the "good" "begat" the sun "in its own image," (*b*) that, as the sun is the cause of the existence of sensible things, so the "good" is the cause of the existence of the objects of the intelligible world. Unless, then, we are prepared to treat the "Republic" as less important for the interpretation of our dialogue than the "Metaphysics," we seem almost driven to regard the fourth class, that of "cause," as the proper place, at least, of the supreme Idea, the "Form of Good." As to the other "Ideas," the case is, no doubt, more difficult. May it not be, however, that, if we are to fit them at all into a classification which seems to have been primarily designed for sensible objects, they belong at once to the third class and to the fourth,—to the third class as themselves in some way caused by the "good," to the fourth as "causes" in relation to sensible qualities? Such a view would at any rate enable us to harmonize the "Philebus" at once with the statements of Aristotle, and with passages in such dialogues as the "Phædo," where causality is ascribed to the inferior "Ideas,"

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and we should thus escape the necessity of assuming, in face of the emphatic commendation given in the "Timæus" to the doctrines of the "Republic," that Plato had in his old age abandoned the metaphysical stand-point of his prime. To tell the truth, we have to a large extent created our own difficulties by attributing to the "Ideal" theory a significance and prominence which it by no means holds in the Platonic writings. We are constantly forgetting that Plato had not before him as he wrote an "Ideal" theory in the precise and definite shape which later philosophers, from Aristotle downward, have naturally given to it for purposes of criticism and reputation. To suppose that Plato sat down to write with such a cut-and-dried scheme in his head as an historian of philosophy with a desire for system, contrives to extract from the dialogues, is indeed a less serious mistake than to regard him as a versatile genius with no fixed convictions at all; but it is as far from the truth as it would be to suppose that Kant was constantly guided by some such formulation of his own principles as we rightly look for in a sketch of modern philosophy. Probably, if Plato had been asked into which of the four classes in the "Philebus" the "Ideas" of the "Republic" fall, he would not have been ready with an answer.

Turning to matters of less fundamental importance, there are two points on which I should like to express dissent from Mr. Bury. The first is, perhaps, rather a matter of taste than anything else. Throughout the *Introduction*, especially in the more metaphysical parts, there is noticeable a tendency to credit Plato with some of the characteristic thoughts of modern, and more particularly of Hegelian, Idealism. This tendency appears very strongly in the language used at p. lxxi. about the results of the "Sophistes" and "Timæus." If I am not mistaken, Mr. Bury would almost be prepared to attribute to Plato, as represented by those later dialogues, something like Hegel's view of the identity of opposites. If this is really his meaning, I cannot but think that the interpretation is rather read *into* Plato than *out* of him. Even in the "Sophistes" Plato sets himself to show, not that *being* itself is identical with *not-being*, but simply that what from one point of view *is not*, from another *is*, and this is surely a statement which might as well be made by Herbart as by Hegel. In the same way, it is hard not to feel that in the stress laid at pp. l.–lii. on conscious *will* as the leading characteristic of the universal νοῦς, Mr. Bury is unintentionally substituting the stand-point of

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modern for that of ancient Idealism. May we not say that it was the *intelligibility* rather than the *intelligence* of the universe that Plato was primarily concerned to maintain?

The other point on which I find it difficult to agree with Mr. Bury concerns the account of "τὸ ἄπειρον in early Greek thought," given in *Appendix C.* Mr. Bury there contends, among other things, (1) that the ἄπειρον of Anaximander was not a "boundless," but a qualitatively indeterminate body; (2) that Parmenides holds the Pythagorean physics of the second part of his poem as "not unimportant;" (3) that Melissus believed in a non-spatial and immaterial "one." On all these points the weight of evidence seems overwhelming in favor of the views of Bäumker and Burnet, which Mr. Bury rejects. As to (2), Parmenides himself more than once expressly states that there is no truth at all in the opinions in question (Parmenides "Fragments," l. 30, 115); while, in respect to (3), we have not only no evidence for the view of Tannéry and Mr. Bury, but the direct testimony of Aristotle against it ("Met." A. 5). With regard to Anaximander, the evidence of Aristotle is again, as Mr. Bury admits, against his view, and it becomes, therefore, of primary importance to consider what force there is in the reasoning by which such weighty testimony is set aside. Mr. Bury's arguments are two: (1) it is *a priori* unlikely that the notion of spatial infinity should be so early formed; (2) spatial infinity is inconsistent with the eternal rotatory motion ascribed by Anaximander to the universe. To this I answer: (1) as Homer's use of the equivalent ἀπείρων shows, the conception of a body stretching out beyond any bounds you can set to it is demonstrably present in Greek thought long before any notion of "quality." Even Anaxagoras, as Burnet well remarks, had no word to express this latter concept. (2) The view that the "eternal motion" ascribed by Anaximander to the universe was circular is mere conjecture of Teichmüller, and really rests on no ancient evidence whatsoever. Once suppose with Burnet that the "eternal motion" is Aristotle's name for the process of "sifting out" of opposites described by Anaximander, and the discrepancy of which Mr. Bury makes so much disappears altogether.

These are, however, but minor blemishes in an admirable book, and do not to any serious extent affect the solid worth of this excellent edition of a great but difficult masterpiece of philosophical analysis.

A. E. Taylor.

Owens College, Manchester.

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PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURES AND REMAINS OF RICHARD LEWIS NETTLESHIP. Edited, with a Biographical Sketch, by A. C. Bradley and G. R. Benson. Macmillan & Co.

Besides those who "knew Nettleship," and to whom these volumes have a peculiar personal interest, they will be welcomed by all genuine students of Plato as a new contribution of the highest value to the interpretation of the master. Moreover, there will be many to whom the biography and the extracts will appeal for their purely human interest, quite apart from the philosophical value of the essays and lectures which follow, readers who are mortal,—*quos et mortalia tangunt.*

The editors have done their work with a tact and delicacy which leave nothing to be desired. Professor Bradley's short biography of his friend is just what Nettleship would have liked it to be, and that is the highest praise that could be given to it. The extracts from the letters are few and short, yet they give a glimpse of the central thoughts round which Nettleship's mind turned, and we would not have had them extended by the addition of anything more personal and commonplace. In what follows I do not propose to give a critical review either of them or the accompanying essays and letters, but merely to set down while it is still fresh the impression which this account of one of the finest spirits modern Oxford has produced has made upon myself.

In discussing Plato's view of Philosophy, Nettleship distinguishes between Philosophy as a study and the spirit of Philosophy. In him the two are closely united. He is a philosopher, but what he values is the spirit of philosophy, and the best things in the book are what he says in his letters of this spirit. It is defined as the spirit of love, of friendliness to truth. Its opposite is not ignorance but "standoffishness," hesitation to commit oneself, doubt. Those who knew Nettleship only superficially were apt to think this latter a characteristic of himself. In view of this common impression, the following passage has a peculiar interest. After protesting against the prejudice that action means "moving the limbs," instead of living and being, he goes on: "To 'do something' is the way out of doubt or misery, because in doing we *are;* we assert not some abstract proposition, but a bit of *ourselves.* We are the thing which we understand; we are *not* the thing which we don't understand, and that is what makes real doubt miserable. There are two lines of Goethe which say it all:

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'Nur wo du bist sei alles, immer kindlich;
So bist du alles, bist unüberwindlich.'

I need not tell you that I feel all this so much the more because it is so hard for me to realize it; because I am so frightfully liable *not* to be 'all there,' to be anywhere but there, to fear and to want instead of to love."

The verses quoted seem to have been constantly present to his mind. They recur several times in these memoirs, and were a suitable motto for one who throughout his life sought for reality as for the vision of the Holy Grail. How few he felt the moments of attainment to be and how much he prized them when they came we may see from his fine saying: "In the greater part of life it seems as if we must consent to be wrapped round with custom; but the naked touch of reality when it does come is like flame through the veins, and each time it comes it leaves the blood running a little quicker." Perhaps it was a sense of the effect of custom and convention in dulling our sense of reality that led him to seek for it by preference in comparatively untrodden places and among simple folk. It certainly explained his preference for life and experience to books and discussions as the source of the highest light. In religion especially he felt how little the mere intellect could do for us. Speaking of dogmas, he says they seemed to "have grown up from people's losing their hold upon the *real* thing and then trying to get it again by feats of intellectual ingenuity. . . . But, after all, no books will do the thing for one. One must ask oneself what it means and cling to the rare moments when it does mean something." To feel this is religion, which he elsewhere finely defines as "the sense that you are as far as you are anything the child of the larger life."

The lectures on logic which follow are only fragments, but they were well worth publishing, if only to show what logical study might be in the hands of a teacher who is too simple and direct to base his treatment on the traditional system, too sincere to pretend that he has any system of his own to put in its place. Among many excellent things his claim for the study of method as bearing the same relation to science as theory does to practice in general is worth quoting. "To study the theory of knowledge should mean to realize gradually what the fact called knowledge means. . . . For a man to realize something of what is implied in this fact assuredly has its value or 'use.' It means that he is far better off, has more in him, is more in contact with reality; . . . to philoso-

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phize" (quoting Novalis) "is to get rid of one's phlegm, to acquire a vivid consciousness of some aspect of reality."

The Platonic discussions constitute the larger part of the Remains. Jowett's Introductions will doubtless for many years be the chief resource of many students of Plato, but there is something here which is not to be found in them. Somewhere in the "Life and Letters" Jowett lets us into the secret of his own method of working. It was, he tells us, to put down sparks of thought as they occurred to him, and trust that they would run into one. This which we might call the subjective method (and how delightfully subjective it sometimes is) is not Nettleship's. The Platonic fire is all fused together in his own mind before he sets pen to paper. Of all the recent writers of the historical school in philosophy he is the most objective. Probably there is nothing better on Plato in the language, perhaps in existence, than the "Essay on his Conception of Goodness and the Good," which occupies the last part of Volume I. And the secret of this success is that Nettleship has not only *read* himself, but lived himself into the ideas he expounds. At the touch of sympathetic criticism of this kind, the look of paradox that Platonic doctrines so often wear, drops away, and we recognize them for the vital truths which they are. What could be better, for instance, than the account of the paradox of the "sovereignty of philosophy" that is given in Volume I. p. 361, where the philosophic element is described as the "element which counterbalances the centrifugal element of self-assertion and aggression, giving rise to different forms of sympathy from the merest attraction to what is familiar up to the fellow-feeling of family, country, and humanity. It is this again which makes man susceptible to the influences of literature and art, drawing his soul out of itself to meet its better self in the uttered thoughts of other souls. It is this, lastly, which issues in the desire for truth and gives birth to knowledge; for here, too, as Plato conceives, the operative impulse is to be at one with something other than, and yet akin to, ourselves, to feel ourselves in our surroundings, to live with the life of the world." There is an old superstition immortalized in one of Dante Rossetti's most famous pictures that to meet oneself means that one is going to die. Nettleship held with Plato that a man cannot truly live unless he meets his higher self in the minds and purposes of other men and in the great and simple things of nature.

In spite of this noble philosophy of life, it must be confessed that

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there is a strain of sadness through these letters and papers. The subject of mortality seems to have had a peculiar fascination for the writer, tempting one to think that he agreed with Plato's definition of philosophy as the practice of death. But there is a deeper note than this. It is given by the editor from a letter Nettleship left behind him to be read only if he chanced to be the first to die: "Don't bother about death; it doesn't count."

Those, finally, who remember his work as a tutor in Oxford will be delighted with his biographer's remark: "It is no exaggeration to call him a master in the art of educating able men in philosophical thinking," and to be reminded of the noble sentence on the marble tablet in Balliol Chapel, "He loved great things and thought little of himself: desiring neither fame nor influence, he won the devotion of men and was a power in their lives: and seeking no disciples he taught to many the greatness of the world and of man's mind."

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

MASON UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,
BIRMINGHAM.

BAU UND LEBEN DES SOCIALEN KÖRPERS. By Dr. A. Schäffle. Second Edition. Two Volumes. Tübingen: Laupp, 1896.

It is a strange feeling with which, after an interval of many years, one returns to a book which made a great impression upon one when a youth, and which for some time directed the current of one's thought. Under no circumstances is one so likely to be unjust as when judging of a book which once left a deep impression upon one, but which does not affect one much now. When, between 1875–78, Schäffle published his four volumes of "Bau und Leben des Socialen Körpers," he was really producing the first sociological work in the German tongue that conformed with modern requirements and covered the whole field of human life. The deficiencies of such a first attempt are of little moment when compared with the eminent merits of this important scientific work. The twelfth of the twenty chief divisions of the work, that treating of the author's special study, Political Economy, is exceedingly suggestive, both on account of the acute criticism of present capitalistic society and of the "glance into the economic future." Like Rodbertus, Schäffle taught those who were too conservative for a belief in democratic communism, that it was possible to bring about most extensive social changes. The series of his publications which

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subsequently appeared showed that he had been hard at work, and justified one in expecting in his second edition a thorough revision, which would take into account the progress made by all the sciences. Unfortunately, this expectation has not been fulfilled. As a matter of fact, the second edition merely condenses the discursiveness of the first into half the compass. It offers scarcely anything of importance that is new, unless it be the placing of a restraint upon drawing analogies from biological phenomena. In accordance therewith, the former sub-title, "Encyclopædic Outline of an Anatomy, Physiology, and Psychology of Human Society" has been omitted. The figures should have been revised in detail. To be given the statistics of population (II. 10–14) from a book by Wappäus which appeared in 1859, supplemented with a few data concerning the year 1870, is decidedly unsatisfactory. This shows that through Schäffle's own fault his book is too antiquated to be of any practical use. Similar deficiencies are discoverable in the theoretical portion of the work. While he is acquainted with the older literature, the philosophic works of the last twenty years seem to be unknown to him. Even the later economic works are only partly taken into consideration, and the author is too much inclined to presuppose that the reader is acquainted with what he has published between the appearances of his first and second editions.

There is no need of entering upon a prolonged discussion of the fundamental ideas of Schäffle, which have undergone no change. Scarcely any one now doubts the justification of sociology. Recent thought no longer favors the antiquated notion that man is best comprehended when considered merely as an individual quite apart from other individuals. Schäffle also holds that man cannot be properly conceived apart from the community. (I. 1.) Research must begin, not with a Robinson Crusoe, but with the "horde-like primitive family" (I. 67). We never meet an abstract isolated personality, but always one interrelated with others. (I. 108.) "From the very first, man is a social being; his existence is bound up with the community . . . and no individual is complete by himself." (I. 235.) Such premises lead to an opinion intermediate between individualistic and socialistic ideas, with a strong leaning towards the latter. We find in Schäffle, as in Spencer, too optimistic a trust in the final peaceful union of individualistic and socialistic aims. Considering the nature of the views which he holds, this optimism is less justifiable in the former than in the latter.

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Schäffle considers that avoiding pain and seeking pleasure are the fundamental laws of the will, which receives its direction from the emotions (I. 55); wherefore, "unreflecting will is characteristic of the one-sided emotional man." The intellect checks the emotions, but we must beware of over-estimating its power. A nation, however intellectual, may perish, if its morality is shaken, says Schäffle. (I. 321.) He declared long before Benjamin Kidd that "without an exalted religious ideal the goal of the future is not attainable." (II. 477.) But his belief that religion will forever continue (II. 418 and 423), though in a more purified form, does not lead him to have recourse to metaphysical ideas. Just as there are Marxites more Marxian than Marx himself, so Schäffle seems to out-Darwin Darwin when he says that "all processes of social development are subject to the law of natural selection." (I. 306.) He actually reproaches Darwin for recognizing other fundamental factors in evolution. The difference between morality and law is defined as follows: "Morality means self-determination; law means the will of society, enforced by government." Both law and morality regulate social relationships, and are called into existence by the interests of individual and collective self-preservation (I. 336), not in order to establish perfect peace, but to regulate social conflict. (I. 337.)

Thus moral actions are explained as being the final product of an enlightened instinct of self-preservation, which best selects the means under the law of natural selection. At the same time the "true idea of duty and of virtue" is not without its influence (I. 568), except in the individualistic, utilitarian morality. The moment that an individual feels himself to be a member of society, the utility of apparently useless actions becomes apparent; and the mere utilitarian explanation that "obedience to law and the fulfilment of moral duty are but the expressions of a deluded selfishness" (I. 340) is rendered worthless. The difference between the two stand-points is not important, for that utility which also benefits the individual as well as society is the final criterion. But, according to Schäffle, "the law of the survival of the fittest is the only clear formula for a moral order of the world" (I. 566); and he holds that morality and usefulness are in the end identical. Although these assertions are open to serious doubt, if set up as part of scientific ethics, they suffice for the purpose of the author, who wishes to demonstrate that social reformatory ideas can be realized. In order to do this, he has to reckon with the egoistic

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inclinations of the men of his time. By recognizing the identity of private and public interest, the whole moral level is to be raised, without which collectivism, the author's economic ideal, would crumble to pieces. (II. 373.) The means of production must gradually be socialized, and family property must be confined to that which is needed for the fulfilment of the special requirements of the family. (I. 69.) But family property must not be identified with and mistaken for business capital. (I. 75.) It is impossible to say in how far the public mind is already in favor of such changes.

Schäffle seems to consider sociology to be much less developed than the "psychology of the senses and the emotions." Jodl's excellent "Lehrbuch der Psychologie" shows that the latter also is defective. In psychological questions the author inclines towards Lotze and Wundt.

Schäffle's complete work may be characterized as an attempt to discover a new form of society which shall steer safely between the Scylla of proletarianism and the Charybdis of state socialism. (I. 147.) He wishes all indispensable authority intrusted to an intellectual aristocracy (I. 187–188) and warns against an exaggerated democracy. For, as he truly says, even the will of all is not necessarily the best social will. He makes a strong point against the illusions of anarchism in urging the necessity of law, even in the midst of universal morality; without law "no moral power can find its true sphere, limits, and application." (I. 245.) On the other hand, an excessive extension of the sphere of law would "weaken the moral spirit," by "narrowing the free play of morality." (I. 248.) Schäffle thinks that human development is best represented, not as a continual struggle upward nor as a straight line nor even as a spiral line, but as a curve which gradually rises in spite of many depressions (I. 311), no result of development being entirely lost" (I. 314). He believes in "a law of organization according to ever higher standards, which insures future progress by eliminating the unfit." (I. 378.) "A progressive development of public collective power causes individualism to recede and socialism to advance." "Liberty and equality are not mere ethical principles," and do not, according to Schäffle, regulate the social struggle, but by means of this struggle they are brought into prominence. (I. 354.) "Law and morality pave the way for liberty and equality by releasing the highest possible amount of power of collective self-preservation." Equality is not to be understood as a mechanical equalization of unequals, but as equal liberty to exer-

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cise one's abilities. Consequently, after the abolition of private capital and the introduction of a collectivistic order, all demands will not be satisfied in the same measure (II. 200); the superior, the more competent, must obtain their rights as well as the more needy. Unequal wages for unequal tasks ought to be the solution of the new society. (I. 517.) It would cause far smaller differences of income than are to be found under the present capitalistic system. The offer of premiums as an economic stimulus would also be in place. Like other consistent evolutionists (I. 518; II. 312), Schäffle thinks that a sleepy atmosphere of lukewarm comforts is not so desirable for the future welfare of humanity as the more bracing atmosphere of constant struggle for a higher development of culture. But this sally against the Social Democrats implies a recognition of the present order of society, which by means of hereditary capital lessens the chances of the gifted poor. Schäffle demands a state of affairs in which (general education being accessible to all) personal worth shall be the only ground of rivalry, and victory be determined by superior personal value. (I. 557.) Otherwise, social selection will be imperfect and our civilization tainted with barbarism. Schäffle does not fall into the error of certain liberal theorists, who consider the brutal struggle for existence in Nature as an example of that which holds good for man. An artificially perfected nature is what man is recommended to imitate. (I. 571.) Such a reform of the nation's economy as would secure with honor, dignity, and self-respect a moderate increase of one's income would be of inestimable value. (I. 433). Not only the material want of the lower classes, but the intellectual and moral poverty of all sections of society is involved in the present economic order and compels its abolition.

Schäffle does not make the mistake of saying that the abolition of capital means the dissolution of the family. He declares that in the present order of society true marriage and true family life are almost impossible. The reviewer agrees with him that "universal monogamy, not a return to hetairism, is the goal of the future." (II. 87.) But it should be added that recent researches, especially those of Earnest Grosse and Heinrich Cunow, have tended to undermine the opinion, based chiefly upon the authority of Lubbock and Morgan, that a lawless promiscuousness prevailed in the first stages of social development. We also agree with Schäffle that monogamy, which imposes the duty of providing for the children upon the parents, "affords a suf-

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ficient stimulation and limitation of the procreative impulse." It conduces to a rational control of population. The danger of over-population that attends an unrestricted fecundity is recognized by the author (I. 405), but the means of prevention which he suggests are inadequate. (I. 417–421.) This is the most difficult practical problem which awaits the future.

In spite of his dislike for a blind democracy, Schäffle is opposed to limiting the equality of citizens by an electoral property qualification, which Washington is said to have well characterized as follows: "If I have a donkey, I vote; if the donkey dies, I don't vote; in reality, the donkey votes and not I."

"True democracy," says Schäffle, "places the greatest possible variety of power at the disposal of the State." (II. 498.) He will be opposed by strenuous Democrats when he says that, apart from general education and an approximate equality of income, what pure democracy needs is a classification of the professions. While the present order of society exists, universal equal suffrage is relatively best; but the present electoral system is, nevertheless, bad. (II. 499.) Schäffle therefore thinks that society should be altered from top to bottom. He wishes to see capitalism abolished and replaced by collectivism (described II. 300–342), which while not doing away with competition entirely, will yet restrict it. The present system, which is demoralized more and more by the constant grasping for immediate profits, is harmful economically in that private profits are sought for at the expense of the general interests of the public. (II. 290.) But the æsthetic as well as the economic and moral advantages of a just order of society are emphasized. "Art and literature, heretofore enjoyed only by the privileged classes and tainted with their corruption, would be spread among the whole people." (II. 91.) The material conditions of society, which are necessary to promote the liberal arts, are mentioned here and elsewhere. (II. 386–390.) It is maintained that the arts are abused by the ruling classes (II. 389), and that only a democratic form of society can restore them to their full dignity. Schäffle shows his confidence in the future of democracy by his opinion of the conditions prevailing in the United States. (II. 648.) In this he differs from Ludwig Stein, whose opinions were recently discussed in this JOURNAL, with whom he otherwise has much in common. The final outcome of human struggle, according to Schäffle, is a mere matter of conjecture. As it is not a scientific question, its answer can only be guessed. Schäffle's work contributes many

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fruitful ideas in regard to the present social struggles. The new revised edition commands respect as the product of a scientific mind that is free from the entanglements of partisanships.

EMIL REICH.

UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA.

MODERN RATIONALISM: Being a Sketch of the Progress of the Rationalistic Spirit in the Nineteenth Century. By Joseph McCabe. London: Watts and Co., 1897. Pp. 163.

The rationalistic spirit, according to Mr. McCabe, is the outcome of the principle that "*reason* is the supreme criterion of all truth, whether in secular or religious, natural or supernatural spheres." It has given rise to various systems of thought at different times, which have all received the name of "Rationalism," since they all bore the same relation to the most generally accepted theories of the time; but "*modern* Rationalism is a system which rejects both natural and supernatural theology, and is antagonistic to the orthodox churches on every point."

Chapter I., pointing out the development of the rationalizing tendency within the church, contains an account of the rise of the Broad Church party, and of the modifications allowed in the interpretations put upon some of the orthodox doctrines. Passing on to attacks from without, the author recognizes in Biblical criticism a weapon wherewith Rationalism can attack church doctrine from a new and independent position; for he considers that not only is it seen to be in many points unacceptable from its intrinsic unreasonableness even to the mind of the theologian, but the sacred literature from which it is believed to have arisen is proved to be historically, and (in the case of the Old Testament) ethically, false: the alleged authorship of many of the books of both the Old and the New Testament is spurious; hence follows the collapse of their claim to be regarded as specially inspired. The destructive work of the "higher critics" upon the Christian doctrines themselves and the authority on which they are based is supplemented by theories arising from the sciences of comparative religion and comparative mythology as to the natural growth of these doctrines. They are found to have so many points in common with the beliefs and rituals of other religions and mythologies that it is no long step to the assumption of a common origin.

So far, Mr. McCabe has been dealing with the conflict between ideas tested by reason and beliefs accepted upon the authority of

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tradition; in the rest of the book (Chaps. IV., V., VI.) he undertakes to show that the rationalist comes out victorious from contending with the philosopher. He here identifies the rationalistic with the empirical spirit, and any philosophy that has an idealistic tendency (Hegel's excepted) he regards as an attempt to save the vital points of religion by having recourse to reason; while in so far as it abandons this (illegitimate) object it apparently results in nothing of any permanent value. The only result which can be caught hold of from among all the systems whose "rise, conflict, and decay" (p. 118) have been traced on the dozen preceding pages in a series of cursory glances, is "the theory of a division of the possible objects of perception into noumena and phenomena, and the complementary doctrine of the phenomenal character of all our perceptions;" and herein is said to lie the condemnation of all speculative philosophy, for "the tendency of modern science is to suppress the duality which the metaphysicians have created" (p. 119). When we find, however, that this duality is treated by the author as one and the same with that of substance and accidents, this being disproved by the discovery that (*e.g.*) sounds and colors are only modes of the sonorous colored body, and not separate entities, we cannot feel satisfied with this abrupt dismissal of metaphysics by physics. In a further chapter on religion and science, the general outcome of the latter is contrasted with the view of the universe afforded by the former; it is found that reason compels us to accept the mechanical theory, and that this means the suppression of the permanent elements of religion. The speculative attempts to support theism having failed, anti-rationalists finally resort to ethics; the fear of losing morality is regarded as a reason for propping up the belief in the supernatural. As rationalism, however, is able to construct a system of ethics (viz., utilitarianism) on a purely humanitarian basis, theism loses its last chance; and the rationalist may claim to be something more than a destroyer, since he "teaches elevated social and ethical ideals to humanity."

The book is summary in style, which is perhaps to be expected in what is professedly a "sketch;" but it is also overcrowded with references to the work of others, and is at the same time dogmatic: so many opinions are quoted, so many systems of thought are traversed in the space of six short chapters, that the reader must be excused for doubting whether justice has been done in all cases; and it is dogmatic in seeking to impress the reader with the supremacy of materialism by means of long lists of its partisans,

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rather than by an examination of their arguments. We are given this choice: rely on authority, and believe in orthodox Christianity, or rely on reason, and accept scientific materialism. But, surely, we should be given some ground for identifying the rationalistic spirit, which is defined as that which relies on reason alone in the ascertainment of truth, with the scientific spirit (in the narrower sense). The result of this identification is that no place is left for idealism, which does not rest on the authority of tradition. It is hastily brushed aside as unscientific, though *why* it should be rejected by those who wish to reach truth by reasoning is left unexplained: for the unsupported reiteration of the statement that the struggles of philosophic systems have left no abiding result cannot be called argument. The chapter on rationalism and philosophy is, in fact, the least satisfactory of the book: it is, *e.g.*, impossible to accept this account of Hegel on p. 117: "The foundation principle in his system is the identity of the idea of being and the idea of nothing. Both are forms of the combining idea of becoming, and every thought is a poise between two contradictories. Thus the laws of thought are also the laws of being. Logic is metaphysics. . . ." Certainly the accounts of most philosophic systems are more intelligible than this; but nowhere is idealism brought to a definite issue with materialism, so that we might judge of the latter's claim to supersede the former: the antithesis emphasized is only that between science and revealed religion. For this reason, the open-minded reader will probably gain no convictions, nor will the idealist be shaken; though the previously convinced "rationalist" may feel a thrill of satisfaction on reading the presentment of his views in so triumphant a light. There is, at any rate, no fear of losing hold of the main point among the intricacies of argument, for the book is clearly written.

M. FLETCHER.

GIRTON COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS. By Alexander V. G. Allen, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Episcopal School in Cambridge. New York, 1897. Pp. xxii, 577.

A work on Christian institutions from so well-known a writer as Dr. Allen demands notice in this JOURNAL, both because it touches at many points the history of practical ethics, and because religious institutions are an integral part of the social structure in which ethical life finds its expression. The present work first took shape

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in a series of Lowell Lectures which the author delivered some five years ago. Possibly the reader will feel that in some places the lecture-style is too evident in the book as it is completed. The field, so we read in the preface, is a very large one, and the author feels justified in making such a selection of topics as will best illustrate his conception of the growth of Christianity. His special aim, we are told further, is to present different institutions "with reference to their mutual relationships." Of the three divisions of the work, the discussion of the organization of the church occupies half the volume, while the remainder is nearly equally divided between the treatment of the development of doctrine and that of Christian worship.

Under the heading of church organization, the author treats of the rise of the episcopate and of the papacy. The reader will be impressed by the clearness and candor with which the earlier history of these institutions is traced through the documents of the first Christian centuries. The discussions of Lightfoot and of Hatch are corrected in many details. Dr. Allen's conclusion is that the local church in the Apostolic age had three classes of officers,—presbyters, deacons, and bishops (usually the latter from the board of presbyters). "These titles, bishop and presbyter, stood from the first for distinct functions, and while they may seem to be used interchangeably, the distinction always existed beneath the apparent identity. . . . Moral instruction and guidance of the young were the function of the presbyter; superintendence of the worship, the care of the funds, and the responsibility for the poor were the sphere of the bishop, in which he was assisted by the deacons" (pp. 85–86). No less interesting is the account of the conflict of monasticism with the episcopate (Chapter IX.), and of the rise of the papacy (Chapter XI.).

The second division, on the Catholic creeds and the development of doctrine, is on a smaller scale, since the same topic is treated by Dr. Fisher in a separate volume of this series. At many points Dr. Allen finds some contact between the development of the creeds and that of other Christian institutions; one does not, however, find a close unity between this section and those which precede and follow it.

The third division, on Christian worship, treats of a more difficult as well as a more interesting topic. Chapter I., entitled Baptism, after a few words on the rite of baptism, discusses the attitude of the church towards ethical questions. That so little attention should be

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paid to baptism itself is strange indeed. The discussion of the catechumenate, of the mediæval system of discipline with its indulgences and its purgatory, and of the ethical influence of the doctrine of justification by faith, has very much to interest the ethical student. Chapter II. treats of principles that effected the cultus. Instead of tracing to the religious environment of the early church the influences by which cultus was transformed in the first four centuries, Dr. Allen holds that the changes in Christianity were the product of the same forces which were at work on the remnants of heathenism in the Græco-Roman world; and he holds further that these forces were primarily philosophical. Beginning with Plato the old nature religion had been undermined and man had been set over against nature as the lord of nature. The influence of this world-wide movement is found in Gnosticism and in Manicheism. But there was a philosophical reaction from this position, which finally took shape in Neoplatonism. This reaction is responsible for the revival of nature-worships, and for a corresponding change in Christian ritual. Such generalizations are very attractive to many readers, but I cannot think that the history of seven centuries can be satisfactorily stated in this brief formula. And granted that the formula is correct, much more may be done to make clear the manner of its application. This is well illustrated in the case of the concluding chapter. The different stages in the development of the Lord's Supper are clearly described so as to bring out its characteristic forms in successive periods as well as in different localities. Still, the reader of Hatch and of Anrichs will feel that much more might be said about the concrete influences at work in the modification of this ritual in the first four centuries.

ARTHUR FAIRBANKS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS. A New English Translation, with Explanatory Notes and Pictorial Illustrations. Prepared by Eminent Biblical Scholars of Europe and America, and Edited with the assistance of Horace Howard Furness. By Paul Haupt, Professor in Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1898. Part VII., JUDGES, by G. F. Moore, D.D., Professor in Andover Theological Seminary, pp. 99; Part X., ISAIAH, by T. K. Cheyne, M.A., D.D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture at Oxford, etc., pp. 215. Part XIV., PSALMS, by J. Wellhausen,

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D.D., Professor in the University of Göttingen. Pp. 237, large 8vo, boards.

Some time ago nine parts of the "Polychrome Bible" appeared in Hebrew: now, at last, three parts have appeared in English. We shall speak only of the latter here.

The aim of the "Polychrome Bible," which seems intended to include only the Old Testament, is to bring before the general public, in an attractive and easily intelligible form, the results of the so-called "higher criticism," and to lend to these results the authority of the highest and most varied scholarship. With this view, color has been freely applied to distinguish the different documents used in the compilation of the different books, and each book has been assigned to a different well-known scholar, without regard to denomination; Catholics alone, seemingly, taking no part. "The Polychrome Bible is translated into the language of to-day, and the chief aim has been to make its meaning clear and intelligible." "The text is accompanied by pictorial illustrations from Assyrian and Egyptian monuments, photographs of Biblical sites, etc., together with explanatory notes and historical and critical introductions to the several books. These comments represent the ripest fruits of research."

Of the three parts before us "Isaiah" is the best; "Judges" comes next, and "Psalms" last. Of the first, it would hardly be possible to speak too highly. Not only are the different documents carefully distinguished on reasonable principles, but the translation is admirable, and the notes just what they should be, brief, pointed, illuminating. Though the result takes from Isaiah much that has long falsely passed under his name, and leaves him with a mere fragmentary remnant, yet that remnant is so strong, simple, and suited to its ends that we learn to think much more of him as a prophet and as a patriot than we did before. What is taken from him is assigned to different authors and epochs, thus giving and receiving new light. The total book extends over a period of four hundred and sixty-five years,—from 740 to 275 B.C., and is the work of many hands. Even the "Second Isaiah" is very composite.

What has been said in praise of "Isaiah" may almost be repeated with regard to "Judges," although the effect of this is hardly so stimulating; but "Psalms" is something of a disappointment. The translation, made by Dr. Furness, from Wellhausen's German, is heavy and wooden, and the notes, though eked out by Dr.

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Haupt, are meagre and unsatisfactory. What shall we say to a piece of translation like this?

> "He laughs whose throne is in heaven,
> At them the Lord scoffs,
> Until in his wrath he says to them,
> In his fury affrighting them:—
> 'Is it not I who my King have established
> On Zion, holy mountain of mine?'"

In the same (second) psalm, v. 12, we read, "Adopt a modest demeanor," for the usual "kiss the son," although in the Hebrew the corresponding words are omitted as corrupt and unintelligible. We are not told what the new rendering stands for. The translation of Psalm CX. is a distinct failure, and could easily be improved. One cannot but regret that this book was not assigned to Dr. Cheyne, whose "Psalms" and "Origin of the Psalter" show him to be eminently fitted to deal with it.

But this is not the place for minute criticism. Let us ask what the ethical importance of the "Polychrome Bible" is? It consists in the fact that the new translation will go a long way to present the Bible in its true light, to deprive it of all supernatural authority and prophetic glamour, and to assign it to its proper place among the intelligible agencies of history. And this is no small advantage; for there is hardly any greater obstacle to the cause of high thinking and noble human practice at the present day than the belief in supernatural authority, which the old view of the Bible maintains and fosters. Break this up, leaving reason, love, and human will to do their work untrammelled, and the salvation of mankind will advance with rapid steps. But, alas! how long will it be before the inert Christian world, sunk in dull orthodox lethargy, will awake to the meaning, or even the existence, of the "Polychrome Bible"! For many years yet, we may expect a "conspiracy of silence" to keep its truths locked up from those who most need them. In thousands of pulpits the old views of the Bible will long be unctuously proclaimed, with slurs at those men whose scholarship dares to doubt that it is divinely inspired down to the last Massoretic iota. But, after all, the truth is out, and the death of supernaturalism and the triumph of science are only questions of time.

The exterior of the volumes before us is not attractive, and many of the illustrations seem useless and out of place. All the modern landscapes might have been omitted with advantage.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

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THOMAS AND MATTHEW ARNOLD, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON ENGLISH EDUCATION. By Sir Joshua Fitch, M.A., LL.D. London: Heineman, 1897.

ARNOLD OF RUGBY: HIS SCHOOL LIFE AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO EDUCATION. Edited by J. J. Findlay, M.A. Cambridge University Press, 1897.

More than ordinary interest must attach to a volume from a man so eminently qualified by training, experience, and insight as is Sir Joshua Fitch, to assign its legitimate sphere of influence to the "radiant vigor," and the strength, "zealous, beneficent, firm," of Thomas Arnold. And we have every right to expect an appreciative, weighty, and impartial criticism from the friend and colleague of "Matthew, a child of light, the son after the flesh of Thomas of Gath, that doughty Philistine." Sir Joshua has more than fulfilled these expectations in the charming essays forming the first of the above volumes. Every teacher or layman who is interested in the wider field of educational politics should read this book in which is set forth so simply, so clearly, and in such beautiful English, the life-work, in its relation to the educational requirements of the present day, of the father and son who have been so finely compared to a modern Savonarola and Erasmus. But who corrected the author's proofs? Did Mirabeau say, "gouverner c'est regner, tout se reduit la"? Again, "Causeries de Lundi" (pp. 243, 244), "abiturientem examen" (p. 218), "reçevoir" (p. 216), "litterateur" (p. 157), are pretty bad, while ἐκ παρέργου (p. 70) is intolerable. Finally, although Arnold's "name will stand out conspicuously with Tennyson and Browning," some daring spirit has deemed it necessary to make many an alteration in the punctuation of the quotations from Arnold's poems. These unpardonable blotches mar an entirely admirable picture of two noble educational reformers.

Mr. Findlay's latest contribution to pedagogic literature consists of selections from Stanley's "Life," Arnold's sermons and essays on educational topics, a useful bibliography, and last, but by no means least, an *Analytical* Index of Arnold's principles according to the Herbartian "division of topics in educational science."

Dr. Percival contributes an excellent Introduction, exhibiting Arnold as "a prophet among schoolmasters." It is curious that Arnold, who had such a thorough grasp of the ethical significance of education, should have left behind him no evidence of any systematic treatment of the theory of the subject.

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Mr. Findlay's work has been well done, and will no doubt find a wide and appreciative audience.

W. J. GREENSTREET.

MARLING SCHOOL, STROUD.

MY QUEST FOR GOD. By John Trevor. London: "Labor Prophet" Office, 1897.

Mr. Trevor has given us what is practically a *journal intime* of the development in his religious opinions, a record of many changes. Born and brought up in an atmosphere of uncompromising Calvinism, he went through the terrors of hell and the joys of conversion natural to the school; gradually he felt the influence of broader conceptions, views that made room for the interests of this world, instead of leaving "on the one hand the scheme of salvation, on the other all the facts and activities of life;" then followed, with curious abruptness, the loss of his belief in the literal inspiration of the Bible and the consequent downfall of his orthodox conviction, an intervening period of sceptical gloom, and finally a renewed and strengthened confidence in God, intimately though obscurely connected with an active belief in the "Labor Movement." The book, it is evident, springs from a genuine spiritual experience, and is impressive and valuable as such, but one could wish often for greater definiteness of thought. It may be profoundly true that "the goal of evolution is the awakening of the consciousness of God in us," and significant that Mr. Trevor's experiences have led him to this conclusion; but he gives no reason for the faith that is in him; where we look for argument we find only the statement that "these things are personal," "above rule and dogma," and the like. It is not clear what place Mr. Trevor would assign to the intellect in the moral and religious life; sometimes he seems to exclude it altogether, without realizing what this exclusion means. Does he really think, for example, that a man can rest in the position that these two commands of the moral law, "Thou shalt tell no lie," and "Thou shalt do no unkind deed," can never be harmonized on earth?

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

A STUDY OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES. By Professor James Seth, M.A. Third edition, revised and enlarged. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1898.

[Considerably improved. The chapter on Method is rewritten, and the view that Ethics should be treated as a Formative Science is definitely adopted. The place of pleasure is more fully discussed than in previous editions. Fairly complete references to the literature of the subject are given at the end of each chapter, and a useful Index has been added. The metaphysical discussions are still retained at the end, but somewhat apologetically. There can be little doubt that in its new form it is a much more satisfactory text-book for students than it was before; but it may be doubted whether it would not be rendered still more useful by the omission of the more purely metaphysical parts, which are puzzling to the beginner and probably unsatisfying to the more advanced student.]

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE MORAL INSTINCT. In two volumes. By Alexander Sutherland, M.A. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

STUDIES OF GOOD AND EVIL; A Series of Essays upon Problems of Philosophy and of Life. By Josiah Royce. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1898.

THE ETHICS OF HOOBES, as contained in Selections from his Works. With an Introduction by E. Henshey Sneath. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1898.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION. By Benjamin Kidd. Nineteenth thousand. With Appendix, containing a Reply to Criticisms. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1898. [Besides the Reply to Criticisms, which is in the main a reproduction of an article in the *Nineteenth Century*, the new edition of this popular work contains a serviceable Index. The "Reply to Criticisms" scarcely seems to be what it is called. It is rather a kind of *résumé* of the point of view.]

THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D., Bishop of Cloyne. Edited by George Sampson. With a Biographical Introduction by Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.A. Vol. II. London: George Bell & Sons, 1898. [Contains Essays in the "Guardian;" Concerning Motion; Essay towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain; Proposal for Supplying Churches in Foreign Plantations; Verses; a Sermon; Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher; Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained.]

A HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. By T. J. Lawrence, M.A., LL.D. Fourth edition. London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1898. [An interesting text-book on the subject, containing Part I., Introductory; Part II., The Law of Peace; Part III., The Law of War; Part IV., The Law of Neutrality.]

A CONCISE HISTORY OF RELIGION. By F. J. Gould. Vol. I., comprising Sketches of the Chief Religions of the World, with the exception of Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. Vol. II., containing a History of Judaism and Jewish Sacred Literature, with a chapter on the Religious Environment of Early Christianity. Vol. III., containing a History of Christian Origins

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and of Jewish and Christian Literature to the end of the Second Century. London: Watts & Co., 1893, 1895, 1897.

GUESSES AT THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE, and Other Essays on Kindred Subjects. By Goldwin Smith, D.C.L. New York and London: Macmillan, 1898.

ANARCHISM: a Criticism and History of the Anarchist Theory. By E. V. Zenker. Translated from the German. London: Methuen & Co., 1898.

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS TO HIMSELF: an English translation, with Introductory Study on Stoicism and the Last of the Stoics. By Gerald H. Rendall, M.A., Litt. D. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

POLITICAL CRIME. By Louis Proal. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1898.

EVOLUTIONAL ETHICS AND ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY. By G. P. Evans. London: William Heinemann, 1898.

A THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. By Sylvan Drey. London: Williams & Norgate, 1898. [A pamphlet, giving a brief summary of Herbert Spencer's point of view in Ethics.]

LA DOTTRINA DELLA COSCIANZA MORALE NELLO SPENCER. (Opera Premiata dalla R. Academia dei Lincei.) Dott. Giuseppe Zuccante, Milano. Lonigo: Prem. Tipographia Gio. Gaspari, 1896.

CONDOTTA BUONA E CONDOTTA CATTIVA SECONDO LO SPENCER. Dott. Giuseppe Zuccante. Roma: Tipographia di Giovanni Balbi, 1896.

L'ASPETTO BIOLOGICO DELLA CONDOTTA SECONDO LO SPENCER. Dr. Giuseppe Zuccante. Roma: Tipographia di Giovanni Balbi, 1896.

THE BUILDING OF THE INTELLECT. A Contribution towards Scientific Method in Education. By Douglas M. Gane. London: Ellicot Stock, 1897.

EVEN AS YOU AND I. By Bolton Hall. London and New York: F. Tennyson Neely.

THE ETHICAL WORLD. Edited by Stanton Coit. London, weekly. [The most striking feature of this paper, as it goes on from week to week, is the series of articles by Mr. F. J. Gould that appear under the heading "The Children's Page." They consist of lessons in practical morals, mostly in illustration of the various virtues. It is to be hoped that they will afterwards be reproduced in the form of a book. Such a book could hardly fail to be of great value to those engaged in the teaching of morals. The paper also contains discussions of practical questions and notes on current topics. The question, for instance, as to the responsibility of bringing sentient beings into existence has recently been discussed in connection with the arguments of Mr. H. S. Salt in support of vegetarianism, the criticisms of these by Mr. Leslie Stephen and Professor D. G. Ritchie, and the reply of Mr. Salt. It seems to be clearly shown that vegetarianism can hardly be defended from the point of view of the animals; on the assumption, at least, that for the animals good may be considered to be simply pleasure, and evil simply pain, and that a moderate degree of either may be held to counterbalance the other.]

THE ECONOMIC REVIEW. April, 1898. London: Rivington's. [Contains, among other things, articles on "The New Trades' Combination Movement," by E. J. Smith, and on "The State in Relation to Education," by John C. Medd, and a very interesting discussion on "Individualism and Socialism," by F. W. Hirst and Sidney Ball.]

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